Developing lobbying process as a strategic capability: a study of European flag carrier airlines in contrasting policy contexts by Rajwani , Tazeeb & Rajwani , Tazeeb
Tanaka Business School 
Imperial College London 
University of London 
"Developing lobbying process as a strategic 
capability: a study of European flag carrier 
airlines in contrasting policy contexts" 
By 
Tazeeb Rajwani, BSc MA 
July 2007 
A thesis presented in part consideration for the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Diploma of 
Imperial College London 
Supervisor: Dr Thomas C Lawton 
"Veni, vidi, vici' 
I declare that the thesis presented by me in June 
2007for examination for the PhD degree is my own 
work 
Tazeeb Rajwani, June 2007 
11 
There has been an increased interest in cross fertihzing studies between strategic 
management and political science. Studies have examined the effectiveness of 
corporate political lobbying at both an organisational and industry level. What is 
lacking in these works is a systematic and comprehensive perspective on 
corporate lobbying development from within the firm. In this thesis we deploy a 
dynamic resource-based perspective to unbundle the development of lobbying 
processes as a strategic capability. We examine two distinct policy contexts; 
Exogenous policy context (where the firm engages with political decisions and 
policies in an unexpected way) and Endogenous policy context (where the firm 
engages with political decisions and policies in an expected way). 
Using a qualitative methodology, this thesis describes the findings from five case 
studies of European long haul airlines. It focuses on the nature of lobbying 
capability development, by focusing on the micro foundations and the 
interactions between the micro lobbying components. Furthermore, it also 
considers whether the different policy environments create distinct lobbying 
capability development paths. 
The findings from the case studies illustrate using several inductive frameworks, 
how cognitive blueprints play a vital role in defining the level of management 
attention to modify human capital resources, network capital resources, 
organizational capital resources and lobbying competencies to develop divergent 
corporate lobbying capabilities in contrasting policy contexts. Our frameworks 
and propositions shed light on the ways in which path dependence and path 
creation are enacted over time in different European flag carrier airlines. 
In conclusion the thesis demonstrates that different organizations- state owned vs 
private owned- follow different patterns in lobbying capability development in 
different policy contexts. This is down to the senior management's cognitive 
blueprints, which play a vital role in undedying interpretive schema by heuristics 
from previous experiences, current learning and forevision. We show that while 
these sources of lobbying capability development are somewhat interlinked, there 
are hazards in assuming they are not connected to lobbying capability 
development. Ultimately, this thesis and its findings have some impact for 
practice. 
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•'Lobbying Capability" 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROLOGUE 
The creation and preservation of competitive advantage is a core challenge for all 
strategy leaders. Government action affects the competitive advantage of firais and 
industries, and can therefore increase or decrease profitability.' As a discipline, 
strategic management has offered a variety of theoretical routes to meet this 
challenge (Segal-Horn 2004). Dynamic capability, a conceptual approach embedded 
in a resource-based perspective, has emerged as a primary explanatory framework of 
competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; 
Rosenbloom 2000; Zollo and Winter 2002; Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Ethiraj et al. 
2005; Siraion et al. 2007). It explicitly focuses on conditions of market environment 
change (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) and more recently non-market environment 
change (Holbum and Bergh 2002; McWlliams et al. 2002; Frynas et al. 2006). 
Originally, Teece et al. (1997, p.510) defined dynamic capabilities as the ability of 
' While it is often difficult to isolate the profitability impacts on firms and industries of government 
policies, the finance literature has examined the impact of proposed public policies on firm and 
industry share prices in a wide number of contexts (MacAvoy 1992; Ries 1993; Thompson 1993). 
The event studies show that stock market participants believe that government actions can have major 
impacts on profits. 
"Lobbying Capability" 
firms to integrate, build and reconfigure resources to sustain competitive advantage 
in rapidly changing envirormients? However, the dynamic capabilities perspective 
encountered criticism for being theoretically ambiguous (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) addressed the criticisms, by proposing that 
dynamic capabilities consist of specific identifiable strategic and organisational 
processes i.e. product development, alliances and strategic decision-making that 
create value for firms within dynamic markets by manipulating resources into new 
value-creating strategies. More importantly, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1107) 
build on Teece et al. (1997) to describe dynamic capabilities as "the firm's processes 
or routines that are used - specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain 
and release resources - to match and even create market change". 
However, since Eisenhardt and Martin's (2000) seminal work, empirical research on 
dynamic capabilities has become more narrowly focussed, with some management 
authors researching identifiable capabilities by looking at specific processes and 
routines, such as pricing process as a capability (Dutta et al. 2003) and marketing 
capabilities (Morgan et al. 2003). These authors believe that there is no such thing as 
an all-purpose dynamic capability that will give a firm competitive advantage in all 
contexts (Ethiraj et al. 2005). Moreover, this author believes that looking at the 
micro levels of specific capabilities is fundamental to explicating competitive 
advantage. 
On the other hand, whilst earlier accounts of the resource-based view (RBV) focused 
on how firms can create advantages using resources and capabilities in market 
enviromnent (Wemerfelt 1984, 1995; Barney 1991; Helfat and Peteraf 2003), more 
recently it has been suggested that these ideas can be cross fertilised into a non-
market environment, particularly to the corporate political context (Baysinger and 
^ Most parts of the thesis have been presented and reviewed by people at the European Academy of 
Management Conference, Oslo, 2006; Irish Academy of Management, Cork, 2006; European 
Doctoral Research Conference, London, 2005, 2006; European International Business Academy, 
Switzerland, 2006; Academy of International Business, London, 2007 (to be presented at Academy of 
Management, Philadelphia, 2007 and Strategic Management Society Conference, 2007) and Surrey 
University, 2005. 
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Woodman 1982; Baysinger 1984; McWlliams et al. 2002; Holbum 2001; Hillman et 
al. 2004; Frynas et al. 2006)/ However, the criticism of some of these studies from 
the political focal lens is that they are not paying attention to the managerial 
coordinative processes by which finns assemble and leverage knowledge assets 
(Baysinger and Woodman 1982; Hillman et al. 2004). Our study will aim to meet 
these shortfalls in providing micro level empirical evidence on the development of 
corporate lobbying processes that will be contextualised in two contrasting airline 
policy environments. 
Recognition of both endogeneity and exogeneity in public policy, governments and 
corporate lobbying activity has been the catalyst for an explosion of academic 
interest in aspects of political (lobbying) strategies (Vining et al. 2005). Despite the 
acknowledged importance of governments and politics to organisations like airlines 
(Brown 1987; Pedler and Van Schendelen 1994), the state of scholarly knowledge 
about non-market lobbying strategies remains scant when compared with research 
on strategies for the economic marketplace (Baron 1995). In the field of competitive 
strategy, Hambrick and Frederickson (2001, p50) argue "we now have...a host of 
helpful, often powerful, analytic tools. Missing, however, has been any guidance as 
to what the product of these tools should be-or what actually constitutes a strategy". 
Grosse and Behrman (1992) argue that theories that fail to incorporate the political 
activities of organisations take the 'national' out of 'international' and leave the 
analysis 'as a simple extension of firm and market theories' (p 97). While 
international business literature has focused on MNE-host government negotiations 
regarding initial entry into a country (Dunning, 1992), little research is directed 
towards the antecedents of corporate lobbying development. Therefore, the better the 
knowledge gained regarding the way organisations formulate their ongoing lobbying 
processes and routines, the more enhanced will be our understanding of the 
^ Governments represent major sources of uncertainty for firms because they often control critical 
resources and opportunities that shape firms' industry and competitive environments (Jacobson et al. 
1993; Baron, 1995). As a result, many firms engage in 'political strategies', or proactive actions to 
affect the public policy environment in the firm's favour (Baysinger, 1984). 
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organisations successes and failures (Jacobson et al. 1993; Boddewyn and Brewer, 
1994). 
1 . 2 OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK AND THEORY-SETTING THE SCENCE 
The airline industry is one of the most dynamic industries of this century. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this industry will be a pivotal component of the thesis, 
it has become obvious to all airline leaders that their business environment has 
become a more unpredictable and complex place in which to trade and invest. The 
unexpected event of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and expected policy changes designed 
to liberalise the airline industry have highlighted the changing business environment 
for airlines (Harrington et al. 2005; Doganis 2005). In light of these developments, a 
fundamental question springs to mind in the field of strategic management; how do 
firms create and sustain a competitive advantage? The sources of a firm's 
competitive advantage have been viewed traditionally through the lens of industrial 
economics (Porter 1980). However, more recently other researchers have questioned 
this focus on industry structure and have decided to instead focus internally on 
firnis' resources and capabilities in order to understand the source of competitive 
advantage, as it is possibly the most important issue in strategy (Penrose 1959; 
Wenerfelt 1984; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; Helfat and 
Peteraf 2003). The extant literature suggests that superior performance can come 
from resource uniqueness (e.g. Barney 1991), from reconfiguration, leveraging and 
integration of existing resources (e.g. Eisenhardt and Martin 2000), and from the 
ability to respond appropriately to the surrounding environment (e.g. Teece et al. 
1997; Mintzberg 1987). Indeed recent studies have also shown firm resources and 
capabilities are often context-specific (Ethiraj et al. 2005 p26). Thus we will aim to 
answer the recent call from Ethiraj et al. (2005, p26), ''that fruitful research in 
strategic management area might emanate from enjoying an in-depth study of 
resources and capabilities in a specific context". 
Conversely, there has also been increasing academic interest in the non-market 
environment context, particularly, in the intersection of politics and business 
-4-
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management of firms or what some scholars call "corporate political activity" 
(Kobrin 1978; Epstein 1980; Mahon 1983; Baysinger 1984; Keim and Zeithaml 
1986; Boddewyn 1988; Baron 1995; Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman, Zarkhoodi and 
Bierman 1999; Rchbein and Schuler 1999), moreover specifically in our study, 
lobbying activity (Coen 1998; De Figueiredo and Tiller 2001; De Figueiredo and De 
Figueiredo 2002). Some of these studies and others have looked at ways in which 
firms create political advantages using corporate political strategies (Yoffie 1985; 
1988; Hillman et al. 2004) and ways in which firms can control political uncertainty 
in foreign direct investments (Holbum 2001; Delios and Henisz 2000; Henisz and 
Zelner 2003). However, it seems that scholars have not sought to understand the 
process issues from within the firm in conjunction with "uncertain and certain" 
contexts. Moreover, these scholars fail to address "why and how" organisations 
develop their lobbying capabilities to help create these advantages. Subsequently, 
"how" firms use capabilities, to organize, reconfigure, leverage, integrate and deploy 
political resources, in their given contexts. Thus the challenge is to begin learning 
how to cope with levels of uncertainty or ambiguity in the capability development 
process. 
1.3 RESEARCH RATIONALE 
Government policy impacts upon most industries in democratic nations. Industries 
like oil, gas, defence, tobacco, telecoms, banks, manufacturing, pharmaceutical, 
airlines and so forth, all have a government affairs function to lobby and manage this 
complex non-market policy domain. In this thesis, the airline industry is selected as 
a "natural laboratory" in which the research questions will be investigated. Bearing 
in mind that there are different types of airlines like low cost,"^ charter,^ flag carrier 
'' A low-cost carrier or low cost airline (also known as a no-frills or discount carrier / airline) is an 
airiine that offers generally low fares in exchange for eliminating many traditional passenger services. 
The concept originated in the U.S before spreading to Europe in the eariy 1990s and subsequently to 
much of the rest of the world. The term originated within the airline industry referring to airlines with 
a low - or lower - operating cost structure than their competitors (Lawton 2002). 
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and fully private airlines, this thesis will focus on European flag carrier airlines (the 
choice of flag carrier airlines and Europe will be explained in more detail in this 
introduction and in the methodology chapter). 
Nevertheless, most airlines have traditionally had a strong natural relationship with 
their own national governments (Pedler and Van Schendelen 1994; Lawton 1999). 
This close link has been a direct consequence of the traditional involvement of 
national governments in the aviation industry (Kasim 1995). The relationship was 
created as a result of airlines flying into foreign jurisdictions where they operated 
with foreign regulated systems. Airlines were allowed to operate on the basis of a 
strictly regulated system of licenses, provision of which was also determined under 
technical, economic and aviation politics criteria.® 
Nowadays, the mutual granting of licenses is regulated internationally by means of 
bilateral agreements with other countries, unless the airlines are flying in deregulated 
zones (Kasim 1995). Therefore almost every airline of any size also has a 
government affairs department (some organisations use different names like public, 
institutional, foreign or aeropolitical affairs for the same function). The operations 
canied out within these departments are governmental/political activities and were 
so even before these terms existed, although they were exclusively directed at the 
preservation and expansion of airlines. However, since deregulation their importance 
and function has shifted to lobbying rather than simply route negotiation. It is 
^ Charter airlines are airlines that operate charter flights that take place outside normal schedules, by a 
hiring arrangement with a particular customer. Although charter airlines typically carry passengers 
who have booked individually or as small groups to beach resorts, historic towns, or cities where a 
cruise ship awaits them, sometimes an aircraft will be chartered by a single group such as a company, 
a sports team, or the military. Many charter flights are sold as part of a package holiday in which the 
price paid includes flights, accommodation and other services. At one time this was illegal, but this is 
no longer the case, and so-called "flight-only packages" can be bought by those who merely want to 
travel to the destination. 
Apart from the issue of the granting of licenses, relationships between flag carrier airlines and their 
governments have also been strong because most national governments have held shares in their flag 
carriers since the Chicago convention. 
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usually within this department that lobbying commences (Pedler and Van 
Schendelen 1994). 
Bearing in mind that this study will be conducted from within the government affairs 
offices of our chosen sample airlines, at this stage we emphasise that it will not try to 
find an underlying relationship between performance of the airlines and lobbying 
capabilities development. More importantly, the aim of this study will be primarily 
exploring and examining "what" lobbying capabilities are (Eisenhardt and Marin 
2000) and, our case, strategic and organisational lobbying routines and processes: 
"how" they are developed in two specific contrasting policy contexts,^ and "why" 
they are developed in these specific ways.^ We argue that the lobbying process is a 
capability that a firm can develop as a basis for competitive advantage but that 
organisations need to understand the dynamics of and interactions between the micro 
foundations in the development of this strategic capability. 
The frame of exploration and identification of two distinct policy contexts in this 
thesis is based on historical reconstruction and follow-up of two major events that 
had many implications for Airlines. (The choice of the two contexts will be 
explained in more detail within the literature review and methodology chapters). It is 
in these contexts that we extend our understanding of the nature of lobbying 
capability development and in doing so extend resource-based theory. 
Subsequently, we will try to build on that level of heterogeneity in corporate 
political decision-making by looking at recent literatures of corporate political 
activity and resource-based view (hereafter RBV), more specifically dynamic 
capabilities, to provide an enhanced understanding of the development of a lobbying 
capability. 
^ The unexpected (exogenous policy event) and expected (endogenous policy event) policy contexts 
will be described later in this study. 
^ In other words, our study will ask "what and how" are the micro foundations of lobbying 
capability, developed in order to capture value from specific policy outcomes, and " w h y " are they 
developed in those specific ways? 
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1 .3 .1 DEFINITIONS 
The concepts involved in describing the process of developing dynamic capabilities 
have remained obscure (Priem and Butler, 2000; Ethiraj et al. 2005). Many scholars 
have used different definitions of concepts such as knowledge, micro-level 
mechanisms, resources, assets and competences in relation to the same theory (for an 
overview see Bogaert et al 1994). However, in order to gain more insight into a 
lobbying process as a strategic capability, some clear definitions of the various 
concepts are required at this stage. 
We would like to define and introduce the most important concepts, underlining that 
these definitions are not universally agreed upon but suitable and appropriate to this 
study, in order to allow the readers to grasp some of the "main characters of the 
story". Therefore, following Barney (1991) and Zander and Kogut (1995), we define 
'resources' as the stock of available factors (tangible or intangible assets) owned or 
controlled by the firm. A 'capability', however, refers to the capacity to deploy, 
integrate, reconfigure and leverage resources to make change (Mahoney and Pandian 
1992; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Makadok 2001; Sirmon et al. 2007). A 
'competence' is different from a capability in that it enables the firm to sustain the 
way in which it uses its resources in order to achieve its objectives (Sanchez et al. 
1996). In other words, this refers to a meta-capability or a film's ability to develop 
its capability. Finally 'lobbying' refers to the presentation of views, communication 
of opinions and suggestions in order to influence institutions and political factors 
that form an essential part of a democratic process at the heart of the non-market 
policy-making environment (Coen 1997).® 
' Contrary to popular stereotype, most lobbyists are not sinister figures. They are professionals that lobby or 
advocate interests that can make a real difference in the process of allocating funds or shaping legislation. They 
conduct research, assemble the facts, understand both substance and procedures, and prepare quality advocacy. 
Indeed, integrity and credibility with decision-makers are indispensable. Increased recognition of the importance 
of government decisions and how they are influenced is what has resulted in the widely reported, explosive 
growth in lobbying (Coen 1997). 
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Therefore, building on Holbum (2001), McWilliams et al. (2002), Bonardi et al. 
(2007) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2001), we define a lobbying capability as the 
corporate political processes - specifically the processes in which managers work 
together to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources - that use resources to 
match or even create non-market change. Lobbying capabilities are the 
organisational and strategic routines by which senior representatives or acting 
representatives achieve new resource configurations to match or even create non-
market change, in our case, in the corporate political environment. They are firm-
specific routines and processes that require interaction with political resources. 
1.4 IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
This area was chosen for investigation based on two fundamental facts. Firstly, there 
is still a paucity of studies that examine the RBV in relation to corporate politics.'" 
This is surprising given that the needs and demands of many markets are forecasted 
to grow within the airline industry, which will undoubtedly expose airlines to 
different forms of policy contexts. Thus understanding the micro-level corporate 
lobbying components, its developmental antecedents and its given context will be 
vital in extending the notion of dynamic capabilities (more broadly RBV), as it will 
offer a fresh extension to academia, using the non-market environment perspective 
(Holbum 2001; Henisz and Zelner 2003; Hillman et al 2004). 
Secondly, this study will be significant as it will specify more clearly the conditions 
under which lobbying capabilities of different types and levels are developed. 
Although the study in its current form does not address outcomes/performance 
relationships it will aim to provide important first steps in exploring the relationships 
by establishing some dependent relationship between the micro sources in the 
organisational lobbying capability, types of political resources and the onset of 
specific types of policy contexts to the airlines. The conclusions of this study will 
This view is aligned with the view of Getz (2002) and Hillman et al. (2004) who have asked for 
scholars to do more research into corporate political activities using the RBV scope. 
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certainly have implications for practice, but a basic objective is to generate further 
efforts directed at the improvement of this emerging and critically important 
managerial function. 
1.5 REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE RESEARCH INDUSTRY OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES 
The airline industry, with emphasis on "European flag carrier" airlines, was selected 
as a "setting" for our investigation. This industry and its emphasis on European flag 
carrier airlines were chosen for three reasons. (The airline selection process and 
sample size will be discussed in the methodology chapter.)" Firstly, there is a 
widely shared view that European Long haul flag carrier airlines have traditionally 
been politically active to some degree, due to the high level of involvement of 
national governments in regulation of the industry (Doganis 2001).'^ What is more, 
in recent times, European flag carrier airlines have become increasingly politically 
active (Cohen and Willman 1998, Doganis 2001). This is due to their planes needing 
to fly into foreign jurisdictions, develop new routes and negotiate traffic rights with 
different countries. Therefore, in light of these developments by European flag 
carrier airlines, the government ownerships, the level of corporate political actives in 
Brussels (Cohen and Willman 1998), and the lack of empirical Resource Base View 
(RBV) studies on the airline industry, it would be interesting to investigate the 
phenomena of a lobbying capability in this highly politicised industry. 
" However, only recently have governments realised that they can no longer treat this industry 
differently to others (Hillman et al. 2004). They hope that commercial aviation will become self 
reliant. In this their resilience will depend on their capabilities to innovate as with firms in other 
industries. Thus airlines need to be able to sustain themselves and compete to provide a service that 
aligns consumer expectations with perceived value. This has been highlighted by recent figures 
showing that airlines are growing and meeting new market demands (lATA Annual Report 2004). 
The regulation of international aviation was initiated with the Paris convention of 1919. It was 
accepted that states have sovereignty over the air space above their territory. Control was mainly 
handled with a set of ad hoc arrangements between nations. The rules on certain economic rights, 
however, were not set until the 1944 Chicago Conference. 
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The second reason for the industry choice is personal interest in and knowledge of 
airlines. Two previous studies on the airline industry have convinced me of the 
usefulness of this field. My own background will make understanding the industry 
and interviewing senior managers easier, and I believe I am well placed to appreciate 
the problems involved and any shortcomings. 
Thirdly, the choice of European flag carrier airlines was based on the fact that 
European airlines included low cost airlines. This breed of short haul carriers was 
not subject to the same political pressures as long haul flag carriers due to their 
different business model and history. These revolutionary low cost airlines managed 
to entice consumers even through the pressures of 9/11 with their bargain prices. 
What is more, firms like Easyjet and Ryan air (low cost airlines) emerged as a result 
of the endogenous policy (i.e. deregulation - the introduction of the third 
liberalisation package) context. Thus having looked at short haul airlines, we 
decided that adding low cost airlines would not justify the comparisons to test 
theory, as our chosen contexts were viewed very differently by low cost airlines and 
flag carrier airlines. 
1 .6 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
Explaining the variation in the degree of success of business organisations, with 
reference to degrees of environmental uncertainty and choices of organisational 
resources and capabilities, has been a major focus of recent theorising in strategic 
management. Concepts and labels coined to characterise the phenomenon abound. 
From pioneering efforts, such as Selznick's (1957) "distinctive competence", to the 
more recent and refined notions of organisational routines (Nelson and Winter 
1982), core competencies (Hamel and Prahalad 1990), architectural knowledge 
(Henderson and Clark 1990), combinative capabilities (Kogut and Zander 1992) and 
finally, dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) there are decades of 
investment in sorting out the traits and the boundaries of the phenomena. Recent 
contributions aimed at providing definitions and clarify distinctions among the 
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various constructs offer some hope that the problem of proliferating and overlapping 
terminologies is being alleviated and real progress made (Sirmon et al. 2007). 
As the corporate political activity field progresses in the definitions of the lobbying 
phenomenon, though, it becomes correspondingly apparent that we are still missing 
a solid account of how lobbying capabilities come into existence and of how they 
evolve over time. What accounts for the fact that one organisation exhibits 
"lobbying competence" in some sense, while another does not? And how do we 
explain the growth and decay of that particular lobbying process, other than the 
simple repetition, or lack thereof, of behaviour? Building on Nelson and Winter's 
(1982) view of the organisation as a set of interdependent operational and 
administrative routines, which slowly evolve on the basis of performance feedbacks, 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) define the concept of "dynamic capabilities" which 
we will look at more closely in the literature review, in order to understand lobbying 
capabilities. 
Indeed, this research will provide a theoretical account based on gathered empirical 
evidence of the genesis and evolution of dynamic lobbying capabilities within the 
firm. We will contribute to existing knowledge in a number of areas. This research 
will: 
• strengthen the theoretical understanding of the antecedents of the 
development of lobbying processes as a strategic capability by analysing 
the processes using dynamic resource-based theory; 
• conversely, support corporate political activity literature in 
conceptualising the relationship between the internal government affairs 
department, the policy environment and the development of lobbying 
capabilities; 
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• provide evidence on whether airlines develop lobbying differently or 
similarly to each other in two contrasting policy contexts; 
• identify the micro foundations and interaction effects in the lobbying 
capability development process that either encourage or discourage the 
implementation of specific political resource configurations; 
• develop potential solutions to the problematic issues identified in the 
procurement and development of a lobbying capability and clarify a 
future research agenda for the dynamic resource-based view. 
The research findings will be of interest to a wide range of individuals, from people 
concerned with the state of the airline services to those working in any lobbying 
institutions. However, the findings will have specific value in the provision of 
government affairs in the airlines for both the governments and for private owned 
airlines in various roles, from government affairs management to CEOs and 
government officials. As lobbying is rapidly gaining popularity around Europe, the 
findings will also be of value in countries that are currently experimenting with the 
lobbying method. 
1 .7 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis adopts an inductive, qualitative approach as the review of the literature 
indicated that existing theory on dynamic capabilities development and lobbying 
development is still in its embryonic stage. Thus, we decided to choose cases from 
the same industry to increase the validity of findings by replication of theory. The 
data was collected from interviews and documents from within the government 
affairs offices. We conducted a within and cross case analysis of data using a RBV 
and corporate political activity theoretical (CPA hereafter) focal lens to analyse the 
development processes, focusing our efforts on analysis of the lobbying capability in 
contrasting policy contexts over two time periods. This case study approach allowed 
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us to retrospectively explicate the effects of different policy environments on 
capability development processes, in conjunction with unbundling the micro level 
interactions between different sources. 
1 .8 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The thesis is designed chronologically, with an in-depth look at the types of 
lobbying structures, government affairs departments and the lobbying capability 
development processes in two contrasting policy contexts. One objective of this 
study is to overcome the existing perception of government affairs as an unimportant 
function in an organisation and to demonstrate that lobbying capability development 
can be managed to create the basis of a sustainable competitive advantage. 
This thesis is structured chronologically and systematically in five parts: (A) 
Introduction, (B) Literature Review, (C) Methodology Development, (D) Case 
Studies and (E) Discussion and Conclusion. Part B (Chapters 2 and 3) reviews the 
existing literature both on static and dynamic resource-based view, corporate 
political theories relevant to the use of the lobbying capabilities and the aviation 
sector. Part C (Chapter 4) develops a methodology that can be used to achieve the 
aim of this research. Part D (Chapters 5 and 6) presents the different case study 
findings. Part E (Chapters 7 and 8) discusses the findings arising from the case study 
research in the context of the two contrasting policy contexts and draws conclusions 
from the findings. 
As such, Chapter 2 commences the literature review with particular emphasis on the 
intellectual antecedents of the static and dynamic resource-based view and its 
implications on the evolution of business over time. Subsequently this chapter starts 
to map out the intellectual terrain of corporate political activity and lobbying 
literature by looking at its impact on internal and external business changes. 
Thereafter, the lobbying capability notion is introduced with its current theoretical 
weaknesses. 
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Chapter 3 is a continuation of the literature review and it focuses on allowing us to 
understand the nature of the two contrasting policy contexts and the chosen airline 
sector. The reviewed literature includes scholarly views on the history of airlines. 
More importantly, this chapter also aims to focus on clarifying key terms and key 
concepts in this study. These include 'endogenous policy', 'exogenous policy', 
'European flag carrier', 'European airline business', 'deregulation' and 'post 
September ll'^' terrorist attacks'. Finally, this logically leads to the research 
questions that are extracted from the literature reviews in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of the research design and methodology used 
in this study. It includes sections on the research design, research methodology, 
selection of the sample and details of the process of analysis carried out. 
Chapters 5 and 6 contain empirical findings using five case studies. These two 
chapters scrutinise the mechanisms used in each case study, with emphasis on the 
lobbying capability development process. This development process is demonstrated 
using illustrative quotes and archival data, which allow the reader to comprehend the 
nature of the lobbying capability development process and underlining micro 
foundations. Secondly, it examines how these lobbying processes are developed and 
why airlines are developing them in these specific ways. 
Chapter 7 discusses the findings that arise from the case studies research in the 
context of the two contrasting policies. This chapter integrates the results with the 
literature review and develops recommendations arising from the study. The 
frameworks for lobbying capability development by European flag carrier airlines 
are also illustrated in this chapter. Subsequently, Chapter 8 provides conclusions that 
draw from this research as a whole. In addition, it outlines the future course for 
lobbying capability research and comments on the execution of this research. 
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1.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Lobbying is an important means by which a firm appropriates value through 
influencing policy that will positively affect its market position (Hillman and Hitt 
1999). Moreover, we have found that a very small proportion of literature has 
directly addressed how firms develop lobbying processes within a given context to 
create an advantage. Therefore, stemming from dynamic capability literature we 
argue that lobbying capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable strategic and 
operational processes that are used to acquire leverage with political resources by 
firms in non-market environments, in our case the corporate political environment. 
This distinctive theoretical position draws attention to the ways in which firms use 
lobbying capabilities to obtain, integrate, reconfigure, and release political resources. 
The main purpose of this study is to examine "what, why and how" lobbying 
capabilities (Eisenhardt and Marin 2000) are developed in an exogenous policy 
context (post September 1 t e i T o r i s t attacks) and endogenous policy (European 
airline deregulation) context by European flag carrier airlines. 
In the next section we develop a set of arguments from the RBV and CPA literature 
to demonstrate that policy contexts in the business, non-market environment are 
inherent to capability development, more specifically lobbying capability 
development, given the evolutionary nature of the process. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides a review of the strategy process and content literatures. 
This will be done from a dynamic resource-based and corporate political activity 
theoretical viewpoint, with a specific focus on the related areas including non-
market environment, lobbying, public policy, decision maldng and where 
appropriate, attempts to draw linJcs between the six literatures. In order to 
introduce the reader to these literatures and provide some idea of the objective 
of this section, a brief outline of the literatures will be given, along with a 
general critique of the existing perspectives. This section will be presented 
systematically to allow the reader to grasp the logical flow between the key 
literatures that lead to the three key research questions. 
2.1 OUTLINE OF THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 
The primary pursuit of business is creating and maintaining value (Conner 1991). 
The resource-based view (RBV) suggests that firms' resources drive value 
creation by building competitive advantage (Ireland, Hitt and Sinnon 2003). In 
recent years strategy scholars have increasingly agreed that competitive 
advantage needs to be based on non-imitable and non-substitutable 
organisational resources (Rumelt 1984; Wemerfelt 1984; Dierickx and Cool 
1989; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). However, all these authors fall short when 
they fail to recognise the importance of the non-market environment (Baron 
2003). Indeed, the underlying principle of the market and non-market strategies 
is their aim of creating and sustaining competitive advantage. In other words. 
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firms that actively participate in both market and non-market strategies increase 
revenues which enhance shareholder value (Basinger 1984; Baron 1999; Hillman 
et al. 1999; Bonardi et al. 2006). While market strategies involve decisions 
regarding such issues as product positioning in relation to competitors, 
technology, customers, supply issues, innovation, R&D, pricing and so forth, 
non-market strategies are decisions taken by organisations in their political, 
regulatory and social environments (Baysinger 1984; Baron 1997, 1999, 2003). 
The non-market, and more specifically corporate political activity, includes such 
activities as lobbying a legislator or regulator individually or as a group, 
litigating a case in court, making campaign contributions and so forth (Hillman et 
al. 1999). Unfortunately, there is minimal theory in the corporate political 
activity arena that explains "how" political resources in firms are likely to be 
used and "how" lobbying capabilities are developed, principally in an 
endogenous (expected) and exogenous (unexpected) policy context and "why" 
are they developed in these ways. These questions are important as they relate to 
both firm strategy and environmental boundaries of the firm. To fully understand 
this linkage, the effects of a firm's external policy environment on managing 
lobbying capability development needs to be examined more closely. 
In this literature review, the author will begin by first addressing the market 
context literature, specifically the RBV and dynamic capabilities literature, with 
their limitations, which will then systematically lead into the non-market 
literature. Thereafter we will look at the corporate political (lobbying) activity 
literature that has been recently cross fertilised with RBV theory, along with 
general critiques. Finally attempts will be made to draw links between the 
literatures. 
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MARKET CONTEXT: 
KEY TENETS, RECENT EVOLUTION, AND SELECTED WEAKNESSES 
2 .2 THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW 
In the past 20 years, RBV has become one of the most important theories to 
address causality and the fundamental beginning of competitive advantage 
(Wenerfelt 1984; Cockbum et al 2000). The canonical reference for RBV 
literature is usually taken to be Penrose (1959), where she views the firm not as a 
"black box" but more as a composition of bundles of resources. The RBV argues 
unique market positions of close competitors derive from each firm's 
heterogeneous bundle of resources and capabilities (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). 
Moreover, to be a source of competitive advantage, resources and capabilities 
have to be "valuable, rare and isolated from imitation or substitution" (Barney 
1991, p. 115). Implicit within the RBV is a significantly different view of the 
dynamics of strategic advantage, and, in particular, of exactly what firms can and 
cannot do (Wenerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; Hoopes et al. 2003). 
These extensions broaden the RBV's range and level of explanation of inter-firm 
performance differences. Although the RBV dominates the conceptual landscape 
and is large in numbers, empirical research on the RBV has not evolved in a 
similar way. It lacks a profound understanding of how resources and capabilifies 
are actually developed in different contexts. Thus many scholars argue that the 
theory is still essentially tautological (Priem and Butler 2001; Hoopes et al. 
2003) and requires in-depth studies to understand the antecedents and the 
practice issues (Ethiraj et al. 2005). 
Nevertheless, some recent studies have been important in demonstrating the 
influence of resources and capabilities on strategy planning and outcome (Brush 
and Artz 1999). For instance in a longitudinal study encompassing three periods 
of transformation in the typesetter industry, Tripsas (1997) shows how 
investment in technological and complementary resources enhanced the ability of 
incumbent firms to survive. Similarly, Collis (1991) highlights the importance of 
resources associated to organisational capabilities, and administrative heritage, as 
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the bearings industry undergoes global transformation. Equally, other researchers 
have highlighted particular resources that rise in importance in rapidly shifting 
industry environments (Majumdar 1998; Chakravarthy 1996). While in the 
industry of banking, Mehra (1996) finds that as this industry restructures 
resources such as management quality and depth, technological expertise, and 
innovation play an important role in explaining performance variation in the U.S. 
banking industry. 
The conceptual RBV literature makes explicit a view of "strategy" that has long 
been dormant, the sense that strategy is not all, or not only, about the ability of 
the top management team to make the "correct" decisions, but also about their 
ability to work creatively with the raw material presented by their firm and their 
environment (Mintzberg 1987); to respond appropriately when their firm's 
organisational structure finds "good" strategies (Burgelman 1994); and to 
generate decision structures and procedures that allow a firm to react to its 
environment adaptively ( Levinthal 1997). In short, in focusing on the dynamic 
capabilities and resource management, the RBV is centrally concerned with the 
degree to which successful firms are indeed "fortunate", since it suggests that 
many of the capabilities underlying advantage are the result of investments made 
under a heavy cloud of uncertainty (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). Therefore, we can 
see that investing time and effort in the resource building process in the market 
environment can bring forth superior outcomes for many firms (Morgan et al. 
2003). However, we believe the simple observation that resources may lead to 
advantage is only half the battle: the other half understands how these 
capabilities are developed and how these capabilities are used to leverage on 
specific resources in different environments. 
We have seen from the above that the RBV approach promises to shed light on 
those who stress 'heterogeneity' in shaping firm performance and the central 
insight of the strategy field; that what firms do matters {Please look at Appendix 
1 for an expansion on RBV genealogy). However, critiques of the current RBV 
need to be recognised, as its implications have not yet been fully worked out, 
especially within the political realms. Most importantly, RBV has not generated 
the kinds of empirical studies of the adoption of the lobbying capabilities and 
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usage of political resources by the firms that are crucial to building a richer 
understanding of how firms manage resources and function in different policy 
contexts to create a competitive advantage (Hillman et al. 2004). 
While there are studies suggesting that the possession of unique organisational 
resources will lead to superior performance from the market context (Henderson 
and Cockbum 1994; Conner 1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989), and others 
suggesting that competitive advantage may be heavily influenced by conditions 
at a firm's founding (Holbrook et al. 2000; Eisenhardt 1988), so far few studies 
have looked at dynamic capability development in contexts of uncertain and 
certain environments. At its worst, just as overenthusiastic readings of Porter led 
to the prescription 'choose a good industry', overenthusiastic readings of the 
RBV have had the flavor of 'build the right resources/capabilities' from a market 
context. Even Barney's original piece has something of this tone, as for example 
when he suggests that, "To be a first mover by implementing a strategy before 
any competing firms, a particular firm must have insights about the opportunities 
associated with using unique resources that are not possessed by other firms in 
the industry, or by potentially entering firms" (Barney 1991, p. 104). Such an 
analysis clearly places the source of competitive advantage in the lime light, but 
leaves unanswered the critical empirical question: what about the non-market 
environment; what about antecedent of specific lobbying capabilities, political 
resources and how are they all developed in different contexts? 
Let us now individually view and elaborate upon resources and capabilities. 
2 . 2 . 1 RESOURCES 
Organisations are a collection of unique resources and capabilities that provide a 
basis for strategy and are the primary source of firm's returns (Wenerfelt 1984; 
Knot 2003). Firm resources include all assets, capabilities, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge and so forth. There are many definitions of resources but 
for the purposes of this discussion, we will use Barney's (1991) definition of 
resources, as he is viewed by many as an important proponent of RBV. Barney 
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(1991, p. 101) postulates that to have resources that are a primary source of 
return, firms need to make their physical capital resources (i.e. technology, firm 
plant, equipment, raw materials, capital etc), human capital resources (i.e. skills 
of individual employees, training, experience, intelligence, relationships etc) and 
organisational capital resources (i.e. formal reporting, structure, planning, 
coordinating systems etc): 
1. Valuable: A valuable resource allows a firm to improve its market 
position relative to competitors. For example, resources acquired at a 
price below their discounted net present value can generate rents 
(Peteraf 1993). 
2. Rare: To be a value the resource must be available in short supply 
relative to demand. 
3. Isolated from imitation or substitution'. To be rare, resources need to 
be immobile, and costly to imitate or to replicate (Knott 2003). 
In other words, resources that are either intangible or tangible in nature and 
concentrating on rareness are crucial to creating value (Besanko et al. 2000). It is 
through the synergistic combination and integration of sets of resources and 
capabilities that competitive advantages are formed (Hoopes et al. 2003). 
However, a critique of the earlier static RBV literature (from mid 1980s to the 
mid 1990s) is that it did not incorporate an evolutionary perspective of resources 
and capabilities to explain competitive advantage. Similar to Barney and Griffin 
(1992, p.56), we believe that "within the analysis of competitive advantage, 
process issues must always be integrated with content issues ". 
Since then studies have moved beyond the static RBV to a more dynamic RBV, 
in which strategy scholars have started embracing the dynamism of resources and 
capabilities within the firm to the changing environment (Teece et al. 1997). 
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2 . 2 . 2 TOWARDS A DYNAMIC VIEW OF RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES 
In an attempt to counteract the limitations of earlier RBV, a dynamic RBV theory 
has been extended to incorporate dynamic capabilities, which, while still 
predicated on path, focus strongly on the processes by which firms reconfigure 
their resources to adapt to changing environments (Teece et al. 1997; Helfat and 
Raubitschek 2000; Winter 2003). Dynamic capabilities and competitive 
advantage emerge over a period of time and also may shift over time (Hamel and 
Prahalad 1996). Recent research on the evolution (and development) of 
capabilities suggests the promise of a dynamic resource-based theory (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2003). The habitual point of reference for the dynamic capabilities can be 
traced back to three authors. Firstly, Schumpeter (1934) viewed performance 
rivalry and profits from a disequilibrium process, change and entrepreneurship 
perspective. Secondly, Penrose (1959, p.25) suggested resources consist of a 
bundle of services. Finally, Argyris and Schon (1978) asserted that people hold 
maps in their heads about how to plan, implement and review their actions. All 
these authors helped to create the concrete foundations of dynamic capabilities 
and competitive advantage creation (Teece et al. 1997). Please see Figure 1 for 
an intellectual map of the terrain. 
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Figure 1: Mapping the Intellectual Terrain 
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Building upon this earlier literature of the economics, evolutionary theory and 
organisational learning, the concept of dynamic capabilities emerged (Teece et 
al. 1997). The "dynamic" tenn refers to the capacity to renew competences so as 
to achieve congruence with the changing business environment (Teece et al. 
1997). Dynamic capabilities have evolved to attract increasing attention within 
the Strategic Management field (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Rodenbloom 2000; 
Zollo and Winter 2002; Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Winter 2003; Ethiraj et al. 
2005). These scholars have come to understand that resources are available to all 
firms, however the 'capability' to leverage them productively is not uniformly 
developed.' {Please look at Appendix 2 for an expansion on dynamic capability 
positioning.) 
' Leveraging on resources here refers to the using the capability to create value for the owners 
(Sirmon et al. 2007) 
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Dynamic capability has been viewed as being the antecedent organisational and 
strategic routines by which managers alter their resource base (Nelson and 
Winter 1982). They are often characterised as unique and idiosyncratic processes 
that emerge from path-dependent histories of individual firms (Teece et al. 
1997). Over time, firms' knowledge, accumulated through 'learning by doing', is 
embedded in bundles of 'routines' or 'processes' that are likened to the genetic 
material of the firm (Nelson and Winter 1982). Consequently, this dynamic view 
of capabilities sees the requirement of investment in routine-specific human, 
organisational and physical capital by a historical entity. This viewpoint suggests 
that history matters and dynamic capabilities are rooted in organisational skills 
and routines (Sirmon et al. 2007). As a result, these heterogeneous skills and 
routines tend to be the drivers behind creation, evolution and recombination of 
other resources into sources of competitive advantage (Teece et al. 1997; Helfat 
and Peteraf 2003). As such, similar to Teece et al. (1997) and Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000, pi 107), we describe dynamic capabilities as {see Appendix 2)-} 
The firm's processes that use resources - specifically the processes in 
which managers pool to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release 
resources - to match or even create market change. In other words, 
dynamic capabilities are the organisational and strategic routines by 
which firms achieve new resource configurations to match the changing 
environment. 
This definition, describes dynamic capabilities as being specific processes that 
are able to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources. For example, 
> "Strategic decision making is a dynamic capability that integrates 
resources, in which managers pool their various business, fiinctional and 
personal expertise to make the choices that shape the major moves of the 
firm" (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, pi 107). 
2 
T h e def in i t ion bears m a n y s imi lar i t ies to de f in i t ions g iven by o the r au thor s such Aini t and S c h o e m a k e r 
(1993) w h o u s e the t e n n ' capab i l i t i e s ' to desc r ibe h o w resources can b e dep loyed , and Kogu t and Z a n d e r 
(1992) w h o u s e the te rm ' c o m b i n a t i v e capabi l i t ies ' to expla in finn p roces se s by wh ich o rgan i sa t ions use 
their k n o w l e d g e re sources to cons t ruc t new appl ica t ions f r o m those resources . 
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> "Patching" are strategic processes used by managers to reconfigure to 
match-up the businesses and their related resources to the changing 
markets (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p l l07) . 
> "Knowledge creation routines" are used by firms to build new thinking 
within the firm, and represents a crucial dynamic capability as it allows 
firms to gain and release resources (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p l l07) . 
These dynamic capabilities often have combinations of simpler capabilities and 
related routines (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Dynamic capabilities and their 
specific identifiable processes are generative and developmental in nature (Helfat 
and Peteraf (2003). The generative processes are identified through retrospective 
sense-making, experience and knowledge of the organisational processes by 
senior managers (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). Conversely, some researchers have 
also suggested that capabilities are developed as a result of deliberate 
investments in organisational structure and systems to make constant 
improvements in those practices (Zollo and Winter 2002). 
The evolutionary nature of the capability phenomenon is powerful in revealing 
how managers are constrained in their actions to manage the process. However, 
criticism of the dynamic capabilities, more broadly RBV, argues that its 
followers are relatively silent when it comes to sense-making in relation to 
managing the composition of the resource bundle. In other words, while the RBV 
has given us theories on how and why a firm's resources provide foundations to 
competitive advantage, the strategic process by which the firm manages the 
composition and structure of the resource portfolio remains somewhat of a 
"black box". This is surprising, given that in their seminal work on the RBV, 
Dierickx and Cool (1989, pi 506) observed that "a key dimension of strategy 
formulation [is] the task of making appropriate choices about strategic 
expenditures ... with a view to accumulating required resources and skills". 
While another critique is that the studies fail to research specific types of 
capabilities and the interactions between sources at a micro level in the building 
process, i.e. lobbying capabilities and how they are developed to manage the 
political resource portfolio. Also, the definition essentially "kicks" the learning 
problem one level up, from single-loop to double-loop learning in Argyris and 
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Schon's (1978) terms, and leaves us with the same problem: how are dynamic 
capabilities formed? How do they evolve? We believe that understanding and 
identifying the specific developmental processes in practices will help in the 
creating a richer notion of dynamic capability. 
Thus the focus of our study will be on strategic and organisational processes of 
the firm. These processes carry such weight because organisational-level 
resources and capabilities are arguably the most important elements of the 
organisation's performance and related competitive advantage (Zollo and Winter 
2002). 
2 . 3 THE MARKET CONTEXT, DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 
Consideration of the environment in both the market and non-market context 
(Baron 1995) is important to the analysis of firm resources and capabilities 
development as different environments imply different valuations of resources 
and capabilities (Penrose 1959; Noda and Collis 2001). In addition, firms in any 
given industry are likely to face similar types of environmental forces. The 
differences in their accumulated resource and capability endowments (e.g. skills, 
propensity for learning, specialised assets) could become important factors that 
may influence the development of the sources of competitive advantages (Kogut 
and Zander 1992). 
These accumulated resource and capability endowments have also been viewed 
in resource dependency approach to organisational theory (Pfeffer and Novak 
1976). Its research shows that firms facing uncertain environments establish 
joint ventures as a means of reducing uncertainty and sharing the risk (Pfeffer 
and Novak 1976). Similarly Achrol (1991) who studied Joint Ventures found that 
firms usually seek to enhance competitive advantage by leveraging critical 
capabilities (i.e. technology related and marketing-related capabilities) and by 
improving flexibility in response to uncertain technological change. Other 
authors like Kogut and Zander (1992) and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) have 
shown that the notions of learning, expertise and skill development have only 
recently been considered in the context of developing firm-level strategies that 
take advantage of differences in firm assets to enact the environment. 
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In retrospect, the notion of dynamic capabihties and environmental contexts help 
firms achieve competitive advantages i.e. uncertain environments increase causal 
ambiguity and, as a consequence, the ability to imitate resources or combinations 
of resources is reduced (e.g. Noda and Collis 2001). Subsequently, in highly 
uncertain environments, the firms can leverage resources to respond to changing 
conditions in the environment. On the other hand, when the environment is 
relatively unchanging and predictable (endogenous environments), competitors 
can see clearly which resources and combinations of resources are valuable to the 
business, and these can be imitated because time is not of the essence (Noda and 
Collis 2001). 
While dynamic resource-based research covers a broad range of issues, an area 
of process and routines research which deals with the question of how cognition 
(decision making) of top managers interplays with capability development is still 
not clearly understood (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). 
2 . 4 TOP MANAGERS, COGNITION AND RBV 
The power of top managers on shaping the future strategic contours of 
organisations has gathered ongoing attention from researchers (Prahalad and 
Bettis 1986; Pettigrew 1992; Finkelstein et al. 2007). Strategic choice scholars 
(Child 1972) argue that top management in organisations have substantial 
discretion in determining the present and future strategic contours of the firm 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990) by using resources, competencies and 
capabilities (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Top managers can use their cognitive 
thinking processes to choose how to react to different market and non-market 
environments in order to achieve better performance (Garud and Rappa 1994). 
Top managers can also influence external and internal organisational 
environments by constructing, eliminating, or defining characteristic elements of 
an environment (Child 1972; Weick 1979). In this way, top managers can create 
their own domain of reality and decision making boundaries. In a similar vein, 
upper-echelon theorists (e.g. Hambrick and Mason 1984) argue that top 
managers are the strategists who set the direction of firms and the pace of 
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competition. However, the role of cognition in capability (specifically lobbying 
capability) development has yet to be better explored. 
The literature on organisational and managerial cognition provides an alternative, 
cognition-based lens to organisational adaptation (Weick 1979; Barr et al. 1992). 
This literature emphasises the role of cognitive processes and sense-making 
centered on perceived causation as the key regulator of organisational actions 
and subsequent process/routine development. Thus, there is a gap in our 
understanding of how cognitive understandings of purpose-oriented business 
logic are initially formed, how initial pre-routines for achieving identified goals 
are created, and how the interplay between cognitive understandings and 
strategising create a platform for subsequent capability development in non-
market environments. 
The cognitive representations are typically based on historical experience as 
opposed to current knowledge of the environment (Kiesler and Sproull 1982). 
For instance, as the managers work together over time they often develop a set of 
'blueprints' of decisions, or dominant logic for the firm based on their shared 
history (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). These blueprints of decisions are affected by 
rapidly changing environments, whether market or non-market, and the top 
managers are often trying to adapt their mental model with these changing 
environmental contexts (Brown and Eisenhard 1998). These blueprints make 
decisions reflect the interaction between an organisation and its environment and 
show how an organisation and senior managers manage this relationship 
(Ginsberg 1988). They may be formal or informal and can be both intended and 
emergent (Pennings 1985). They are embedded in both the inner context (e.g. 
psychological, structural, cultural and political factors) and the outer context of 
the organisation (e.g. competitive factors) (Pettigrew 1992). They deal with 
concerns which are essential to the livelihood and survival of the organisation 
and usually involve a large proportion of the organisation's resources; and they 
usually address issues that are unusual for the organisation rather than issues 
which lend themselves to routine decision-making (Stahl and Grigsby 1992). 
They are difficult to define or to assess in teiTns of performance; they are 
associated with different trade-offs and risk; they are interrelated to other 
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decisions in the organisation and set precedents for subsequent ones; they are 
political and carry high levels of uncertainty; they rarely have one best solution 
and, once a decision is made, it is difficult to reverse (Wilson 2003). 
On the other hand, Dean and Sharfnian (1996, p379) describe strategic decisions 
as: "committing substantial resources, setting precedents, and creating waves of 
lesser decisions"; as ill-structured, non-routine and complex (Schwenk 1988); 
and as substantial, unusual and all-permeating (Hickson et al 1986). Some of the 
characteristics of strategic decisions are as follows. They are the responsibility of 
top management. Indeed, these decision-making processes are attached to the 
cognitive aspects of an individual. The study of strategic decision-making has 
long been of interest to both scholars and executives (Finkelstein and Hambrick 
1990). Research into strategic decision-making has often been divided into two 
categories; 'content research' and 'process research'. Content research deals with 
issues of strategy content such as portfolio management, diversification, mergers 
and the alignment of frnn strategies with environmental characteristics 
(Pettigrew 1992). Process research, however, deals with the process by which a 
strategic decision is made and implemented and the factors which affect it. For 
example, it concentrates on the way in which managers influence the firm's 
strategic position through the strategic decision-making process that they use.^ 
While the success of a firm depends as much on its top management team as it 
does on the leader perspective (Hambrick and Mason 1984), the leader still plays 
a crucial role within the "dominant coalition" that steers the organisation. This 
can be a leader in a department or a leader of the organisation. Every leader plays 
an external, strategic role linking the organisation with its environment and an 
internal, organisational role mobilizing and coordinating teams to effectively 
implement the strategy of the finn (Finkelstein a/. 2007). The leader of a 
department is ultimately responsible before the CEO for setting up the 
^ Although the RBV body of research over the last two decades indicates the domination of the 
research agenda by content issues, sadly RBV process issues have received less attention. There 
is renewed interest in process research (Li and Rajagopalan 1995). It should be borne in mind that 
these two categories are complementary, not alternatives, and that content research can 
significantly influence the direction of process research and vice versa (Mintzberg and Waters 
1985). For the purposes of this thesis, we will focus on the second approach, namely, process 
research. 
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departmental goals and for deciding on the means for attaining such goals. For 
this purpose, the departmental leader must secure access to a differentiated set of 
resources and information, as week as to link with the different constituencies 
whose support is crucial for the performance of the organisation (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1990). 
On the other hand, the organisational leader has to facilitate coordination among 
the members of his top management team in order to ensure successful 
implementation of the strategy. While the impact of the leader within top 
management teams has been stressed in the strategy and behavioural theory of 
the firm (Cyert and March 1963), the leader and his team are often left out in 
RBV theory in understanding the interactions between the organisation and its 
environment. This thesis will allow us to view the role of the leader and his 
organisational capacity inside and outside the firm, which pertains to the leader's 
strategic role. However, before this, it's important to look at the notion of 
lifecycles to comprehend the 'development' of the dynamic capabilities in given 
environmental types (whether exogenous or endogenous). 
2 . 5 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT AND LIFECYLCE 
Capability development theory covers two main substrata of resource-based 
view; core competences (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) and dynamic capabilities 
(Teece et al. 1997; Winter 2003), each of which draws upon similar conceptual 
fundamentals (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999). Essentially, this body of strategy 
research views competitive advantage from the perspective of a firm's superior 
resources, competences and capabilities, which lead to sustainable competitive 
advantage. However, in capability-development theory these barriers are erected 
by firm-specific choices about internal organisation, which, being socially 
complex, are path dependent and non-imitable. This body of theory intrinsically 
assumes relatively stable competitive advantage, in which the resource or 
capability or competence base may be gradually evolved and leveraged over time 
(Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999; Venkatraman and Subramaniam 2001). 
* The notions of exogenous (uncertain is high) and endogenous (uncertainty is low) environments 
will be defined later in this chapter and in Chapter 3. 
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Furthermore, it involves an essentially stable view of competition, since other 
firms are assumed to be pursuing fairly consistent courses, such that the firm 
with a superior resource or competence base can benchmark against the 
competitor and so gain advantage (Chakravarthy 1997). 
The dynamic capability perspective permits some concepts from capability 
building theory to be relevant and applicable in higher-velocity markets. Thus, 
firms in high velocity markets may have capabilities in rapidly reconfiguring 
their resources through, for example, time pacing (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). 
Similarly, a firm might have capabilities applicable to a knowledge intensive 
environment, such as knowledge generation and transfer (Grant 1996). 
Furthermore, development of dynamic capabilities might reflect the interplay 
between high velocity and knowledge-intensive contexts, in which speed of 
change drives capabilities. 
Bearing in mind the notion of environment (certain vs uncertain environmental 
context) and time, the capability lifecycle describes a general pattern and set of 
paths that characterise the evolution of the firm's capability (Helfat and Peteraf 
2003). Helfat and Peteraf (2003), argue that firms can go through different 
'development paths' deploying different types of resources along the way. We 
posit that the environment contexts and capabilities have conjoint cycles or 
stages where firms use different mechanisms in order to develop a firm's 
capability i.e. lobbying capability used in a specific policy context. Therefore, 
dynamic capabilities are suggested to have a cycle that depends on the 
environmental or organisational context (Helfat and Peteraf 2003), as shown in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Branches of the capability lifecycle 
Level of 
capability 
per unit of 
activity 
Selection event 
New event 
Matur i ty 
F o u n d i n g 
D e v e l o p m e n t 
R e n e w a l t r ans fo rma t ion 
R e d e p l o y m e n t 
or R e c o m b i n a t i o n 
Repl ica t ion 
R e t r e n c h m e n t 
0 Cumulative Amount of Activity 
Source: Adapted from Helfat and Peteraf (2003, plOOl) 
We can see from Figure 2, the general form of the initial capability develops 
from founding to maturity. The horizontal axis represents the cumulative amount 
of activity toward which the capability is directed and the vertical axis represents 
the level that corresponds to a particular scale of activity (Helfat and Peteraf 
2003), such as lobbying for a type of policy. The figure collapses many attributes 
of a capability into one specific type of capability i.e. in our case, we intend to 
look at the lobbying capability and its constellations of attributes. 
As seen from Figure 2, the capability lifecycle includes several stages. The 
lifecycle of a new capability is founded as a consequence of the environment of 
the organisation and is developed at the founding stage, laying the basis for 
further development of the capability. The development stage it follows this 
initial stage, marked by gradual building of the capability. Eventually, dynamic 
capability building ceases and the capability reaches the maturity stage where it 
can no longer be used due to the changes in the environmental context. A variety 
of events may influence the future evolution of that specific dynamic capability 
development, so firms need to be aware of their time and level of uncertainty, 
where they either replicate or renew their dynamic capabilities (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2003). 
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We have seen from the above lifecycle approach, and generally from dynamic 
RBV literature, that strategy scholars have not really sought to understand the 
uncertainty (exogenous environment) and certainty (endogenous environment) 
that surround choices about what fiiture paths of resources and capabilities the 
firm should commit to. What is more, we believe that the non-market 
environment is still underdeveloped and needs more research to create a richer 
and complete dynamic RBV theory. Environmental uncertainty related to a 
capability's development and to dynamic complexity of the process has been 
implicitly recognised, yet largely neglected by strategy scholars. The uncertainty 
level is associated with the subjective nature of the choice decision, and is thus 
relevant for organisational theorists, but has also been largely ignored by strategy 
scholars researching the corporate political activity arena. This avoidance 
undoubtedly does not contribute to the development of normative frameworks for 
managing the capability development process. The next part of the literature 
review leads logically to the application of the RBV to corporate political 
activities, where we intend to introduce the notion of non-market environment 
and its sub component, politics (focusing on lobbying). 
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NON-MARKET ENVIRONMENT: 
KEY TENETS, RECENT EVOLUTION, AND SELECTED WEAKNESSES 
2 . 6 NON-MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
While a firm's creation of competitive advantage derives in the main from the 
development and exploitation of difficult to imitate capabilities and resources in 
the market environment, a firm's non-market business environment can also 
create advantages for strategy makers. Kobrin (1978) emphasises that firms need 
to recognise both the rules and the broader (non-market) environment in which 
they operate as it's often ambiguous and changing. However, the resolution of 
ambiguity and direction of change in the non-market is neither uncontrollable nor 
divorced from strategic considerations (Hillman et al. 2004). Rather, the process 
involves interest groups interacting within a system of institutions that includes 
but is not limited to the various branches of government, the media, and non-
governmental institutions (Henisz 2002). 
According to Shaffer and Hillman (2000), competitive advantage can be affected 
by this interaction with the non-market, and hence corporate strategies must often 
include actions to influence the outcome of the policy process. Such is the case in 
deregulated industries i.e. telecommunications, airlines or electric power where 
one set of rules is effectively being substituted for another. Correspondingly, 
market success for large companies depends not just on their products and 
services, the efficiency of their alliances, supply chain, reducing competition 
with low cost, differentiation, and distribution channels. Analogously, success 
also depends on how effectively the top management team's deal with 
governments, interest groups, activists, and the public (Baron 1995, 1997, 2001; 
Aggarwal 2001; Wiseman 2004). The forces these parties generate can foreclose 
entry into markets, limit price and raise the costs of competing, they also unlock 
markets, reduce regulation, handicap rivals, and generate competitive advantage 
(Baron 1995). The definition of the non-market that we have provided for the 
purposes of this investigation will be that given by the founding father of this 
term Baron (1995, p73), who depicts it to be; 
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''The environment that consists of social, political and legal arrangements that 
structure interactions among companies and their public". 
Bearing in mind Barons definition of the non-market, the focus of this 
investigation will be on the political component of the non-market environment 
and not the other two components. The choice of the politics was based on the 
fact that there is still very little literature in strategic management that looks at 
politics and very few studies in corporate political activity that look at the RBV, 
therefore the logical step was to bridge them together and contribute to this gap. 
Figure 3 shows the main focus of this investigation, which will be the political 
facet, but let us try to understand the architectural nature of the non-market in 
more depth, with emphasis on its political features. 
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Figure 3 Firm - market and non-market environment 
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Baron (1995) has made a decade old call for strategy research on the non-market 
environment within strategic management, but strategic management arena still 
remains far more heavily influenced by analytic traditions in economics than in 
the politics. However, the new wave of research from the non-market arena is 
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slowly gaining pace (Hillman et al. 2004; Frynas et al. 2006). Authors have 
acknowledged that the political and legal aspect of the non-market environment 
can create the rules, in many cases their enforcement are both endogenous or 
exogenous and are influenced by the strategic participation of companies in the 
policymaking or legal process (Brink 2004). Corporate strategies to leverage a 
firm's capabilities and resources are often constrained by the non-market 
business environment that includes antitrust institutions, governmental actions to 
reduce market failures (e.g., through information provision requirements, 
regulations and/or standards), ethical consensus, and public sentiment (Coen and 
Grant 2001). 
Indeed we believe that the firm-centered approaches, shown earlier firom the 
RBV, help to explain competitive advantage as they have already generated 
many productive insights, but provide only a partial explanation of the entire 
picture. Their incompleteness, as Pfeffer (1987, pl21) points out, stems from the 
fact that "just as organisations are structured, systems of organisations are 
structured, and there exist institutional elements of these structures that need to 
be attended to in doing either research or practice in the area of strategy." 
Analogous to Pfeffer's ideas, we believe the field of strategic management can 
benefit substantially from taking a more serious inside-organisational view of 
corporate political (lobbying) activities from the non-market environment to 
provide a more complete picture of competitive advantage. 
Let us briefly look at the non-market lobbying activity and structure within the 
European Union (the focus area of this thesis) and its structure. 
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ENTER CORPORATE LOBBYING ACTIVITY: MOVING TOWARDS THE 
LOBBYING CAPABILITY NOTION 
2 .7 CORPORATE LOBBYING ACTIVITY NEXUS AND STRUCTURE 
We have seen that organisations engage in both "market" and "non-market" 
strategies to create shareholder value (Baron 1995, 2001). Two ways of 
understanding non-market activity are (1) "how much" non-market behaviour 
firms are likely to undertake, and (2) whether non-market activity will be done 
individually or collectively within the industry. These questions are important as 
they relate to both firm strategy and the boundaries of the firm. We apply these 
questions to the corporate lobbying activities undertaken by airlines at mainly the 
European Commission, European Parliament and national governments levels 
{Please look at Appendix 4 for an expansion on the components in the policy 
making process). 
The notion of corporate lobbying activity and its value to firms is acknowledged 
in management literature (Baysinger, Keim, and Zeithaml 1985; Getz 1993; 
Hillman and Hitt 1999). It is preconditioned to influence decision shaping and 
decision making (Coen 1998). Baysinger (1984) and Keillor et al. (2005) suggest 
that firms involved in corporate lobbying activities have several motives for 
engaging in political behaviour: (1) domain advantage, (2) domain defense, (3) 
domain maintenance. The implied reason for engaging in political behaviour can 
be a desire to pursue the firm's private interest (i.e. domain advantage), to 
manage public policy that might be at odds with the firm's strategic goals (i.e. 
domain defense), or to influence public policy that might threaten the means by 
which a firm achieves it goals (i.e. domain maintenance). A variety of political 
behaviours can be used to accomplish the firm's overall objective of dealing with 
political issues. These include business-government relations, political 
inducements and contributions and, in this study, overt lobbying (Baysinger and 
Woodman 1982; Baysinger 1984; De Figueiredo and Tiller 2001). The resulting 
benefits to the firm can include reduced environmental uncertainty, reduced 
transaction costs, and increased long-tenn sustainability (Hillman et al. 1999). 
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However one must bear in mind that competing in the non-market political 
context is "not easy as firms must recognize the need for an exchange: they must 
give something valued by public officials in exchange for getting favorable 
policies" (Getz 2002, pp. 318). 
Lobbying, consisting of presenting views, opinions and suggestions to influence 
the institutions (at national and international levels), forms an essential part of a 
democratic process which is at the heart of the European policy making culture 
(Coen 1997). Existing research on lobbying tend to focus on the amount and type 
of lobbying that occurs and has largely omitted the options firms have to 
organise their lobbying, i.e. the process of lobbying fi-om a corporate perspective. 
Since the seminal work of Olson (1965), the literature has focused on the ability 
of individuals and groups to overcome the free-rider problem in creating 
collective action (Sandler and Tschirhart 1980; Bendor and Mookherjee 1987). 
While the collective action literature has much to say about the amount of 
lobbying that occurs, it is less informative when it comes to the organisation of 
lobbying process (Hillman et al. 1999). The theories articulating the fi-ee-rider 
problem do not address whether finns will choose to internalise the lobbying 
function or do it through a common body in a specific type of context. The only 
conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that less lobbying occurs as a 
group when there are collective action problems (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987). 
Lobbying structures vary in Europe at a national and European level. Moreover, 
various institutional arrangements in Europe respond differently to different 
contracting policy uncertainties (Lawton 1996). For instance individual national 
airports, the airport council and an aviation international conference are all used 
by organisations to exert political influence (Lawton 1999). However, the major 
organisational arrangements considered here are trade associations, contract 
lobbyist and lawyers and in-house departments (De Figueiredo and Tiller 2001). 
Each has its own distinct composition that allows it to perform more effectively 
and efficiently under certain conditions. Table 1 presents the main organisational 
forms of lobbying activities that play an integral part in most large EU organisations: 
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Table 1: Organisational Forms of lobbying structures 
We believe that there are three important factors which determine the fmns' 
choice in designing the organisational fonn for their lobby activities. Size is the 
first important factor with regards to the lobby activities of companies (Hillman 
et al. 2004). It is assumed that whereas large players have enough resources to 
undertake individual lobbying, smaller actors often have to rely on collective 
action to be able to undertake political action at different levels in the EU multi-
level system (Coen 1997). The second major factor that determines the 
organisational structure of a firm's lobby operations is its corporate strategy 
(Bonardi et al. 2006). The different market strategies of national niche players 
and large internationally-oriented firms require different political strategies. 
Finally, the institutional environment of the firm is the third important factor to 
study in order to understand the national and European lobbying activities of 
private interests (Baron 1997). A close working relationship between state 
administrative elites and private interests at the national level might, for example, 
create a hierarchical interaction that undermines the incentives of private 
interests for direct European level action. We now proceed to examine the 
organisational lobbying forms with respect to their ability to create high-powered 
incentives in given types of policy contexts. 
2 . 7 . 1 LOBBYING VIA TRADE ASSOCIATIONS 
Trade associations (also known as industry trade groups and industry 
associations) are voluntary associations that combine characteristics of business 
groups, business interest associations (BIA), and interest associations 
(Greenwood 2002)/ Trade associations participating in the government policy 
A collective structure that has developed to provide the centralised information and coordination that may be 
required in unconcentrated industries ' (Pfef fer and Salancik 1978), Associat ions of organisations in the same 
population that formulate product/process standards via trade committees and that publish trade journals . Trade 
associations also undertake marketing campaigns to enhance the industry 's reputation, promote trade fairs at which 
customers and suppliers can gain a sense of the industry 's stability. They are minimalist organisations as they are 
able to operate on low overhead and quickly adapt to changing conditions (Aldrich 1999). 
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process is not something new. This phenomenon has attracted the attention of 
scholars since Arthur Bentley's famous work "The Process of Government" in 
1908, which discussed in detail the influence of trade associations on politics. 
Today, the pluralism of trade groups is even taken as a component of democracy 
in the west (Cohen and Willman 1998; Greenwood 2003; Lyon and Maxwell 
2004). Contemplate first that the trade association is an organisational form for 
legal and lobbying activities (Coen 1997). By trade associations, we mean the 
multi-member industry organisation to which firms fi-om the industry donate 
money to sustain them for the greater benefit of the industry as a whole (Lyon 
and Maxwell 2004). Examples of such in Europe include the Association of 
European Airlines, the British Generics Manufactures Association, European 
Computer Manufacturer's Association and the European Regions Airline 
Association. When the members of an industry give a unified interest in 
particular governmental action, the trade association can amass and unite 
tremendous resources through a common vessel with the purpose of influencing 
governmental outcome (De Figueiredo and Figueiredo 2002). 
When benefits can be made through agent specialisation, or when the revelation 
of proprietary information is needed for effective lobbying, the trade association 
may become less appealing as an organisational choice. First, specialisation of 
the trade association as an agent for the firm is unlikely. The trade association is 
made up of many players, each having some say in the activities of the trade 
association (Mack 1990). The trade association morphing to one firm's interest is 
likely to cause deviation with other association members (Mazey and Richardson 
1993). Thus, when an individual finn's lobbying needs can be enhanced by a 
specialised lobbying agent (in-house lobbyist or hired lobbyist), the trade 
association is an unlikely vehicle (De Figueiredo and Tiller 2001). 
2 . 7 . 2 DEPLOYING OUTSIDER LOBBYISTS 
Another organisational choice for lobbying and legal needs is to hire outside 
lawyers or professional lobbyists for such services (Greenwood 2002). One gain 
this offers over the reliance upon a trade association is that the lawyers or 
lobbyists are agents for the principal business firm and, as such, contracted to 
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work for the interests of that client company only. Indeed, there is much greater 
control for the firm over the strategies and performance of the lawyers and 
lobbyists than if the trade association were handling the effort (Mack 1990). The 
market incentives for the contracted agent are also extremely high. The profits 
(for work done efficiently) or the overstated returns from the contingent fees (for 
work done successfully in the case of lawyering) accrue to the agent, thus 
creating an incentive for the agent to perform more efficiently. The incentive to 
specialise is greater in repeated transactions than in one-shot transactions. 
However, weak loyalty may be of concern in this contractual relationship. 
Although confidentiality agreements can be raised to provide some security, they 
are often costly or difficult to put into effect. Furthermore, in the quest for 
business from future clients, the agent may consciously or unconsciously 
disclose knowledge gained to other competitors (De Figueiredo and De 
Figueiredo 2002). 
2 . 7 . 3 DEPLOYING INSIDER LOBBYISTS 
Finally, the firm could choose to organise the legal or lobbying activities "inside" 
the firm itself by setting up a legal or government affairs department (Baysinger 
and Woodman 1982; Cohen and Willman 1998; Broscheid and Coen 2004). 
Here, the motivation for the agent and firm to have a close relationship is much 
higher, because the employment relationship is stronger than in outside contract 
relationships (Bennett 1999). Moreover, this employment relationship provides 
the firm with a high degree of control over its lawyers and lobbyists behaviour 
(Baysinger and Woodman 1982) and the firm's management is in a better 
position to monitor their activities. As the agent works solely for the firm, loss of 
proprietary information becomes less of a problem (Cohen and Willman 1998). 
There are trade-offs in this form of organisation. In addition to muted incentives, 
the managerial costs to the firm are relatively high, as they must sustain a legal or 
government affairs department and its associated administrative costs. If the use 
of lawyers and lobbyists is few and far between, the costs of internalising these 
functions are most likely too troublesome to take on. 
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2.8 CONTENT OF CORPORATE LOBBYING ACTIVITY 
Lobbying activities are realised actions of a firm with the aim to promote or 
maintain the competitiveness of a firm, and therefore, political activity and a 
related strategy are seen as an integral part of corporate competitive strategy 
(Epstein 1969; Gale and Buckholz 1987; Schuler and Rehbein 1997; Hillman, 
Zarkhoodi and Biermann 1999; Shaffer et al. 2000). In order to describe and 
analyse the corporate lobbying activity process in the political system, it is 
essential to understand corporate lobbying activity content (De Figueiredo and 
De Figueiredo 2002), as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: The content of corporate political strategy 
a m 
Individu 
lobbying 
Strategy to influence 
Co-operative strategy 
Executive lobbying Infonnation-oriented 
strategy 
ection funding Pressure-oriented strategy 
Coalition building - Issue-by-issue strategy 
Advocacy advertising 
The content of the corporate political strategy is here understood as 
configurations of different kinds of political tactics, which in turn can have two 
characteristics that are here called procedures (Table 2). The procedures depict 
the nature of actions, i.e. what is the aim of a particular action. The procedures 
included in the framework are collected from the existing research literature 
concerning corporate political activity (Hillman et al. 1999). The literature on 
lobbying strategy content aims to perceive strategy configurations that represent 
common, thematically driven alignments of elements and dimensions (Getz 
1997). Besides the descriptive elements, constructing the configurations of 
corporate lobbying strategy and tactics provides the framework for understanding 
- 4 4 
"Lobbying Capability" 
lobbying capability development, since the analysis reveals the most dominant 
lobbying processes and routines are still not understood in the current literature. 
By categorising each of the observed political moves it is possible to recognise 
the patterns of actions (for example, to perceive if an airline has favoured 
individual lobbying strategy over collective lobbying action), and thereby 
construct a comprehensive picture of corporate lobbying activities. Moreover, 
when the political moves (events) are ordered through time, it is possible to 
distinguish temporal variations in the amount and nature of lobbying activity. 
2 . 9 RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND CORPORATE LOBBYING ACTIVITY 
We have seen earlier that the literature on the firm-level corporate lobbying 
activity (or what some authors call corporate political activity) is the focus of 
scholarly work utilising assumptions about firm strategies. Management scholars 
emphasise strategic choice and assume that senior managers choose to engage in 
political activity to enhance the value of the firm, and that these choices depend 
largely upon such firm-specific factors as capabilities that deploy resources, size, 
and dependence on government contracts (Hillman et al. 2004). The recent shift 
of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm into studies of corporate lobbying 
activity (e.g., Keim 2001; McWilliams et al. 2002) has heightened the focus on 
firm-strategic factors. Researchers from economics- and political science who 
take on the "profit maximizing" approach (e.g., Mitchell, Hansen and Jepsen, 
1997, pi098), typically presume that a firm is a "black-box" value maximiser 
and will routinely connect in corporate political activity given certain firm 
characteristics. However, even some scholars from this arena admit that 
organisations still have a fair amount of discretion over their choice of lobbying 
activifies (Caldeira, et al. 2000), and how they configure their lobbying 
capabilities and political resources (Holbum 2001). 
Consequently, the interest in corporate lobbying acfivities is accompanied by 
parallel interest in a firm's stock of political resources and capabilities 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994, Holbum 2001). For instance, Boddewyn (1993) 
highlighted the importance of understanding the development and exercise of 
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resources as well as their availability and use in the non-market environment. 
Just as leaders take advantage of economic resources and capabilities in their 
market environment, the execution of corporate lobbying strategies in their non-
market environment requires a better understanding of political resources and 
lobbying capabilities as they help sustain competitive advantage. 
2 . 9 . 1 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND A LOBBYING CAPABILITY 
As seen earlier, the term dynamic capabilities emphasises two aspects seldom 
discussed in previous strategy perspectives (Teece et al. 1997). The term 
'dynamic' refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve 
congruence with the changing business environment. The term 'capabilities' 
emphasises the key role of strategic management in appropriately "adapting, 
integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organisational skills, 
resources, and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing 
environment" (Teece et al. 1997, p515). Thus, according to this framework 
dynamic capabilities combine flexibility, which enable finns to change, with 
constraints, which derive from these finns histories. 
We believe that a lobbying capability has always been an important dynamic 
organisational capability used by large organisations within the oil industry 
(Frynas et al., 2006) to airline industry (Brown 1987) to the telecommunication 
industry for decades (Yoffie 1988). Industries like the airline industry have 
always had dynamic non-market environments. However, academia has 
neglected to explain how lobbying capabilities are developed by organisations as 
a strategic capability. What is more, there is no agreed definition within 
academia to a lobbying capability. Gertz (1997) describes it loosely as every 
deliberate attempt of a finii to influence political decision-making. However, in 
this thesis, using Teece et al. (1997); Getz (1997); Eisenhardt and Martin (2000); 
Holbum (2001); Sirmon et al. 2007 and Bonardi et al. (2007) ideas, we shall 
describe a lobbying capability as the following: 
The corporate political processes - specifically the combination or 
sequence routines in which managers work together to leverage and 
deploy resources - that use resources to match or even create non-market 
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change. Moreover, lobbying capabilities are the organisational and 
strategic routines by which senior representatives or acting 
representatives achieve influence to match or even create non-market 
change in the corporate political environment. 
Looking at the definition more closely, and using our words we believe that 
lobbying capabilities are the combination or sequence of processes/routines that 
have the potential to consistently achieve outputs matching the organisational 
strategic intent. They consist of routines that enable firms to deploy and leverage 
political resources to manage and influence (i.e. deploying information to 
decision makers or leveraging network resources to influence) the dynamic 
public policy environment.^^ Lobbying capabilities are specific to the jurisdiction 
in which the firm operates and allow the firm to configure corporate political 
strategy to fit the context of a particular situation (Holbum 2001). Lobbying 
capabilities include the networks of relationships between corporate employees 
and national and local political, regulatory, legal, and interest group actors who 
influence public policy and these capabilities are based on the firm's experience 
in a specific country (Coen 1997, 1998; Holbum 2001). They include the 
aptitude to find political preferences and patterns of behaviour in different types 
of institutional environment, to correctly assess the source and nature of 
expropriation hazards and to successfully negotiate with political and regulatory 
actors (Holbum 2001; Bonardi et al. 2007). 
2 . 9 . 2 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND A LOBBYING CAPABILITY 
Having now defined a lobbying capability, let us now understand its relationship 
with political resources. Previous research has shown us that a set of resources, 
not equally available to all firms, and their combination into skills and 
capabilities, are a precondition for sustained superior returns (Barney 1991). The 
idea of skills and resources used by the firm to manage its political environment 
is not recent. Fainsod (1940) suggested that an industry obtains a favourable 
regulation by its capacity to mobilise three kinds of resources: financial (political 
^ Deploying a resource here refers to releasing the political resource to create value for the 
owners (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) 
' Leveraging on resources here refers to the using the political resource to create value for the 
owners (Sirmon et al. 2007) 
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campaign financing), human (the use of lobbyist and lawyers), political (political 
coalition-building). The idea of mobilising specific political resources and skills 
was also mentioned by Leone (1977), while Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985) spoke 
of the accumulation by a firm of political capital. Within political affairs 
literature, the notion of political resources, which help create lobbying 
capabilities, have been indirectly suggested but the theory and empirical 
evidence in the development processes are still underdeveloped (Dahan 2005). 
Attempts have been made at applying RBV concepts to the public policy arena 
(McWilliam et al. 2002). However, the term political resources has caused much 
confusion. Recently, Dehan (2005) tried admirably to conceptualise "political 
resources" but stopped slightly short of providing substantial empirical 
evidence^. However, bearing Dehan's (2005) and Barney's (1991) ideas on 
resources and political resources in mind, we conceptualise political resources 
for the purpose of analysis as being divided into three categories.- network capital 
resources (i.e. access to specific people within the network), human capital 
resource (i.e. skills of individual employees, training, experience, intelligence, 
relationships and so forth) and organisational capital resource (i.e. formal 
reporting, structure, planning, coordinating systems and so forth). However 
caution must be given here, as these definitions do not have empirical 
underpinnings. These early definitions will allow us to easily map out the 
lobbying capability development process and will give the analysis section more 
structure in identifying interaction effects between political resources and 
lobbying capabilities not previously understood. However, we will attempt to 
clearly define political resources in the theoretical discussion chapter. 
The idea of resources as being inputs to capabilities is evident (Winter 2003). 
According to Coen (1997), developing lobbying and resource accumulation in 
specific contexts implies that the impact of a policy will be unequal across 
® The political resource idea is a firm-specific resource from a political view that is embedded 
within the firm's employees - for example, the in-depth knowledge of particular political systems 
which rely on the coordinated action of multiple employees. Political resources can include 
access to legislators, officeholders in public institutions or prior experience in dealing with public 
institutions that are specific to the non-market environment (Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985; Dehan 
2005). 
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different firms. Firms with differing resource bases and lobbying activities with 
which to manage their non-market environment will develop different responses 
to expectations about the profitability and investments in political situations (Lo 
2003). How, why and whether firms develop their lobbying capabilities in 
different policy contexts using specific political resources will be important to 
understand the interaction effects and broadly the notion of sustainable 
competitive advantage. 
2.9.2.1 NETWORKS AS A RESOURCE 
Social capital or what we would like to call "network capital" has become an 
ubiquitous metaphor in the study of organisations (Finkelstein et al. 2007). The 
compelling metaphor embodied in the notion of political resource is implicitly or 
explicitly present in various research streams that focus on how social ties 
enhance actor's ability to attain their goals. Previous studies have shown that 
political networks can facilitate access to information, resources, and 
opportunities (Campbell et al. 1986; Podolny 2001). Thus, actors with networks 
rich in political capital should have privileged access to resources and 
information and should be better at leading, organising, and mobilising others 
actors towards collective goals. 
Network capital, which came fi-om the term "social capital", is a common 
metaphor in the study of how social networks can create advantage for 
individuals and organisations (Burt 1997). Beyond differences in emphasis, most 
treatments coincide with a general definition of network capital "a.s the resources 
that an individual or a group can access through his contact network'. Political 
network capital is viewed as being social capital but firom the political aspect of 
the non-market. We define it as "how political networks that can create 
advantage for individuals and organisations. Moreover, political network capital 
is a resource that an individual or a group can access through his contact 
network". 
Building on this metaphor, early research on social capital focused on the value 
of relationships as conduits of information and channels to access resources or 
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social support (Lin, Ensel and Vaughn 1981). Consistent with the emphasis on 
networks, this research will emphasise the strength of the tie between political 
resources and the top management team, with the theory focusing on the effects 
of tie-in facilitating or hindering access to the appropriate information and 
resources (Bouwen 2002). 
In this thesis, we aim in a careful way to conceptualise the context in which 
actors operate along the dimensions of policy, namely how the top management 
access the resources and information to minimise policy uncertainty. In addition, 
we will look at how the top management controls those resources and decision 
making to develop their lobbying. 
2 . 1 0 CORPORATE POLITICAL LOBBYING IN THE AVIATION INDUSTRY 
As already seen, governments represent major sources of uncertainty for firms 
because they often control critical resources and opportunities that shape firms' 
industry and competitive environments (Jacobson et al. 1993; Baron, 1995). As a 
result, many firms engage in 'political strategies': proactive or reactive actions to 
affect the public policy environment in a way favourable to the firm (Baysinger, 
1984). 
Despite the acknowledged importance of governments to airlines (Brown 1997; 
Lawton 2002), which is the industry focus of this study, the state of scholarly 
knowledge about airline lobbying processes remains scant when compared with 
research on strategies for the economic marketplace (Brown 1997). Grosse and 
Behrman (1992) argue that theories that fail to incorporate the political activities 
of organisations take the "national" out of "international" and leave the 
analysis "as a simple extension of firm and market theories" (1992, p97). On the 
other hand, management and public policy literature has focused on 
multinational enterprise (MNE) - host government negotiations regarding initial 
entry into a country (Coen and Heritier 2000), but little research is directed 
towards how companies develop these corporate lobbying capabilities. 
The European airline industry has traditionally had a strong natural relationship 
with national governments (Pedler and Van Schendelen 1994; Staniland 2003). 
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This close link has been a direct consequence of the traditional ownership by 
national governments of airline companies. Airlines are only allowed to operate 
on the basis of a strictly regulated system of licenses, provision of which is 
determined under technical, economic and aviation politics criteria. For instance, 
even with the coming into effect of the European internal market on 1®' January 
1993, possession of a technical and economic license to operate remains a 
necessity within the EU (Pedler and Van Schendelen 1994). For international air 
routes outside the EU, in addition to possession of a license from the country of 
destination, the mutual granting of licenses is regulated internationally by means 
of bilateral agreements with other countries. Almost every airline of any size has 
a Public Affairs department, a Foreign Relations department or an Aeropolitical 
Affairs department. The operations carried out within these departments are 
public affairs activities and were so even before the term existed within 
management processes, although they were exclusively directed at the 
preservation and expansion of airlines and traffic rights (De Figueiredo and 
Emerson 2001). 
Until a few years ago, systematic cultivation of government contacts by airlines 
was principally undertaken with a view to the acquisition and maintenance of 
traffic rights. The promotion of other international, political interests was the 
responsibility of government and in the case of most countries was looked after 
by a Ministry of Transport (Lawton 1999). However, much of this changed in the 
mid-1980s, when a number of national governments in Europe relinquished their 
majority holdings in their national airlines and European airlines were 
consequently forced to adopt a more efficient and market-oriented policy, 
involving increased competition throughout the world. The liberalisation of the 
European aviation industry, which gradually came about after 1987, acted as a 
catalyst for this process (Kyrou 2000). Airlines started acting more and more like 
normal commercial undertakings, having to promote their political interests as 
part of their corporate strategy and conduct their own public affairs. They soon 
became aware that there were many other areas where, in their own interest, 
government relations had to be maintained, and especially that a systematic 
approach can in time deliver advantages for the operation of the business. 
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2 . 1 1 CONTRASTING POLICY CONTEXT AND CONDITIONS 
Contextual conditions establish the parameters under which a theory may be 
considered valid or false (Popper 1968; Bacharach 1989; Whetten 1989; King et 
al. 1994). They identify the contingencies under which bodies of strategy 
knowledge may be more or less actionable (Priem and Butler 2001). In a 
knowledge economy, existing theory is posited to be irrelevant due to 
increasingly high velocity business environments (D'Aveni 1994; Prahalad and 
Hamel 1994) and the rise of strategic decision making as a key source of 
competitive advantage (Courtney et al. 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This 
thesis therefore draws together the various challenges for the application of 
strategy theory into two key non-market contextual conditions: endogenous and 
exogenous policy contexts. These types of policy environments have specific 
implications for the practical relevance of the resource-based view of strategy 
theory. As such they constitute important contextual conditions with which to 
formulate falsifiable propositions about the practical validity of strategy theory in 
a knowledge economy (Bacharach 1989; Priem and Butler 2001; Whetten 1989). 
Bearing in mind the condition types, Baum and Singh (1994) and Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) propose a co-evolutionary approach to the analysis of change. It 
assumes that organisations, industries (populations), and environments 
(institutional and extra institutional) co-evolve and their rate, pace and patterns of 
change are distinct and interdependent. Co-evolutionary approach aims to inquire 
into how the structure of direct interactions and feedback within organisation-
environment system gives rise to the dynamic behaviour of that system. This 
approach can also benefit the non-market policy environment. 
The non-market policy environment has two types of categorisations, which we 
define as an endogenous or exogenous policy context. The endogenous context is 
one in which the organisation is expectedly confi-onted by policy decisions, 
stakeholders or actions within a non-market political system i.e. a deregulafion 
context (Kim and Prescott 2005). On the other hand the exogenous policy 
context is one which the organisation is unexpectedly confronted by policy 
decisions or stakeholders within a non-market political system. The reason for 
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this choice will be explained in more detail in the methodology chapter, but it 
was mainly because of the highly influential nature of recent events, allowing us 
to really capture development. These contrasting policy contexts are shown 
below. 
Endogenous policy-Deregulation (1985-1997 ) 
4- Exogenous policy- Post 9/11 terrorist attacks policy issues (2001-
2005) 
Other examples of endogenous policy contexts include environmental policy 
issues like cutting carbon dioxide, noise pollution policy, lost luggage 
replacement policies and so forth. While examples of exogenous policy contexts 
could include the likes of unexpected policy issues from SARs flu (pandemics) 
or wars. As such, our perspective on poHcy contexts is built on Brink (2004, p23) 
who describes a policy context as "the basic set of policies forming the 
foundation of public laws". 
These two contrasting policy context types recognise strategy process and time 
process issues. These process approaches recognise that the world changes fast 
and that there is much about the policy environment in which one is operating 
that is not known. Given this, pohcy processes cannot be a simple matter of 
designing and implementing definitive blueprints. 'Policymakers' need to admit 
that they are dealing with provisional knowledge, and aims and methods need to 
be tested and re-evaluated along the way. What looked like the right policy goal 
and method a year or a month ago may not be so further down the line. Therefore 
new voices and influences may emerge to align the policy with the current non-
market environment. 
The two contrasting policy contexts suggest that the spaces in which engagement 
in the policy process is likely to happen will vary due to the dynamic nature of 
the policy type. Different balances will need to be struck between building voice 
and decisions in lobbying at the bottom, and increasing responsiveness at the top. 
This depends on whether there is bureaucratic capacity, lobbying capabilities and 
political resources. In one place supporting the government may be possible and 
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an option, in another it may be that there exist more subtle ways of creating voice 
for personal interest with the government. 
The two policy contexts will be looked at more closely in the next literature 
review chapter that will investigate the industry dynamics in more detail. 
However, let us look at policy theory more closely. 
2.11.1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE ON POLICY 
Political Economy (PE) scholars have already recognised this potential and 
leveraged their knowledge of the policymaking process to make significant 
contributions to the study of non-market strategy. Consistent with their 
disciplinary orientation, these scholars begin with the assumption that 
policymakers are rational actors who pursue their own self-interest and are 
capable of making complex, sophisticated calculations using all available data. 
The interest group politics perspective in PE (Olson 1965; Wilson 1980; Denzau 
and Munger 1986; Snyder 1992; Baron 1994, 2001) focuses on the demand for 
policy. An interest group seeking a specific policy may 'purchase' that policy by 
supplying a policymaker with a greater level of electoral support in the form of 
campaign contributions and votes than do the interest groups that oppose the 
policy. More concentrated interest groups win out over less concentrated ones 
because members of the former receive higher net benefits per head from 
attaining their preferred policy and also suffer from a lower incidence of free-
riding. As a result, business interests typically prevail over consumers, who are 
relatively diffuse and poorly organised (Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971). 
The literature on structure-induced equilibrium focuses on the supply of policy. 
Scholars working in this area accept the tenets of the interest group politics 
perspective but use game-theoretic analysis to combine to it the role that political 
structures such as the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government 
play in the formal policymaking process (McNoll 1987). Subsequently, Gilligan 
et al. (1989) explain that specific features of these structures, such as voting 
rules, partisan composition, committee and agency jurisdiction, and veto 
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thresholds, determine the range of feasible policy outcomes that can result from 
the process. 
Together, structure-induced equilibrium literature has shaped much of the 
existing thinking on non-market strategy. The outcome of non-market 
competition among interest groups, including firms, is viewed as depending 
exclusively on the configuration of economic interests and formal political 
institutions. That unorganised groups, the public at large, are weak to affect 
policy on their own frequently assumes the status of a stylised fact (Denzau and 
Munger, 1986). But firms assess the range of feasible poUcy options, identify 
pivotal political actors to support (i.e. those with the greatest ability to influence 
policy outcomes) and determine optimal campaign donation levels (Holbum and 
Vanden Bergh 2002), presumably by undertaking equilibrium analysis based on 
information about the derived policy preferences of individual policymakers and 
the structure of formal policymaking institutions. 
A third body of literature builds on these insights to consider more traditional 
choices of interest in the study of organisational strategy. Specifically, this 
literature examines how cross-sectional variation in formal political institutions 
affects the location of investment (Henisz and Delios 2001), entry mode (Henisz 
2000; Oxley 1999) and investment sequencing (Delios and Henisz 2003). Even 
though this nascent body of work does not fall strictly into the field of non-
market strategy under the definition that we have adopted above, it is clearly of 
relevance to strategic management scholars. Of particular interest is recent work 
examining the differential impact of formal political institutional configurations 
on firms possessing varying levels of experience with specific types of 
configurations (Delios and Henisz 2003). 
2 . 1 2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To summarise from the above literature review, we have gone on a quest to 
understand the current literature that has looked at the notions of dynamic 
resource-based view, capability development, performance enhancement and 
heterogeneity (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). An 
attempt has been made to 'critically' evaluate some of the most influential 
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theories, explaining the holy grail of competitive advantage. We try to draw from 
the RBV, cross fertilised with corporate political activity and lobbying literature, 
to conceptualise political resources and lobbying capabilities. Moreover, we 
highlight implicitly the importance of understanding the lobbying capability 
development process in two specific contrasting policy contexts. 
Based on the sometimes neglected insights of corporate political activity theory 
and empirical research, we argue that a more realistic, theoretically valid, and 
empirically accurate view is needed to understand the foundations of competitive 
advantage. Moreover, a link between dynamic capabilities and corporate 
lobbying activity must be made. Recent literature on dynamic capabilities has 
included well-known organisational and strategic processes like alliances and 
product development whose strategic value lies in their ability to manipulate 
resources into value-creating strategies (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000), but we 
believe all these strategy scholars are missing specific types of dynamic 
capabilities and how they are developed, i.e. in our case developing lobbying 
capabilities in given policy contexts. 
Correspondingly, lobbying capabilities are the foundations of how firms deploy 
and lever their political resources in the non-market. Their broad structural 
patterns vary with non-market dynamism, including the robust, grooved routines 
in dynamic non-market contexts that can be exogenous or endogenous. Dynamic 
capabilities encounter a boundary condition in non-markets where the duration of 
that specific capability is inherently unpredictable and depends on the context. 
These unpredictable phenomena are however socially complex and ambiguous in 
nature, thus a more prescriptive argument is needed for improving and extending 
dynamic capability view and more broadly the RBV (by understanding lobbying 
capabilities). It is hoped that this inductive conceived study will contribute to the 
dynamic theory of strategy. This study will be an incremental step towards this 
goal. 
From the review of the theoretical and empirical work on dynamic capabilities 
and corporate lobbying, several important questions emerge that are in need of 
further theoretical development. First, we need to better understand the relative 
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importance of "what" types lobbying routines/processes are developed and more 
importantly "how and why" these lobbying routines/processes are developed in 
certain ways within specific contexts, where we need to examine systematically 
the relative importance of internal ("organisational push/proactive behaviour") 
versus external ("non-market pull/reactive behaviour") factors in developing 
lobbying capabilities. The latter will enable us to understand the degree to which 
a lobbying capability relies and develops in conjunction with the policy context. 
Second, we need to focus on the role of the senior management and their 
decision making in the development process of a lobbying capability in order to 
understand the micro-foundations of lobbying capability development. Finally, 
we focus on the cormection between the capability development to the policy 
contexts. 
To summarise, firstly our work attempts to contribute to the RBV and CPA, by 
marrying them together and then explicating the nature of dynamic lobbying 
capabilities in a way that is realistic, empirically valid, and non-tautological. 
Secondly, our work attempts to clarify the RBV's logic of the antecedents of 
lobbying capabilities, political resources, and competitive advantage. Thirdly, 
our work will aim to understand the micro attributes of lobbying capabilities 
which play an important role in the strategy process. Fourthly, dynamic 
capabilities are necessary, but we suggest a boundary condition is needed in all 
studies i.e. in our case we use the endogenous and exogenous policy context to 
capture the development of lobbying capabilities. We recognise that the RBV 
breaks down in changing markets, and moreover, that extant literature always 
misses the changing non-market environment, where time is an essential aspect 
of strategy. Finally, our work will aim to extend the future research agenda, and 
provide broader questions related to the impact of micro sources on 
organisational capabilities. Let us now look at the airline industry and the two 
chosen policy contexts in more detail. 
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SETTING THE SCENE-
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Before discussing our empirical approach, we will briefly outline the chosen 
industry for this investigation. Thereafter we will aim to look at the two selected 
policy contexts of our chosen industry. From here we will seek to look at some of 
the reasons why the industry focus provides a beneficial setting for examining 
non-market strategy and lobbying capability development. We will present this 
chapter chronologically to allow the reader to understand and appreciate the 
dynamics and history of this fascinating industry and the two chosen contexts for 
study. 
3 . 1 INTRODUCTION 
Travel has existed since the start of time. Ancient history speaks of a time when 
people travelled for trade, migration, religion, economic benefits or war. 
Moreover, travel has grown continually since World War 2 and recorded history 
demonstrates traits that can still be observed nowadays, especially in light of 
developments of air transport. Nonetheless, air travel and policy are very distinct 
twentieth century issues (Sochor 1991; Williams 1993). The real rise in 
international development of countries started after the creation of commercial 
airlines during World War 2 and the emergence of the jet aircraft in the 1950's 
(Theobald 1998). 
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The airline industry, the focus sector of this study, is a fascinating and complex 
industry. Airlines have traditionally had a strong natural relationship with their 
own national governments (Pedler and Van Schendelen 1994).' This close link 
has been a direct consequence of the traditional involvement of national 
governments in the aviation industry. As a result, air transport became 
intrinsically linked with foreign policy considerations. Commonly, one of the 
first actions of newly de-colonised states was the establishment of a publicly 
subsidised, national airline. The creation of a "flag carrier" airline was seen, and 
continues to be seen by many states as a crucial element in creating a national 
identity. 
In short, for decades flag carrier airlines have been engaged in government 
affairs as part of their long-term strategy. Forecasts are made of what new 
licenses are necessary, based on long-term expansion plans, and what existing 
licenses will be retained at all costs (Pedler and Van Schendelen 1994). 
Networks of contacts and coalition partners have therefore been systematically 
maintained by flag carriers. Moreover, these networks are developed in the 
various countries that form part of the desired route net. Political developments 
have been followed closely, and opportunities created, with the object of 
ensuring political domain advantage, domain defense or political domain 
maintenance. 
Notwithstanding the fact that governments impact upon airlines, this industry is 
also viewed to be cyclical in nature with times of high and low profits due to 
political and economics factors. Indeed, this industry has faced a severe decline 
over the last 15 years (Doganis 2001). During early 1990's, the first Gulf War 
and the economic recession indubitably had a negative impact on air travel 
(Hanion 1999). Thereafter it returned to profits between 1994 and 1998 due to 
deregulation, when lots of people started flying with cheaper fares, before the 
industry returned again to hard challenges fi-om 1999-2005. The problems in 
Asia in late 90's, the 9/11 attacks, the fear of subsequent terrorist attacks, the 
Apart from the issue of the granting of licences, their relationship with government has also been 
important for national airlines because of the majority holding which most national governments have held 
in the share capital of their flag carriers. 
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Afghanistan war, the SARS phenomenon, the second Gulf War and the slump in 
the world economy all had a negative effect on the air travel industry (Harrington 
et al. 2005), as shown below in Figure A? A significant upturn occurred in the 
third and fourth quarters in 2003 (AEA Annual Report 2004). 
Figure 4: Profit/Loss on total scheduled routes 
PROFIT / LOSS ON TOTAL SCHEDULED ROUTES 
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The airline industry has changed immensely over the last 15 years with 
deregulation in Europe allowing the emergence of low cost airlines in the short 
haul sector. This dramatic change is due to several variables like cost, capacity, 
demand and legislation, which can be seen in Figure 5 (adapted from Forsyth et 
al. 2005). This research will focus on two air transport policy contexts that 
affected "flag airlines" instead of the other factors, mainly because there is a lack 
of empirical studies conducted from a RBV perspective that look at policy and 
lobbying capabilities. 
^ The outcome of 9/11 has been a severe financial crisis for most major European carriers with 
Sabena and Swiss Air going bankrupt. 
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Figure 5: Most important factors influencing Air Travel 
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All the above factors have been detrimental to the airline industry, which is now 
going through a major phase for transformation (Harrington et al. 2005)/ 
Declining profits and passenger numbers have forced many large airline 
companies to reduce costs by slashing their workforce and eliminating 
unprofitable routes. Additional factors have included the recent increase in oil 
prices that have caused further troubles for the airline sector. 
3 . 2 SETTING THE SCENE: AIRLINE INDUSTRY-PAST AND PRESENT 
Air transport is a major industry that is vital for maintaining a healthy economy. 
It is the fastest growing mode of transport for both passengers and freight. It is 
also the largest employer of labour and at the forefront of many technological 
developments, and is often a pioneer in adopting such innovations. It is the 
source of important economic stimuli for local economic developments and it 
often provides essential long distance access for more peripheral areas. It is 
^ Carriers such as Swiss Air went from being bankrupt to being saved from the brink of closure 
by being acquired by Lufthansa, whereas other national airlines such as Aer Lingus have now 
adopted the low cost model (Harington et al. 2005). Airlines such as British Airways, KLM, Air 
France and Austrianair have done well. On the contrary, the low cost carriers such as Ryanair and 
Easyjet have been quite profitable with healthy growth margins all the way (Easyjet 2005 Annual 
Report). Amongst the other entrants in the low cost carriers, many have not reported their results. 
Airlines like Flybe, German wings. Air Berlin, and BMI baby have all experienced losses 
(Lawton 2002). 
For further expansion please visit http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/soe/cpd/atm-finance.htm. 
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therefore central to the globalisation taking place in many other industries 
(Doganis 2001), its role being that of a facilitator to the economic system. At the 
same time it is a maturing industry. It is by most measures the safest way to 
travel and there are continual technological and managerial developments to 
reduce any adverse environmental effects. 
Travel for both business and leisure purposes grew strongly worldwide. 
Scheduled airlines carried 1.5 billion passengers last year (AEA Annual report 
2005). In the leisure market, the availability of large aircraft such as the Boeing 
747 made it convenient and affordable for people to travel further to new and 
exotic destinations (AEA Annual report 2004). Governments in developing 
countries realised the benefits of tourism to their national economies and spurred 
the development of resorts and infrastructure to lure tourists from the prosperous 
countries in Western Europe and North America. As the economies of 
developing countries grow, their own citizens are already becoming the new 
international tourists of the fiiture.^ 
Airlines' profitability is closely tied to economic growth and frade respectively. 
However, during the first half of the 1990's, the industry suffered not only from 
world recession but was fiirther depressed by the Gulf War. In 1991 the number 
of international passengers dropped for the first time. The financial difficulties 
were exacerbated by airlines over-ordering aircraft in the boom years of the late 
1980's, leading to significant excess capacity in the market. lATA's member 
airlines suffered cumulative net losses of $20.4bn from 1990 to 1994 (AEA 
Annual Report 2004).^ 
The International Air Transport Association (lATA Annual report 2005), 
forecasts international air travel to grow by an average of 6.6% a year to the end 
^ Business travel has also grown as companies become increasingly international in terms of their 
investments, supply and production chains and customers. The rapid growth of world trade in 
goods and services and international direct investment has also contributed to growth in business 
travel. 
® lATA airlines' profits were $5bn in 1996, less than 2% of total revenues (lATA Annual report 
2000). This is below the level lATA believes is necessary for airlines to reduce their debt, build 
reserves and sustain investment levels. 
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of the decade. In Europe and North America, where the air travel market is 
already highly developed, slower growth of 4%-6% is expected. The most 
dynamic growth is centred on the Asia/Pacific region, where fast-growing trade 
and investment are coupled with rising domestic prosperity. Air travel for the 
region has been rising by up to 9% a year and is forecast to continue to grow 
rapidly till 2015. In terms of total passenger trips, however, the main air travel 
markets of the future will continue to be in and between Europe, North America 
and Asia. 
3 . 3 EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY-PAST AND PRESENT 
The European airlines have had a very remarkable past. The European Union 
(EU) was initially slow to embody air transport in its Common Transport Policy 
(CTP). Tliis in part reflected the still relatively small role it played in economic 
interactions in Europe in the 1950's and 1960's (Hanion 1999; Kyrou 2000). 
That situation changed significantly in the late 1980's and 1990's when 
increasingly national policies for air transport were brought within the broader 
framework of EU policy. The need for a coordinated infrastructure policy, 
especially regarding air traffic control, furthered the role of the EU. This process 
is an on-going one as matters of authority over external EU policy continue to be 
debated. The aim of this part is to look at the past and cuirent state of European 
airlines - mainly but not exclusively those within the EU and the European 
Economic Area (EEA). It seeks in particular to see the institutional structures 
provided as a basis for the continued vitality of air transport as a facilitator of 
economic developments and an input into wider matters involving political 
decisions within Europe. 
Deregulation was viewed by many EU political decision-makers and some 
specific airlines as the main solution to make this high cost industry more 
efficient (Williams 1993). The US led the way in 1978 and Europe followed suit 
in 1988 by introducing a three packages system to liberalise their industry 
(Brown 1987). The EU's final stage of deregulation took effect in April 1997, 
allowing an airline from one member state to fly passengers within another 
member's domestic market. Beyond Europe too, 'open skies' agreements are 
beginning to dismantle some of the regulations governing which carriers can fly 
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on certain routes. Nevertheless, the EU aviation industry is characterised by 
strong nationalist sentiments towards domestic "flag carriers".^ 
Despite this, the EU airline industry has proceeded along the path towards 
globalisation and consolidation (i.e. KLM and Air France), characteristics 
associated with the normal development of many other industries. It has done 
this through the establishment of alliances and partnerships between airlines, 
linking their networks to expand access to their customers (Doganis 2001). 
Hundreds of airlines have entered into alliances, ranging from marketing 
agreements and code-shares to franchises and equity transfers. 
The Transport industry accounts for over 10% of the EU's GDP and employs 
around 10 million people (Doganis 2005). In the past decade, air travel has 
grown exponentially, as shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Passenger transport by Air within EU 
Passenger transport by mode - EU-25 (1995=100) 
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Source: European commission (1995), white paper on the European transport poHcy, p45 
According to the AEA Annual Report (2004, p.3), "the air traffic in Europe has 
increased by five times since 1970, but the EU air travel market is now highly 
saturated with fierce competition from low cost airlines". Previously, the 
^ In many parts of the world, airlines will therefore continue to face limitations on where they can 
fly and restrictions on their ownership of foreign carriers. 
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European short haul airline sector was dominated by national airlines such as Air 
France, British Airways and Lufthansa where they accounted for over 70% of the 
civilian passenger traffic (Sheehan 2003). However, these national airlines are no 
longer dominant as the free market forces are changing the European short haul 
airline market (Doganis 2005). The low cost airlines model is successful and the 
low cost airlines such as Ryanair and Easyjet are the new breed of airlines that 
offer value for money (Lawton 2003). Also a number of factors are forcing 
airlines to become more efficient. The European Union (EU) has ruled that 
governments should not be allowed to subsidise their loss-making airlines. 
Governments' concerns over their own finances and recognition of the benefits of 
privatisation have led to a gradual transfer of ownership of airlines from the state 
to the private sector (Pedler & Van Schendelen 1994). In order to appeal to 
prospective shareholders, the airlines have to become more efficient and 
competitive. 
3 . 3 . 1 EUROPEAN AIRLINE SCALE EFFECTS 
European airlines differ in terms of their sizes and the extent to which they 
engage in services outside of Europe. European airlines are also small compared 
to their US counterparts. The US has the world's four largest airlines (American, 
United, Delta and Northwest) in terms of passengers carried with Continental and 
US Airways also in the top 10 (Doganis 2005). All of them are active on 
transatlantic routes. Only British Airways, KLM/Air France and Lufthansa are in 
this grouping. This is important because there are debates about the effects of 
scale on airline costs and revenues and while the broad consensus is that while 
pure size is not important beyond a threshold, economies of scope and density -
and on the revenue side, market presence - have relevance. This implies that 
within the overall network served by a carrier there may be significant 
differences in unit costs for individual routes or sub-markets. 
According Basso and Jara-Diaz (2006), although economies of scale in a narrow 
economic sense may not be large, size may be important in other ways. Bigger 
airlines usually have greater reserves and easier access to finance that can be 
important during downturns in their markets, and scale can be of political 
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importance. The extent to which this is impoitant depends on the temporal 
context and the institutional structure of the country. Evidence suggests that 
airlines' unit costs do not fall by a great amount as they expand (Doganis 2005). 
Strictly the evidence indicates that within any city pair market there are rapidly 
declining costs of service but that there are approximately constant returns to 
scale for airline systems that have reached the size of the major carriers. Savings 
come from attracting more traffic rather than expanding the network to cover 
additional origin/destinations. 
Regulatory reforms have seen airlines seeking diversity of service, primarily via 
hub-and-spoke operations. The empirical evidence is not conclusive that this 
generates significant economies of scope. The main difficulties have been in 
isolating scope and scale effects from other aspects of airlines' cost functions. 
Further, a major rationale for hubbing comes from marketing advances (i.e. on 
the demand side). Providing a diverse range of services leads to market visibility 
and makes frequent flyer programs more attractive, thus enhancing customer 
loyalty. These attributes are features of network value or ' 'value of presence and 
utility to [the] customer" (Sheehan 2003). Smaller operators and new market 
enfrants can, however, also enjoy some marketing benefits of diversity by 
forming alliances - British Midland vigorously pursued this approach in the past. 
3 . 4 POLICY CONTEXT 
Consideration of the endogenous (expected/proactive) and exogenous 
(unexpected/reactive) policy contexts in the non-market environment are 
important to an analysis of firm lobbying capabilities development since different 
environments imply different valuations of resources and capabilities (Penrose 
1959). However, little work has been done to assess the effects of firm-specific 
lobbying capabilities in helping the firm manage its resources in a given policy 
context (Ethiraj et al. 2005; Hillman ef al. 2004). As explained earlier, although 
firms in any given industry are likely to face similar types of policy forces, the 
differences in their accumulated political resources and lobbying capability 
endowments (e.g. skills, propensity for learning, specialised assets) could 
become important factors that may influence the development of sources of 
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competitive advantages. Therefore within the framework of our study, we define 
ow chosen policy contexts as the following: 
• Policy context: Our perspective on policy contexts is built on Brink 
(2004, p.23): "The basic policy or set of policies forming the foundation 
of public laws'". 
The chosen exogenous and endogenous policy contexts are "polar types", which 
allow for themes and notions to be better formulated for within case and across 
case analysis (Pettigrew 1997). Furthermore, the time frames for both contexts 
were chosen based on the interviewees who proclaimed that "those dates best 
represented the period in which lobbying was developed" (KLM Government 
Affairs Executive).^ The next part will look more closely at the two chosen 
policy contexts and their definitions. 
3.4.1 ENDOGENOUS POLICY CONTEXT-DEREGULATION (1985-1997)' 
The types of policy contexts are important in understanding lobbying capability 
development. The endogenous policy context is a context where organisations 
have time to react and be proactive in the policy formulation process. There is 
also less uncertainty in this emerging policy context type compared to an 
exogenous policy context type. To be more precise, in this study we define an 
"endogenous policy context" as (adapted from Brink 2004); 
A policy context where the firm has an expected understanding of 
stakeholders, decisions or actions within a political system. As a result, the 
firm lobbies proactively to advance its interests. 
Hence, our chosen endogenous context is the air transport market deregulation 
period, which is viewed as a subset of broader regulatory reform and refers to 
complete or partial elimination of regulation in a sector with the objective of 
improved economic performance (Kim and Frescott 2005). Bearing in mind our 
Interview code E020. 
^ The time frame for the contexts were chosen based on the interviewees who proclaimed that 
"those dates best represented the period in which lobbying was developed". 
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definition of an endogenous policy context, the twin objectives of air transport 
deregulation (in Europe) were fair and open competition (Barrett 1990). 
Air transport deregulation was viewed by many, as a means to integrate Europe 
(Barrett 1990; Lawton 1999). There were several interest-coalition actors that 
played a vital role in deregulating the airline industry, as shown in Figure 7 
below. This policy context was very complex and airlines had to deal not only 
with their national government but also the EU level supranational institutions 
(see Appendix 3 for further expansion). To add to this complexity the airlines 
had to deal with a shift in power from the national to EU level (Lawton 1999). 
Figure 7: Interest-coalition actors for European Airline liberalisation 
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Policy 
/ 
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Source: Adapted from Lawton 1999, p99 
There are also many studies that have looked at the extent to which integration 
has produced a cumulative and irreversible transfer of policy competencies from 
nation states to the European Union level (Wallace 1996; Schmidt 1998). The 
chosen endogenous policy context looks at the deregulation process in 
conjunction with "Europeanisation". The concept of Europeanisation can be 
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understood as the transfer of power from national governments to supranational 
institutions (Cram 1993; Nugent 1995). This shift in authority from the national 
to the EU level signifies a merging, rather then a convergence of European policy 
styles. 
The outcome of the legal challenges and the implicit move to a Single European 
Market forced the Council of Ministers in Europe to take the helm on the 
deregulation policy process, although there were differences between Members 
on the desirability of competition. The Commission decided to increase pressure 
and to instigate proceedings against certain airlines. But, the Council decided that 
the best way to regain control was to agree to introduce deregulation but of a 
kind, and at a pace, of its own choosing (Lawton 1999). 
Hence in 1987 the 'First Package' of three packages was implemented in Europe 
to liberalise air fransport. The basic philosophy of these measures was that 
deregulation would take place in stages, evolution rather than revolution being 
the watchword and workable competition being the objective. In December 1987 
the first 'Package' was agreed by the European Council of Transport Ministers. 
However prior to this date, airlines heard that deregulation was planned, 
therefore many airlines began lobbying government decision makers to make 
their interest heard (Pedler & Van Schendelen 1994). The outcome was the first 
package that introduced more liberal fares into the market and forced the 
abandonment of equal sharing of capacity on routes served by airlines of two 
states at either end of such routes. It also began steps for the entry of new airlines 
by opening up market access (Stasinopoulos 1992). This package acknowledged 
competition articles from the Treaty of Rome, which meant that a large 
proportion of inter-airline agreements were deemed to be anticompetitive and 
hence illegal (Doganis 2001). 
In December 1989 the Council of Transport Ministers returned to the issue of 
deregulation. A 'Second Package' involving more deregulation was entered into 
by the Union. In June 1990 a 'Second Package' of air transport liberalisation 
measures were introduced by the council. This time they loosened the previous 
constraints on price, capacity restrictions and market access (Stasinopoulos 
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1992). On routes above a certain traffic density more flights and airlines were 
permitted. But it was not just the changes in regulation that occurred at this time. 
Immigration and customs controls were lifted and in 1993 a single 'domestic' 
European market was created (Stasinopoulos 1992). This was developed with the 
third 'Package' which created an 'open skies' system whereby airlines firom any 
member state could freely operate anywhere in the EU with full traffic rights. 
The main objective of the European Commission was to introduce 
competitiveness, eliminate barriers that could limit entry, and limit government 
aid to carriers. 
The 'Third Liberalisation Package' was introduced by the European Union (EU) 
on 1 January 1993 and the process of implementation lasted until 1 April 1997 
(Stasinopoulos 1993). With the exception of cabotage rights on purely domestic 
routes (which became available in April 1997), EU airlines gained access to 
other EU markets under its provision (See Appendix 3). Any EU airline could 
operate domestic services within another EU state, so long as domestic routes 
forming part of such services follow on from a flight from the member state in 
which the airline is licensed and so long as passengers on the domestic route do 
not exceed 75% of the airline's capacity on the linked international route (Barrett 
1990). For example, Lufthansa was able to fly Frankfrirt-Milan-Rome, provided 
it did not sell more than 50% of its capacity in Milan, but it was not able to fly 
Milan-Rome until after April 1997 (Doganis 2001). Hence, this third 'Package' 
went ftirther than any of the previous measures to liberalise the European skies 
because it was not merely a bilateral agreement and for the first time allowed 
cross-border majority ownership (Doganis 2001).'^ 
However, the crisis in the early 1990's was particularly acute in the European airline industry. Most 
companies were owned by governments and subject to public policies. Therefore, they were not able to 
compete in an open market. The handicaps of flag carriers were covered by public funds during this period. 
Government aid was subject to certain conditions; for example, aid might be provided as part of a 
restructuring program to restore the long-term viability of a company, and aid could not be used to increase 
capacity. It might be self contained, so aid might be granted once. Companies such as Iberia, Sabena, Air 
Lingus, Tap, Air France, Olympic and Alitalia received subsidies from their governments. 
" The third package was fully implemented between January 1993 and April 1997. This package fully 
opened aerospace to cabotage in April 1997 for European airlines (Pedler & Van Schendelen 1994). It also 
gave companies complete freedom to establish fares and opened doors to purchase ownership of other 
European carriers. Carriers responded to the new market conditions with three main strategies: first, mergers 
and acquisitions, either in domestic or external markets; second, setting up low cost carriers; and third, 
airline alliances (Barrett 1990). 
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Consequently, when the packages were going to be introduced, airlines had time 
to adapt incrementally to the manifestation of this endogenous event by lobbying 
and preparing, as shown in Figure 8. EU Airlines had time to use corporate 
political activities to influence the right people to allow them to develop routes in 
cities like Milan-Rome before other airlines could affect them (Doganis 2005). 
They had time to use different types of influencing routines with their national 
governments and at the EU level to have their needs aligned with their corporate 
strategy. Most national airlines managed to negotiate important routes within the 
EU linking cities that were either national capitals or flag-carrier bases (Barrett 
1990). Thus the lobbying capabilities that airlines had developed during this 
expected period were important in leveraging firm-specific political resources to 
create influence. 
Figure 8: Patterns of Path Development of European Long Haul Airlines 
Change 
Endogenous Rolicies 
1 Incremental Change 
^ Hearing about the deregulation 
^ Imie 
S o u r c e : Adapted from Johnson and Scholes (2002) 
Subsequently in examining the impact of the 'Third Package', the Commission 
of the European Communities found evidence of important consumer benefits. 
These included a rise in the number of routes flown within the EU from 490 to 
520 between 1993 and 1995. Additionally, some 30% of EU routes were served 
by 2 operators and 6% by 3 operators or more. Eighty new airlines had been 
created while only 60 disappeared; fares had fallen on routes where there are at 
least three operators. Overall, after allowance was made for charter operations, 
90%-95% of passengers on intra-Union routes were travelling on reduced fares, 
a caveat being that there were quite significant variations in the patterns of fares 
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charged across routes. Mandel (1999) found that on routes with three or more 
competing airlines (about a third of the total in terms of passengers carried) fares 
fell. 
In this context, the reduction in EU regulation was designed to introduce more 
openness into markets. Initial documents laying the foundations of reform 
brought up issues of contestability and the initiation of low cost point-to-point 
services by new entrants. In many ways these objectives have been met in the 
short term, although not always in the ways that miglit have been envisaged in 
the late 1980's when reform was initiated. They have also been met by carriers 
that have not had a tradition of market competition but have had to rethink their 
approach to service provision as well as restmcture their operations. These 
changes have been more challenging within the EU than those that confronted 
the US domestic carriers after 1978 because of extensive public ownership of 
many flag carriers. 
Let us now look at the exogenous policy context that was one of the most critical 
events in aviation history. 
3 . 4 . 2 EXOGENOUS POLICY CONTEXT -POST SEPTEMBER 11™ ( 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 5 ) 
This perspective on policy context type is built on Brink's (2004, p23) view of a 
type of policy where firms have to react to reduce political uncertainty. We 
develop some of his views by describing an exogenous policy context, within the 
framework of our study, as the following: 
An exogenous policy context is the context where the firm is unexpectedly 
confi-onted by policy decisions, stakeholders or actions within a political 
system. As a result, the firm must react to this policy context to advance 
its interests. 
The chosen context is one in which exogenous policy outcomes came as a result 
of post September ll"" terrorist attacks (2001-2005). It was within this context 
that the airlines came to learn that lobbying the European Commission or 
European Parliament or national government in a reactive manner was vital to 
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sustaining their competitive positions. These lobbying paths were seen to be 
vital, in order to get the compensation to support their growing debts, 
exacerbated by a fall in demand and extra costs associated with new government 
security policies (Kim and Prescott 2005). If the airlines would not lobby, they 
risked receiving less aid which would hinder their competitive positions. 
This policy context is chosen due to our aim of identifying lobbying capability 
development using Pettigrews (1997) "polar type" idea, and also because 
governments forecast that terrorism activity will not disappear in the near future 
but rather escalate (Glasser 2005). Firms in any given industry are likely to face 
the same types of exogenous (unexpected) environmental policy forces. Research 
shows that firms facing unexpected environments can establish joint ventures as 
a means of reducing uncertainty and sharing the risk (Pfeffer and Novak 1976). 
However, past studies on business-environment relationships neglect the political 
arena and it is important to explore further how organisations develop their 
lobbying capabilities in these uncertain contexts. 
According to Harrington et al. (2005) the impact of September ll '^, was 
unquestionably one of the most influential events in the history of air travel (see 
Appendix 5 for an expansion on costs incurred by airlines). Passengers 
abandoned airports in the weeks following the tragedy. The attacks on New York 
City and Washington D C. extended beyond U.S. borders with grave 
ramifications for many European Airlines (Lawton 2003). Soon after 9/11, a 
number of airlines collapsed, many of which had been in existence for decades 
i.e. United, Sabena and Swiss Air. As this unexpected event unfolded it brought 
heavy financial losses for most airlines around the world ($10 billion loss for the 
airline industry in 2002, lATA Annual report 2001), especially the European 
cohort of airlines, (see Table 3). The generic path of most flag carrier airlines and 
how most of these types of airlines were hit is illustrated by Figure 9. The impact 
of this event was mainly commercial but it also had many emerging policy 
implications i.e. security policy, insurance coverage and large issues revolved 
around the compensation package. 
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Table 3: 2002 Operating Profits € 
Lufthansa -226 
Swiss 
-353 
ALitaha -314 
BA -423 
KLM -238 
Olympic -158 
Air France -146 
SAS -70 
Source: Annual reports 
This context had caused comphcations that could not be dealt with using the 
expected domain capabilities. In management literature, various extensions of 
unexpected hazard planning have been proposed and explored, such as 
strategising under uncertainty (Lawrence and Lorsch 1969), with the intention of 
moving planning towards more realistic application to domains. At this stage we 
believe that the dynamic capability extension in the political context is important 
for representing and expressing the notion of continuous processes and 
expressing how firms use lobbying capabilities in responses to these 
exogenous/unexpected situations. 
Figure 9: Patterns for Path Development of European Airlines 
Change 
Exogenous Policy context 
Source: Adapted from Johnson and Scholes (2002) 
Firms in any given industry are likely to face similar types of exogenous 
(unexpected/reactive) and endogenous (expected/proactive) environmental policy 
forces. Research shows that firms facing an unexpected environment usually 
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seek to enhance competitive advantage by leveraging critical capabilities (i.e. 
technology related and marketing-related capabilities) and by improving 
flexibility in response to unexpected technological change. Other authors, like 
Kogut and Zander (1992) and Prahalad and Hamel (1990), have shown that the 
notions of learning, expertise and skill development have only recently been 
considered in the context of developing firm-level competencies that take 
advantage of differences in firm resources and assets to enact the business 
environment. 
3 . 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study comes at a time when many European airlines, like numerous carriers 
in other markets, are experiencing severe downturns in their financial 
performance. This chapter has combined evidence to paint a picture of two 
contrasting policy contexts, where one was an expected policy context that gave 
advance warning of changes to come and the other was a consequence of the 
more immediate repercussions of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New 
York and the Pentagon in Washington. However, we are primarily concerned 
with European air transport and, whilst recognising those periodic shocks and no 
shocks firom policy to the airlines, the study will focus on the more conventional 
lobbying capability development process in these two divergent context types. 
The impact on individual European airlines has varied considerably. Differences 
can to some extent be explained by the particular markets they serve; a strong 
North Atlantic presence has not for example been helpful. But the research 
shows that airlines have themselves responded in different ways in their efforts to 
cut costs, influence legislators and to attract traffic (Doganis 2005). Unlike US 
carriers, there was very limited public funding to compensate EU airlines for the 
immediate impact of the closure of US markets, and no form of guarantee system 
to assist in overcoming cash flow problems in the intermediate term. 
The next part will look at the methodology in more detail. 
-75-
'Lobbying Capability" 
METHODOLOGY 
The previous two chapters looked at the notion of lobbying capabilities and then 
the contrasting policy contexts in the European flag carrier sector. Moreover, 
the bodies of literature highlighted that corporate lobbying activities and 
dynamic resource-based view were the backwater of the intellectual effort. The 
aim of this research methodology chapter is to explain how we captured the 
knowledge to explicate the development of the lobbying process as a strategic 
capability, in two contrasting policy contexts, using the airline industry as our 
setting. Given that this area has not been previously researched and that we want 
to encapsulate the historical policy contexts and extend theory, we employed a 
qualitative methodology, specifically a case study method, to make the task more 
manageable and to be able to better elaborate on theory. 
4 . 1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study examined European flag carrier airlines in an endogenous and 
exogenous policy context. Within these polarised contexts, the government 
affairs office within the airlines may have built their lobbying capabilities in a 
specific way to allow their organisations to sustain a competitive position. 
However, as seen in the literature review, no previous study has really tried to 
explore this development process in real detail. Therefore this study will focus on 
specific research questions and broader theoretical questions to meet the 
knowledge gaps. A combination of the gaps highlighted in the literature review. 
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the nature of the phenomena and theoretical perspectives provide three key 
questions that need to be addressed: 
"What" lobbying capabilities does the firm develop to selectively leverage 
and deploy its political resources in an exogenous and endogenous policy 
context? 
Utilising a political science and strategic management perspective, this study will 
extend existing knowledge of corporate lobbying activity, specifically using five 
European Flag carrier airlines. While the business politics theories and strategy 
scholars have looked extensively at corporate lobbying activity, they have largely 
ignored routine and process concepts within actual organisations. This study will 
utilise theories from dynamic resource-based scholars (Eisenhard and Martin 
2000; Ethiraj et al 2005), corporate political (lobbying) activity scholars (Gertz 
1997; Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman et al. 2005), and decision-based scholars 
(Bass 1983; Bourgeois 1985), as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, as a guide for 
understanding how lobbying capability development operates within flag carrier 
airlines. 
"How" does a firm develop lobbying capabilities to selectively leverage and 
deploy its political resources in an exogenous and endogenous policy 
context? And "why" does a firm develop lobbying capabilities to selectively 
leverage and deploy its political resources in these specific ways in an 
exogenous and endogenous policy context? 
The study will further explore evidence for interaction effects in the development 
process of a lobbying capability. Much literature assumes an absolute movement 
in capability development (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). However, more recent 
studies are looking at micro level sources in the development of capabilities, 
suggesting a more nuanced model whereby multiple, and sometimes hybrid 
modes of development co-exist (Dutta et al. 2003). This research will also 
examine whether the dynamic capability life cycle model represents a genuine 
shift towards a post dynamic capability life cycle model. Stemming from the 
themes for analysis, which will be outlined later, this thesis will further study 
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whether management decision aspects have the capacity to operate alongside the 
development phase of lobbying. The cognitive aspects of decision making 
emerged as a significant theme during data collection for lobbying capability 
development, and will thus be considered in more detail with the addition of 
network, structure and human capital resources in the remaining chapters. 
The analysis will then consider more theoretically how these empirical findings 
on lobbying development can be conceptualised within a broader framework of 
change in dynamic resource base. Moreover, research questions above (using 
both RBV and CPA theoretical focal lenses) aim to guide our analysis of the data 
and design of enquiry to target knowledge to fill in the gaps. We adopted a looser 
research design than a precise hypothesis-testing one, but we did not adopt a 
"pure grounded theory strategy". Induction was balanced against early structure 
in the research questions (Langley 1999) to avoid the peril of "drowning in 
data" (Ferlie et al. 2005). The next part will explore further "how and why" our 
research design was chosen, with a further explanation into our chosen mode of 
analysis of data. 
4 . 2 RESEACH PARADIGM 
The term "paradigm" is used here to represent the conceptual foundation for this 
research. Cuba and Lincoln (1998) describe a paradigm as a set of beliefs and a 
view of the world. Consequently, they state that proponents of any given 
paradigm need to realise three important questions to serve the choice of the 
paradigm. These questions are (Cuba and Lincoln 1998, p.36): 
1. The ontological questions: These are based on assumptions that concern 
the nature and form of the phenomena under investigation, whether 
reality is internal or external (either in one's mind or out there). 
2. The epistemological questions: These are based on assumptions about 
grounds of knowledge; what forms of knowledge can be obtained and 
whether knowledge can be acquired or has to be personally experienced. 
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In other words, the relationship between the researcher and the 
researched. 
3. The methodological questions: These are based on how one can attempt 
to gain knowledge about what can be known. 
The following section will aim to explain the position of our paradigm with 
respect to the three types of question, where we aim to identify each dimension 
of the paradigm in order to justify the choice of our methodological approach. 
4 . 3 RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE PARADIGMS 
An unapparent 'paradigm war' exists in the social science arena, with qualitative 
and quantitative research paradigms traditionally opposed (Silverman 1993; Flick 
2002). This battle is rooted in competing epistemological assumptions; how 
diverse paradigms understand the nature of knowledge and habits of knowing 
(Addicott 2006). The quantitative epistemological view has by tradition been 
strong in social and scientific research, however qualitative epistemology 
(usually associated with interpretivism) is establishing itself as a suitable mode 
for exploring social phenomena (Oakley 2000; Gephart 2004). 
The quantitative epistemology normally spawns a research design that allows for 
generalisation of findings and the creation of general laws, with an emphasis on 
causality and measurement (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). This method is typically 
associated with positivism (Addicott 2006). Under positivist paradigm ontology, 
one would believe that there is one truth; one objective reality that is completely 
and correctly structured in terms of entities, properties and relations (Guba and 
Lincoln 1998; Bowling 1999). In our case, however, we beheve there is no 
objective material reality independent from, and external to, individuals' 
subjective perceptions (Bryman and Bell 2003). It is the governing philosophy in 
quantitative research and presumes that all phenomena are measurable using 
deductive principles (developing a theory and testing it). 
A positivist methodology proposes that the same experiences will be experienced 
in the same way, as most people share the same mental meaning scheme 
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(Addicott 2006). Positivism assumes that "rational people who independently 
observe facts will agree on them" (Neuman 1991, p.63). This view does not 
allow for individual perceptions and meanings and supposes that people search 
for precise rules to organise their social world, which neglects the intricacy and 
deep richness of social interactions. 
In stark contrast to positivism, the application of a dynamic capability theory, or 
more widely the RBV, its influence and perspective, places this study within a 
broadly interpretivist (qualitative) paradigm. This paradigm focuses on the ways 
in which people make sense of the world through constructing meaning 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). However, this view is far too simplistic, as the 
nature of the interpretivist paradigm is rooted in ontological, epistemological and 
methodological questions and these have implications for the way in which the 
research can be designed (Addicott 2006). 
The interpretivist ontological issues revolve around the nature of the 
phenomenon we seek to understand. The ontological view in this research is that 
realities exist in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions and are 
specific in nature (Guba and Lincoln 1998). Moreover, reality is constructed as 
one perceives and interprets the nature. From this perspective, we view lobbying 
capability development as having no ultimate shared reality, but maintain that 
reality is the outcome of constructive processes and paths in individual firms 
(Oakley 2000). 
From ontology to epistemology, this research will be exploratory, given that 
there is no existing data on the research question. The epistemology will 
therefore take the observer and the observed as inseparable, so the findings are 
created as the investigation proceeds. Bearing in mind the epistemology and the 
subjective nature of the interpretivism paradigm, we will use a qualitative 
research approach (Yegidis and Weinbach 2002). The qualitative research design 
will be constructed of inductive logic and will emphasise the specific experience 
of the participant (Yegidis and Weinbach 2002). The qualitative research will 
aim to study the phenomena and context in which they naturally occur and use 
the social actor's meanings to understand the phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln, 
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2000)/ Beyond this, qualitative research is particularly difficult to pin down 
because of its evolving character (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
Oakley (2000) composed different perspectives to explain the various 
characteristics of the quantitative and qualitative epistemologies. Table 4 
contrasts these different paradigms and their conceptualisations. 
Table 4: Qualitative vs Quantitative epistemology 
' Sherman and Reid (1994) state that the qualitative approach promotes a pluralistic view and 
aims to produce descriptive data based upon spoken or written words. 
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Source: Adapted from Oakley 2000, p. 26-27 
Oakley (2000) offers that qualitative paradigm questions the perception of truth. 
He goes on to explain that there is nothing that can be truly known but that we 
can try to understand the truth as closely as possible. 
4 . 4 TOWARDS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY 
APPROACH 
Political behaviours are often difficult to evaluate in quantitative terms, unless 
studied in the context of questionnaires completed by managers. It can be 
assumed that even then managers may be reluctant to disclose political strategies 
or micro lobbying development processes (Frynas et al. 2006). However, this 
thesis is not aimed at analysing just the managerial decisions but also 
determining the actual sources in developing a strategic capability that can help a 
firm in creating a competitive edge. Therefore, a longitudinal qualitative case 
study methodology lends itself better to understanding the significance of 
process, formation and context. Moreover, we adopted this approach to gain a 
richer understanding of the complex processes by which firms develop their 
lobbying capabilities and adapt to both certain and uncertain enviromnents. 
Indeed, as seen previously in the literature review of RBV studies, lobbying 
capability formation and development still presents scholars with an under-
investigated puzzle, especially in the context of competitive advantage creation. 
Hence, a further reason for adopting a qualitative approach is that it is especially 
appropriate in new topic areas (Eisenhardt 1989) to extend theories and find links 
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not previously researched. Bearing in mind the notion of 'linkages', this thesis is 
best described as theory elaboration (Lee 1999; Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski 
1999), in that it elaborates on a theoretical links not previously addressed 
satisfactorily through the RBV in corporate political activity literature and 
decision making literature (and vice versa CPA disregarding RBV and decision-
making theory). Previous studies show that corporate lobbying has not been 
looked at on an organisations level in conjunction with specific policy contexts, 
or at a micro level, especially using a dynamic capabilities view. At the same 
time, the dynamic capabilities literature has only recently started to look at the 
non-market environment (Holbum 2001; McWilliams et al. 2002). As a result, 
we attempt in this thesis to "reconnect and redirect dynamic capability theory", 
more broadly RBV, in an inductive way (Lee et al. 1999, p. 166), relating to the 
development of lobbying capabilities in a way that is related to the actual policy 
context and time frames (Pettigrew 1992).^ 
The concept of lobbying capabilities and its development within firms is still 
unexplored in the management field. The lack of theoretical understanding might 
be caused by the fact that these relations are very complex phenomena with no 
clear boundaries to its context. Hence, a qualitative approach will help to answer 
the proposed research questions, where we hope to understand the complex 
phenomenon of capabilities and relevant decision-making for capability 
development. However, the design of the actual qualitative study is important. 
It is important to bear in mind that qualitative research contains many variants, 
therefore our stance was that of process researchers.^ Bearing in mind the general 
qualitative nature of our research, the aim was to incorporate a historical case 
study methodology into the research. In their opening essay to a "Special 
Research Forum" in the Academy of Management Journal, Harrison and 
Freeman (1999) draw a distinction between case studies "designed with a 
purpose" and those that "just happened", in the sense that the researcher chanced 
- We feel that qualitative research can provide rich data that can extend the dynamic RBV theory 
by highlighting human interactions, decision-making within a setting where uncertainty is 
inherent, and relationships among variables that are not often addressed in the field (Gephart 
2004). 
^ Process research is the dynamic study of behaviour within organisations, focusing on the 
organisational context, activity, and actions that unfold over time (Pettigrew 1997). 
-83-
'Lobbying Capability" 
to observe an interesting situation and decided to write it up. They believe that 
the former type of study is most likely to contribute new knowledge, and cite 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) as providing guidelines for conducting case 
research with a purpose. Therefore, this study will follow Lees (1999) ideas on 
theory elaboration and extension,following Yin's (1993, 1994, 2003) and 
Eisenhardt's (1989) extensive guidelines on designing case study research. 
Thereafter it will use Miles and Huberman's (1994) visual analysis suggestions 
and Langley's (1999) suggestions on narrative analysis, constructing a story from 
data using quotes to reflect the interviewees' reality.^ The following sections 
expand on Yin's (1994) ideas, in the chronological order in which they are 
executed in the current study. Each section begins with the procedures 
recommended in the literature, followed by the application of the recommended 
procedure in the current study. The following sections go from design to data 
sources to analysis. 
4 . 5 CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study is not aimed at analysing the managerial decisions in isolation but also 
in determining the actual sources in developing a strategic capability that may 
help a firm in creating a competitive edge. Therefore, a case study methodology 
lends itself better to understanding the significance of process, formation and 
context. Many scholars explain that case study is an ideal methodology when in-
depth investigation is needed (Feagin et al. 1991). Case studies have been used in 
varied investigations, particularly in sociological studies, but increasingly, in 
instruction. Yin, Eisenhardt, and others who have wide experience in this 
methodology, have developed rigorous procedures. When these procedures are 
followed, the researcher will be following methods which are well developed and 
tested in the social science field. 
With regards to designing the case study, many people believe that crafting and 
interpreting case studies is relatively easy. However, several authors stress that it 
Interpretative methods are adapted to the description, interpretation, and explanation of a 
phenomenon rather then to estimation of its prevalence (Lee 1999). 
^ It was these contributions that allowed case study research to gain acceptance in and importance 
to the management research arena. 
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is in fact very hard to do good case study research (Stake 1995; Yin 2003). In 
fact some authors believe that performing case studies is so difficult that it is not 
suitable for all researchers (Hakim 1987; Feagin et al. 1991; Stake 1995). 
Nevertheless, highlighting the difficulty and special features of case study 
methodology, Yin (1994) states that the main objective of a case study is to: 
> cope with a technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points. 
> function on multiple sources of evidence, with data converging in a 
triangulating fashion. 
> benefit fi-om the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis. 
A case study research strategy may be adopted when one wants to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within its context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 1994). This is 
assumed to be the case in our research, where we want to investigate lobbying 
capabilities development in two policy contexts, and their boundaries are not 
very clearly defined with regard to the development process and the changing 
environment Thus a case study can be a powerftil approach that captures the 
essence of the contemporary phenomenon, which is a benefit that many other 
methodologies overlook, neglect or fail to capture. Stake (1995), finds other 
benefits of using case studies: 
> It is rich in detail and may therefore lead to a more complete understanding 
of some aspect of a person, group, event or situation. Case studies can satisfy 
the three parts of a qualitative method: describing, understanding and 
explaining. 
> By using exploratory case studies the researcher may identify hypotheses that 
may be tested, and aid in finding a more precise research question. 
> Case studies should preferably be multi-perspective analyses, which consider 
the voice of many actors, including e.g. the powerless. 
> It may aid in getting affective information that cannot otherwise be collected. 
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However, there are reasons why case studies have sometimes been viewed with 
scepticism (Yin 1994): 
> Many case studies have been careless and the results have been formed 
by biases (the same however goes for surveys, for example). Perhaps this 
was partly due to the fact that there is a limited body of literature on case 
study research. 
> It has been argued that case studies provide poor foundations for 
scientific generalisation. 
> It has been highlighted that case studies are generalisable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes. 
> Often, case study research is considered as flawed because it involves less 
rigorous methods than in 'hard' sciences. 
> It also been suggested that only one researcher conducts it, thus it is very 
much exposed to researcher bias. 
> Finally case studies take too long and result in massive documents. This 
has often been the case, but does not have to be. 
Bearing in mind the case study sceptics, a rigorous research design is needed that 
will be a comprehensive research strategy, with a logic of design that 
incorporates specific approaches to data collection and analysis. Yin (1994) is 
quick to elaborate that in order to have a rigorous case study one must have five 
components of research design. 
The first component is a study question, in which questions framed as " w h o " , 
"what" , "where" , " h o w " , and " w h y " determine the relevant strategy to be 
used. He suggests " h o w " and " w h y " questions are likely to a favour case 
studies approach (hence their use at start of this chapter), because they aid the 
researcher in getting a holistic view of an event, including the context as well as 
the details. The next four components are its propositions (our questions), its 
unit(s) of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria 
for interpreting the findings. These are elaborated on more thoroughly in the next 
few sections. 
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4 . 5 . 1 SINGLE CASE VS MULTIPLE CASE 
A choice has to be made between one case or several cases of study. The single-
case has the advantage that a phenomenon can be studied in depth, while the 
multiple-case approach looks at the phenomenon in a much more compelling 
way, as it offers the possibility of comparing the findings of the different cases 
with each other. The rationale underlying the two approaches varies a lot. The 
single-case approach is especially appropriate for testing a well-formulated 
theory by studying a critical case or studying an extreme or unique case, and/or 
analysing a previously inaccessible phenomenon resulting in a revelatory case 
(Yin 1994). 
The rationale for a multiple-case design is either to test results across the cases 
for a comparison or to produce contradicting results, which can be explained, 
based on predicted reasons (Yin 2003). Therefore, in this study, we adopted the 
multiple-case design to facilitate a cross-case comparison which helped to make 
the results more generally applicable to theory. Moreover, our design facet 
permitted "replication" of logic (Yin 1994), by which the cases were treated as a 
series of independent experiments that confirmed or disconfirmed emerging 
conceptual insights. 
4 . 5 . 2 HOLISTIC VS EMBEDDED DESIGN 
Yin (1994, p.38) postulates that there are "four types of designs for the case 
study strategy, (a) single-case (holistic) designs, (b) single-case (embedded) 
designs, (c) multiple-case (holistic) designs, and (d) multiple-case (embedded) 
designs". For this study we used a multiple-case approach as stipulated earlier. 
We focused thereby on individual European flag carrier airlines that were 
exposed to those chosen contexts and that participated in corporate political 
activities. However, a choice had to be made between an holistic or embedded 
research design. 
The choice between an holistic and an embedded research design is influenced 
by one or more "units of analysis" (Yin 2003, p.42). The holistic approach 
chooses a single unit of analysis; if that is the case, then one will view the 
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phenomenon in its entirety. By contrast, in an embedded approach, attention is 
given to multiple units of analysis. In this case study research design, we used the 
holistic design. The reason for this was to facilitate the identification of the 
phenomenon, which is the lobbying capability (and its developments). 
Furthermore we believed that the subunit of analysis could not be logically 
identified, making an holistic design was more favourable. 
4 . 5 . 3 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The choice of the key units of analysis for a study can have significant 
implications both for the substantive content and research time (Hakim 1987; 
Yin 2003). Relating back to our research question, it followed that the chosen 
unit of analysis in this research was the lobbying capability. Therefore, the 
reason for using a single unit of analysis in our design was to understand and 
explore the unique and complex contemporary phenomenon. In our case it will 
be the development process of "lobbying processes and routines" (lobbying 
capability), which was identified by an industry informant as a means to change 
some aspect of the firm's "political influence to react to a political stimulus" as 
shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Unit of Analysis 
Lobbying 
Capability 
WHAT, 
H O W & 
WHY 
The use of a single unit of analysis in each case study permitted the construction 
of a more robust case that allowed us to understand the company and industrial 
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level forces. We gathered information on the unit of analysis by interviewing 
specific people i.e. Directors of Government Affairs who were responsible for 
corporate political activities and some aspects of strategy-making within their 
firms, as well as relevant experts in the policy-making process and airline 
industry experts (Stake 1995). 
4 . 5 . 3 . 1 IDENTIFYING AND OPERATIONALISING A "LOBBYING CAPABILITY" 
We faced challenges in operationalising and identifying a lobbying capability 
using existing definitions that rely on a firm's routines. For example, Winter 
(2003) defined a capability as a "high-level routine" or collection of routines 
that, together with implementing resource inflows, gives an organisation's 
management a set of decision options for producing significant outputs of a 
particular type. These high-level routines can be either generic or idiosyncratic in 
nature (Winter 2003). We were aware of the possibility that non-market lobbying 
activities may not be repeated again in the same form, sequence or combination 
and, therefore, might fail to meet this widely-used definition of a routine. On the 
other hand, some scholars suggest that firms deliberately intend to develop a 
capability and a planned outcome (goal) to capture the effectiveness fi-om 
deploying and leveraging a resource is a clear sign of this (George 2005). This 
portrayal of purpose or goal-directed behaviour in organisational activities may 
not be accurate. Therefore, we did not assign a priori intent as a condition in the 
development of a lobbying capability, as firms may develop lobbying capabilities 
accidentally or without a convincing sequence of pre-planned actions, especially 
in contrasting policy contexts where situational uncertainty varies in degree from 
firm to firm. 
Although our data revealed high degree of repetition in activities, a substantive 
subset of activities were not repeated. This observation indicated to us that the 
execution of activities may have depended upon the cognitive archetype of 
cause-effect relationships. Non-repeated processes may have served as 
interventions to achieve the desired goals. For example, state owned airline used 
different processes for lobbying to private airlines (e.g. using AEA more in 
exogenous policy context then the endogenous policy context), depending on the 
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perceived appropriateness of these processes in each non-market. Therefore, we 
adopted a working definition of a lobbying capability as a combination or 
sequence of processes/routines and its enabling resource commitments that have 
the potential to consistently achieve outputs matching organisational strategic 
intent.^ 
While a process could also be a routine, by using a broader lens, we were able to 
observe new, ancillary, modified, and non-repetitive processes that might be built 
into a lobbying capability. Also, we inferred that airlines' use of a variety of 
processes in a variety of combinations or sequences implied that it has a 
repertoire of processes, such that not all processes are used at all times or in the 
same sequence. Yet such processes may still be a constituent element of a 
lobbying capability. 
4 . 5 . 4 REPLICATION LOGIC VS SAMPLING LOGIC 
A single case is usually used when one wants to investigate a unique case, while 
a multiple case study is usually used when one wants to replicate logic. Yin 
(1994, p52) reminds us that in a multiple case study, each case is considered as 
an individual experiment and thus ''multiple cases are treated as a series of 
individual experiments". From there he explains that when using multiple case 
studies, each case must be carefully selected so that it either predicts similar 
results (literal replication) or predicts contrasting results but for predictable 
reasons (theoretical replication). He goes on to explain that this replication logic 
used within multiple-case studies must be distinguished from the sampling logic 
commonly used on surveys. The sampling logic requires defining a pool of 
potential respondents, then selecting a subset fi^om that pool of potential 
respondents, then selecting a subset from that pool using a statistical procedure. 
Sampling logic was not be used in this case, as we do not wish to determine the 
frequency of a particular phenomenon. Instead we used replication logic in order 
to elaborate on theory. 
' Adapted from our definition in the literature review. 
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4 . 5 . 5 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
The quality and rigour of the case study may be judged by certain tests which can 
be applied to the design of the case study. Such perspectives are usually applied 
to quantitative studies, however, with regard to qualitative studies, they suggest 
that we should concentrate effort on reliability and validity. This becomes a key 
concern at this stage, and many case study researchers go to great lengths to 
ensure that their interpretations of the data are both reliable and valid (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000; Bryman and Bell 2003; Yin 2003). This is because issues of 
validity and reliability are an important part of any attempt in the social sciences 
to find the "truth". Thus it is important to identify some ways of dealing with 
results. The four common tests used in social science research were incorporated 
in our case study (Yin 1994). They are outlined in Table 5 below: 
Table 5: Criteria Matrix forjudging the quality of research designs 
Tests Case study tactic 
Construct -use multiple sources of 
validity evidence 
-establish a chain of evidence 
-have key informants review 
draft case study report 
Internal -do pattern-matching 
validity -do explanation-building 
External -use replication logic in 
validity multiple-case studies 
Reliability -use case study protocol 
-develop a case study database 
Phase of research in which 
tactic occurs 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Composition 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Research design 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Reliability is associated with the "degree of consistency" and replicability of the 
study (Silverman 1993, p. 144) which, in a qualitative study, would be concerned 
with whether the researcher is observing what they say they are. To satisfy both 
the requirements of reliability and replicability (Bryman and Bell 2003), the 
current study clearly outlines the various social roles that we adopted within our 
research framework. Indubitably, we tried our best to adhere to these reliability 
guidelines in the most stringent and strictest way possible. 
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The assumed validity of the research is another area for consideration, hi 
quantitative studies, validity is normally concerned with measurement validity, 
which entails questioning whether the measures being used really reflect what 
they are measuring. By contrast, in qualitative research validity represents the 
truth; in other words, it involves the extent to which an account accurately 
represents the social phenomena to which it refers (Silverman 1993, p.149). 
Validity can be divided into both internal and external concepts, the former 
concerned with issues of causality, whilst the latter considers the ability for 
generalisation beyond the specific research setting. For qualitative research, 
internal validity is more closely related with the identification of a high level of 
congruence between observations and concepts (Bryman and Bell 2003). On the 
other hand, external validity is seen as difficult, as qualitative research slants 
towards small scale research (Bryman and Bell 2003, p.288). One suggested way 
to address issues of generalisation would be the use of a survey to 'test' the 
research findings among a broader audience (Silverman, 1993). hideed within 
this study, we also considered reliability as important in further developing the 
research design. We tried our best to adhere to these guidelines in the strictest 
way possible. 
4 . 6 RESEARCH SAMPLE AND CASE STUDY BOUNDARIES 
The number of cases chosen for this multiple case study was important for theory 
elaboration and extension. The number of cases that should be used for a 
multiple case study approach is between 4 and 10 (Eisenhardt 1989; Pettigrew 
and Whipp 1991; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Eisenthardt (1989) explains that 
where there are fewer than 4 cases, theory replication is problematical and with 
more than 10 cases, it becomes far too complicated to manage. Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997) show in their complexity theory study that a multiple case 
study between 4 and 10 cases can consider the "factors that contribute to 
competitive success" and to understanding the "art of continuous change". In this 
thesis we have 5 case studies that focus on both the exogenous and endogenous 
policy contexts. 
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On the case study boundary front, this research focused on the development of a 
lobbying capability by European airlines in two contrasting policy contexts 
(endogenous and exogenous policy contexts). The government affairs office 
develops its lobbying provision over a period of time. The research focused on 
two contrasting policy contexts because such distinct contexts give the study 
more scope to understand influence building. According to Pettigrew (1992) it is 
important to choose a "polar type" context that allows one to see things more 
clearly as a result of the extremity of the situation. Therefore, the two chosen 
context were the exogenous policy context (chosen time frames of study were 
2000-2005) and the endogenous policy context {chosen time frames of study were 
1985-1997), as they had important consequences for the allocation of political 
resources by European carrier flag airlines. 
The choice of time frame came from interviews, where informers felt that these 
time frames represented the main lobbying capability development efforts. Thus, 
the time frame is as follows: 
• Begins as the government affairs office becomes aware of 
the potential policy introduction. 
• Continues as the government affairs office starts to lobby 
the micro targets using specific lobbying processes. 
• Ends when the policy is introduced. 
As the research questions imply, this research focused on lobbying capability 
development. The lobbying development process is determined by the core micro 
level sources (not previously investigated). The rationale for focusing on the 
chosen time frame was that the chosen policy issues were determined by the 
policy stakeholders. Once the policy had been commissioned, this being the end, 
the government affairs office took subsequent decisions on new policy issues i.e. 
negotiating with other governments about new routes, airports or simply 
monitoring the political landscape. 
Based on this context and time frames, we selected airlines that were affected by 
government policy issues from these two periods. The selection of the case sites 
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was based on theoretical sampling, necessary so that the phenomenon of interest 
can be readily observed (Yin 1994). In the European airline industry we 
identified several firms that met out initial criteria by being a fully-functioning 
business in the chosen contrasting policy contexts, including firms that: (a) had 
history over the two chosen contexts (i.e. were not recent start-ups); (b) had 
made statements in press releases or the media that they were in the process of 
reconfiguring some important aspect of their lobbying during the two chosen 
contexts; (c) allowed a reasonable amount of access to the senior people within 
government affairs office. We contacted the relevant firms and selected for the 
study five organisations (seven cases used at start of the study, however two 
cases were used for the pilot study), which agreed to participate by giving us 
good interview access to members of their top management team within their 
government affairs offices or related departments that dealt with government 
issues. All five participating airlines expressed a high level of interest in the 
potential findings of the study, which ensured a high degree of cooperation 
during the interviewing process. 
Table 6 describes the five critical case companies of similar contextual time 
spans for the exogenous policy context (2000-2005) and the endogenous policy 
context (1985-1997)7 The five cases are global European flag carrier airlines that 
fly to many parts of the world. In addition, we used two categories for the 
European flag carrier airlines. Private vs State owned airlines. "Private" in this 
thesis refers to the airline in which a majority of shares are held by private 
investors, compared to a minority shareholding i.e. KLM, Lufthansa, SAS. 
Conversely, "state" owned airlines here means that the government has a 
majority shareholding in the company in comparison with the private 
shareholding i.e. TAP Air and Alitalia. Indeed, in Europe we found there to be 
only "one" fully privately owned flag carrier airline: KLM (from 2001). 
However, we found only two other European long haul airlines (non flag carrier 
airlines) that were totally privately owned, Virgin Atlantic and BMI. 
Nonetheless, after choosing our sample airlines, we conducted a pilot study on 
two airlines that were not included in the final sample cases. We used the pilot 
' The time span reflects the number of years to allow us to critically evaluate the lobbying 
capability development process. 
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interviews to test questions with Virgin Atlantic (entirely privately owned airline 
during both contexts) and Swiss Air (privately/state owned during both contexts), 
interviewing government affairs directors. However we decided not to include 
these two cases in case study sample due to lack of full access. 
Table 6: Description of the Five Airlines Studied 
Airlines Snap shot of ownership in 
1999 and 2004 
Airline 
typology* 
Number of 
employees 
in 2004 
Country of origin 
during the two 
contexts 
SAS 21.4% Swedish State 
14.3% Danish State 
14.3% Norwegian State 
50% Private interests 
Majority 
private 
shareholding 
13528 Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
62.4% State ownership Majority 20575 Italy 
Alitalia 35.7% Private ownership 
2% Air France 
state 
shareholding 
Majority 5750 Portugal 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
100% State ownership state 
shareholding 
Lufthansa 91.4% Free Float 
8.6% Block Ownership 
Majority 
private 
shareholding 
90673 Germany 
KLM 100% Public quoted company 
(2001) 
96% KLM/Air France (2004) 
Majority 
private 
shareholding 
37487 Netherlands 
The government affairs offices,^ the point where the lobbying usually begins, 
were located in each of the organisations headquarters with some additional 
offices next to the European Commission in Brussels and Association of 
European Airlines (AEA). This complex structure of government affairs 
operations allowed for what the organisations believed would cause maximum 
influence based on "who owned the airlines" and "what it wanted to achieve". 
^ This typology will be used in our analysis chapters. 
' Some airlines call their government affairs offices by other names like institutional relations, 
aeropolitical, public or industrial affairs. However, all these departments had nearly the same 
functions even though they had different names. 
-95-
'Lobbying Capability" 
The directors or presidents of these government affairs departments have been 
selected to maximise influence in legal regimes at national and international 
levels, to negotiate with airport officials on route formation and to monitor the 
political arena at both national and international levels (Figure 11). As shown in 
the Matrix in Figure 11, this combination helps in isolating the effects of national 
and international political risk exposure on the airlines, which helps in sustaining 
a competitive edge (Kobrin 1978). In order to get a representative sample, our 
design has encapsulated the private and state owned European airlines. The state 
owned airlines are characterised as being majority government owned while the 
others more mixed with government having a minor shareholding. 
Figure 11: Matrix of chosen holistic cases 
'Hereditatis Possessio' 
International 
Nature of 
Work 
National 
TAP Air, 
Alitalia 
TAP Air, 
Alitalia 
KLM. Luthansa 
KLM, Luthansa, 
State Private 
Ownership 
Operatic' 
The 'hereditatis possessio' being either state or private represents the opposite 
ends of the spectrum of competence, scope of activity, and professional values. 
The 'operatio' allows one to understand the interaction level of focus in the 
lobbying process between the principal and agent and the policy level. 
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4 . 7 DATA COLLECTION 
The next stage of the methodology recommended by Yin (1994), which will be 
used in our study, is the "conduct of the case study". There are two tasks in this 
stage that must be carried out for a successful study: Preparation for Data 
Collection, and Conducting Interviews. Nevertheless, in our case studies, data 
collection was treated as a design, enhanced by the introduction of rigorous 
construct and internal validity, as well as by the external validity and reliability 
of ideas (Yin, 1994). 
Yin (1994) suggested three principles of data collection for case studies: 
1. Use multiple sources of data 
2. Create a case study database 
3. Maintain a chain of evidence 
These are all elaborated on in the next few sections. 
4 . 7 . 1 MULTIPLE SOURCES OF DATA-TRIANGULATION 
Yin (1994) identified six primary sources of evidence for case study research. 
The use of each of these might require different skills from the researcher. Not 
all sources are essential in every case study, but the importance of multiple 
sources of data to the reliability of the study is well established (Stake 1995; Yin 
1994). The six sources identified by Yin (1994) are, documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical 
artifacts. 
The rationale for using multiple sources of data is the triangulation of evidence 
(Yin 2003). Triangulation increases the reliability of the data and the process of 
gathering it. In the context of data collection, triangulation serves to corroborate 
the data gathered from other sources (Silverman 1993). As opposed to relying on 
one single form of evidence or perspective as the basis for findings, multiple 
forms of diverse and redundant types of evidence are used to check the validity 
and reliability of the findings (Jacob 1990). Over-relying on any one form of 
evidence may impact on the validity of the findings. 
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Case studies are likely to be much more convincing and accurate if they are 
based on several different sources of information, following a corroborating 
mode (Yin 2003). This conclusion is echoed among many composition 
researchers (Hakim 1987; Silverman 1993; Stake 1995). We will use mainly 
interviews, documentation and archive data as these will allow us to focus on the 
case study topic. Moreover this provides perceived causal inferences and further 
provides corroborative evidence. The next part will look at this in more detail by 
looking at both interviews and documents. 
4 . 7 . 1 . 1 INTERVIEWS AND DESIGN 
The main actors lobbying in the aviation industry are the government affairs 
offices and the trade association groups. The government affairs offices do not 
normally have complete influence over decisions taken on the policy design 
front. Instead, they guide the policy development by structuring the procurement 
process and by issuing documentation and white papers. We firstly conducted 
pilot interviews with directors of government affairs at both Swiss Air and Virgin 
Atlantic, but then we decided not to include these two cases in our study due to 
the lack of access. However, the pilot studies allowed us to try and test various 
questions before using them on our actual representatives. In the end, five case 
studies were chosen and their senior management interviewed. 
The interview could take one of several forms: open-ended, semi-structured, or 
structured. We opted for a semi-structured and open-ended form. As such, we 
conducted in total 42 interviews, ranging from 40 to 100 minutes, by telephone 
and in person (see Appendix 8 for expansion on the q u e s t i o n s ) . T h e interviews 
were with a CEO and government affairs directors, information directors, 
institutional affairs directors, industrial relations directors, several government 
affairs managers and leading experts on the airline industry (see Appendix 7 for 
interview summary). The names of the individuals were kept anonymous but 
organisations' names were allowed to be transparent. We wanted a true sample 
Each government affairs office had between 4 and 15 people in both contexts. The exact 
information could not be obtained, as it was lost or uncertain. However, the numbers were based 
on the memories of executives. 
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of senior management who were involved in the lobbying capability 
development process from mainly within the government affairs office. The 
interview questions explored the forces in lobbying capability development that 
affected policy formation in the two contrasting policy contexts. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. 
A list of core questions was prepared to address the relevant issues. A sample of 
the core questions can be found below: 
> What decisions and routines did the firm develop to deploy and leverage 
its resources in each context? 
> Why were these routines and decisions made and what influenced the 
development in each context? 
> How were these decisions and routines brought about and developed in 
each context? 
> How did decisions and routines influence the process of capability 
development in each context? 
As such, the interview had three sections. The first section began with asking 
respondents open-ended questions that let them relate their stories of what their 
position entailed at their firm during the chosen periods. The second part used 
semi-structured questions that focused on the first policy context, which was the 
deregulation context. This allowed us to depict the strategic issues of processes 
and the evolution the lobbying capabilities. In the third part of the interview, the 
questions focused on strategic issues of processes and development of the 
lobbying capability in the post 9/11 context. The ideas of capability attributes 
were looked at in depth. 
4 . 7 . 1 . 2 DOCUMENTATION 
We located and researched many rich documents that depicted the interaction 
effects in the lobbying capability development process. The documentation found 
on lobbying efforts can be classified into national government, EU level and 
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government affairs offices issued documentation. The government issued 
documentation includes the European Commission documentation, hivitation to 
Negotiate Documentation (ITND), Full Business Case (FBC), the Minutes 
documents and so forth. It was anticipated that once working relationships with 
the case study firms had been established, it would be possible to gain access to 
some of the archival documentation. As a result, we gathered some important 
documents such as letters to the EU supranational institutions, study reports, and 
media items that were added to the data base.' ' The validity of the documents 
was carefially reviewed so as to avoid incorrect data being included in the data 
base (Yin, 1994). 
In designing the case study data collection strategy, it was also assumed that 
access to any important National government, EU level and government affairs 
offices issued documentation could not be obtained easily. At the time, it was 
acknowledged that there were likely to be categories of data that would be 
impossible to obtain, namely lobbying cost data. Furthermore, it was 
acknowledged that the previous lobbying data might not necessarily exist or they 
might not contain a great level of detail. Thus, the research was not designed to 
be reliant on the lobbying cost data to understand the lobbying capability 
development process. 
4 . 7 . 2 CASE STUDY DATABASE 
As seen previously, the researcher must gather and store multiple sources of 
evidence systematically and comprehensively, in formats that can be 
acknowledged and sorted so that converging lines of inquiry and patterns can be 
revealed (Stake 1995, Yin 2003). Reconfiguring of arrangements with the objects 
of the study or addition of questions to interviews may be necessary as the study 
progresses (Yin 1994). Case study research is flexible, but when changes are 
made, they are documented systematically. 
Our case studies used interview transcripts and databases to categorise and 
reference data so that it could be readily available for subsequent reinterpretation. 
We triangulated in every possible way. 
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On top of the transcribed interviews, the notes from the interviews were recorded 
onto a word document with notes on feelings, intuitive hunches, posed questions, 
and work in progress (Yin 2003). Furthermore, we also recorded ideas, variables 
and illustrations, which subsequently were all added to our database. The 
database helped to reduce any impending bias and helped to give an early signal 
of the emerging patterns from our analysis (analysis will be discussed latter in 
this chapter). 
Maintaining the relationship between the themes and evidence is mandatory. We 
entered data into our database and physically stored other types of data which we 
classified, and cross-referenced with all evidence so that it could be efficiently 
recalled for sorting and examination over the course of the study. 
4 . 7 . 3 MAINTAINING A CHAIN OF EVIDENCE 
Yin (1994) recommends that a chain of evidence be maintained, this will provide 
an avenue for the researcher to increase the reliability and construct validity of 
the study (Yin 2003). We adopted this procedure and maintained a clear trail of 
evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions. 
4 . 7 . 4 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE CASE STUDY 
> Duration of field research: It was intended that the field research last 
between five and six months on the selected settings and not go beyond 
September 2005. However, we had some interviews after this date due to 
executives being extremely busy and the need for clarification. 
> Accessing the settings: The attempt to get in the settings relied on letters 
addressed to key senior staffs that deal with government affairs of the 
chosen airlines and association groups. We also employed direct phone 
calls to senior people and used personal connections to gain access. 
> Covering letter: A covering letter was sent to the identified interviewees 
with a brief resume of the interviewer, the purpose, how their names were 
obtained, the importance of their response, confidentiality assurance, use 
of results, likely duration of the interview and a request for an 
appointment date at their convenience, in order to gain trust and with the 
-101-
'Lobbying Capability" 
intent of establishing rapport. In order to confirm the time for 
appointments or any arising modification, telephone calls and emails 
were used. 
^ Tape recording: A tape recorder was used to help capture and collect the 
information in individual interviews, as far as possible. We used a good 
quality miniature tape recorder in order to minimise the possibility of 
frightening the interviewees, and then transcribed before analysis. In 
addition to taping interviews, notes of important and unimportant matters 
were to be taken as discretely as possible. 
> Transcription: Transcription was done after every interview in order to 
capture as much as possible fi^om the ideas of interviewees. This 
permitted early analysis and categorisation of the data, and this strategy 
made it possible to build up or improve some of the original questionnaire 
material. 
4 . 8 DATA ANALYSIS 
Tesch (1991) outlines three approaches to analysing qualitative data. These are 
language based analysis, descriptive or interpretive analysis, and theory building. 
The language based analysis looks at how language is used in the source data 
and is sometimes called discourse analysis. It also focuses on the meaning that is 
attached to the use of language. On the other hand, descriptive or interpretive 
analysis (or what other authors call theory elaboration) seeks to formulate a real 
view of the process being studied, alter/improve theory and to find theoretical 
l i n k s not previously addressed in literature. This is done from the viewpoint of 
the people involved in the process. Theory building, as the term indicates, is an 
attempt to develop a new theory based on the collected data. Therefore, this 
research chose to use the theory elaboration to improve current dynamic RBV 
theory by linking it to CPA and cognitive theory (Lee 1999; Lee, Mitchel & 
Sablynski 1999; Gilbert 2005) through an interpretative approach to analyse the 
interview data over two time periods (Pettigrew 1992), as its main purpose was 
to clarify the concept of lobbying capability and its development in two 
contrasting policy contexts. By elaboration, we mean the process of refining 
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theory, thus an attempt to "reconnect and redirect theory" (Lee et al. 1999, 
pl66). 
While information is collected, researchers strive to make sense of their data. 
Generally, researchers interpret their data in one of two ways: holistically or 
through coding. Holistic analysis does not attempt to break the evidence into 
parts, but rather to draw conclusions based on the text as a whole. However, 
composition researchers commonly interpret their data by coding (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). That is by systematically searching data to identify and/or 
categorise specific observable actions or characteristics. These observable 
actions then become the key variables in the study. This part will provide a 
breakdown of how data analysis was approached within this research. 
As such, the case studies were analysed in a way which provided insight into the 
mechanisms of lobbying capability developments. These developments were 
seen as longitudinal sequences of events over a period of time that was based on 
path dependencies. The time frames used were evaluated mainly from "before" 
the policy environment emerged and the "after" the policy environment emerged 
(deregulation vs post 9/11 policy i s s u e s ) . T h e s e developments were 
influenced in a gradual way by a set of driving and buffering forces. In the case 
of each case study, which was considered as an evolving institution, the driving 
and buffering forces were analysed along several dimensions of development by 
asking the questions around the several dimensions (see Appendix 8 for those 
questions). They show a firm's reality in the flight and can be derived from an 
integrated view of strategic management and corporate political activity. We 
used a rigorous narrative and visual analysis that produced not only chronology, 
but also concepts, understanding, and theory closely linked to data (Golden-
Biddle and Locke 1997). 
The "before" perspective will be looked at more closely in this thesis because lobbying 
process tends to begin before the policy is implemented. 
Outcome is less important in this thesis as explained earlier, but process is fundamental. 
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The main modus operandi for analysis that we incorporated was that proposed by 
Miles and Huberman (1994). Miles & Huberman (1994) perceived qualitative 
analysis as having three stages, as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Procedures of Qualitative Data Analysis 
1. Data Reduction 
2. Data Display 
3. Conclusion Drawing and Verification 
The way they presented the procedures was in the form of a logical sequence of 
steps. Miles and Huberman (1994) provided further guidelines for analysis into 
steps which should be carried both during and after the full case data has been 
collected. They are arranged roughly from earlier to later in data collection and 
from simple to complex. Please see table 8 that depicts the sequential analysis 
that we used in our analysis illustrating how methods of this sort flow over time. 
Table 8: Procedures of Case Analyses 
Method for case analyses 
Contact Summary form 
Codes and Coding 
Pattern Coding 
Memoing 
Interim case summary 
Vignettes 
Reasoning 
It is a simple way to summarise time limited 
data that is gained from interviewing. 
Codes are especially useful tools for data 
reduction purposes and having a coding 
scheme helps to facilitate replication of a 
given study and allows the reader to see the 
logical link between the theoretical model 
and the codes. There are several approaches 
one can use to create a coding scheme (also 
called a "code manual") to serve as a 
template for organising the data. The 
coding will attach meaningful labels to data 
chunks. 
This is when the researcher starts coding the 
codes that are formed in the previous coding 
phase. 
This is when the researcher starts to derive 
and comments on what he sees via 
annotations and memos. 
This is when researcher tries to write what is 
currently known and what gaps need to be 
filled. 
This is a method to produce focused or 
extended reports. 
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After carrying out the early stages of analysis from the pilot studies, which 
served to organise the data for later and deeper analysis, a within-case data 
display was started (Miles and Huberman 1994). The within-case analysis was a 
technique used with each case study airline. We studied each firm using 
interview response data as a separate case to identify unique patterns within the 
data for that single organisation. Thereafter, we prepared detailed case study 
write-ups for each organisation, categorising interview questions and answers 
and examining the data for within-group similarities and differences. Visual and 
matrix displays were used to look at similarities and differences within each case 
studies (Miles and Huberman 1 9 9 4 ) . M i l e s and Humberman (1994) suggest 
different types of displays that can be incorporated within-case analysis. These 
are: partially ordered displays, which are useful in exploratory work (p. 102); 
time-ordered displays, essential in understanding the flow and sequence of 
events and processes (p. 110); role-ordered displays, which sort people out 
according to their position-related experiences (p. 122); and conceptually ordered 
displays, which emphasise well-defined variables and their interaction (p. 127). 
We used mainly partially ordered displays and conceptually ordered displays to 
capture lobbying capability development. 
The selection and building of displays within-case was undertaken. Thereafter, 
on completion of the within-case analyses, we conducted a cross-case analysis. 
We examined pairs of cases, categorizing the similarities and differences in each 
pair (Miles and Huberman 1994). We then examined similar pairs for 
differences, and dissimilar pairs for similarities. As patterns began to emerge, 
certain evidence stood out as being in conflict with the patterns. In those cases, 
we conducted follow-up interviews to confirm or correct the initial data in order 
to tie the evidence to the findings and to state relationships in answer to the 
research questions. 
The strategy was to produce "rich" primary data from a subset of cases so that 
conclusions drawn evidently link back to data and theory (Langley 2001). We 
used the following strategies: compiling narrative quotes for all cases as well as 
''' Moreover, the visual graphical representation will allow the simultaneous representation of a 
large number of dimensions and the passage of time (Langley 1999). 
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diagrams to add vividness, and exploring cases in depth in order to construct a 
story from data (Langley 1999). The "best fit quotes" were chosen to reflect the 
true patterns and reality, and were not modified in any way in order to capture 
the meaning intended by the interviewees. Therefore, direct quotes might contain 
some syntax errors due to senior executives interviewed not being native English 
speakers. 
4 . 8 . 1 SOFTWARE 
hi order to support the analysis of all the data collected during the various steps 
of the research process we used a specific software tool. After an evaluation of 
various programs, the NVIVO program was chosen as the prime software for 
computer-aided qualitative data analysis of the five case studies. The reasons 
were as following: 
> NVIVO was a powerful workbench for the qualitative analysis of large 
bodies of textual, graphical, audio and video data. 
> It offered a variety of tools for accomplishing the tasks associated with 
any systematic approach to "soft" data, i.e. material which could not be 
analyzed by formal, statistical approaches in meaningful ways. 
> It helped to uncover the complex phenomena hidden in the data in an 
exploratory way. 
> NVIVO helped to build typologies and taxonomies by identifying 
differences in data and helped to make relationships among concepts. 
Thus, bearing in mind Yins (2003) case study design framework and Miles and 
Huberman (1993) case study analysis framework, we will look at theory 
elaboration and proposition building using a qualitative methodology. The next 
section will look at how we elaborated on theory and built different propositions 
from the case studies. 
4 . 9 THEORY ELABORATION AND PROPOSITION BUILDING 
The present research might best be described as theory elaboration (Lee 1999); 
in that it elaborates theoretical links not previously addressed in RBV by using 
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CPA and cognitive studies. It demonstrates how to induce and elaborate theory, 
arguing that that theory elaboration from case study research can often be novel, 
as well as testable and empirically valid (Ferlie et al. 2005). Lee (1999) draws on 
previous work on case study research, grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967), and qualitative data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1984), suggesting 
ways for explaining the phenomenon. Eisenhardt (1989, p.533), defines a 
roadmap as summarized in Table 9 to get propositions, where we followed her 
recommendations on "shaping propositions", "enfolding literature" and 
"reaching closure". 
Table 9: Process Theory from Case Study Research 
Step Activity 
Getting Definition of research question. 
started Possibly a priori constructs 
Selecting Neither theory nor hypothesis. 
Reason 
Focuses efforts. 
Provides better grounding of construct 
measures. 
Retains theoretical flexibility. 
Specified population 
Theoretical, not random sampling 
Multiple data collection methods 
Qualitative and quantitative data combined 
Multiple investigators 
Overlap data collection and analysis, 
including field notes. 
Flexible and opportunistic data collection 
methods. 
Within-case analysis 
Cross-case pattern search using divergent 
techniques 
Iterative tabulation of evidence for each 
construct. 
Replication, not sampling, logic across cases. 
Cross-case pattern search using divergent 
techniques. 
Comparison with conflicting literature 
Comparison with similar literature 
Reaching Theoretical saturation when possible 
closure 
S o u r c e : A d a p t e d f r o m Eisenhard t (1989 , p . 533 ) 
Crafting 
instruments 
and 
protocols 
Entering 
the field 
Analyzing 
data 
Shaping 
propositions 
Enfolding 
literature 
Constrains extraneous variation and 
sharpens external validity. 
Focuses efforts of theoretically useful cases 
- i.e. those that replicate or extend theory 
by filling conceptual categories 
Strengthens grounding of theory by 
triangulation of evidence 
Synergistic view of evidence 
Fosters divergent perspectives and 
strengthens grounding. 
Speeds analyses and reveals helpful 
adjustments to data collection. 
Allows investigators to take advantage of 
emergent themes and unique case features. 
Gains familiarity with data and preliminary 
theory generation 
Forces investigators to look beyond initial 
impressions and see evidence through 
multiple lenses. 
Sharpens construct definition, validity, and 
measurability 
Confirms, extends and sharpens tlieory. 
Forces investigators to look beyond initial 
impressions and see evidence through 
multiple lenses. 
Builds internal validity, raises theoretical 
level, and sharpens construct definitions 
Sharpens potential for generalisation, 
improves construct definition, and raises 
theoretical level 
Ends process when marginal improvement 
becomes small 
-107-
'Lobbying Capability" 
Thus, we elaborated theory from the case studies by following criteria to build 
testable propositions (Gilbert 2005). A number of issues emerged from following 
Lee's (1999) and Eisenhardt's (1989) guidelines of theory elaboration and 
proposition building from a case study research. Firstly, theory elaboration from 
a case study is likely to have an important strength, like empirical validity and 
testability, which arises from a close association with empirical evidence. 
Secondly, given the strengths of this theory-elaboration sfrategy and its 
dependence on past empirical observation, it is particularly suited to new 
research areas for which there is insufficient literature. Finally, Eisenhardt's 
(1989) approach complements our idea of incremental theory elaboration of the 
dynamic capability (broadly RBV) literature by providing fresh re-linked 
perspectives and knowledge into lobbying capability development. 
By means of an interactive process of data reduction and data display, final 
conclusions developed and became more apparent. As highlighted earlier, data 
was verified through a process of coding. Thereafter the author showed these 
themes back to the people interviewed to see their views on the interpretation of 
the context and derived codes. There was only a minimal discrepancy between 
interpretations. Where there were disparate interpretations, the author discussed 
these variables with other researchers at Imperial College, conferences and 
seminars in an effort to gain a better understanding of the concepts and themes, 
as a means of reflecting upon the stance of the author and any biases developed. 
4 . 1 0 RESEARCH NARRATIVE 
Thus far we have tried to depict the logic in the research design, data collection 
and data analysis to capture the true reality and knowledge by means of being the 
"mirror". This section will try to give an account of our practical research 
experience attained from conducting this research. It intends to balance the 
theory aspects in this chapter by highlighting the "nuts and bolts" of the research 
progression, in other words the research experience gained in understanding the 
lobbying capability development process. This part will look at the problems 
encountered and the solutions used to reduce these perplexities. 
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As such, given the range of possible qualitative studies suggested by Marshall 
and Rossman (1995), including case studies, life histories, in-depth interview 
studies and field studies, and the review of the appropriateness of the case study 
method, it was decided that the appropriate strategy for this thesis was an 
exploratory longitudinal case study methodology, using mainly an in-depth 
interview study and documents study as the method to capture to true "process". 
This strategy was however reviewed in the light of the practical implications of 
accessibility to the respondents, the nature of the phenomenon and the time 
implications for this methodology. 
Respectively, we started by designing our questionnaire based on three research 
questions (as shown in the start of this chapter). We tested our pilot 
questionnaire on Virgin Atlantic and Swiss Air interviewees, which worked well 
for us in organising the micro level questions on the design aspects of lobbying. 
The senior people helped in providing vital information to improve our 
questiormaire, but we soon realised that they tended to answer questions very 
quickly and to the point. Therefore, in order to really understand the lobbying 
capability phenomenon, we organised the next sets of questions in a way to allow 
the interviewee to really answer the questions without deviating off track. These 
executives helped in answering the questions framed in the two contrasting 
policy contexts. After each interview, we would code the themes. 
We were aware of not losing sight of the full cases and the rich data provided by 
the interviews and documents. We were also wary of coding in general and the 
use of the computer software to help analysis. The author was conscious of not 
allowing individual transcripts or cases to become incoherent through re-
categorising and comparing data in the aforementioned manner. Therefore, while 
coding data, the author continued to read through individual transcripts and other 
material as a whole, to avoid losing sight of the policy contexts. 
Conversely, we also came to learn that organising these interviews was not easy, 
as the interviewees were always on the move. Therefore, we had to exert our 
own influence by telling them that other senior people from different airlines had 
participated and helped complete this study on time. This did help in some ways 
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moving things onwards but the managers and executives would often reschedule 
meetings. An example of this irritation was when we organised an interview 
with a Lufthansa government affairs executive who at the end cancelled his 
interview 4 times before giving up his time (it took 4 months to interview him). 
As a result, a large number of our interviews were conducted by phone; this did 
not in anyway affect the quality of narrative, but it could have made it less 
relaxed and more formal. 
The next part will look at the experiences and the weaknesses of our research in 
more detail. 
4 , 1 1 RESEARCH WEAKNESSES 
As was highlighted earlier in this chapter, this was an exploratory study in the 
area of lobbying capability development. Very little previous work has been done 
in this area and hence there was a general lack of authoritative literature arising 
from past studies. Apart from the limited research material, the research 
methodology relied on 42 interviews and lots of document analysis. The 
document analysis was useful in situations where data accessibility was a 
problem (Holsti 1969). In this particular study, there was difficulty in gaining 
access to all respondents within the companies within the time allocated for the 
study. The decision to use a non-obtrusive method like document analysis 
(mainly EU level and company documents) was thus taken. The fact that two 
methods of data collection were used means that it is possible to gain more 
clarity through triangulation, but caution must be given to the fact that not all 
airlines provided internal documentation for each context. Hence, our research 
using additional methods of data collection like all airlines providing "full" 
access to past documents maybe could have been useful to gain additional 
insights. 
Given that the aim of this study was primarily theory-elaboration, we used the 
sample of 5 European flag carrier airlines. An improper or inadequate sampling 
population may provide spurious conclusions, but we did not see evidence of 
routines or processes being confounded because of the nature of the sample. The 
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senior government affairs managers we interviewed to capture the knowledge to 
understand the lobbying capability process, were familiar with lobbying 
development and the standards, strategies, resources and routines adopted by 
their departments. We tried to reduce the process of potential misinterpretation 
and other halo-effect biases. Although we have tried to limit this bias by 
checking accounts with the top managers themselves and triangulating with other 
sources of infonnation, it cannot be completely removed and there is also the 
danger of placing too much reliance on the perceptions of those involved. 
We were also aware that 42 interviews looked like a small number of interviews, 
but we were guiding the selection of the interviewees based on their 
participations in the two policy contexts. Moreover, the people chosen for the 
interviews were all very senior people within the designated offices, therefore 
their views had added weight compared to less senior people. We also were at 
times constrained by the government affairs units having a small number of 
people to interview, usually between 5 to 18 people would work in these units, of 
which 5 people were senior people who actually were in the two chosen policy 
contexts'^. However, while a larger sample is potentially advantageous to any 
study, we reached theoretical saturation with the patterns that these high status 
interviewees revealed. 
4 . 1 2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The methodological fi-amework that we used for the purposes of our research was 
based on a case studies (process strategy) approach. The case study approach has 
already been comprehensively reviewed elsewhere and its effectiveness assessed 
(Eisenthardt 1989, Miles and Huberman 1993, and Yin 1994, Lee 1999). The 
literature clearly suggests that case studies are an appropriate method of looking 
at "how" and "why" questions. So why has it not been used more to look at the 
dynamic capabilities (in conditions of expected and unexpected uncertain 
environmental contexts), when case studies offer a convenient framework to 
understand the complex issues of development? This may well be due to the 
' It was more about getting quality of people instead of a large number of people. 
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amount of criticism that has been levelled at case studies, both because of the 
lack of clear demonstration of validity and reliability of the results and because 
of methodological inadequacies in the past by other management authors. 
We believe that the case study methodology has a role to play in evaluating 
complex, multifaceted phenomena and practice models underlying process based 
interventions. Traditional quantitative analyses are not able to offer the flexibility 
to cope with such tasks. The case study design provides a contemporary 
framework, which extends beyond the traditional descriptive case study, enabling 
this case to be used with greater rigour in research as a tool to develop 
hypotheses and to build theory. Practical applications of this approach have been 
limited in strategic management literature. However, research to date provides a 
critical step in the instrumentation of this methodology. 
As seen earlier, our case studies looked at the process of lobbying capabilities 
development in two contrasting policy contexts. Subsequently, the investigation 
was done through multiple case studies, which had many advantages. This 
technique provided a comprehensive and dynamic analysis of the strategy 
process of dynamic developments. These developments were seen as sequences 
of events over a period of time, which were based on path dependencies. They 
were influenced in a gradual way by a set of driving and buffering forces. 
However, the perpetual weakness of case studies was the problem of 
generalisation. Another limitation of the framework is that it does not explicitly 
assess whether the lobbying capabilities have been effective or not in creating 
competitive advantages (which was not the aim of this study). 
The next part will show some interesting findings that support some aspects of 
the literature review. 
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS PART 1: 
LOBBYING CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT IN AN ENDOGENOUS 
POLICY CONTEXT (1985-1997) 
This empirical chapter will provide an analytical overview of five European flag 
carrier airlines in conjunction with a detailed examination of each airline in 
relation to the deregulation context and lobbying issues: price, state aid and 
routes. It will look at the longitudinal analysis of lobbying capability 
development before the introduction of the deregulation policy (using Miles & 
Huberman's 1994 and Langley's 1999 suggestions). It will investigate how the 
five airlines have individually developed their lobbying capability, with 
particular focus on the deregulation issues: price, routes and state aid. We will 
show, through the inductive study, that a range of non-market environment 
responsiveness strategies were adopted by the chosen case organisations in the 
form of a lobbying capability to create organisational alignment with the non-
market deregulation environment. Finally, the data analysis will show the main 
micro level sources that are playing a role in the development of a lobbying 
process as a strategic capability and the interactions between each micro level 
source that may help to create a competitive benefit. This chapter will be 
structured chronologically; it approaches each European airline individually 
with a cross case analysis in Chapter 7. In addition, some emergent themes 
relating to lobbying process development suggest labels from the resource-based 
literature, which will again be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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5 . 1 INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of European airline deregulation policy, our endogenous policy 
context, implemented in phases from 1988-1997, was managed by the 
government affairs office within most European airlines. Before the introduction 
of deregulation, the function of this department was mainly helping to facilitate 
communication of information with government decision-makers at a national 
level with the international level coming into play mainly after 1985 (Pedler and 
Van Schendelen 1994). During this period, we found from the 'within' case 
analysis that the majority of government affairs departments had to influence and 
make organisational interests heard on several issues, chiefly the following: 
• Route license 
• State aid 
• Prices 
The three issues that airlines mainly lobbied for emerged from the interviews, 
where respondents highlighted that these three issues were to be pivotal for them 
in either creating new opportunities or hindering their competitive positions.' On 
the other hand, the question of whether and to what extent specific outcomes of 
lobbying for the liberalisation of aviation in Europe are the result of concerted 
campaigns to influence (through, for instance, AEA, governments and individual 
campaigns) is certainly not easy to measure, and not the aim of this section. This 
part will aim to look at "what, how and why" each airline developed their 
lobbying in a specific way in this endogenous policy context, using their strategic 
'blueprint' decision-making processes to develop a lobbying capability to form a 
beneficial policy for governments, airlines and consumers. 
The variable of time was important within this endogenous policy context with 
regards to the lobbying development process, and this will be elaborated on in 
this chapter. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. We also found that the organisational 
' Also see commission of the European communities, 'Report by the commission to the council 
and the European Parhament on the evaluation of aid schemes established in favour of 
community air carriers', Document. SEC, 431 final, 19 March, 1992. 
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lobbying function was frequently associated with each management executive's 
'blueprint' decisions in investing effort into 'network', 'human' and 
'organisational' resources, in order to integrate and reconfigure their lobbying 
capability to then leverage on political resources and exercise influence. 
Subsequently, we found that while the deregulation process was unfolding 
package by package, these senior executives within these departments were also 
simultaneously monitoring the political landscape for 'future' policy issues. 
Indeed we have also found that developing a lobbying capability was important 
in all the case organisations studied. Though it was more important in some 
organisations than others, it was nevertheless still a vital function in achieving 
their strategic intents. The flag carrier airlines that did not develop their lobbying 
capability in same manner like other flag carrier airlines were the two majority 
government owned airlines TAP Air and Alitalia. The reasons for this will be 
explained in more detail later in this chapter, but it relates to their ownership 
structure. 
To achieve the aim of answering the research questions, the people interviewed 
within each case were typically comprised of government affairs directors 
with/or institutional affairs directors, industrial relations directors, and a couple 
of government affairs managers, combined with expert opinions.^ It is evident 
from our findings that the government affairs office was created with the view 
that its services will improve or sustain the competitive position of the 
organisation by reducing the political uncertainty created by government policy. 
Let us now recap deregulation from the interviewees, documents and archival 
data. 
^ The "best fit quotes" were chosen to reflect the true patterns and reality and were not modified 
in any way in order to capture the meaning intended by the interviewees. Therefore, the direct 
quotes might contain some syntax malfunctions due to senior executives interviewed not being 
native English speakers. 
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5 .2 OVERVIEW OF DEREGULATION FROM CASES 
From the literature review, we know that most airlines have traditionally had a 
strong natural relationship with their own national governments. This close link 
had been a direct consequence of the traditional involvement of national 
governments in the aviation industry. Indeed, within Europe, the Single 
European Act was an important catalyst in moving the European airline industry 
forward (Sochor 1991). Airlines were only allowed to operate on the basis of a 
strictly regulated system of license provisions, determined under technical, 
economic, and aviation politics criteria (Sheehan 2003). 
After the signing of the Single European Act, which provided for the completion 
of the internal market, the council of transport ministers decided on 7 December 
1987 that European air transport would be liberalised in three phases (McGowan 
and Seabright 1989).^ The first phase involved various measures laid down in 
two regulations, one directive and one decision (Button 1992). These applied 
only to internationally controlled traffic within the EC and concerned access to 
the market, rules of competition, tariff setting and allocation of passenger 
capacity. In summary, they dealt the following areas (European Commission 
1994): 
> introduction of zoning system for tariffs, with automatic approval by 
member states; 
> a limited opportunity for relaxing the capacity restriction (from 50%/50% 
to 60%/40%); 
> widening access to the market; 
> group exemptions for concerted practices or agreements between airlines, 
which in principle would fall within the ambit of Article 85, Section 1, of 
the EC Treaty, but which contribute in such a way to improved 
productivity or to the improvement of technical and economic progress 
that the Commission will grant the airlines exemption for them on the 
grounds of Article 85, Section 3. This covers, for instance, agreements on 
3 Communication and proposals by the commission to the council, civil aviation memorandum 
No.2- Progress towards the development of a community air transport policy, COM (1984), 72. 
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joint planning and co-ordination of capacity, sharing of revenues, 
consultation on tariffs, and the assignment of landing and take-off times 
('slots') in airports. 
The first phase proceeded until 1 '^ November 1990. Thereafter phase 2 came into 
effect. The most important elements of the second phase, which lasted until 1 
January 1993, were (European Commission 1994); 
^ Expansion of the zone system for tariffs with automatic approval by the 
member states, which involves both member states having to approve the 
tariff before it can come into operation. In addition it would be obligatory 
for governments to approve tariffs which are fairly related to costs; 
> Expansion of capacity from 60/40% to 75/25%; 
> Freeing routes between regional airports; 
> A limited adjustment of the group exemptions. 
The transport ministers of the EC reached agreement on the third aviation 
liberalisation package on Monday 22 June 1992, consisting of new regulations, 
all of which came into effect on 1 January 1993 (European Commission 1996). 
Although for a number of key issues, including the competence of the European 
Commission to conduct external negotiations, the rules of the game still had to be 
decided, in particular the criteria employed for allocation and the supporting 
policy to be followed. Nevertheless, it can with appropriate modesty be 
concluded that EU airlines, in co-operation with its partners such as other EU 
airlines and the industry organisations like AEA, had achieved a favourable 
provision-outcome from its Euro-lobbying for liberalisation of aviation.'* Some 
instances of these positive results were (European Commission 1996): 
> The achievement of freedom of capacity and access to the market gave 
airlines the opportunity to grow faster than before in the EU, beyond the 
frontiers of its natural hinterland. The expansion of traffic rights and the 
Several informants highlighted this in the interviews i.e. mainly senior management within 
KLM and Lufthansa. 
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capacity to be deployed for flights within the EU was then no longer 
dependent on an airline's own domestic market. 
> The almost complete freedom of airlines to set tariffs offered airlines the 
opportunity to show that they were efficient airlines supplying high 
quality level of service at competitive prices. 
> The merger policy pursued by the European Commission had made it 
possible for airlines to acquire holdings-some of them majority holdings-
in other airlines. 
> Duty-free shopping for travellers had been extended within the EU until 1 
^Myl999. 
Besides these positive outcomes there were, of course, certain sticking points, 
disappointments and differences of opinion, when the airlines lobbying activities 
were unable to achieve any better result in the end. For instance, KLM, together 
with the government of the Netherlands, made several attempts, right up to the 
final decision in the Council of Transport Ministers, to keep the bureaucratic 
content of some of the measures in the third package as limited as possible. As a 
Senior KLM executive postulated: 
KLM and the Netherlands' government tried on many occasions to 
influence people right up to the final decision in the Council in the 
Transport Ministers. We especially wanted to keep the bureaucratic 
content of some of the measures in the third package as limited as 
possible but sadly that did not happen [E014]^ 
The commission's first proposal on the subject of granting licenses to airlines is 
an example of this added bureaucratic content. The first text included a 
regulation which would have required existing airlines to add a single extra route 
to their route network and, among other things, submit audited costs and business 
plans for three years. Airlines argued against the financial checks by the 
authorities, in order to treat in airlines the same way as other commercial 
undertakings, and maintained that interference by the authorities should be kept 
' All the code references can be found in Appendix 7. 
- 1 1 8 -
'Lobbying Capability" 
to a minimum. Although in their final proposals the Commission relaxed some of 
their requirements for existing airlines, they stood by their opinion that, in this 
field, intervention by the European level authorities was desirable. Bearing the 
outcomes in mind. Figure 12 below describes the dynamic lobbying patterns 
before, during and after the endogenous policy context, based on the interviews 
conducted: 
Figure 12: The lobbying capability development patterns 
Hearing about deregulation 
Deregulation Packages 1 , 2 , 3 
w 
•I 
O 
1 
1993 1997 
S A S / K L M / 
Lu thansa 
TAP/Al i t a l i a 
Time period 
From Figure 12, we can see that the lobbying activity increased over time. We 
found that some European flag airlines were advocating a free European market 
for aviation, in other words, a market within which ''European airlines fly their 
aircraft on all European routes without any regulatory constraints" (Senior 
Lufthansa Executive-A005). There were divergent lobbying patterns between 
both private airlines (majority private ownership rather than government 
ownership) and state airlines (majority state ownership rather than private 
ownership). Let us look at one of the main issues that three out of (KLM, 
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Lufthansa and SAS) five case airlines were advocating in the deregulation debate 
using their specific lobbying processes. 
5 . 2 . 1 ROUTE LICENCES AND TRAFFIC RIGHTS 
A route license has always been important to airlines, and it was one of the main 
issues that many airlines wanted changed during deregulation (Brueckner et al. 
1992). The route building and granting of licenses before deregulation was 
complicated as governments would negotiate on the behalf of airlines with other 
governments. The mutual granting of licenses was regulated internationally by 
means of bilateral agreements (Sheehan 2003). However, we found that most 
case airlines wanted the regulation of routes licenses to change (SAS, KLM and 
Lufthansa). Moreover, most of the interviewed firms explained that they wanted 
all European airlines to fly their own aircrafts on all European routes without any 
restrictions. Therefore, most airlines were keen to see route licenses modified, 
and lobbied heavily on this issue. However, two wholly govermnent-backed flag 
airlines, Alitalia and TAP Air Portugal, both declared that they did not spend too 
much time advocating this issue, as they were taking the back seat and focusing 
their efforts on other areas. For instance TAP was focusing their efforts mainly 
on "building routes to Brazil" while Alitalia was also focusing on South 
America. However, those two airlines did agree that AEA did a large part of their 
lobbying during this time. Where they felt they wanted most influence, they 
spoke directly to their national government targets. 
Nevertheless, even with the coming into effect of the internal market on 1 
January 1993, possession of a technical and economic license to operate 
remained a necessity within the European Union (Doganis 2001). For 
international air routes outside the EU, in addition to possession of a license from 
the government-owned airlines, another was required from the country of 
destination. The mutual granting of licences was regulated internationally by 
means of bilateral agreements at the EU level before the deregulation packages 
(European Commission 2003). Almost every airline of any size therefore had a 
government affairs department. The operations carried out within these 
departments were public and government affairs activities and were so even 
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before the term existed, although they were exclusively directed at the 
preservation and expansion of airlines traffic rights (Pedler and Van Schendelen 
1994). Indeed, this department played a large role in lobbying for route licenses 
and traffic rights pre deregulation packages. 
However, after deregulation came into place, EU airlines got routes and traffic 
rights deregulated. As a result, the airline route planners within the government 
affairs departments started to meet face-to-face with airport marketing executives 
to discuss new business opportunities. In those challenging times, the meetings 
were seen to offer an ideal opportunity to review the performance of established 
routes and services, and stimulate joint ideas to increase revenue and reduce 
costs.^ 
Post deregulation, the airports became recognised as a vital part of the route 
development process and routes were the key annual opportunity for the global 
airport community to showcase their market potential to the airlines. There were 
three types of meetings that flag carrier airlines were having after the 
implementation of the third package:^ 
• Airline-to-Airport Meetings: Airports were helping with airline network 
planning by providing key information such as catchment area 
characteristics, traffic forecasts, competitive pricing arrangements and, 
full route viability studies. Meetings also provided airlines with the 
opportunity to review the performance of existing routes and to discuss 
the levels of capacity presently offered, together with any marketing 
support opportunities that may be available. 
• Airline-to-Airline Meetings: In addition to meetings with airports, the 
routes team within most of government affairs departments arranged for 
airlines to meet other airlines to discuss commercial opportunities such as 
code-sharing, schedule co-ordination, interline agreements, alliance 
synergies and spare aircraft availability. 
6 Interview with DO 17. 
Three category types came from interviews with F015, F008, C009, E023, B024 and E020. 
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• Airline-to-Slot Co-ordinator Meetings: After deregulation, 1997, many 
of the European Slot Co-ordinators started to be available to help airlines 
understand any capacity limitations and constraints at the airports which 
could make a difference to any airline network expansion plans. 
After 1997, certain bilateral air agreements in the EU contained provisions on 
slot allocation in order to create more transparency in the relationship between 
slots and traffic rights. Nonetheless, there was another issue that flag carrier 
airlines were heavily lobbying for in the run up to deregulation. This was the 
tariff issue. 
5 .2 .2 TARIFF 
We found from our research that many airlines "were lobbying for tariffs that 
could be freely set by the airlines'" (B028). The freedom to charge a tariff without 
any bureaucratic pressure was an issue that some airlines wanted to see 
introduced in the packages, while other airlines opposed this issue. The reason 
for opposition was that the flexible tariffs would mean that some airlines would 
have had to change their tariffs due to competition, which would cascade to 
hinder bottom line profits. Therefore, the lobbying activity for some airlines was 
in the favour of such legislation while others tried to restrict it.^ 
Nonetheless, after deregulation, the overwhelming majority of the travelling 
public enjoyed lower fares (Dempsey and Gesell 1997). The benefits of the tariff 
competition unleashed by deregulation, however, were unevenly distributed 
among travellers. That was because the intensity of competition varied from one 
market to another. Prices per mile were usually much higher on thinly travelled 
than on densely travelled routes (Dempsey and Gesell 1997). They also were 
higher for the minority of travellers who had to pay full fares because they were 
unwilling or unable to meet the typical conditions for discounts (advance 
purchase, non-refundable tickets and staying over a weekend). Conversely, there 
was another issue that flag carrier airlines were also heavily lobbying for in the 
run up to deregulation. This was the state aid issue. 
^ Interviews with FO19 and FO15 
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5 . 2 . 3 STATE AID AND SUBSIDIES 
We found from our research that the majority of airlines were lobbying for 
competition that would not be distorted by forms of state aid, while other airlines 
were lobbying for some sort of state aid, mainly to allow for re-structuring. 
Indeed, the state aid issue has always been a vexed, as injection of state aid into 
government-owned airlines was viewed to disrupt markets, and the issue has 
important spatial repercussions because of its capacity to inhibit competition 
(European Commission 1994). In 1993, as a result of deregulation, the EC 
appointed a Comite des Sages (sometimes called "the wise committee") to 
investigate methods of enhancing the competitiveness of EU air transport 
(Lawton 1999). In identifying continuing state ownership and subsidies as a 
crucial factor impeding and distorting the implementation of a more competitive 
aviation environment, the Comite advocated a 'onetime/ last-time' policy of aid 
packages for restructuring (European Commission 1994). Since then, a number 
of flag-carriers, including Air France, Aer Lingus, Iberia, Olympic and TAP Air 
Portugal, have received substantial infusions of state aid (albeit with substantial 
conditions attached), while Alitalia's case was still being heard in 1997 (Lawton 
1999). 
Although much of the debate on this issue is intensely hypocritical, not least on 
the part of BA, which was financially restructured at public expense prior to its 
privatisation in 1987, the continued prevalence of state intervention ensures that 
the concept of a 'level playing field' in the EU airline industry remains an 
unattainable ideal (Button 1996). Furthen-nore, all flag-carriers retained three 
major and peraianent hidden subsidies:^ 
> The historical advantage of an extensive and specific route network, 
combined with market dominance of core hub airports 
> The continuing subsidy of bilateral agreements negotiated with extra-EU 
governments. 
> Less tax or no tax on petrol for the airlines. 
' Three points came from the interview with F038. 
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Thus, the real 'victims' of state aid are not other flag carriers, but the entrant, 
private-sector airlines on which effective competition primarily depends (CAA 
1995). Although few of these, in turn, have not benefited in some way from 
government protection and encouragement, subsidies and other manifestations of 
Member State policies, past and present continue to underpin incumbency and 
the interests of the major airlines. 
5 . 3 GENERAL STAKEHOLDER TARGETS IN THE LOBBYING PROCESS 
Before discussing lobbying capability development, in order to create the content 
of the legislation which was introduced in the first, second and third phases, it is 
worth listing the most important stakeholders who have been active in the 
legislative and lobbying micro targets. Figure 13 is created without claiming to 
be completely comprehensive but as accurate as possible from the interviews, 
archival data and EU commission documents: II 
From all interviewees from KLM, Lufthansa, TAP, SAS and Alitalia. 
II European Commission (1994). Report on expanding Horizons-Civil Aviation in Europe. An Aviation 
programme for the Future & European Commission (1995) white paper on the European transport policy, 
1-475, 
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Figure 13: Initial organisation of key lobbying micro targets for all airlines 
before and during the endogenous policy context 
National level Firm level International level 
Ministries 
Transport; 
Finance; 
Foreign Affairs; 
Housing, regional 
development and the 
Environment. 
Parliament 
Government advisory bodies and 
industries, such as the: 
• Social and Economic 
Council 
• Provisional Council for 
Transport 
• Airport officials 
• Air transport users group 
CEO 
Government Affairs 
Office 
Marketing 
HR & Operations depts 
Industries and organisations 
such as: 
• Association of European 
Airlines; 
• lATA 
• European Civil Aviation 
conference 
• European regional and 
charter Airlines 
• The international chamber 
of commerce 
• ICAO and ICAC 
Government advisory bodies, 
such as: 
• The Economic and Social 
Committee 
• The joint committee 
The European government 
itself, in the form of: 
• The economic and social 
committee 
• The joint committee 
• The European 
Commission, 
• directorates for aviation 
transport (DG Vll), 
Competition (DG IV), 
Indirect taxation (DG 
XXI), External relations 
(DG 1), and 
Environment (DG XI) 
• European Parliament, 
• The committee for 
Transport and Tourism; 
The Council 
Although it is tempting to portray these stakeholders, possibly in some kind of 
matrix, as either supporters or opponents of deregulation, to do so would not give 
the true picture. The establishment of an internal liberalised market for aviation 
within the EU involved a fairly complicated and lengthy decision-making 
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process in which the stakeholders appeared in changing roles as protagonists in 
the different phases of the process, and the complexity of some issues was to an 
extent dependent on the information provided by each protagonist and influenced 
by the mutual positions they took up. Also the process of liberalisation and 
harmonisation had taken place at the same time as the transfer of powers from 
the national to the European level (for example, from the Ministry of Transport 
to the European Commission), although the formal decision-making about 
regulations and directives took place in the council of ministers, consisting of 
government ministers of all twelve member states, this also contributed to the 
problem. 
The position with regards to competing airlines was also subject to continual 
change. Although industry organisations such as the AEA or lATA outwardly 
worked in the interests of their associated airlines as a whole, and as such were 
considered by the national and European governments as respectable 
interlocutors, it was not unknown for the various airlines to have played 
competing roles in their individual lobbying with respect to the competition 
policy to be adopted by the European authorities (for example, the question of 
whether or to what extent state aids should have been allowed).'^ 
Ultimately, most of the stakeholders had many partially overlapping interests, in 
which there were only slight differences in the individual goals for which they 
were striving.'^ Because of the great number of stakeholders it is obvious that the 
decision-forming process, and consequently the process of influencing those 
decisions, was fairly complicated (Pedler and Schendelen 1994). It was important 
for airlines that they were able to play their own direct role vis-a vis a number of 
stakeholders in their individual internal decision-making process. 
Taking the chairmanship of one of the AEA's standing committees as an 
example, it could be seen that the opinion of the AEA on important subjects such 
as, for example, the imposition of VAT on passenger air traffic within the EU 
was important.'"' The AEA could draw on the specific knowledge from within its 
Interview with D021 
Interview with F015 
Interviews with COl 1 and E012 
- 1 2 6 -
'Lobbying Capability'' 
organisation to offer solutions for the many technical taxation problems which 
would be involved in such as issue. National authorities, which also determined 
the voting in the Council, and the European Parliament, which could disrupt the 
European Commission by passing amendments, often paid attention to the 
AEA's v i e w s . D u r i n g the negotiations on the regulations for the third 
liberalisation package, representatives of the AEA were invited by, among 
others, the European Parliament and ECOSOC to give their reactions to the 
European Commission's proposals, although without any formal obligation to do 
so.'* It is perhaps superfluous to mention that the position taken up by an 
industry organisation such as the AEA was determined by its members; in other 
words, by the twenty-six European airlines belonging to it, which included a 
large number of non-EU carriers, such as Swissair, Finnair, Turkish Airlines, and 
so on (AEA Annual report 1993). It is obvious that the associated members could 
have conflicting as well as common interests, which were promoted as much as 
possible by the airlines themselves, either individually or jointly with other 
partners, either vis-a-vis the Brussels institutions or their national authorities.'^ 
5 .4 CASE STUDY ONE: KLM 
5 .4 .1 KLM OVERVIEW 
KLM, founded in 1919, is the oldest airline in continuous operation. Its head 
office is located in Amstelveen, close to both Amsterdam, the capital of the 
Netherlands, and to Schiphol airport. KLM is the primary Dutch airline, as it has 
been granted a so-called open license by the Minister of Transport, which means 
that KLM may operate any route stipulated in the international air service 
agreements, concluded by the Netherlands (KLM company web-site 2006). 
Soon after its establishment in 1919, the founders of the airline had to admit that 
their initial financial calculations had been incorrect and as a result they turned to 
the Dutch government for financial assistance (Paape 1993). During the 
following years, due to increasing losses, it became clear that the long-term 
F008 
'^D021, A026 and B004. 
'^F015 
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future of the airline depended on additional government funds and the airline was 
transformed from a private company into a semi-state enterprise (see Appendix 
11 for expansion on Dutch government's general views on airline policy). In 
1929, the Dutch state acquired the majority of the shares (KLM company web-
site 2006). 
Many years latter, KLM Airlines, through its partnerships (including a long-time 
code share agreement with Northwest), the airline started providing passenger 
and cargo services to some 350 destinations in almost 75 countries. With its 
primary hub located in Amsterdam, the airline nowadays carries nearly 16 
million passengers and about 490,000 tons of cargo annually. KLM operates a 
fleet of more than 210 aircraft, mostly Boeings. KLM also operates regional 
carrier KLM cityhopper (KLM company web-site 2006). Recently, the company 
merged with European competitor Air France in 2004 (see Appendix 6 for 
expansion on KLM's financial position and for a snap shot of the economy). 
5 . 4 , 2 THE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION IN KLM 
A large part of the government affairs function within KLM was carried out by 
the company's foreign relations and co-operation department until the end of 
1990's, whose main objective was the preservation and acquisition of traffic 
rights.'^ External factors, such as environmental and conservation pressures, the 
development of an adequate infrastructure and the ongoing development of the 
single market led to the establishment on 1 January 1991 of KLM's public affairs 
department. It was part of the corporate development Bureau which was 
responsible for the development of KLM's long-term strategy.'^ 
All KLM public affairs planning derived from the airlines long term strategy. 
The organisational components of this planning consisted of:^° 
• a clear organisational structure; 
Interview with E014 
" Interviews with E014 and E022 
Interviews with BO 14, BO 12 and BO31 
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*X* monitoring the relevant political fields; 
developing the network of stakeholder; 
••• systematic communication with different stakeholders. 
In addition to a number of societal and in particular political developments which 
actually or potentially influenced the position of KLM and its profitability, the 
position of the business was determined to an important extent by factors such as 
access to markets, relations with suppliers, relations with competitors, and the 
possibility of cooperation^'. In the long term these factors, taken together, 
determined the profitability of the business. 
To protect and strengthen its commercial position before the introduction of 
deregulation, KLM followed a corporate political strategy by lobbying. It 
implemented this by participation in public debate and by attempting to exert 
influence by means of both formal and informal exchanges of ideas with 
prominent figures in politics and the governments and with representatives from 
various sections of society. As one respondent said: 
We also have a corporate centre which is basically, the, we call ourselves 
consultants to the board of the managing directors here at KLM. We 
would be talking about departments, financial, legal, strategic and 
government and industry as well. Now, within government and industry 
as well Now within government and industry, there are two main issues 
that we deal with. One are the bilateral air service agreements, the 
bilateral negotiations, so trying to acquire as many traffic rights as 
possible in the world. And the other part of what we do in government 
and industry is public affairs, which covers industry affairs and 
government affairs in a broad sense so we see ourselves as the counter 
parts of all sorts of government officials at all kinds of levels and 
politicians. Both in the Netherlands, as well as outside, especially in 
Brussels and also due to our special relationship with the United States, 
with our joint venture with North West Airlines [E012] 
The main activity of the public affairs function was:^^ 
> to locate as early as possible any social and political developments which 
could affect the position of KLM and its future; 
Interview with F015 
E014, E012 and E031 
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> within the social and political developments identified, to support the 
making of internal decisions relevant to the positions taken by KLM and 
to advise on the way in which these positions should have been followed 
through in the political and administrative decision making process. 
From this definition of its function, it follows inexorably that public affairs was 
in principle a management responsibility. Only management could weigh up the 
relative importance of short- and long-term interests, of political, commercial and 
technical interests, and make judgments between those interests which were 
quantifiable and those which were not. Only to management and its 
representatives did politicians and administrators assign the authority to act on 
behalf of the business, whether as a whole or as one of its component parts. 
Profitability and survival of airlines depended increasingly not only on a 
combination of strategic decisions, such as investments and entering into 
cooperation, but also on factors in the social environment, such as the acceptance 
of obligations to regulatory authorities.^^ For this reason, in KLM, public affairs 
were an integral part of the strategic planning process/'* 
KLM's lobby for influencing the EU and the relevant national organisations was 
based at the KLM head office in Amstelveen. Although KLM had a sales office 
in Brussels, it had a public affairs manager in the European c a p i t a l . T h i s 
decision stemmed fi"om KLM's view that public affairs were a management 
activity. The basing of a manager in Brussels, both within KLM and outside, was 
perceived as something which would have helped at the source of strategic 
decision making. The Brussels man was an external resource that could be used 
to create some form of value for KLM. It was not a common practice during the 
1990's, especially in the airline industry. 
Notwithstanding KLM's individual lobbying activities in the Hague and Brussels 
before the introduction of deregulation, political influence was then exerted 
^ E 0 2 0 
Interviews with E014 and E022 
Interviews with HO 14, E031, E020 and E022 
-130-
'Lobbying Capability" 
through various industry organisations, and through co-operative arrangement 
with other businesses and organisations. At the national level KLM was using the 
SER (Social and Economic Council in the Netherlands), AT AN (Netherlands Air 
Transport Association) and Schiphol Aiport.^^ At the European and global level, 
they were using the Association of European Airlines (AEA), the European Civil 
Aviation Conference (ECAC), lATA (International Air Transport Association), 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation), and the International Chamber 
of Commerce, as well as using collaboration with individual European airlines 
and the ACIE (Airports Council International Europe). 
Over the last twenty years, European air transport has increasingly been subject 
to an environment of liberalisation and harmonisation, as well as the many 
supporting regulations which were together designed to bring about the internal 
EU air transport market (Lawton 1999). KLM was closely involved from the 
start in the preliminary discussions on this and, as one of the many interested 
parties, had tried to make its contribution to the establishment of a liberalised 
European aviation market.^^ 
KLM's lobbying activities for the liberalisation of European air traffic began 
well before the European Commission put forward concrete proposals in the 
early 1980's.^^ These lobbying activities cannot be described in terms of separate 
'influencing campaigns'. The complexity and the duration of such an operation 
required an approach in which continuity and permanence were fundamental; 
continuity by holding office and membership in the relevant organisations for a 
longer period, and permanence by opting as far as possible for a problem-solving 
approach, to demonstrate one's worth as a reliable and useful debating partner.^^ 
In addition, KLM tried to maintain contacts with members of national 
governments, administrators and parliamentarians, with members and officials of 
the European Commission and with members of the European Parliament. These 
contacts had included periodic meetings with members of the KLM board, 
E012, E014, E031, E020, F019 and E022 
" E031,E012, F019and E014. 
E0I2, E014, E031, E020, F019 and E022. 
E012 and E014. 
E012 
-131-
'Lobbying Capability" 
exchanges of correspondence on suggestions and positions taken up, organisation 
of industrial visits, presentations, and so on. 
5 . 4 . 3 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY KLM 
There were lots of different lobbying routines found to be used by the 
government affairs office before, during and after the endogenous policy 
context.^' These lobbying routines were used to influence national and 
international political targets. We have managed to categorise the different 
lobbying routines according to generic and idiosyncratic lobbying routines. Table 
10 shows the different illustrative quotes that are a categorisation of themes 
based on a listing of common concepts and ideas emerging from the interview 
transcripts. A response from one KLM senior management respondents 
encapsulates the essence of what was happening in this context: 
Yes, we here at KLM tended to use the personal contact as the primary 
route to follow but we did not have a strict recipe, perhaps on a general 
level but then we had to customize it according to the different stimuli"... 
"We were then using a more direct routines method then indirect method 
of lobbying. Indirect meaning using the personal touch instead of just 
AEA or lATA. Because using a single path is not as effective as a 
combination in our view. [E020] 
Table 10: Direct KLM quotes to show lobbying processes types. 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"Formal visit" "Holding speeches at conferences" 
"Personal letters" "Outside lobbying consultants" 
"One to one contact with politicians" "Affiliated interest groups" 
"Personal phone call" "Cocktail parties" 
"Meeting a friend" 
KLM used to have freedom to function how it wanted and the government was 
aligned with the KLM's vision. After the 1980's however, the vision had to 
change because the government had enough of pumping money into a sinking 
ship. With the addition of the EU single market coming into place in 1992, KLM 
Routines and processes are viewed here synonymously. 
Quotes from E020, E23, E014 and E031. 
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had to drastically change its approach to running an efficient organisation. One 
Senior KLM figure postulates: 
So the need for very very strong lobbying within the Netherlands up to a 
number of years ago, was not as severe as it is now. Because in those 
days, I am talking about the 1970's and 80's. Even in the start of the 90's, 
the Dutch government, KLM and Skipo airport all had the exactly the 
same idea and vision of how they wanted to proceed, so it was latter in 
the last couple of years, in the last five to ten years that we have seen 
lobbying increase in intensity. [E031] 
The lobbying routines and combinations had to change during this context. 
Bearing in mind that Europe was gaining more power, KLM had to influence 
using a combination of individual and coalition influence. However, according 
to people interviewed, KLM used mainly individual influence routines, with 
AEA and the Dutch Authorities. Nevertheless, the actual lobbying routines that 
were used by KLM to leverage on political resources (in order to influence) in 
this context were important for KLM to respond to the type of policy context. 
The next part will look at the actual content of the political resources more 
carefially. 
5 . 4 , 4 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
The KLM respondents all agreed on the fact that the political resources were 
very important in developing their lobbying process in this context. The senior 
public affair management believed that their lobbying capability development 
processes would start from their political resources. They would then introduce 
new political resources or use existing ones to make new lobbying processes that 
would be used to build influence (a symbiotic relationship between resource and 
capability). 
Subsequently the KLM respondents explained that their thinking led them to 
believe that political resources were comprised of human (knowledge, 
experience), organisational structure and network. Moreover, political resources 
were needed to be reconfigured and deployed to create non-market change. We 
" E020, E23 and E014 
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categorised all the themes found into three key variables that make up a political 
resource, these were human, organisational and network resources. The KLM 
public affairs management team thought from their previous experiences that 
these important resources were needed to develop their lobbying capability in 
order to effectively leverage on these political resources to create influence. 
Table 11 below shows the three main categories of emergent concepts that were 
important in the political resource composition. 
Table 11: KLM political resources 
Political capital resource Illustrative quotes 
Human "Knowledge" and "experience obtained in 
areas such as law", "economics", "political 
and management were used", "People were 
used" 
Network "Being a member of an association or 
committee", "it's all about contacts" and 
"friends within the political system". 
Organisational "organisational formal structure", its 
'planning and coordinating systems „ 3 6 
Bearing the idea of having the right political resources, one of the respondents 
believed that it was important to get involved in lobbying process earlier rather 
than later and that talking to lower down people in the policy-making process 
was the right way in this context. Therefore having the right political resources in 
place earlier then your competitors was important and where you lack the 
resources you "buy". This idea of early contact using political resources was 
important in this context. As this respondent says: 
At KLM we try to get into the process as early as possible. And preferably 
at the lowest level possible, because if you get to the government level 
where you are talking about the director general or secretary generals 
etc. Our idea is that you are probably already a bit too late, when it has 
gone up to that level and that stage. Influencing becomes more and more 
difficult. So in this time period we got involved earlier in the process then 
some airlines, we thought this would make it easier to get your message 
and your interest across. We evaluated our political resources earlier 
then most airlines and then we decided the lobbying design. To 
E020, E23 and E014 34 
" E020 and E014 
E020 and E23 
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summarize we were using more indirect routines to communicate our 
interests. [E020] 
The next part will aim to understand in more detail how KLM devised its 
lobbying capability and political resources within this office. In addition, as 
shown by the illustrative quotes in Table 3, KLM had several variables that were 
key to the development of a lobbying capability in the endogenous context. 
Moreover, we came to learn that the government affairs management used some 
form of templates or what we term a "cognitive blueprints" to modify political 
resources in order to develop a lobbying capability. This department 
reconfigured and deployed human, organisational and network resources to 
develop their lobbying capability pro actively with the intent of making non-
market change. The next part will look at the core elements of the lobbying 
capability process in more detail. 
5 . 4 . 5 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The decisions taken by senior management at KLM's government affairs office 
played a vital role in developing what they believed to be a strong lobbying 
capability for this period. The decision-making templates that the senior 
executives created over time, "the cognitive blueprint", were what we found to 
be at the core of the lobbying development process. The attention given by senior 
management to meeting their overall strategic intent was important in the 
lobbying process and creating the blueprint,^^ 
Nonetheless, where did these blueprints come from? As we found from several 
informants, the cognitive blueprint came mainly from their previous experiences, 
their current learning and a weighing on future potential policy impacts. As one 
respondent put it: 
My lobbying thinking comes from my previous experiences ...Of course I 
believe that the patterns of thinking in lobbying are important...! read 
lots and lots while at work or at home...we also need to monitor the 
" E020,E23 and E014 
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future policy issues...we don't get formal training like other employees, 
as we are hired on the expectation that we have the expertise [E031] 
We found that the decision making blueprints of the government affairs 
management was fairly flexible and it had a lot of support from its owners. 
Furthermore, we found that the top management teams within the KLM 
government affairs office needed their cognitive blueprints to be improved every 
so often. In this context, after hearing that deregulation may be infroduced; the 
KLM government affairs executives started to develop their lobbying capability 
by firstly looking at their own cognitive blueprints, and where they lacked 
knowledge they looked outside the organisation or within their networks or they 
learned by reading. As one senior informant put it: 
Well during that time we would talk to the legal office and attend the 
conferences to build our expertise in the deregulation area. We also 
would meet with AEA to build new thinking and approach to 
understanding deregulation... and of course lots of reading [E022] 
As explained earlier, the senior management within the government affairs office 
would learn by doing, instead of getting formal training to develop their lobbying 
capability. However, another question that we posed was how did the lobbying 
cognitive blueprint process affect the decision-making flow and where did the 
decision making originate for this context? We found that within this period the 
actual decision-making went from the govenraient affairs office to the CEO 
level. As one informant put it; 
/ would say honestly that the knowledge flowed from the department like 
ours, upwards. That is because I think that the experience and knowledge 
of the people in departments like ours, is very much focused on 
international regulatory setting, it was very much focused on what are the 
developments in the United States, in Europe, in the far east and we tend 
to be a bit closer to the fire as we would say in Holland, than the board of 
directors. We have a very close link to them. [E023] 
The cognitive blueprint was also influenced to a certain degree by the 
organisational stakeholders like the CEO; Ministries, such as those of transport, 
finance, foreign affairs housing, regional development and the environment; 
parliament; government advisory bodies and industries, such as the social and 
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economic council, provisional council for transport and NV Schiphol Airport.^^ 
The international stakeholders that affected the cognitive blueprint were 
industries and organisations such as the Association of European Airlines (AEA), 
IATA, European Civil Aviation conference, European regional and charter 
Airlines and the International Chamber of Commerce. In addition, government 
advisory bodies, such as the Economic and Social Committee and the joint 
committee. The final stakeholder was the European government itself, in the 
form of: the European Commission, the most important directorates for aviation 
being of Transport (DG VII), Competition (DG IV), Indirect Taxation (DG XXI), 
External Relations (DG 1), and Enviromnent (DG XI); European Parliament, the 
most important committee for aviation being the committee for Transport and 
Tourism; and lastly, the European Council. 
We found that senior executive's "blueprints" decided the targets and sequence 
to lobby at both national and international levels. From 1984-1992, the lobbying 
was conducted chiefly at a national level with the shift taking place fi-om 1992-
1997 towards the EU level.'^" As a respondent put it: 
Our decision on lobby targets also depended on who we previously 
targeted. Therefore lobbying targets very much depended on our previous 
experiences and formal and informal relations [E023] 
As seen in this part, rather than jumping in and using a laissez-faire path-creating 
strategy, directors of government affairs used their cognitive blueprint firom 
previous experience and current learning to channel and fuel their decisions on 
the lobbying process. The way in which top management thought played a very 
important role in developing the architecture and design for the lobbying 
processes. As one respondent put it: 
The sequence of thinking in lobbying is structured at most times and 
could be fluctuating at other times in my opinion. We knew how to 
communicate with targets at national level in the 80's. Well that was my 
case in that time, where we chose to lobby early who we believed to be 
38 E012, E014, E031, E020, F019 and E022. 
E012, E014, E031, E020, F019 and E022. 
E023 
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the right people in the Netherlands. It was a time where we had national 
lobbying knowledge but Brussels was fast entering the picture, so we had 
to change our lobbying design. Overall the good thing was that we put 
our efforts in lobbying early because our CEO thought communicating 
our interests quickly was very important. [E014] 
As the illustrative quote shows, who to target in the lobbying process was based 
on mental schema and time. Moreover, we found that management cognition and 
attention played a role in reconfiguring and leveraging human resources, 
organisational resources, networks resources, and competence to develop an 
effective lobbying capability. However, ownership and stakeholders were 
thought to have influenced the decision-making aspects of the public affairs 
management team.'*' 
5 . 4 . 5 . 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
One of the ways found in KLM through which the lobbying capability was 
developed, was by "adapting the lobbying capability of the firm".'^^ We use the 
term "adapting" because it was used by one of our informants and adequately 
reflects the notion. Informants expressed that they were working towards 
bringing lobbying process to "the following stage" in the endogenous policy 
context. Developing their lobbying capability was associated with adapting the 
department's organisational structure. 
There was a lesser level of transference of responsibility for strategic decision-
making to interest group representation in the endogenous policy context where 
there was more of an attempt for an "influence to make an impact alone""*^. 
Furthermore, lobbying activities in this challenging policy context changed, 
leading to structural reorganisation and formal redefinitions of the 
responsibilities of new units and substructures with the government affairs office. 
As one respondent said: 
E030 and E021. 
E014 
E030 
138-
'Lobbying Capability" 
Our office had to become more EU and US orientated after the third 
package was introduced [E031] 
Our observations suggested that organisational structure was used to reconfigure 
the lobbying capability. However we found that lobbying network relationship 
resources had been used by KLM to develop their lobbying capabihty and also a 
way to influence specific people. The next part will aim to better explore the 
relationship between network resources and the lobbying capability. 
5 . 4 . 5 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Networks were viewed to be another core resource in creating a lobbying 
capability. From our analysis of KLM, we found that networks played an 
important role in developing KLM's lobbying capability because knowing the 
right political actors was paramount in the influencing game. As one of our 
respondents said: 
Knowing the right people is one of the most important things in our 
office. It's key to lobbying development [E031] 
While another respondent said: 
Yes we hired new people after the first package that had EU level 
networks. These people were important in targeting and influencing the 
right political people [E023] 
At KLM, during the deregulation period, especially during the introduction of the 
first package, the government affairs office again had to modify its network base 
to incorporate new people, after hiring some people in 1987. As one respondent 
postulates: 
We had to lose some people but that is inevitable in any large company to 
make space for new networks... 
... When we were lobbying, we did not have a network order but we did 
have a pre-determined selected group of targets in our heads. We 
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arranged these lobbying targets according to who was available to meet 
first [E022] 
KLM were using people within the office that had specific networks to create 
influence during this period but when the shift from national to EU level power 
was taking place, KLM started to hire some more people that had EU level 
networks. The lobbying network targets were pre-determined by the individuals 
but the sequence of whom to target was based on access and time. AEA was 
another network that KLM used to a certain degree. 
AEA was another group that we used to influence political actors at the 
European Commission. [E031] 
As seen from the quote above, KLM was also using their indirect network 
resources by using AEA which is placed outside the KLM office but is a paid 
resource because KLM pays a fee every year to belong to this common interest 
coalition group. KLM went to work along these lines, and after 1997 they had a 
relatively large number of chairmanships, memberships and advisory functions 
filled by KLM in international industry and umbrella organisations, and this 
certainly strengthened its arguments in Brussels, helping KLM to become a fully 
qualified partner in discussion and consultation. 
5 . 4 . 5 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING PROCESSES 
From our observations of KLM, we found there to be great importance attributed 
to the role of human capital in the process of developing lobbying capabilities. 
As one infonnant said: 
Of course designing a fast and effective lobbying track is dependent on 
the right people. So we hired some EU people with EU specific level 
competence during the deregulation period. [E018] 
Network relationship capital is generally considered an attribute of the individual 
people, whereas human capital is considered an attribute of individuals and 
comprises a stock of skills, qualifications and knowledge. There is an overlap 
between human resources and network resources but they differ on the level of 
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organisational networks like trade associations which are more generic to the 
organisation. The next part will explore the overlap between lobbying 
competence and human capital investment in the lobbying development process. 
5 . 4 . 5 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Reconfiguring lobbying competencies is the forth core process we observed 
through which senior managers evolve their lobbying capabilities. We use the 
term "lobbying competencies" to refer here to technical subject matter (hard for 
competitors to duplicate) that enable firms to influence policy makers. Senior 
executives in the KLM government affairs office explicitly related the 
development of the lobbying capabilities of their firm to a change in lobbying 
competencies, which were expected to enable them to influence new decision-
makers. Either of these strategies, or a combination of them, was viewed as the 
means for reaching "the following stage". KLM pursued a policy of fetching new 
people that had EU and national level technical knowledge which was expected 
to give them access to new and better networks that they believed could not have 
been accessed or grown quickly organically. As one KLM respondent said: 
Yes, we were definitely bringing in new human resources and getting rid 
of some old resources. This was important for our overall strategy to 
become an international player. Lobbying was important with a shift 
taking place from national governments to EU level. However, we also 
did try to keep any important knowledge or networks from leaving. 
Underlying the diversity was an effort to gain access to specialised expertise, 
embodied in individuals that were viewed as being among the top in their fields 
of expertise. Hiring top experts in areas targeted for developing new lobbying 
competencies and supporting them through developed management cognitive 
blueprints appeared to be the underlying model for the evolving KLM's lobbying 
capability. 
An interesting question with regard to developing new lobbying competencies is 
not only what processes enable finns to configure them effectively, but also how 
firms select lobbying competencies for further progress towards developing 
lobbying capabilities. Several informants describe the process through which 
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new lobbying competencies were targeted, tagging them as "important" during 
regular managerial meetings, and integrating them into strategic planning efforts. 
Furthermore, the greater the interactions among top managers with the board, as 
determined by the management cognitive blueprints, the more confident 
managers were in the effectiveness of their lobbying competence discovery 
process. 
We were empowered to take major decisions before deregulation to do 
what it took. Deregulation was a big opportunity for us to grow into a 
large player. We had to have a strong lobbying strategy and we had the 
support of the CEO [E014] 
We can see that the lobbying capability development played an important role in 
the endogenous policy context where KLM had time to manoeuvre to make their 
interest heard using both generic and idiosyncratic lobbying processes. From the 
micro level analysis of KLM'S government affairs office, we found that there 
were few variables that played a vital role in the lobbying capability 
construction. It was evident that political resources were comprised of human, 
organisational, network and competence resources. These existing resources 
were used and others were modified to develop their lobbying capability. 
Indeed, cognition played a role in building this symbiotic relationship between 
political resources and lobbying capability development. Once the lobby 
capability was developed satisfactorily, it was used to exert maximum influence 
(see Appendix 16 for KLM's overall storyline map cluster in the endogenous 
policy context). 
5 .5 CASE STUDY TWO: LUFTHANSA 
5 .5 .1 LUFTHANSA OVERVIEW 
The Weimar government created Deutsche Lufthansa (DLH) in 1926 by merging 
private German airlines Deutscher Aero Lloyd (founded 1919) and Junkers 
Luftverkehr (formed in 1921 by aircraft manufacturer Junkers Flugzeugwerke). 
DLH built what would become Europe's most comprehensive air route network 
by 1931 (see Appendix 12 for expansion on German government's general views 
on airline policy). It served the USSR through Deruluft (formed 1921; dissolved 
1941), an airline jointly owned by DLH and the Soviet government. In 1930 
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DLH and the Chinese government formed Eurasia Aviation Corporation to 
develop air transport in China (Lufthansa company web-site 2006)/'* 
In 1954 the Allies allowed the recapitalisation of Deutsche Lufthansa. The airline 
started with domestic routes, returned to London and Paris (1955), and then re-
entered South America (1956). In 1958 it made its first nonstop flight between 
Germany and New York and initiated service to Tokyo and Cairo. Meanwhile, it 
started a charter airline with several partners in 1955. Lufthansa bought out its 
partners in 1959 and renamed the unit Condor two years later (Fisher 2003). 
The carrier resumed service behind the Iron Curtain in 1966 with flights to 
Prague. The stable West German economy helped Lufthansa maintain 
profitability through most of the 1970s (Fisher 2003). The reunification of 
Germany in 1990 ended Allied control over Berlin airspace, allowing Lufthansa, 
which had bought Pan Am's Berlin routes, to fly there under its own colours for 
the first fime since the end of WWII. The company began seeking international 
partners in 1991, but that year European air travel suffered it's first ever 
slowdown, forcing Lufthansa into the red for the first time since 1973 (Lufthansa 
company web-site 2006). 
The company restructured in 1994 into a group of new business units: Lufthansa 
Technik, Lufthansa Cargo, and Lufthansa Systems. In 1995 the carrier began to 
face increased domestic competition from Deutsche BA, a British Airways 
affiliate. The airline formed a code-sharing agreement with Air Canada in 1996. 
In 1997 the Star Alliance was formed, and Lufthansa signed a pact with 
Singapore Airlines. That year the German government sold its remaining 38% 
stake in Lufthansa. In 1998 Lufthansa and All Nippon Airways formed a code-
sharing alliance, and Condor was combined with Karstadt's tour company NUR 
Touristic to form C&N Touristic. (After buying UK-based travel operator 
DLH established the world's first transatlantic ainnail service from Berlin to Buenos Aires in 
1934 and went on to develop air transport throughout South America. The outbreak of WWII 
ended operations in Europe, and the Chinese government seized Eurasia Aviation in 1941. Klaus 
Bonhoeffer, head of DLH's legal department, led an unsuccessful coup against the Nazi 
leadership and was executed in 1945. Soon afterward all DLH operations ceased (Lufthansa web-
site 2006). 
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Thomas Cook in 2000, C&N Touristic changed its name to Thomas Cook in 
2001 
In eariy 2005 Swiss International Air Lines agreed to be acquired by Lufthansa. 
As the first step in a lengthy and complicated transition process, Lufthansa 
created a Swiss holding entity named AirTrust through which all Swiss 
International shares were held. Lufthansa then took an initial 11% stake in the 
newly created company. The Swiss government, which owns 20% of the airline, 
approved the $238 million deal (Lufthansa company web-site 2006). Once the 
merger is complete (maybe as late as 2007) Swiss International Air Lines will 
retain its name and Zurich will become an additional Lufthansa hub. Lufthansa 
will set up a holding company to manage the combined operations of the two 
airlines, similar to the one established by Air France and KLM (see Appendix 6 
for expansion on Lufthansa's financial position and for a snap shot of the 
economy). 
5 .5 .2 THE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION IN LUFTHANSA 
The government affairs office at Lufthansa was called the corporate policy 
department before deregulation (changing the name to government affairs in 
1990).^^ Before deregulation came into place, they were much more about traffic 
rights and giving assistance to transport ministries who were in charge of 
negotiating traffic rights with foreign countries. This department would also 
provide strategic information to its CEO and other departments about expansion 
planning'^^. Lobbying for deregulation and for specific issues was new for this 
department because having a government sitting on the board always facilitated 
lobbying ef for t s .However , this department quickly recognised that they needed 
to change their lobbying capabilities. They began this by targeting different 
people within the European Commission, instead of only focusing effort on their 
In a plan to gain more access to London's Heathrow Airport, Lufthansa took a 20% stake in 
British Midland, which was admitted into the Star Alliance in 2000 along with Mexicana 
Airlines. In 2001 the airline bought the 52% of Texas-based Sky Chefs it did not already own and 
formed a new unit, LSG Sky Chefs International, to hold its catering operations. 
AOOl, A002, A003 and A005. 
47A026 
AOOl, A002, A003 and A005 and Fischer (2003). 
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national level authorities. Furthennore, they decided to bring in some new talent 
while retaining their best people, changed their departments design and started 
the process early."^^ As a Lufthansa senior respondent said: 
This department decided to commence its lobbying for the packages 
around 1985 after the European civil aviation conference. It was 
important to us to start early to influence new people and old people 
within our networks. I recall us hiring new people that had specific EU 
commission knowledge. [AOOl] 
It was evident that Lufthansa was new to the international lobbying game and 
needed to build a lobbying capability that was going to change the policy 
environment. It seems from the research that this government affairs office was 
focused on attaining traffic rights but that they started to use more routines to 
influence political regulators to formulate a fair deregulation policy. 
5 . 5 . 3 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY LUFTHANSA 
There were lots of different lobbying routines found to be used by the 
Lufthansa's government affairs office. The categorisation of the different 
lobbying routines was made according to idiosyncratic and generic lobbying 
routines. Some illustrative quotes were chosen which exemplified themes that 
emerged from the interview transcripts, as shown in Table 12. As one Lufthansa 
senior management respondent sums up the essence of what was happening in 
this context: 
/ remember that that Lobbying was a new word in Lufthansa even though 
we were doing it indirectly for decades. Before deregulation, we had to 
change our structure and people. The people hired had to have national 
level relations and competence, but with the addition of new relations at 
an EU level with EU level competence [A002] 
'AOOl, A002, A003, A005, F008 and F016. 
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Table 12: Direct Lufthansa quotes to show lobbying processes types 50 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"Visiting people" "Holding speeches at conferences" 
"Personal letters" "Outside lobbying consultants" 
"One to one contact with politicians" "Affiliated interest groups" 
"High frequency phone call" "Cocktail parties" 
"Meeting a friend" 
As seen from the illustrative quotes from the above, Lufthansa was using an 
array of individual lobbying routines that involved complicated targeting and 
sequences by using a combination of high frequency telephone routines, visiting 
friends, letters and one to one sessions with political contacts. They were also 
using generic lobbying routines that other airlines may tap into for a fee, 
including AEA and talks at conferences. Lufthansa was using many lobbying 
routines to influence policy makers before the introduction of the deregulation 
packages. The generic lobbying routines were not the best way to influence in 
their opinions, therefore they focused most efforts on their individual efforts. 
Indeed from 1988 most of the lobbying that Lufthansa did was through AEA. 
However, simultaneously the institutional relations office was slowly learning 
and influencing the European supranational institutions and the German 
authorities in the Brussels arena. 
Lufthansa used to have freedom to function how it wanted and the government 
was aligned with the Lufthansa's vision. After the 1980's however, the vision 
had to change because the government had enough of pumping money into a 
sinking ship With the addition of EU single market coming into place in 1992, 
Lufthansa had to drastically change its approach to running an efficient 
organisation.^' One Senior Lufthansa figure highlights: 
Lobbying had to change at Lufthansa. We were monitoring the different 
shifts taking place on the EU politics front. We also knew that 
deregulation was an opportunity to move forward to becoming more 
Quotes from A026, A002 and A030 
AOOl, A002, A003 and A030 
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efficient player. We had to proactively move forward by putting our 
interests in front of the aviation policy makers [A026] 
The actual lobbying routines that were used by Lufthansa to leverage on their 
political resources in this context were important for Lufthansa. The next part 
will look at the actual content of the political resources more careftilly. 
5 . 5 . 4 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
The respondents acknowledged the fact that the political resources were 
important in the lobbying capability development process. Subsequently the 
respondents explained that political resources were comprised of mainly 
organisational structural resources, human competence and networks. We 
categorised all the themes found into three key variables that make up a political 
resource; these were human, organisational and network resources. It is from 
these important resources that lobbying capabilities are formed and these 
capabilities are then used to deploy the political resources. Table 13 below shows 
the three main types of emergent concepts that are important in political resource 
composition. 
Table 13: Lufthansa political resources 
Poli t ical capital resource I l lustrat ive quotes 
Human 
Network 
Organisational 
"We starting hiring people with specific EU 
knowledge", "we were getting in specific 
people with EU level knowledge"^^ 
"Being a member of an association or 
committee" and having "friends within the 
political system" 
"Our structure in the department", its 
"planning and coordinating systems" '^* 
As shown in Table 13 from the illustrative quotes, Lufthansa had few variables 
that were key to the development of a lobbying capability in the endogenous 
context. On the other hand, Lufthansa believed that it was important to get 
" A026 and AOOl 
" A026, A002 and AOOl 
^ A026. A002 and A030 
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involved early in the lobbying process compared to later as it allowed more time 
to influence micro targets. As this respondent says: 
In this context we had to respond proactively and try to inform policy 
makers of our position early because the later, the more complicated. The 
actors in the policy formulation had to see that tariffs and state aid had to 
change. Everyone had to play on the same level playing field. If anyone 
does not play the game right they should be out [A030] 
However, cognition was at the core of this development, as the senior 
management was found to have formed mental templates or what we term a 
"cognitive blueprints" to modify political resources in order to develop a 
lobbying capability. The Lufthansa government affairs department reconfigured 
their human, organisational and network resources to create a lobbying capability 
to deploy political resources and create influence. The next part will aim to 
understand how Lufthansa developed its lobbying capability and political 
resources within this office before and during deregulation. Moreover, the next 
parts will look at the core elements of the lobbying capability process in more 
detail. 
5 .5 .5 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The decisions taken by senior management at Lufthansa's government affairs 
office played a vital role in developing what they believed to be a strong 
lobbying capability for this period. The decision-making templates that the 
senior executives created over time, "the cognitive blueprint", were what we 
found to be at the core of the lobbying development process. Where did they 
come from? As one respondent put it: 
Lobbying comes in general from my previous experiences from jobs and 
education. We read and learn by doing that forms our mental frames of 
thinking 
...Understanding the future policy impacts also help us to make 
calculated decisions on how to develop our lobbying [A026J 
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As the illustrative quote above shows, the cognitive blueprint came mainly from 
their previous experiences, their current learning and a weighing on future 
potential policy impacts. Thereafter the government affairs management team 
would give attention to some specific routines/processes using their chosen 
blueprints to meet their strategic intents. Moreover, we found these decision 
making blueprints were fairly flexible and Lufthansa had a lot of support from its 
owners .Fur thermore , we found that the top management teams within the 
Lufthansa's government affairs office needed their cognitive blueprints to be 
improved every so often. 
In this context, after hearing that deregulation may be introduced, the Lufthansa 
government affairs management started to develop their lobbying capability by 
firstly looking at their own cognitive blueprints, and where they lacked 
knowledge, they brought in new people to join their department, looked outside 
within their networks or learned by reading. As one senior informant put it: 
We had various proactive decisions but we first got new people in with 
specific skill sets then we used AEA and then improved our thinking by 
learning from others. That was really my order of thinking. [A002] 
We can see here that the senior management within the government affairs office 
would learn by doing, instead of getting a formal training to develop their 
lobbying capability. Conversely, how did their lobbying cognitive blueprint 
process affect the decision-making flow and where did the decision-making 
originate? We believe that within this period the actual decision-making went 
from the government affairs office to the CEO level. As one senior informant put 
it: 
We were the most important department then and we had I think the most 
power. I would say more then marketing and human resources. What we 
thought meant a lot to the board. So it did start from us where we 
informed the board and our CEO on how to proceed in this deregulation 
period. What we decided before on the lobbying side was our decisions 
and Ulrich was leading the way. [AO26] 
Rather than jumping in and using a laissezfaire'^dXh to create strategy, directors 
of government affairs used their cognitive blueprints from previous experience 
" A026, A002 and AOOl 
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and current learning to fuel their decisions on the lobbying capability 
development process. Furthermore, this facilitated investment decisions with 
regards to choice of political resources. As one Lufthansa respondents said: 
Before deregulation came to exist, we used to target people that we 
thought needed to be contacted. Then we would inform them on our 
position and what we thought needed to be done. We would organize 
meetings and send letters... 
... Our thinking came from the previous jobs, current job, people around 
us and education. [A030J 
However, ownership and stakeholders were also found to have influenced the 
cognitive aspects of the government affairs management team at Lufthansa. The 
quote below reflects Lufthansa's relationship with the government. 
We were always very close to our government but they wanted us to be 
independent. The government wanted us to function like other industries. 
Our thinking led us to talk to the ministry of transport to move for 
liberalisation. I think we were talking to them about deregulation around 
1982. I was at an lATA meeting where we fist discussed how we could 
manage liberalisation. Transport was on the agenda and Europe was 
trying to figure out how and what it could do and trying to obtain the 
legal right to introduce liberalisation to air transport. Not only to 
liberalise but also to harmonise existing regulation so it initially started 
the most important thing to come out in that period was something called 
the Compass report, competition on Intra-European air services in 1982, 
it was the European Civil Aviation conference that did that work and it 
was the first effort on the part of airlines and governments to sort of 
begin talking together, so you can see when you have a large number of 
governments and airlines who are interested in something like this, 
especially in Europe there is a limit to a number of people that can get 
involved. In the case oflCAC, lATA had AEA, so they set up a committee 
to follow what was going on in ICAC and the European commission. At 
that time this committee reported to a senior strategy group called in 
those days APAC, the Aeropolical advisory group. APAC like lATA, 
policy making groups had a membership of 24 airlines, and they met 
twice a year to endorse what lATA was putting forward as an 
international airline position as apposed to the European airline position 
through AEA. We were one of the 24 airlines that were pushing for 
liberalisation. [A026] 
56 A026 
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Let us now look at organisational structural modifications in more detail to 
unbundle the lobbying capability development process. 
5 . 5 . 5 , 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
One of the ways through which the lobbying capability was developed was by 
modifying the department's organisational structure. Informants expressed that 
they were working towards bringing lobbying process to "the following stage" in 
the endogenous policy context. Developing lobbying capability was associated 
with adapting the departments' structure to increase influence and align the 
deparments with what they believed to be the future. 
Lufthansa did also use a combination lobbying structure in order to exercise 
influence, comprising individual lobbying and collective action (using AEA). 
This allowed EU level actors but pushed to be "better influenced instead of just 
being solo" [A002]. As one respondent said; 
We did change our department's structure slightly for the purposes to 
influence in Europe. We had hired some EU level people for our Brussels 
office. However the Brussels office opened in 1989. However we used our 
national office to work closely with the EU. We were on the steering 
committee with KLM, Air France, BA which was very important to 
influence. AEA also played a large role and we were a resonant member. 
As seen from the above, organisational structure was used to reconfigure the 
lobbying capability. Synonymously the network relationship resources were also 
used by Lufthansa to develop their lobbying capability, as will be further 
explored in the next part. 
5 . 5 . 5 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Network resources were seen as very important in the lobbying capability 
development. Senior executives' decision "blueprints" decided that the network 
targets for lobbying would be both national and international. Lufthansa was 
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found to have good national networks with their government, especially before 
the introduction of deregulation. However, the senior management team in the 
government affairs office knew that their network composition had to change by 
incorporating an EU frontier. According to the respondents, EU level network 
building began in 1985, where specific people were hired that had EU level 
network connections (and competence). These networks played an important role 
in developing their lobbying capability. As one of our respondents said: 
We started to hire a few people in 1983 that had international law 
experience with a focus on airlines. They had to have friends in Europe 
and national government. They had to be familiar with US deregulation. 
We did not want a US style big bang as that did not work well. [A002] 
From the quote above, we can see that the senior management team in the 
government affairs office realised that they needed some new networks. 
Therefore the senior management team made decisions to hire new people with 
influencing policy in mind. Once three people were hired, they were contacting 
EU and national level targets. However, these senior individuals did not target 
EU and national level actors using a specific sequence, it was rather in flux. They 
were more concerned about securing access to those individuals that had power. 
Lufthansa, during the deregulation period, especially in the introduction of the 
third package, decided to modify its network base using their cognitive 
blueprints. Their network base incorporated new people that had EU level 
networks. As one respondent's postulates; 
At this time few airlines were buying in people with networks in mind. 
Maybe the big four, British Airways, KLM, SAS and Air France. We 
bought few people with some lobbying expertise, as we knew it was a 
matter before regulation would be deregulated. We were in the steering 
committee and we had to make sure nothing bad would happen to our 
airline. [A026J 
Indeed, Lufthansa was using extensive networks from individuals within the 
office to create influence, but the shift in power from national governments to 
Brussels meant that they had to play a new EU level game. Therefore, they also 
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decided to use their indirect network resources, AEA, which was placed outside 
their office. 
AEA was very important before and during deregulation [AOOl] 
The government affairs office perceived associations to be important network 
extension resources in developing their lobbying. The next part will look at 
human capital investment more closely, as this also played a vital role in 
developing their lobbying capability. 
5 . 5 . 5 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING 
PROCESSES 
Through our interviews with Lufthansa, we found there to be great emphasis on 
human capital investment in the process of developing their lobbying capability, 
especially before deregulation. Bringing in new people was seen by senior 
management as a means to influence the deregulation policy process and to 
prepare for the next stage of the non-market policy environment. The reason for 
this was that senior management's intuitive perception was that new people 
would bring in new lobbying networks and lobbying competence. These new 
people would then better leverage the political resources to align them to the 
changed non-market environment, in order that it would not hinder the airlines 
market position, but actually advance them and protect them. As one informant 
said: 
We hired some EU people with EU knowledge to improve our lobbying 
arm. We wanted deregulation to improve the airline industry and to 
reduce transaction costs. We wanted to be able to protect our airlines at 
the same time from any issues that would affect our profitability. Having 
seen the US airlines lobbying Washington, we knew that the next step 
would be to increase frequency in contact meeting at EU [A030] 
The next part will better explore the effects of interaction between human 
resources and competence in the lobbying capability process. 
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5 . 5 . 5 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
Reconfiguring lobbying competencies was a very important way for Lufthansa to 
develop their lobbying capability. Senior managers in the Lufthansa government 
affairs office explicitly related the development of their lobbying capability 
hence change in their lobbying competencies, which was expected to enable 
them to influence new decision-makers. Lobbying at this time was to inform 
policy makers about the position of their airlines. Policy makers were not experts 
in the industry so they needed to be provided with information. Lufthansa 
pursued a tactic of fetching new people that had EU level knowledge which was 
expected to give them access to new knowledge that they believed they could not 
have accessed otherwise. As one Lufthansa respondent said: 
We needed to inform policy makers at the EU level. Therefore, we had to 
get some of the best people that had worked in the EU commission. Our 
thinking then was about transferring knowledge to policy makers and 
educating policy makers. This was the key to good lobbying as political 
actors don't have all the information. Being transparent was always 
important to us. [AOOl] 
The underlying effort to gain access to specialised expertise was important to 
senior management in this office. Individuals that were viewed as being among 
the top in their fields of expertise were approached to work for this airline. In 
other words, hiring top experts in areas targeted for developing new lobbying 
competencies and supporting them through developed management cognitive 
blueprints appeared to be the underlying model for evolving the lobbying 
capability. 
An interesting question with regard to developing new lobbying competencies is 
not only what processes enable firms to configure them effectively, but also how 
firms select lobbying competencies to build on their lobbying capability. Several 
informants describe the process through which new lobbying competencies were 
targeted, tagging them as "important" during regular managerial meetings, and 
integrating them into strategic planning efforts. 
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We can see that the lobbying capability development played an important role in 
the endogenous policy context where Lufthansa had time to manoeuvre to make 
their interest heard. From the micro level analysis of Lufthansa's government 
affairs office, we found that there were few variables that played a vital role in 
the lobbying capability construction. It was evident that political resources were 
comprised of human, organisational, network and competence resources. These 
resources were used to reconfigure their lobbying capability development 
process into generic and idiosyncratic platforms. The reason for all this was that 
cognition played a role in building this symbiotic relationship between political 
resources and lobbying capability development. Once senior management 
thought the lobby capability was developed satisfactorily, then it was used to 
deploy political resources to exert influence (see Appendix 17 for Lufthansa's 
overall storyline map cluster in the endogenous policy context). 
5 . 6 CASE STUDY THREE: ALITALIA 
5 . 6 . 1 ALITALIA OVERVIEW 
Alitalia got off the ground in 1946 as Alitalia Aerolinee Italiane Intemazionali. 
The airline was 40%-owned by BE A (British European Airways, later part of 
British Airways) and 60%-owned by the Italian government (see Appendix 13 
for expansion on Italian government's general views on airline policy). Alitalia 
was intended to be an international carrier. 
They began flying in 1947 with a Turin-Rome-Catania route, and services to 
Afhca and Brazil were launched from Rome in 1948. To better compete with 
other European carriers, Alitalia and LAI merged in 1957 and took the name 
Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane. The government bought the shares held by BEA 
and TWA and assigned Alitalia to IRI, the Italian state holding company. The, 
new airline's fleet boasted 37 aircraft (Dienel and Lyth 1998).^^ 
In the early 1980's they diversified by creating Sigma (travel-related information 
systems) and Italiatour (tour operator). Diversification came, however, at the 
" By 1960 Alitalia carried a million passengers and had introduced its first jets. By 1968 it had 
an all-jet fleet (Alitalia web-site 2006). The stylised "A" tailfm logo appeared a year later, and in 
1970 Alitalia adopted use of the Boeing 747. Yet Alitalia began losing money in the 1970's. 
Facing rising fuel prices, inflation, and labour strikes, it responded by cutting underused routes 
and buying fuel-efficient Boeing 727s. 
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expense of the airline's expansion, and it began losing market share to rivals Air 
France and Lufthansa (Dienel and Lyth 1998). In 1988 they brought in Carlo 
Verri from the private sector to deal with labour and structural p r o b l e m s . H e 
secured labour contracts and developed aircraft financing, but his auspicious start 
ended with a fatal car crash in 1989. They limped through the early 1990's with 
losses, ageing equipment, and a reputation for poor service. 
Europe's air transportation market was opened to competition in 1996 (after a 
long process that began in 1983). Alitalia began low-fare carrier Alitalia Team, 
signed on Italian regional airline Azzurra as a code-share partner the next year, 
and set up its own regional carrier, Alitaha Express. In 1997 it also achieved its 
first annual profit since 1988 (Dienel and Lyth 1998). 
IRI reduced its stake in Alitalia to 53% in 1998, and employees got their 20% 
stake. Alitalia began an alliance with Dutch carrier KLM, and in 1999 Alitalia 
and KLM completed a 'virtual merger' that unified their management structures 
for passenger and cargo joint ventures and allowed them to share profits. KLM 
ditched the partnership in 2000, however, and demanded Alitalia repay $91 
million it had spent on upgrading an Italian airport. Alitalia protested KLM's 
termination of the alliance, and the dispute between the carriers ended up in 
arbitration proceedings (European commission web-site 2007). (Later, in 2002, a 
European court found KLM's reason for abandoning the deal insufficient and 
ordered the Dutch carrier to pay Alitalia 150 million euros.)^^ 
D017 
Thereafter Alitalia hired former IBM executive Renato Riverso as chairman in 1993. With 
deregulation fast approaching, Alitalia penned code-sharing partnerships with Continental (1994) 
and Canadian Airlines (1995). In 1995 several labour strikes flared up amid talk of restructuring 
and cost-cutting measures. After receiving little government support, Riverso resigned in 1996. 
His short-lived reign laid a foundation: labour tensions were eased with the promise of an 
employee-owned share in the company (Alitalia company web-site 2006). 
^ Alitalia was liquidated in 2000, and the state holding company's stake in Alitalia was 
transferred to the Treasury Ministry. Another chance at an alliance hatched when Alitalia signed 
partnership agreements with Delta and Air France, which led to full membership in the SkyTeam 
alliance near the end of 2001. Also in 2001 Alitalia said it would unload non-core assets, 
including its leisure division. The next year the company sold its reservation services unit, Sigma. 
That year the Italian government raised its stake in the airline from 53% to 62% (Alitalia 
company web-site 2006). 
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With the world's airlines struggling to regain passenger trust post-2001, cut costs 
and combat upstart low-fare carriers, in late 2003, Alitalia cut some 1,500 jobs 
from its workforce of 21,000. The Italian government denied direct aid to the 
airline in 2004, largely due to EU rules against such practices, but that did not 
stop Alitalia workers from initiating a costly strike in late April of that year that 
led to the cancellation of more than 1,500 flights. The strike was in protest at the 
lack of government assistance in conjunction with an armouncement to cut a 
further 16% of it workforce on top of the cuts made in 2003. The government 
began transferring Alitalia employees to other state-controlled jobs. 
As European competition grew, Alitalia launched regional carrier Alitalia 
Express, which took over the operations of Gandalf, a previously independent 
regional carrier that it acquired for $8.6 million (Alitalia company web-site 
2006). Alitalia also had low-cost carrier operations that it later spun off; the 
company is now known as Eurofly. Early in 2004, the company was plagued 
with labour disputes, facing several strikes within a period of a few weeks over a 
restructuring plan proposed by the board. The plan called for a reduction of 2,700 
jobs, forcing it to cancel hundreds of flights and leading to long delays and 
dismayed passengers (Air transport World 2005). The crisis level was enough to 
force the government to intervene. 
The Italian government received approval in 2004 from the EU to grant the 
carrier a bridge loan of up to €400 million, which could be supplemented by 
private banks (Air transport World 2005). One catch was that a restructuring or 
liquidation plan had to be ready by the end of 2004. Additionally, the carrier 
would never be allowed to receive aid from the Italian government, which would 
also have to reduce its stake from 62% to 49%. 
''' With airline deregulation and the subsequent arrival of low-cost European airlines, Alitalia's 
skies have been cloudy for some time. Once a monopoly, Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane now 
competes for the 22 million passengers that it carries each year. It operates a fleet of about 190 
aircraft, has hubs in Rome and Milan, and, including codeshare flights, flies to about 500 
destinations in more than 100 countries. Subsidiaries offer regional airline services. Since 2003 
the carrier has struggled to keep financially afloat, battled with disgruntled employees, and 
undergone management shake-ups. The Italian government has reduced its stake to just under 
50% (European union web-site 2006). 
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In 2005 Alitalia had plans to sell off 49% and control of its loss-making ground 
service unit, Alitalia Servizi, to holding company Fintecna for about $108 
million in order to raise capital, but the company has put the sale on hold while it 
holds talks with its un ions .Al i ta l ia also announced plans to issue new shares, 
more than half of which the Italian government, with the approval of the 
European Commission, has agreed to purchase to insure that the company 
remains afloat. (See Appendix 6 for expansion on Alitalia's financial position 
and for a snap shot of the economy.) 
5 . 6 . 2 THE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION IN ALITALIA 
Historically a large part of the government affairs function within Alitalia was 
carried out by the institutional relations office.^^ It was not until the early 1990's 
that this department started to focus its efforts on national and EU affairs, instead 
of just national affairs. More precisely, it only started to slowly recognise the 
importance of EU level affairs after 1988.^ After this period they were initially 
learning the process of dealing with the governments in Brussels and later 
directly with the commission from 1996 to 1997.^^ The increased contact with 
the commission got a foothold after Alitalia underwent its first re-structuring and 
re-capitalisation program in 1997, which had to be approved by the commission 
in Brussels (Flight International 2001). Nonetheless, this department had a role 
within Alitalia, and its main function consisted of the following: 
I providing a clear organisational structure; 
*l* monitoring the relevant political fields; 
*t* developing the network of stakeholder; 
systematic communication with different stakeholders; 
all relations with institutions at national and EU level 
D017 and D021. 62 
The name of the department is slightly different from government affairs but it has the same 
function. 
^ D 0 1 7 
DO 17, D034, F032 and F037. 
D017,D027 and D034, 
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Until the end of 1980's, Alitalia's institutional relations department had an 
objective of preservation and acquisition of traffic rights. However, external 
factors, policy change pressures, the development of an adequate infrastructure 
and the ongoing development of the single market led to this department 
modifying its lobbying capability. As one Alitalia respondent put it: 
We have always been lobbying using our national government but during 
this period we did not really influence our government like other airlines 
because they owned us. It's easy and great to arrange a meeting with 
your owner and ask them to speak to other important political actors... 
We did change our lobbying ways during the first deregulation package 
but I think slowly compared to other airlines. In my opinion we started a 
little too late lobbying EU level but we did not want changes because we 
were comfortable... I also think that AEA helped us a lot by lobbying 
using our views [DOl 7] 
To illustrate, this department has been lobbying fi:om the very beginning because 
of the political nature of the industry and its management. This department has 
always had constant interactions with the political arena in Italy and its 
governments. Pre 1988, lobbying at Alitalia focused very much on a national 
level. However, they only realised in the early 90's that they needed to lobby at 
EU level for the third package. 
5 , 6 . 3 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY ALITALIA 
From the interviews we found that different lobbying routines/processes were 
used by the institutional relations office at Alitalia before, during and after the 
endogenous policy context.^^ The categorisation of the different lobbying 
routines was made according to the terms idiosyncratic and generic, using 
Winters (2003) ideas. Some illustrative quotes were chosen, as shown in Table 
14, which were exemplary of themes that emerged from the interview transcripts. 
One Alitalia senior management sums up the essence of decisions taken in this 
context in conjunction with the types of lobbying processes: 
Routines and processes are viewed synonymously here. 
4 5 ^ 
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Before deregulation we were not lobbying like other airlines. We were 
owned by the government which complicated things a little. We did not 
have a robust lobbying arm because we could just talk routinely to 
government people. Some might say that this is a means of lobbying 
efficiently but in my opinion it's not a sophisticated mechanism when the 
policy environment is changing to a new one. But then, we realised in 
1990 that Alitalia needed to be heard at EU level and that we had to 
change. Other airlines had modified their lobbying to meet the policy 
needs from the first two packages... We used AEA on most part I think to 
lobby. But we too hired new people to contact at an administrative and 
political counter part level at EU and national level on a daily basis 
around this time but I think it was too late. Sometimes we were more than 
just influencing on a daily basis at every level... We have to diffuse the 
knowledge somehow to inform policy makers... So the kind of 
relationship between authorities and Alitalia was so close for that time 
but questionable if it was efficient. [DOl 7] 
Table 14: Direct Alitalia quotes to show lobbying processes types 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"Visiting friends" "Using our resources like interest groups like 
AEA that we pay to use" 
"Personal letters" "Some consultants" 
"Talking to our owners" "Conferences" 
"Personal phone call" "Cocktail parties" 
As seen from the illustrative quotes from the above, Alitalia was using an array 
of individual lobbying that involved complicated targeting and sequences, using 
a combination of telephone calls, visiting friends, and letters. They were also 
using generic lobbying routines that other airlines may tap into for a fee, these 
included AEA and cocktail parties. The executive interviewed felt that Alitalia 
wanted to use a combination of lobbying routines to influence policy makers. 
Alitalia's institutional affairs office decided to put most effort on their generic 
lobbying routines before the implementation of the first package, as they felt 
constrained by their ownership. They believed that based on their limited 
financial resources and human resources they could exert influence mainly using 
AEA and the country which owned them. According to the respondents, from 
1988 most of the lobbying that Alitalia did was through AEA. However, 
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simultaneously the institutional relations office was slowly learning that 
influencing the European supranational institutions and the Italian authorities in 
the Brussels arena was important. 
The institutional affairs office was mainly lobbying through AEA but we 
had our eyes set on some specific people at the council, parliament and 
commission level. [D021] 
It was evident that Alitalia was late in the lobbying game, but they became very 
active in lobbying directly to the commission in 1996 and 1997, just after the 
adoption of third package. This was mainly due to Alitalia facing difficult 
financial and economic difficulties where the state decided to recapitalise the 
company together with an in-depth restructuring plan. 
It was from financial distress moment that Alitalia started lobbying 
directly the commission in its own name using a more developed lobbying 
activity. [F008J 
Therefore the recapitalisation had to be approved by the commission in Brussels 
under the state aid rules. There were lots of interesting policy response 
techniques and political resources that Alitalia used within this endogenous 
policy context. 
5 . 6 . 4 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
From the analysis we found that the lobbying capability was developed from the 
political resources. Political resources are important in the lobbying process, 
especially in responding to policy needs. Subsequently the respondents explained 
that political resources are comprised mainly of people who have experience and 
networks, as well as actual organisational structure. We categorised all the 
themes found into three key variables that make up a political resource; human, 
organisational and network resources. It is firom these important resources that 
lobbying capabilities are formed and these capabilities are then used to deploy 
the political resources. Table 15 below shows the three main categories of 
emergent concepts that are important in the political resource composition. Table 
15 also shows the illustrative quotes. 
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Table 15: Alitalia political resources 
Political capital resource Observations 
Human "Knowledge" and "experience" 
Network "AEA" and "friends within the political 
system" "associates in EU level and 
national level" 
Organisational "organisational formal structure", its 
"planning and coordinating systems" 
Alitalia developed its lobbying process from its political resources, but the 
rejuvenation of their lobbying capability happened later in comparison to other 
airlines ("around 1990"). This was mainly because they were very comfortable in 
their old ways. Nevertheless, they decided to develop their lobbying capability 
utilising people, their network and the institutional relations department 
structure. As one Alitalia senior respondent says: 
Alitalia decided to develop its lobbying later compared to other airlines. 
The resources that we had in our office were limited because we did not 
have to lobby before the deregulation because of our governance 
structure... Aviation policy had changed forever and Alitalia required new 
resource collection. [DOl 7] 
The illustrative quote shows that Alitalia had moved late in the game when 
compared to its competitors. They started developing their lobbying capability 
during the 2"^ and 3"" package, mainly due to their being a government owned 
organisation. Moreover, this department felt that they did not have the right 
configuration of political resources to develop a robust lobbying capability 
before 1990. They started to focus on several factors to develop their lobbying 
capability. 
The next part will aim to understand how Alitalia developed its lobbying 
capability and political resources within this office before and during 
deregulation. We came to learn that the institutional relations office used some 
form of decision templates or what we term a "cognitive blueprints" to modify 
political resources in order to develop a lobbying capability in their specific way. 
In other words, the Alitalia drew on its human, organisational and network 
resources to form a specific lobbying capability configuration to deploy political 
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resources based on how their executives interpreted this policy context. The next 
part will look at the core elements of the lobbying capability process in more 
detail. In other words, we will illustrate that Alitalia had micro level variables 
that were used significantly to develop lobbying in this endogenous policy 
context. 
5 . 6 . 5 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINTS AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The way in which lobbying development decisions were taken by the senior 
executives within the Alitalia institutional affairs office played a vital role in 
developing what they believed to be a strong lobbying capability. Similar to the 
other cases, we found the cognitive blueprints to be at the core of the lobbying 
process. However, the blueprint decisions made by the senior executives within 
the institutional affairs office were limited due to the majority government 
ownership. As an Alitalia senior member said: 
The way we think is important....The way we were thinking in our office 
was mainly due to our ownership. We wanted to lobby the EU earlier 
before deregulation was introduced but we were constrained by our 
finances and having an old lobbying function meant that we were limited 
in many ways... We realized that we had to change our ways so around 
package two we hired in two EU experts that had EU networks to inform 
EU political actors... In my opinion, lobbying is about influencing 
through networks, this is important to our lobbying function. [D027] 
Building on the idea of a constrained capability, senior management members 
from the institutional affairs office found their decision blueprints constrained to 
a certain degree which affected their ability to renew their lobbying capability to 
match the new policy environment. As one senior informant put it: 
Alitalia wanted to develop their lobbying thinking to make it efficient but 
they had limited resources for what was going to come. Don't get me 
wrong, they had great national lobbying abilities but they were not 
prepared that well in Brussels, so they were using AEA as their EU 
lobbying platform. This in my opinion was attributed due to their 
government ownership structure. [F008J 
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Alitalia wanted to develop their lobbying capability after 1990 as they were very 
comfortable in their old ways before 1988. We can see here that the senior 
management within the institutional affairs office learned later that they had to 
change. They would start to work closely with the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA) to develop their thinking processes and blueprints. 
However, another question is, how did the lobbying cognitive blueprint process 
affect the decision-making flow and where did the decision making originate in 
this context? We believe that within this period the actual decision-making went 
from the CEO level to the institutional affairs office. As one informant put it: 
The knowledge flowed from our department to the CEO. [D027] 
We also found that cognitive blueprints decide the targets to lobby at, both 
national and international. During the endogenous policy context, the lobbying 
was conducted chiefly at a national level between 1985-1997, with a shift taking 
place ft-om 1987-1997 towards the EU level. Rather than jumping in and using a 
laissez-faire^go.Wi in creating strategy, directors of institutional affairs used their 
cognitive blueprints from previous experience and learned to charmel and ftiel 
their decisions on the lobbying process. However, ownership and stakeholders 
also influenced the cognitive aspects of the top management team within the 
government affairs office. 
Sometimes it's difficult to change lobbying patterns, as you feel stuck in 
the old ways. It was easy to just talk to our national contacts through our 
owners and they would influence on our behalf. [D027] 
Indeed the mix between human, organisational, and networks resources, as well 
as competence investments, played an important role in developing an Alitalias 
lobbying capability. 
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5 . 6 . 5 . 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
We found that in 1992 this department had to slightly modify their structure. The 
people interviewed explained how they were bringing lobbying process to "the 
following stage" in the endogenous policy context. Developing a lobbying 
capability was associated with greater levels of interaction among the top 
management teams from the institutional affairs office with the European level 
targets. Therefore the structure chosen was one which would allow the greatest 
interaction to take place between the institutional affairs office and the CEO. 
Surprisingly enough a large level of responsibility for strategic decision-making 
was moved to interest group representation where there was more of an attempt 
to have an influence together in order to make an impact. Furthermore, lobbying 
activities in this challenging policy context changed, often leading to structural 
reorganisation and formal redefinitions of the responsibilities of substructures 
within the government affairs office. As one respondent said: 
There was the addition of a specific focus on Brussels. There we had to 
slowly add another aspect of EU lobbying into our structure. [DOl 7] 
We also found that lobbying network relationship resources were used by 
Alitalia to develop their lobbying capabilities. However, we found that network 
and organisational resource reconfiguration was done later, around the end of the 
second package, in order to develop a strategic lobbying capability. 
5 .6 .5 .2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Alitalia was found to have a very strong national network but not a very strong 
EU level network. These networks played an important role in developing their 
lobbying capability. However, Alitalia believed that networks were constrained 
in this context by having a majority government ownership structure, as 
influencing at a national level could be done but it was more difficult at an EU 
level, and contacts were limited. As one of our respondents said: 
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Before deregulation, at a national level, I had also the relations with the 
Italian regions. You know that the Italian regions have a lot of power. At 
national level, I also have lots of stakeholders, which are mainly 
consumer organisations. For EU level, it's of course the commission, 
parliament, and council. The three main institutions but here we had a 
limited lobbying scope. We did not have too many contacts in these 
places. We reacted too late in contacting the right people because we 
were comfortable and don't think we wanted to change... 
I also had relations with AEA, acting as a focal point and coordinator 
with the AEA, the association of European airlines... this was another of 
our favourite routes " [D035J 
While another respondent said: 
Before deregulation, this department was lobbying mainly the Italian 
parliament and the Italian government. One aspect of the government 
that they used was mainly the ministry of transport. The treasury was 
another main contact because the treasury held about 62% of the capital 
of Alitalia, so it was the main shareholder. Also ENAC (Ente Nazionale 
per I'aviazione Civile), the Italian civil aviation authority, was another 
point to contact during this point. [D027] 
At Alitalia, during introduction of the third package, the government affairs 
office had to modify its network base to incorporate new people. This was 
believed by many to be far too slow but essential to becoming aligned with the 
new policy environment. As one respondent postulates: 
We had to hire new people to engage with EU politics that had EU 
relations. We had to add a EU component to our relations or maybe face 
problems ...so EU networks were developed that played a integral role in 
our lobbying but a little too late... It should have happened in mid 80's 
like other airlines but sometimes things happened slowly in Italy. [D02I] 
Alitalia was not using extensive networks from individuals within the office to 
create influence, as they had the contact base with the national level political 
actors due to the ownership structure. However, the shift in power from Italy to 
Belgium meant that Alitalia had to play a new EU level game. Therefore, Alitalia 
started to hire people that had EU level networks in 1992. Alitalia was also using 
there indirect network resources by using AEA which is placed outside the 
Alitalia's office. Now let us look at another variable that interacted with the 
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network resource to help develop a lobbying capability in the endogenous policy 
context. 
5 . 6 , 5 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Human capital seems to determine the development pace of the lobbying 
capability. More importantly, we found that Alitalia's institutional affairs office 
viewed the role of human capital as being an important component in the process 
of developing lobbying capability. As one informant said: 
I think that the kind of contact and visibility that Alitalia had on the 
process was fairly good. I would say that Alitalia always had the ability 
of having access to the right people in terms of information, assessment 
of the risk and so on. I believe that we still have the same kind of 
capabilities in that period but at a national level... Obviously what 
Alitalia did not have was a business that can transform this information 
into sustainable decisions because in 1994 and 1995, we went through a 
very challenging period simulated by the level of competition that meant 
we needed a strong restructuring plan. That was a result of a managerial 
weakness in deciding the strategy rather than inability to asses the risk or 
to influence the course of regulatory development... perhaps the 
management weakness came from a poor corporate governance structure 
where the ownership was not matching the control aspects... therefore, 
we in 1995 hired a few new senior people with the view that they would 
align Alitalia with the new business environment [D017] 
Network relationship capital is generally considered an attribute of the individual 
people to other people, whereas human capital is considered an attribute of 
individuals and comprises a stock of skills, qualifications and knowledge. We 
found that there were interaction effects between specific people, their network 
targeting sequences and level of competence (national vs international). 
Yes, our relationships play a role in our lobbying. It's the most important 
part of our lobbying but during deregulation our networks were at a 
national level. As the people we hired were Italians. We did not need to 
hire external lobbyists. Consultants yes, we had them for all sorts of 
things for Data etc. We have not done that in the past and no now. In fact 
we have never hired a lobbyist outside the firm. I think having internal 
lobbyists is the only way to get influence. [D027] 
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As it can be seen from the illustration below, the number of people lobbying does 
not matter to Alitalia. We found the lobbying capability was developed at 
Alitalia with the consideration of the quality of network base and not so much the 
quantity of people. However, the networks were thought to be affected by the 
ownership structure, as it was the majority government ownership structure that 
ultimately played a role in devising the networks targets and sequence. 
It is always a matter of how efficient you can be. I think it is not a matter 
of having more people with more networks; it is a matter of having the 
industry having its voice heard. Especially during this time, I think 
Alitalia could have spent more time building lobbying targets in Brussels 
but we had the idea that our government contacts were enough. [DOl 7] 
Indeed, the people interviewed felt that Alitalia had good networks at a national 
level but poor management competence, which could be attributed to their weak 
corporate governance structure. 
5 , 6 . 5 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The lobbying competencies at Alitalia were reconfigured by senior executives 
within the institutional affairs office in order to build their lobbying capability. 
However, the senior executives within this office did not relate the development 
of the lobbying capabilities of their firm to a change in lobbying competencies 
until 1995. This was viewed as the means of reaching "the following stage". 
Alitalia pursued a strategy of fetching new people that had EU level competence, 
which was expected to give them access to new knowledge and better networks 
that they believed they could not have accessed otherwise. As one Alitalia 
respondent said: 
We wanted to bring in new EU knowledge, as aviation law was changing. 
I think the expertise was there for the national level but not there for the 
international level. [D021] 
An interesting question with regards to developing new lobbying competencies is 
not only what processes enable firms to configure them effectively, but also how 
Alitalia selected lobbying competencies to further develop lobbying capabilities? 
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Several informants describe the process in which new lobbying competencies 
acquired though talent hunting. 
I think we just sat around the table and asked if we knew anyone for 
lateral hiring. If so, then get there CV and negotiate a salary. As simple 
as that I think. [D035] 
Conversely, some informants felt that Alitalia did not have the right management 
competence for lobbying: 
During this time Alitalia was comfortable with the government's big 
helpings. In my opinion, this made some of the management staff and 
systems maybe outdated and weak. They tried to get the right people in 
1995 during the re-structuring plan but it still had fundamental 
management and systems flaws. [F008J 
From the micro level analysis of Alitalia institutional affairs office, we found that 
there were few variables that were evident from the interviews that played a vital 
role in the lobbying capability construction. We found that competence played an 
important role in the endogenous policy context and into Alitalias lobbying 
capability development process. It was evident that political resources were 
comprised of human, organisational, network and competence resources. 
However, we found that the ownership structure was viewed by some of the 
executives to have affected Alitalia lobbying capability capacity in this context. 
Moreover, Alitalia was very comfortable resting on their laurels and relying on 
monopolistic positions on routes. For them lobbying capability was developed 
for national purposes, and only in 1995 did they decide to modify this capability, 
when they realised that things had to change or they would face bankruptcy (see 
Appendix 18 for Alitalia's overall storyline map cluster in the endogenous policy 
context). 
5 .7 CASE STUDY FOUR: SAS AIRLINES 
5 .7 .1 SAS OVERVIEW 
The national airlines of Sweden (ABA), Norway (DNL), and Denmark (DDL) 
first met in 1938 to negotiate joint service to New York (see Appendix 14 for 
expansion on the Scandinavian government's general views on airline policy). 
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The plan was delayed by WWII but kept alive in Sweden, where banker Marcus 
Wallenberg founded Svensk Interkontinental Luftrafik (SILA), a private airline 
that in 1943 replaced ABA as Sweden's international carrier. With SILA's 
financial backing, the yet-to-be-formed Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) 
obtained the necessary landing concessions to open a Stockliolm-New York air 
route in 1945. SAS was formed in 1946 after the mergers between SILA, DNL 
and DDL.^^ 
After opening service to South America (1946), Southeast Asia (1949), and 
Africa (1953), SAS inaugurated the world's first commercial polar route in 1954. 
It formed charter airline Scan air in 1961 and Danish domestic carrier Danair, 
through a joint venture, in 1971 (SAS web-site 2006). 
Deregulation of US airlines (1978) signalled the demise of nationally protected 
airlines. Jan Carlzon, former head of Swedish airline Linjeflyg, became SAS's 
president in 1981. By targeting businessmen as the airline's most stable market 
and substituting an economy-rate business class for first-class service on 
European flights, Carlzon turned SAS's losses into profits by the end of 1982 
(Dienel and Lyth 1998). 
The company bought about 25% of Airlines of Britain Holdings in 1988, gaining 
a foothold at London's Heathrow Airport. Another purchase that year brought 
SAS nearly 10% of Continental Airlines Holdings. In 1989 the airline signed 
agreements that provided route coordination and hub-sharing with Swissair, 
Finnair, LanChile, and Canadian Airlines International. 
SAS tried in the early 1990's to merge with KLM, Swissair, and Austrian 
Airlines to create a new international carrier, but that effort failed in 1993, 
leading to the replacement of Carlzon. New CEO Jan Stenberg consolidated the 
group, shed non-core businesses, and cut 15,000 jobs. By late 1994 SAS had sold 
SAS Service Partner (catering, its largest non-airline unit). Diners Club Nordic, 
and most of the SAS Leisure Group. By spinning off its 42% stake in LanChile 
and creating a new Latvian airline with Baltic International, SAS focused its air 
The Swedish government owns 21% of the new SAS, and the governments of Denmark and 
Norway each own 14%. 
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routes in Scandinavia, Western Europe, and the Baltic region (Dienel and Lyth 
1998). 
The SAS consortium was restructured into a single publicly traded company, 
SAS AB, in 2001. That year SAS and Danish carrier Maersk Air were fined by 
the European Commission for agreeing not to compete on certain Scandinavian 
routes. SAS EVP Vagn Sorensen accepted responsibility for the illegal 
agreement and resigned. A month later SAS's board of directors also resigned, 
and a new board was elected at an extraordinary shareholders' meeting held later 
that year. At that time Jorgen Lindegaard took over the CEO position. 
SAS is a founding member of the Star Alliance, whose members include Air 
Canada, All Nippon Airway, Lufthansa, Thai Airways, United Airlines, and 
VARIG of Brazil. The marketing alliance allows the carriers to pool fi-equent-
flyer programs and share booking and airport facilities. Many of the members 
have signed code-sharing deals with one another. SAS serves more than 770 
destinations worldwide tlirough its Star Alliance partners. It has tliree alliance 
members within its group: Scandinavian Airlines, Spanair, and Bluel (formerly 
Air Botnia). The SAS group also owns Wideroe, airBaltic, and Estonian Air. 
Wideroe is Norway's leading regional carrier, and Spanair is Spain's second-
largest airline. Fast-growing Bluel is based in Finland. 
The airline has been struggling to keep costs down, and it has been exploring the 
usual ways to quickly eliminate high costs, including reducing jobs from its 
workforce. The increase in fuel prices has also exacerbated the airline's financial 
condition. Despite its cost-cutting efforts, SAS has failed to stop losses in the 
face of stiff competition and record jet fuel prices. 
The SAS trading subsidiary was folded into the airline unit in 1994. Through its hotel unit, 
SAS allied itself with Radisson Hotels to expand its presence in Europe, the Middle East, and 
Asia. In 1997 the company joined with United Airlines, Lufthansa, VARIG, and others to form 
the Star Alliance. In 1998 SAS acquired Finland's Air Botnia. 
™ The company has split its Scandinavian Airlines businesses into four separate airlines. Three of 
the units operate in Denmark (Scandinavian Airlines Danmark), Norway (SAS Braathens), and 
Sweden (Scandinavian Airlines Sverige), and there is an additional airline to handle international 
flights (Scandinavian Airlines International). Together these airlines transport almost 24 million 
passengers yearly (SAS company web-site 2006). 
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To reduce costs, the company has decided to focus on its core business. As part 
of that strategy, the company in 2005 agreed to sell its European Aeronautical 
Group, which has operations in Sweden and the UK, to Canada-based flight 
operations manager Navtech (see Appendix 6 for expansion on SAS's financial 
position and for a snap shot of the economy). 
5 . 7 . 2 THE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION IN SAS 
The government affairs function within SAS was carried out by the company's 
aeropolitical affairs department, whose main objective was the preservation and 
acquisition of traffic rights, and influencing of political actors. This department, 
like a government affairs office, dealt with external factors, such as 
environmental and conservation pressures, as well as the development of an 
adequate infi-astructurc. This department has been lobbying from the very start 
but senior managers within this department realised that its lobbying capability 
had to accommodate a new target group, mainly political actors in Brussels. As 
one respondent said: 
Then I think that SAS has been lobbying from the beginning in 1946. And 
why is it so? Because aviation and governance have been so intertwined, 
maybe more then any other industries. Because our industry has been so 
heavily regulated. And I think therefore contact with governments and 
airlines started much earlier then many other industries... 
...Whilst lobbying in a more historical sense was based more on a 
bilateral basis or national basis. We were aware that the regulatory 
arena was going to change since the commission would get a strong role. 
It is a long answer but I think it is very important to highlight the change 
in the lobbying environment was inevitable after deregulation. So we had 
to work hard in the aeropolitical affairs office to influence the policy 
makers early and change our lobbying function to be more efficient. 
A number of political developments which actually or potentially influenced the 
position of SAS and its profitability were controlled by the aeropolitical affairs 
department. This department determined the access to markets, relations with 
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suppliers, relations with competitors, and the possibility of cooperation. The 
main activity of this department before deregulation was as following:^' 
> To monitor as early as possible any social, political, legal developments 
which could affect the position of SAS and its future; 
> Within the social, political, legal developments identified, to support the 
making of internal decisions relevant to the positions taken by SAS and to 
advise on the way in which these positions should be followed through in 
the political and administrative decision-making process. 
To protect and strengthen its commercial position, SAS follows a corporate 
political strategy by lobbying targeted political actors. It implements this by 
participation in public debate and by attempting to exert influence by means of 
formal and informal exchanges of ideas with prominent figures in politics and the 
government, and with representatives from various sections of society. This 
department viewed deregulation as the following: 
When we came to the realisation that liberalisation was unavoidable. 
When we did that we wanted to go all the way within the EU. We wanted 
as much liberalisation as possible. And by liberalisation we also would 
stress that non discrimination a great deal. And I think a lot about state 
aid in that regard. Because if you liberalise the market that would 
probably be a number of candidates which turned out to be true for 
failure. And if you liberalise a market you should allow those airlines and 
businesses to fail otherwise you cannot talk about free and liberalised 
competition. As soon as the market was liberalised, there was no pardon 
from the Scandinavian authority. They went all the way immediately and 
abided by all the rules. And that is a Scandinavian way of doing things. 
There were many national carriers that were protected, protected, 
protected in so many ways by national governments. They were protected 
from the consequences of the liberalisation. For instance Air France, 
received something like 5 billion Euros in State Aid in 1997. Which would 
be unheard of in a Scandinavian environment. So SAS had to survive on 
its own and in some instances also fighting its own authorities and this is 
where lobbying became a more important integral part of the SAS 
regulation game. [B006] 
B007 and B024. 
-173-
"Lobbying Capability" 
SAS's lobby function at the EU and the relevant national organisations is based 
at the SAS head office in Denmark. Although SAS created a public affairs 
manager role in the European capital in 1995, this was done to meet the new 
needs from this policy context. This decision stems from SAS's view that 
government affairs are an important management activity. They based of a 
manager in Brussels, both within SAS and outside, and the manager would soon 
be perceived to be important by political actors. The Brussels man is an external 
resource that can be used to create some form of value for SAS. 
5 . 7 . 3 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY SAS 
SAS spent a lot of time developing lobbying routines before, during and after the 
introduction of the deregulation. This was mainly due to SAS executives 
believing that political decision-makers were in the position to affect their 
bottom line tremendously, so it was important for them to have an influence 
mechanism that would direct the right policy outcome and also matched their 
resources and skills. The senior executives within the aeropolitical affairs office 
had several ways of influencing national and international political actors. The 
types of lobbying processes used by SAS were mainly a combination of 
individual and group coalition influence. As one respondent said: 
We lobbied bilaterally with the national authorities in the three 
Scandinavian countries. The individual lobbying path was in our opinion 
the best way to influence. However, according to our thinking and 
evaluation then we used other resources from our lobbying bag to 
influence. AEA was a great resource that we pulled out of the hat. We 
were lobbying using AEA during that time using mainly some influence at 
the general meetings but everyone wants to push their views in these 
meetings... 
...If you ask me what actual process we used more, we used maybe more 
individual lobbying routines but AEA played a big role and of course our 
national government authorities. [B007] 
The categorisation of the different lobbying routines was done according 
to idiosyncratic and generic lobbying routines. Some illustrative quotes 
were chosen that were exemplary of themes that emerged from the 
interview transcripts, as shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Direct SAS quotes to show lobbying processes types 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"Visiting friends" "Using our resources like interest groups like 
AEA that we pay to use" 
"Personal letters" "Conferences" 
"Contacting the national authorities" "Cocktail parties" 
"Personal phone call" 
As seen from the illustrative quotes from the above, SAS was using an array of 
individual lobbying that involved complicated targeting and sequences by using a 
combination of telephone calls, visiting friends, and letters. They were also using 
generic lobbying that other airlines may tap into by paying a fee, including AEA 
and conferences. According to the SAS respondents, the aeropolitical affairs 
office decided to put most effort into lobbying using idiosyncratic lobbying 
routines, while also using the generic routines. The reason for this was thought to 
be because the government affairs executives believed that these routine 
combinations were the best way to influence the policy makers. As one 
respondent said: 
We were lobbying using the classic lobbying techniques like using friends 
inside the political system, dinner parties, cocktails and breakfast 
meetings but this has changed to a lesser extent to before, because it is a 
matter of cost. It is also a matter of time, a matter of resources etc. 
Sometimes it might be more efficient to have a short meeting in an office 
on a specific topic. [B029] 
Before 1988, the aeropolitical affairs office was learning to influence at the EU 
level, by learning the paths of influencing the European political actors, while 
lobbying the three Scandinavian authorities. As one respondent said: 
Before the first package was introduced, we had to deal with a lot of 
questions around traffic rights. But after the third package came into 
place it was not necessary to negotiate any flights anymore because we 
had an open European market. So this meant that the geographic 
priorities had to change. That you could focus on entirely on non-
liberalised markets when it comes to those issues. So as a result you need 
less people in an aeropolitical function. But then of course the institution 
started to become more creative when it comes to proposing legislation 
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within other areas. First they liberalise then they find out that liberisation 
did not work the way they thought so then they started to debate other 
issues to adjust the market or adjust the behaviour of the undertaking or 
whatever. We sometimes refer this to as, re-regulating the market. Like in 
consumer legislation or competition law or whatever. So there was a 
change in focus. [B004] 
The EU government had very little power before 1992, but it did have 
discussions about the components of the policy with the Scandinavian authority. 
Actually SAS had a very special situation at that point in time, as Sweden and 
Norway were not members of the European Union while Denmark was a 
member of the EU. That of course made it necessary to ensure that there was 
some consistency between how the deregulation package was going to be applied 
to the three countries. Therefore, there was a special agreement created between 
the European Union and Sweden and Norway to ensure that all legislation was 
also going to be applied to Norway and Sweden. 
5 . 7 . 4 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
From the analysis we found that the lobbying capability was developed from 
political resources. Political resources are important in the lobbying process, 
especially in responding to the policy needs. Subsequently the respondents 
explained that poHtical resources are mainly comprised of people who have 
experience and networks, and the actual organisational structure. We categorised 
all the themes found into three key variables that make up a political resource; 
human, organisational and network resources. It is from these important 
resources that lobbying capabilities are formed and these capabilities then are 
used to deploy the political resources. Table 17 below shows the three main 
categories of the emergent concepts that are important in the political resource 
composition. Table 17 also shows the illustrative quotes. 
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Table 17: SAS political resources 
Political capital resource Observations 
Human "Knowledge" and "experience" 
Network "AEA" and "friends within the political 
system" "associates in EU level and 
national level" 
Organisational "organisational formal structure", its 
"planning and coordinating systems" 
SAS developed its lobbying process from its political resources; the rejuvenation 
of their lobbying capability happened around 1986. Nevertheless, they decided to 
develop their lobbying capability through people, their network and department 
structure. As one SAS senior respondent says: 
It is very double-sided. But I must admit that it is much more difficult to 
influence the policy making alone. It is a matter of network resource and 
other resources. So I would say in 1986 we developed our lobbying 
within the firm by focusing on making the commercial side of SAS 
understand what was happening at Brussels. We knew that we wanted 
regulation to change like KLM and British Airways. At the same time 
AEA and we hired new people that gathered information so that SAS 
could understand the regulatory environment more thoroughly. We were 
aware that many good things were going to come but also competition 
was going to be increased as a result of this deregulation. So definitely 
we tried to make Brussels hear our opinions but our individual level of 
influence was limited due to the large number of other interest groups. 
The political environment definitely shaped our routines during this 
period. We had to find the resources to meet the new environment. Yes, 
we all wanted to be proactive but at this time it is difficult to have our 
opinions heard due to lack of resources. I must admit that's the key to 
everything! [B004] 
The illustrative quote shows that SAS had moved early in the game compared to 
some of its competitors. They started developing their lobbying capability the 
well before the first package. Moreover, this department felt that they did not 
have the right configuration of political resources to develop a robust lobbying 
capability to match the new policy environment. They started to focus on several 
factors to develop their lobbying capability. 
The next part will aim to understand how SAS developed its lobbying capability 
and political resources within this office before and during deregulation. We 
came to learn that the aeropolitical affairs office used some form of decision 
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templates or what we term a "cognitive blueprints" to modify political resources 
in order to develop a lobbying capability in their specific way. In other words, 
the SAS used from its human, organisational and network resources a specific 
lobbying capability configuration to deploy political resources, based on how 
their executives interpreted this policy context. The next part will look at the core 
elements of the lobbying capability process in more detail. In other words, we 
will illustrate that SAS had micro level variables that were significantly used in 
order to develop lobbying in this endogenous policy context. 
5 . 7 . 5 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The decisions taken by the SAS senior management in their aeropolitical affairs 
office played a vital role in developing what they believed to be a strong 
lobbying capability for this period. The decision-making blueprints that the 
senior executives used and adapted in that time, are what we have found to be at 
the core of the lobbying development process. As one respondent put it: 
Our thinking frames were important in this period. The way I made 
decisions was made from the people around us, my past experience and 
what lies ahead. However, some of our previous routines were challenged 
with the potential policy liberalisation so SAS and our department had to 
evolve our lobbying routines. [B029] 
As the illustrative quote above shows, the senior management's cognitive 
blueprints came mainly from their previous experiences but also from the people 
around them to assist their current learning and from their perception of the 
frature impact of policy. This highlights that past, present and future is something 
that SAS managers look to when developing their own cognition in order to then 
develop lobbying capability. 
We found that the SAS decision-making blueprints were fairly adaptable and 
decision-makers had a lot of support from owners. The senior management teams 
within the aeropolitical affairs office were conditioned by default to create 
cognitive blueprints to facilitate decision-making. Moreover, the top 
management teams within this office needed their cognitive blueprints to be 
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improved every so often to meet the new policy environment. After hearing that 
deregulation may be introduced, the SAS aeropolitical affairs office started to 
develop their lobbying capability by firstly looking at their own cognitive 
blueprints, and where they lacked competence they looked outside the 
organisation within their networks, or learned by reading. As one senior 
informant put it: 
Like always before the deregulation period when you do lobby work, it is 
a matter of analysing the political environment. We were analysing the 
different political parties and their views. This was done in order for us to 
make our information packages or what some call 'position influence 
packagesthese were brought to the political receivers. Our thinking was 
adaptable and we lobbied in the way we thought was right. As we went 
past the first package we had to read a lot of books on the US 
deregulation period in order to inform our thinking. ..fB024] 
... My thinking then led me to believe that we had to have a large number 
of meetings which in our view was the most sufficient way to deal with, 
for example, the parliament. We had one to one meetings with politicians, 
meetings with various committees etc. And obviously to use whatever 
organisations around the political system. [B024] 
We can see here that the senior management within the government affairs office 
would leam by doing, instead of getting formal training to develop their lobbying 
capability. We believe that within this period the actual decision-making went 
from the aeropolitical affairs office to the CEO level. As one informant put it: 
Decisions flowed from mainly our office to CEO. Yes, he did play a large 
role in the influencing game but we provided him with the SAS corporate 
political strategy information. I think it usually starts in our office. 
On a different note, we found that senior executives' decision "blueprints" 
decided the targets to lobby at, both national and international. During the first 
and second package of the endogenous policy context (1987-1992) the lobbying 
was conducted more at a national level, with a shift taking place towards the EU 
level firom 1992-1997. 
SAS did target people in the lobbying game before deregulation. The 
lobbying targets depended on access to who we knew and who we thought 
had power. [B028] 
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As the illustrative quote shows, SAS would target political actors in their 
networks, and this depended on their cognitive understanding of access and 
power. Nevertheless, we have also found that human, organisational, and 
networks resources, and competence investments all played an important role in 
developing an effective lobbying capability. In addition, ownership and 
stakeholder's views influenced the cognitive aspects slightly, according to the 
top management team within the government affairs office. 
5 .7 .5 .1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Organisational structure was found to be important in developing the SAS 
lobbying capability. Moreover, lobbying capability development was helped by 
senior management adapting the aeropolitical affairs office to be better aligned 
with the perceived endogenous policy context changes {"adapting our 
department" [B007]). Therefore, organisation structure modification was done in 
order to allow greater levels of interaction between the top management teams 
from the SAS aeropolitical affairs office and political actors within the different 
supranational institutions. However, we found that there was a lower level of 
transference of responsibility for strategic decision-making from the SAS to their 
interest group representation (AEA). Instead they attempted to exercise more 
influence alone. Furthermore, lobbying routines in this challenging policy 
context were adapted, often leading to some simple structural reorganisation and 
formal redefinitions of responsibilities within the government affairs office. As 
one respondent said: 
Our department had been functioning since the beginning but we changed 
the characteristics since the aviation policy world was changing around 
us. Yes we wanted to create a unique structure! You will not find that too 
much... 
...We made our department more communication focused. That was our 
intent and thinking before deregulation. During deregulation we were 
working in always improving the structure of our department. And yes we 
were conscious of doing this all the time. [B024] 
From our follow up interview, we found that the SAS senior managers 
recognised the power shift fi'om national governments to the EU level. Therefore 
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they extended their organisational structure within their aeropolitical affairs 
office by hiring a person to man their new Brussels office. Indeed, it was 
important for SAS to be close to the political actors so they opened a small office 
after the introduction of the first package to reduce transaction costs. As a senior 
respondent said: 
At that time it was located in Denmark. But then we also opened a small 
Brussels office in 1991. We had one person looking after this place and it 
was their role to feed us information and make contacts. But our 
Denmark office also played a major role in coordinating the lobbying to 
our satellite office. [B006] 
We found that SAS senior managers made decisions from their own blueprints to 
improve their organisational structure reconfiguration in order to develop a 
strategic lobbying capability. However networks relationships were also found to 
be closely related to the lobbying capability development process. 
5 . 7 . 5 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
SAS was found to have good national networks with all three of its governments, 
especially before the introduction of deregulation. However, the senior 
management team in the aeropolitical affairs office knew that their network 
composition had to change by incorporating an EU frontier. According to the 
respondents, EU level network building began in 1985, where specific people 
were hired that had EU level network connections (and competence). These 
networks played an important role in developing their lobbying capability. As 
one of our respondents said: 
I think the recipe was simple. Way before deregulation, we had to meet 
people usually at national level or make contact with people in the 
countries that we were flying to. During this time we were structured 
well, we had the right contacts to meet the right people. Access channels 
through relationships allow influence to be facilitated. We would try to 
show the politicians that we understand what kind of dilemma they had 
and what kind of consideration they needed to take. At a national level 
that was definitely the best way to do it before 1985. Our lobbying 
involved having the right people, after 1985 we knew that we had to bring 
in new blood. The lobbying routines did not change too much, however 
who you contacted changed slightly. I think that the new recruits that 
were hired gave EU targets our version of the story, these new hires 
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would help tell those EU actors that they knew well, why one thing was 
good and why another thing was bad. But at the same time understand 
what position the politician was in. [B007] 
While another respondent said: 
It was an ongoing process, we knew that all new players at EU level had 
to be contacted after a certain time and that is probably the way to do it. 
We were just mixing with the EU parliament ministers to let them know 
our views. They would listen because we were viewed to be a very 
important industry with regards to bringing in tourists and allowing 
business tourism to flourish. It was natural and being in places for the 
sake of influencing is not how we conduct lobbying at SAS. I don't think 
any airline is that intricate in their lobbying capability building. We like 
to try to be in a natural setting to influence. We were the biggest airline 
in Scandinavia by far; we were also in the position that we had the 
expertise that politicians needed from time to time. [B028] 
From the quotes above, we can see that SAS realised that they needed new 
networks. Therefore the senior management team made decisions to hire new 
people. These people that were hired then were contacting EU and national level 
targets. The people within this department did not target EU and national level 
actors in specific planned sequences; access allowed by those individuals was 
more important. 
During the deregulation period, especially in the introduction of the third 
package, SAS decided to modify their network base to incorporate new people 
that had EU level networks, using their cognitive blueprints. As one respondent's 
postulates: 
On an EU level, SAS was at that time a very high profile airline and our 
CEO was also a very highly profile CEO within the industry and within 
the business environment in Europe in general. So I think he had easy 
access to whatever top layers. We also had this external person come in 
with their own network. So we bought it partly so to speak, the network 
on most levels and managed to open most doors as a result of that. That 
is what lobbying is all about in my opinion. It was very easy for us to 
open doors at the EU level and certainly at the national level where we 
had the network needed to open the doors already. [B006] 
SAS was using extensive networks from individuals within the office to create 
influence, as they had the contact base with the national level political actors due 
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to having a strong historical attachment. However, the shift in power from 
national governments to Brussels meant that SAS had to play a new EU level 
game. Therefore, SAS started buying EU level networks in 1986 and also used 
their indirect network resources, AEA, which was placed outside the SAS office. 
Well we belonged to lATA, AEA and we belonged to an organisation that 
is of an industry association being part of the national employers' 
organisation. That was the only organisation that we were members of in 
the Norway. We equally had an organisation in Sweden and Denmark 
more or less. So both AEA and lATA were very important resources for 
us. They did quite a significant part of the lobbying for us but I think 
going alone is the best, especially when you have time to react. [B024] 
From the above quote, we can see that before the introduction of deregulation, 
the SAS aeropolitical affairs office perceived associations to be an important 
network resource in developing their lobbying. The next part will look at another 
variable that helped develop their lobbying capability more closely. 
5 . 7 . 5 , 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING 
PROCESSES 
Human resources were seen to be very important in the SAS lobbying game. The 
senior management team within the aeropolitical affairs office decided that 
influencing at EU level meant bringing in new talent. The new talent was 
important in lobbying capability development process, as they would bring into 
this office both "competence" and "network" resources. As one informant said: 
Well, before deregulation, we didn 't really get formally trained like in 
other departments. We had to learn by doing and build national contacts 
to influence abroad. However, when we learned that deregulation was 
indeed needed to integrate Europe, we realized the opportunity and the 
importance of bringing in EU competence, which meant bringing in new 
people to lobby European targets. We knew from looking at the US case 
that Europe wanted to build a strong united institutional continent. 
Logically democracy differentiates itself from other types of political 
regimes by allowing business people to inform politicians because they 
don't know everything. We knew that SAS had to take lobbying seriously 
like KLM and Lufthansa. Our thinking took us to believe that we already 
had prior knowledge from the national lobbying so these kinds of things 
become embedded in our culture. But what we needed was EU 
relationships and EU expertise in order to influence targets in Brussels. 
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So we went out shopping for people. We usually hired based on how long 
you worked for either the national government in Scandinavia or a 
European institutions. If you had a strong education and background in 
EU law, economics or airlines, then we would consider you to enter the 
aeropolitical department. [B004] 
The above quote suggests that the senior management decision in bringing in 
new talent was crucial to developing the SAS lobbying capabihty, in order to 
influence the deregulation pohcy. The senior management beheved that in order 
to influence the deregulation process and other future pohcies they had to bring 
in new talent that had both EU and national level competences and networks. 
What is more, we found their resource acquisition strategy had an overlap at a 
micro level between human resources, network resources and competence, 
highlighting again the complexity involved in developing lobbying at SAS. This 
interaction effect helped the lobbying development process. 
We had our own office in Brussels during that time. For this office, we 
hired a great mind with strong relationships. I think most airlines had an 
office there during that time, so SAS did the same. Obviously we have to 
hire from time to time external legal help. That's important. And I would 
think we did that also in 93 and 94. That is more or less the only expertise 
we buy from outside. We never use lobby consultants or things like that. 
We use our own people, as that is the only way to keep control on the 
influencing. Preferably people that have years of experience in transport 
/aw. 
From the above quote, we can see that human capital investment was important 
to SAS to influence the whole deregulation procedure. Senior management used 
their cognitive decision-making to bring in new blood with networks and 
competence. 
Similarly another respondent said: "I know that during that time we employed a colleague of 
mine from the Danish foreign office who was a specialist in EU processes and political 
procedures. He was employed in particular to influence the whole procedure and of course the 
end result was liberalisation process in the EU the Europe. But how he did it and how much 
impact and success we actually had I don't know. But I know that SAS from the initial .stages 
being maybe a little apposed to the liberalisation package shifted strategy to more or le.ss to 
being in favour because that was the way to have influence to get the end result. This was a 
process that was going to be, that was impossible to stop anyways, so it was good to be part of 
the process instead of being opposed to the process.'' [B024] 
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5 . 7 . 5 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
Lobbying competencies was viewed by SAS senior managers as a way to 
develop their lobbying capability. Senior management in the SAS aeropolitical 
affairs office explicitly related the development of their lobbying capability to a 
change in lobbying competencies, which were expected to enable them to 
influence the policy decision-makers in Brussels. The competence acquisition 
was linked to the human capital investment, where they bought in specific people 
instead of training current employees to influence. Moreover, this strategy was 
viewed as the means for reaching "a positive outcome" [B006]. SAS pursued a 
strategy of fetching new people that had EU level knowledge, which was 
expected to give them access to new knowledge and better networks that they 
believed could not have accessed from training people. They needed to influence 
people before it was too late, so in 1985 they went looking for some people. As 
one SAS respondent said: 
Lobbying development then was in my opinion about knowledge and 
skills building before policy introduction. It was also about exchanging 
information with people in power, and this power was moving to 
Brussels. The power shift also meant that the lobbying behaviour we had 
needed to change. Influencing these people in power depended on our 
thinking, relations and skill set. This comes from expert knowledge we 
gained over time... 
...In the lobbying game, you give the politician something and they give 
you something back. We are not talking about bribery, far from that, but 
we are talking about knowledge on our position. At SAS we were 
educating the political actors on our position and on how packages 
would reduce the risk of failure. I made it clear to my contacts that 
packages were the way forward. We also wanted subsidies to stop for 
everyone. We wanted fair competition for everyone. Equal platform for 
everyone on price and routes. [B007] 
Underlying the diversity was an effort to gain access to specialised expertise, 
embodied in individuals that were viewed as being among the top in their fields 
of expertise. Hiring top experts in specific areas helped SAS in developing new 
lobbying competencies and supporting them developed management cognition 
that appeared to be the underlying model for evolving their lobbying capability. 
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An interesting question with regard to developing new lobbying competencies is 
not only what processes enable firms to configure them effectively, but also how 
firms select lobbying competencies that will further develop lobbying 
capabilities? Several informants describe the process through which new 
lobbying competencies were targeted, "We looked for the best aviation law 
experts with EU and National networks " [B024]. 
We can see that the lobbying capability process played an important role in the 
endogenous policy context where SAS had time to manoeuvre to make their 
interest heard. From the micro level analysis of SAS, and its aeropolitical affairs 
office, we found that there were few variables that were evident from the 
interviews that played a vital role in the lobbying capability construction. It was 
evident that political resources were comprised of human, organisational, 
network and competence resources. Furthermore, a symbiotic relationship was 
found between political resources and lobbying capabilities, where the political 
resources were used to develop the lobbying capability and the lobbying 
capabilities were then used to deploy the political resources (see Appendix 19 for 
SAS's overall storyline map cluster in the endogenous policy context). 
5 . 8 CASE STUDY FIVE: TAP AIR 
5 . 8 , 1 TAP AIR OVERVIEW 
The airline was founded on March 14 1945, beginning commercial service on 
September 19, 1946 from Lisbon to Madrid under its original name of 
Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP). On December 31 of that year, it began 
its Linha Aerea Imperial, a twelve-stop service including Luanda, Angola and 
Lourenco Marques (now Maputo), and Mozambique. 1947 saw the inauguration 
of its domestic service from Lisbon to Porto (see Appendix 15 for expansion on 
Portuguese government's general views on airline policy). Service to Sao Tome 
and London began in 1949 (TAP company web-site 2006). 
In 1953, the airline became a private company and began service to Tangier and 
Casablanca. The one millionth passenger flew on TAP on June 19, 1964, 18 
years after the airline began operations. In 1969 service to New York via Santa 
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Maria Island in the Azores began. Boston was added to the New York service the 
following year (TAP company web-site 2006). In 1975, TAP was nationalized, 
becoming a public corporation (Empresa Publico). 
TAP purchased the Boeing 747 during the 1970's, replacing their Boeing 707s; 
but the 747s were eventually sold due to lack of demand. They were replaced by 
Lockheed TriStars and Airbus A310s on long haul routes. By the late 1990's 
TAP had expanded its fleet by selling its older Boeing 727s and Boeing 737s and 
had replaced them with Airbus A319, A320 and A321. The TriStars were sold to 
Air Luxor and were replaced by more capable Airbus A340s giving TAP a large 
fleet of Airbus only aircraft (TAP company web-site 2006). 
In 1989 service to Newark, New Jersey was introduced and in 1991, service to 
Berlin. Also in 1989 TAP became a publicly-traded company (Sociedade 
Anonima). In 1993, TAP began flying to Tel Aviv. In 1994, TAP began a code 
sharing arrangement with Delta Air Lines for north Atlantic service. This 
agreement was ended in 2005. 1996 saw the introduction of a service to Boston 
via Terceira Island in the Azores, the inauguration of service to Macau and the 
launch of TAP's Web site. In 1997, service began to Punta Cana and Bangkok. 
Flights to Macau and Bangkok have since been discontinued. 
In 2005 TAP became the sixteenth member of the Star Alliance. TAP Air 
Portugal was rebranded as TAP Portugal in February 2005. It employs 9750 
staff. TAP also ended its code sharing agreement with Delta Air Lines and began 
a new agreement with United Airlines as part of its membership in Star Alliance. 
Under this agreement United's code (UA) is placed on TAP's trans-atlantic flights 
and some African flights, and TAP's code (TP) is placed on United flights (see 
Appendix 6 for expansion on TAP's financial position and for a snap shot of the 
economy). 
In 2006, it is planning to start codesharing with US Airways on all routes 
between Portugal and the USA and connection services out of New York City-
Newark and Philadelphia. TAP Portugal has shareholdings in a number of other 
airlines; White (75%), Air Sao Tome e Principe (40%), Linhas Aereas de Sao 
Tome e Principe (40%) and Air Macau (15%) (TAP company web-site 2006). 
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5 . 8 . 2 THE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION IN TAP AIR 
A large part of the government affairs function within TAP Air was carried out 
by the external affairs office/^ Until the early 90's this department was focusing 
mainly on national and also on new EU affairs. However, before 1989 it was 
focused chiefly on national level lobbying. Only after this period did they begin 
to learn that the lobbying process had to change to accommodate the new 
changing policy environment. Then the team of four had to deal with the various 
institutions in Brussels. Nonetheless, this department had a role within TAP Air, 
and its main function consisted of the following: 
*l* providing a clear organisational structure; 
••• monitoring the relevant political fields; 
*l* developing the network of stakeholders; 
I systematic communication with different stakeholder. 
*l* all relations with institutions at national and EU level 
The external affairs department had an objective of preservation and acquisition 
of traffic rights to Asia, North-America, Africa and Europe until the end of 
1980's (Annual Report 1989). According to interviewees, they did not have to 
lobby national governments like other airlines, mainly because the governments 
owned them so influencing just meant picking up the phone and "having a 
chat"'^. However, external factors, policy change pressures, the development of 
an adequate infrastructure and the ongoing development of the single market led 
to this department modifying its lobbying capability. As one TAP air respondent 
explained; 
Our department then dealt with government affairs like it does now. It 
dealt with multi-lateral representation, and aeropolitical affairs and also 
alliances. So it had an external affairs and the alliances function. By 
alliances it does not mean on the alliance in which we are integrated, its 
more then that, its also all the commercial arrangements that we have 
73 
C009,C010, C011,C013 and C025. 
C009, CO 10, c o n , C013 and C025. 
The external affairs office has the same function as a government affairs office. 
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with other non-alliance partners. But to get to the subject, we knew that 
things had to change at Tap before deregulation. If we wanted to stay in 
the business, our office would have to change. We had an important 
lobbying function but we knew that it would increase more with time, but 
being government owned complicates things, as you can imagine. [C009] 
This department has been lobbying from the very beginning because of political 
nature of the industry and its management. It has always had constant 
interactions with the political arena in Portugal and its governments. Moreover, 
the nature of lobbying at TAP before 1988 focused very much on national level 
targets using their national aeropolitical division at the Ministry of Transport to 
negotiate traffic rights. However, senior management realised from the early to 
mid 90's that they needed to lobby at EU level for the third package. As a senior 
respondent said: 
Well we first were happy with our position on routes but knew that it 
would not last. So we wanted some sort of phasing to be agreed upon 
because each member state had for a long time a different aeropolitical 
development, so the regulatory environment was individualised up to that 
point and there was difference in the playing field among the several 
members, so we definitely thought that in order for this process to be 
successful it had to be phased in. The other issue is that you also needed 
to take into account special situations such as peripheral areas, which 
needed special treatment, so exceptional treatment if wish in terms of 
regulatory environment, I am referring to our islands like Accores and 
Madeira. Those were the two main issues that we were working on and 
fighting for. However, we tried to lobby mainly on these issues 
individually and using AEA. I think that we lobbied later then KLM, 
Lufthansa andBA, but that's due to our organisation. [CO 10] 
We can see from the illustrative quote above that Tap Air did lobby individually 
and also used AEA, however, they felt that they started late compared to others. 
This was mainly due to their organisations culture, which had government ethos 
all over it which affected the incentives^^. This constrained them and they were 
also reluctant to change the system that allowed them to be protected by their 
own government. 
C O l O 
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5 . 8 . 3 TYPES OF LOBBYING PROCESSES USED BY TAP AIR 
From the interviews we found that lobbying routines/processes were used and 
modified by the external affairs office at TAP Air before, during and after the 
endogenous policy context/^ The categorisation of the different lobbying 
routines was done according to two types, idiosyncratic and generic lobbying 
routines. Some illustrative quotes were chosen, as shown in Table 18, which 
were exemplary of themes that emerged from the interview transcripts. As one 
TAP Air senior management respondent sums up the essence of decisions taken 
in this context in conjunction to the types of lobbying processes used: 
It was mainly AEA that played a role in our lobbying. As you understand, 
when Portugal joined the European Union in 1996, until then a certain 
habit of articulation with the national authorities came into place. The 
direct lobbying functions of TAP via the national authorities was fairly 
developed compared to our young EU contact base. I would say that if 
you are considering that time frame of deregulation, we definitely gave 
our input into the whole process but less at the start. I think that it was 
done more from our trade association, AEA than directly, through our 
authorities. But of course in this process there [are] always three 
institutions that need to be lobbied, so to speak. The one that AEA lobbies 
most effectively is the commission. And in a way it might also influence 
the transport committee or the European parliament, but it is for the 
members to secure and assure that their message are well heard at 
council level and MEP level through their own lobbying processes and 
efforts. The lobbying efforts were not as structured as it is nowadays. 
Yes, we lobbied much more through AEA, I am pretty sure, but we used 
some individual paths with our local authorities. [CO 11] 
Table 18: Direct TAP quotes to show lobbying processes types 78 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"Talking to our board members and our 
civil aviation authority" 
"Using interest groups like AEA and I AT A" 
"Letters" "Conferences" 
"Speaking to our stakeholders" "Cocktail parties" 
"Phone call" 
" Routines and processes are viewed synonymously here. 
^ C009,C0]1, C013 and C025. 
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As seen from the illustrative quotes from the above, TAP Air was using an array 
of individual lobbying that evolved complicated targeting and sequences by 
using a combination of telephone calls, visiting friends, letters. They were also 
using generic lobbying routines that other airlines may tap into for a fee, 
including AEA, conferences and cocktail parties. The senior management 
interviewed felt that TAP wanted to use a combination of lobbying routines to 
deploy political resources to influence policy makers. TAP external affairs office 
decided to put most effort on using their generic lobbying routines before the 
implementation of the first package, as they felt constrained by their ownership. 
Correspondingly, they believed that based on their limited financial resources 
and human resources they could influence mainly using AEA and political 
targets in their country. According to the respondents, from 1988 most of the 
lobbying that TAP did was through AEA. However, simultaneously the external 
affairs office was slowly learning the influencing routines for European 
supranational institutions and Portuguese authorities in Brussels. 
Well, we were much more active with our national authorities because 
you also have to understand that whole process of becoming a member of 
the EU, saw a lot of transformations in the structure of the Civil aviation 
authority in Portugal. And the competition authority in Portugal and 
competition authority and the national authority as well. Throughout this 
process, we had to adapt to new interfaces, it was a learning curve that 
made our lobbying more effective. So definitely in 1997, we were heard 
with a different degree of active listening then we were heard before 
1988, that is for sure. This is because things were structured differently 
as an organisation. [CO33] 
It was evident that TAP was late in the lobbying game, but they became very 
active in lobbying direcfly to the commission in 1996 and 1997, just after the 
adoption of the third package. This was mainly due to TAP facing financial and 
economic difficulties where the state decided to recapitalise the company 
together with an in-depth restructuring plan. 
I assume because also understand that the relations. TAP at the time was 
100% owned by the government and being perceived as the flag carrier 
of Portugal. The relationship between our board and the Minister of 
Transportation was quite close, I would think at the time, this was the 
channel to influence the best possible way. Definitely the most effective 
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one, I don't think that through AEA we would be able to influence the 
process as much nowadays, as now we are one of thirty carriers that have 
a different dimension and global structure in Brussels, which is to their 
advantage, in this regard. So I would assume in that time the main 
channel would be the national one through our board to the Minister of 
Transportation. The other one through our civil aviation authorities. I 
would say that my department would do more through the civil aviation 
authority but also letting the board know so that they can convey them to 
the Minister of Transport. That was how things were done more or less. 
We can see that TAP senior managers used a combination of individual and 
collective influence routines to deploy political resource before, during and after. 
However, they could not keep using the same routines because the whole 
environment was changing. The power that was in the hands of the national 
authorities was being transferred slowly to European level authorities. Therefore, 
after the third package, the commission definitely, gained more power than ever 
in relation to aviation issues. This does not mean that TAP stopped lobbying their 
national authorities, due to the triangle with the commission, council and 
European Parliament. On the contrary, they had to lobby even more to try to 
influence their national authorities at an EU level, particular those that sat in the 
different council of ministers. So in 1997 they started to keep their individual 
efforts focused on national activities and EU level which, of course, impacted on 
their decision-making. But in terms of lobbying the commission TAP did it either 
through AEA or through their permanent representative in Brussels and Portugal. 
There were lots of interesting policy responsiveness techniques and political 
resources that TAP used within this endogenous policy context. 
5 . 8 . 4 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
Similar to the other four cases, we found that the lobbying capability was 
developed from the political resources. The senior management at TAP 
configured their political resource base to help improve their lobbying process, 
especially in responding to the endogenous policy needs. The respondents 
explained that political resources were comprised mainly of people who had 
experience and networks, as well as the actual organisational structure. We 
categorised all the themes found into three key variables that make up a political 
resource: human, organisational and network resources. The senior management 
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thought from their previous experiences that these important resources were 
needed to develop their lobbying capability in order to effectively deploy the 
political resources. Table 19 below shows three main categories of emergent 
concepts that are important in the political resource composition. 
Table 19: TAP Air political resources 
Political capital resource Observations 
Human "Knowledge" and "experience" 
Network "used AEA" and "friends" "associates in 
EU level and national level" 
Organisational "organisational formal structure" 
As it can be seen from the above quotes, TAP Air developed its lobbying process 
from its political resources, but the rejuvenation of their lobbying capability 
happened much later when compared to other airlines ("around 1996"). This was 
mainly because they were very comfortable in their old ways of being a flag 
carrier. Nevertheless, they decided to develop their lobbying capability from 
people, their networks and knowledge, and the institutional relations department 
structure. As one TAP Air senior respondent said: 
If you are talking about lobbying before deregulation, in our instances, 
then the lobbying capability we had did not change the environment the 
way we wanted. But I would say that airline size and ownership played a 
part in the outcome. But if you are talking about national level then that 
is a different story. I think that we introduced then ways of lobbying that 
could change the environment, even the relationship with those 
authorities that were overseeing the aviation issues in our country. So it 
is all relative but we definitely had introduced new lobbying processes 
which changed the environment locally but in terms of making impact on 
the deregulation it's difficult to say. [CO 10] 
The illustrative quote shows that TAP Air had moved late in the game in 
comparison with its competitors. They started developing their lobbying 
capability during the third package, which was mainly due to being a government 
owned organisation. Moreover, this department felt that they did not have the 
right configuration of political resources to develop a robust lobbying capability 
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before 1994. They started to focus on several factors to develop their lobbying 
capability. 
The next part will aim to understand how Tap Air developed its lobbying 
capability and political resources within this office before and during 
deregulation. We came to learn that the external relations department used some 
form of decision templates or what we term a "cognitive blueprints" to modify 
political resources in order to develop their lobbying capability in their specific 
way. In other words, the Tap Air drew from its human, organisational and 
network resources a specific lobbying capability configuration to deploy political 
resources, based on how their executives interpreted this policy context. The next 
part will look at the core elements of the lobbying capability process in more 
detail. 
5 .8 .5 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The way in which lobbying capability development decisions were taken by the 
senior executives within TAPs external affairs office played a crucial role in 
developing what they believed to be a strong lobbying capability. Similar to the 
other cases, we found the cognitive blueprints to be at the core of the lobbying 
process. However, the blueprint decisions made by senior management within 
the external affairs office were constrained due to the majority government 
ownership. TAP were not able to invest in this function, as they were not 
financially strong. As a TAP senior member postulates; 
We knew that the focus was going to shift to Europe. We had a small in 
team at that time in our office so we decided to develop influence at the 
national level. But on the European front, we had to learn by doing, we 
were faced by a new policy environment so we had to learn and adapt the 
organisation slightly and process wise, this was definitely done. This 
internal reflection became normal to prepare for the different phases, 
especially for the third package. We had a multi-disciplinary team that 
looked into this, recommended changes and improvements in the 
organisations and processes in humans. These were needed for enhanced 
functions but this was done internally. We hired one EU person but that 
was it, we spent less unlike others that spent more in getting new people. 
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Building on the idea of a constrained capability, senior management members 
from the institutional affairs office found their decision blueprints constrained to 
a certain degree which affected their ability to renew their lobbying capability to 
match the new policy environment at the same pace. As one senior informant put 
it: 
At that time, we didn 't change our lobbying efforts too much as we were 
owned by the government, so whoever came into power, they played a 
role in who we targeted. But after the third package we had to focus more 
on Europe. [C009] 
TAP Air only wanted to develop their lobbying capability after 1990 as before 
1988 they had been very comfortable in their old ways. The senior management 
within the external relations office learned that they had to change their 
department. Simultaneously, we found that the senior management tried to work 
closely with the Association of European Airlines (AEA) to develop their 
thinking process and blueprints on the European front. 
Another question posed was, where did the decision-making originate in this 
context that devised the lobbying capability? According to the interviewees, the 
actual decision-making went from the institutional affairs office to CEO level. 
As one informant puts it; 
It very much started at our level and then we interphased with other 
departments that were impacted by deregulation policy issues at stake, so 
we sought opinions internally and we prepared our lobbying position, 
which was discussed with the board. The CEO had less say on how we 
developed our lobbying. It was all about our thinking and what we 
thought was right at that time. [CO 10] 
We also found that cognitive blueprints decided the targets to lobby at both a 
national and international level. During the endogenous policy context, the 
lobbying was conducted mostly at a national level between 1985-1997, with a 
shift towards the EU level taking place from 1996-1997. This was later than 
other airlines, perhaps due to being complacent in their monopoly position. 
™ con 
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Nevertheless, rather than jumping in and using a laissez-faire path for creating 
strategy, senior managers in the external affairs office used their cognitive 
blueprints from previous experience and learning to channel and fuel their 
decisions on lobbying capability development. 
Indeed the mix between human, organisational, and networks resources, as well 
as competence investments, played an important role in developing TAP Air's 
lobbying capability. However, ownership and stakeholders also influenced the 
top management cognition within the external affairs office. 
5 .8 .5 .1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
We found TAP Air's external affairs department slightly modified their structure 
during deregulation (endogenous policy context) to accommodate the new policy 
environment. However, before 1988 they were very static in their structure, with 
resistance to changes in departmental organisation. The reason for this, as 
explained by people interviewed, was that senior management was reluctant to 
change their lobbying platform due to the embedded nature of their resources, 
culture and ownership. However they realised that they had to bring lobbying 
processes forward and align them with the endogenous policy context, especially 
if they wanted to influence fixture policy. They used AEA as a way to learn how 
to configure their department and to look at their competitors. 
Senior managers saw potential for lobbying capability development with greater 
levels of interacfion between the external affairs office and European level 
targets. Therefore they created a satellite office on Brussels in 1996 to lobby the 
European Union. As one respondent said: 
I believe that TAP entered the European lobbying game later than the 
others. But we did hire one EUperson to be closer to Brussels in order to 
influence EU politicians. I remember that we had to take lobbying and 
external affairs seriously, but again we were little limited in what we 
could do, as being a government organisation has some problems. Our 
structure changed a little with older people leaving in 1994 and we got 
few new people with EU contacts. [CO33] 
-196-
"Lobbying Capability" 
Surprisingly, a high level of transference of responsibility for lobbying was 
moved to interest group representation. However, as lobbying activities in this 
challenging policy context changed, TAP implemented some structural 
reorganisation and formal redefinitions of the responsibilities within the external 
affairs office. 
On the other hand, we found that lobbying network resources were also used by 
TAP to develop their lobbying capabilities. However, we found that network and 
organisational resource reconfiguration were done later, around the end of the 
second package, in order to develop a strategic lobbying capabihty. 
5 . 8 . 5 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
TAP Air was found to have a very strong national network but its senior 
management did not a very strong EU level political network. These networks 
played an important role in developing their lobbying capability. However, TAP 
believed that their networks were constrained in this endogenous policy context. 
This was believed to because of the majority government ownership structure 
that allowed them to influence at a national level for years, which made 
individuals reluctant to change. This created resistance to changing their 
lobbying patterns; hence they started lobbying later than other airlines, because 
the CEO created pressure. As one of our respondents said: 
That is difficult to say, it is such a long process, hard to say, how much 
time we spent lobbying in this period and if our ownership made it more 
difficult? I believe we did not spend that much time, we used AEA with 
our national influencing tactics. I think some people thought this was the 
best combination to influence not realising that it was outdated. We 
needed to lobby individually also at EU level instead of just at home. Also 
remember that we are owned by the government so lobbying then was 
very different to that done in a partially owned private airline. [C009] 
At TAP Air, during introduction of the third package, the government affairs 
office had to modify its network base to incorporate new people that had EU 
contacts. As one respondent postulates: 
Well, we wanted new people. We wanted a lot from them. They had to 
come from the inside the political system; they needed to have EU 
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contacts and have international law experience, preferably in aviation 
law. They had to create the necessary empathy to start the process but it 
was also the basic rule that they had to involve themselves from the 
outset, we faced them to these live experiences from an early stage of the 
process. They were included in the Portuguese delegations to bilateral 
consultations with third countries and they were included in multilateral 
meetings, where all the policy issues were discussed. They were asked to 
prepare letters and positions. This was very much a learning curve that 
needed to be very rapidly accelerated after the third package. [CO 10] 
Before deregulation, TAP was not using extensive networks from individuals 
within the office to create influence at the EU level, as they had a strong 
relationship with their government. However, the shift in power from Portugal to 
Brussels meant the senior management recognised that they had to play a new 
EU level game soon. TAP Air started to hire people that had EU level networks 
in 1993. Correspondingly, TAP was also using their indirect network resources 
by using AEA. Now let us look at another variable that interacted with the 
network resource to help develop a lobbying capability in the endogenous policy 
context. 
5 . 8 . 5 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING 
PROCESSES 
Human capital seems to determine the development pace of the lobbying 
capability. More importantly, we found that the external affairs office viewed the 
role of human capital as being an important component in the process of 
developing lobbying capability. As one informant said: 
In this department we had people who had been working with the civil 
aviation authority which was part of their curriculum. We had around 4 
people in this office dealing with aeropolitical affairs. Most had a 
regulatory area type of expertise. To add to this, I don't think it's about 
having a big department with lots of people. Lobbying is about who you 
know and how you reach them using those processes. However, we very 
much interconnected our legal department with regulatory and 
competition related issues. [C009] 
As can be seen from the illustration below, the number of people lobbying does 
not matter to TAP. Network relationship capital is generally considered an 
attribute of the individual people to other people, whereas human capital is 
considered an attribute of individuals and comprises a stock of skills. 
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qualifications and knowledge. There is an overlap between human resources and 
network resources, as the networks come from the human resources. This means 
that when you develop lobbying by hiring someone, then you are also buying 
their network resources. 
Everything was done in-house. We did not have anyone lobbying for us. 
You will find this behaviour more in America then in Europe. We used 
our in-house human resources. [CO 11] 
From the above quote, TAP had as its main consideration maintaining the quality 
of its network base and not so much the quantity of people. However, the 
networks were considered to be affected by the ownership structure., as it was 
the majority government ownership structure that ultimately played a role in 
devising the networks targets and sequence. The senior managers would by 
default opt to contact national authorities instead of seeking EU networks. 
However, the senior managers did start to recruit new networks during the 
deregulation process, not specifically with the intention of influencing the 
deregxilation process. 
In our particular case we had some major changes. We had some early 
retirements. Around 1993, there were quite a few people that had been 
working for more then 20 years for TAP, then were given an opportunity 
to retire. It was coincidence but it did. If you ask me if it's hard to hold or 
train or to prepare anyone for this department in terms of their social 
networking and lobbying capabilities. It all goes through knowledge. So 
what we made sure that before these people left which had the realm of 
knowledge in their heads, they were able to coach those who were 
coming in from the areas of external relations. They have been prepared 
for these sorts of functions or diplomatic carriers. So we did take a lot of 
attention in how our collaborators are trained, but it takes a long time 'til 
you have that ideal web of contacts, the ideal level of intimacy with your 
authorities or peers or so forth. It takes some time. I think that when 
people come to such a department. They are not looking at brief 
experiences, they understand that it is a time life and long commitment. 
/ c o j j y 
Indeed, the people interviewed felt that TAP had good networks at a national 
level but poor management competence, which could be attributed to their weak 
corporate governance structure. 
-199-
"Lobbying Capability" 
5 . 8 . 5 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The lobbying competencies at TAP were reconfigured by senior management 
within the external affairs office in order to build their lobbying capability. 
However, the senior management within this office did not relate the 
development of the lobbying capability to lobbying competencies until 1996. 
This was viewed as the means for moving forward and aligning themselves with 
the endogenous policy context. TAP pursued a strategy of fetching new people 
that had EU level competence which was expected to give them access to new 
knowledge and better networks that they believed they could not have accessed 
otherwise. As one Alitalia respondent said: 
We hired some people that had EU level knowledge around package 2. 
An interesting question with regards to developing new lobbying competencies is 
not only what processes enable firms to configure them effectively, but also how 
TAP selected lobbying competencies for further development of their lobbying 
capabilities? Several informants described the process through which new 
lobbying competencies were acquired though talent hunting. Some informants 
felt that TAP did not have the right management competence for lobbying, which 
resulted in them joining the game later. 
Alitalia and other government owned airlines were used to lobbying their 
governments. This meant they had to change years of eating the same 
ybocf. /"Fooay 
From the micro level analysis of TAP external affairs department, we found that 
there were few variables that were evident from the interviews that played a vital 
role in the lobbying capability construction. We found that competence played an 
important role in TAP's lobbying capability development process in the 
endogenous policy context, but they had problems in changing their old ways. It 
was evident that political resources were comprised of human resources, which 
encapsulated network and competence resources, and organisational, structural 
resources. To add to this, we found that the ownership structure was considered 
by some of the senior management to have affected TAP's lobbying capability 
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capacity in this context. Indeed, TAP was resting on their laurels and 
monopolistic positions on routes instead of adapting earlier. Portugal was 
shrouded by a government security blanket, as Portugal had not joined the 
European Union till 1986. For them lobbying capability was developed for 
national purposes. In 1995 they decided to modify this capability, when they 
realised that things had to change or they would face potential problems (see 
Appendix 20 for TAP Air's overall storyline map cluster in the endogenous 
policy context). 
5 . 9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In summary, we have seen that three out of five airlines developed their lobbying 
capabilities early. These three airlines were considered to have developed their 
lobbying capabilities in similar ways, using a sophisticated cognitive blueprint in 
advance with intent to influence policy-makers in order to protect their 
organisations. Moreover, the government affairs management was able to adapt 
their lobbying capability with full support of their owners. 
We also found that at the generic level of lobbying capability, the development 
process was fairly similar in pattern across all airlines in adapting human capital, 
network capital, competence and organisational structure. However, at the 
idiosyncratic level, the lobbying routines were different due to the use of 
different combinations of resources and lobbying targets and sequences. These 
routines were idiosyncratic because they were leveraged on firm-specific 
resources like network and human resources. 
We also found that two government-owned airlines developed their lobbying 
capabilifies very differently to private airlines. The reason for this difference was 
that government ownership was thought to constrain finances, structure and 
management. In addition, the lobbying capability development process was 
similar in the two government-owned airlines at the micro foundations. 
To summarise, there were clear similarities and differences between the cases 
fi-om the European flag carrier's airlines. The cases on lobbying development 
from the state airlines showed: 
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1. Great emphasis on generic lobbying routines and idiosyncratic routines at 
the national level. 
2. Leveraging later from their current political resources. Also leveraging 
from new political resources, but far too late. 
3. Little emphasis on changing networks, structure and human capital assets 
until very late in the deregulation process. 
In contrast, the cases from privately owned airlines showed: 
1. More emphasis on idiosyncratic lobbying routines but also using generic 
routines. 
2. Leveraging early from current political resources, but also adding new 
political resources. 
3. Greater emphasis on developing new networks, structures and human 
capital assets. 
Overall the lobbying capability development played an important role in the 
endogenous policy context where airlines had time to manoeuvre to make their 
interests heard. The private airlines configured their resources and lobbying 
capability differently to the government-owned airlines. Subsequently, they were 
all using functions with the same macro-organisational context. We also found 
from the micro level analysis of all government affairs offices that four variables 
played a vital role in lobbying capability construction. It was evident that 
political resources were comprised of human, organisational, network and 
competence resources. These resources were used by management to reconfigure 
their lobbying capability development process. It was here that cognition played 
a vital role in building this symbiotic relationship between political resources and 
lobbying capability development. Once the lobby capability was developed 
satisfactorily, then it was used to deploy the political resources to create 
influence. 
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS PART 2: 
LOBBYING CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT IN AN EXOGENOUS 
POLICY CONTEXT (2001-2005) 
This empirical chapter will provide an analytical overview of five European flag 
carrier airlines, in conjunction with presenting a detailed examination of each 
airline in relation to the exogenous policy context. Focus will be on lobbying 
activities on specific issues: insurance coverage, aviation security costs and 
compensation package. It will look at providing a longitudinal analysis of 
lobbying capability development mainly post 9/11, but with some description of 
lobbying activity before the 9/11 event. We will show, through the inductive 
study, that a range of non-market environment responsiveness strategies were 
adopted logically by the chosen case organisations in the form of a lobbying 
capability to create organisational alignment with the non-market exogenous 
environment. Finally, the data analysis will show the main sources that are 
playing a role in the development of a lobbying process as a strategic capability 
and the interactions between each micro level source that may help create a 
competitive benefit. This chapter will be systematic, looking at each airline 
organisation individually using a within-case analysis. Thereafter, a cross case 
analysis will be conducted in Chapter 7, where some emergent themes and 
propositions relating to lobbying development processes suggest labels from the 
dynamic resource-based literature and corporate political activity. 
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6 . 1 INTRODUCTION 
The chosen context in this investigation is one in which exogenous policy (2001-
2005) events emerged as a result of post September 11 terrorist attacks in the 
U.S. The terrorist attacks had heavy knock-on effects on airlines in Europe 
(Harrington et al. 2005). The airlines knew that they were loosing demand, so 
they had to be compensated for this political attack. In order to secure 
compensation to support their growing debts, exacerbated by a fall in demand 
and extra costs associated with new government security policies, airlines had to 
react quickly (Bonham et al. 2006; Tarry 2005). It was within this context that 
European airlines quickly learned that they had to lobby the European 
Commission and their national governments, as lobbying was vital to them 
sustaining their competitive positions. Moreover, the majority of airline 
government affairs departments had to influence and make their organisation's 
interests heard on several issues. According to the senior management 
interviewed; the main issues included the following:' 
• Compensation package 
• Aviation security cost 
• Insurance coverage 
Similar to the interviewees, Doganis (2005) highlights the importance of these 
emerging policy issues that surfaced after 9/11. Therefore, if the airlines did not 
lobby, they would have risked receiving less aid, and possibly would have had 
large insurance premiums and larger security costs to pay, which would have 
hindered their competitive positions. Let us look more closely at the three issues 
that the European airlines were mainly lobbying for during this exogenous policy 
context. 
6 . 2 OVERVIEW OF THE EXOGENOUS POLICY CONTEXT FROM THE CASES 
The full service scheduled airline sector had experienced a difficult year even 
before the exogenous shocks of September 11. Numerous European flag carrier 
airlines saw first half year losses increase by almost half compared to the 
Some people included AOOl, B004, F008, CO 10, E014, D021, E022, E014. 
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previous year (Irish Aviation Authority report 2003). Much of this poor financial 
performance had been attributed to the slowdown in the global economy 
experienced in the first half of 2001. Financial results from other air transport 
sectors were healthier. In particular, the low fares sector continued to go from 
strength to strength, with profits growing by over 150% compared to those in the 
first half of 2000 (Irish Aviation Authority report 2003). 
However, most hub airlines were affected severely post September, as seen from 
Figure 14. The terrorist attacks in the USA caused a number of short and medium 
term impacts on the European aviation industry. First of all, US airspace was 
closed in the immediate aftennath of the attacks, and was not opened for four 
days (AEA Annual report 2002). During this period, no flights from Europe to 
the USA could operate, leading to a loss of revenue for airlines and airports in 
Europe. When flights resumed, there was a dramatic decrease in demand. This 
was most severe on North Atlantic routes but was significant across all types of 
routes. The only market segment that did not appear to be badly hit was the low 
fares sector. It seemed that demand from consumers for low fares still kept them 
on a healthy and strong foothold in this period. 
Figure 14: Full service European Airlines (revenue per kilometre) RPK 
'Airlines included: 
BritHh Arnwy* 
LufUwnw 
Air France 
KLM 
Ibefia 
SWGSiW 
Alitalia 
Virgin Adantio 
SAS 
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THY Turkish Airlines 
TAP Air Portugal 
Austrian Airlines 
A#f Lingus 
Olynq)w Akway* 
Finna* 
CSA Czech Airlines 
Mabv 
Cypfus Airways 
Tarom 
40%-
45% 
Full Service European Airlines RPKs* 
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MTA GABIMIS Traf f ic levels dec l ined 
marked ly in Sep tember 
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days of post Sep tember 
11 per formance. 
Vo lumes^ at European full 
serv ice air l ines fell by 12% 
compared to Sep tember 
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si tuat ion v /orsened in 
October and November 
before recover ing sl ightly 
in December . 
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Source: AEA Annual report 2002 
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On the commercial side, the airline industry response to the crisis facing them 
post September 11 was centred on withdrawing aircraft from service, cutting 
staff numbers and renegotiating contracts with suppliers. In the months following 
September 11, the European Union's surviving flag carriers aimounced job cuts 
of circa 25,000 employees. Air France and Finnair were notable as the only 
major carriers who did not announce job losses (Irish Aviation Authority report 
2003). In addition, there were also a number of actions taken to maximise cash 
reserves, such as deferring investments and sale of non-core businesses (AEA 
Aimual report 2002). 
On the non-market front, European flag airlines realised that they had to lobby 
quickly and hard post September 11 in order to be compensated for their losses 
or risk going bankrupt. Using both individual and collective lobbying routines 
and action responses they managed to demonstrate their positions to both 
European states and the European Commission, who as a result provided 
different financial support mechanisms. These included a mixture of financial 
and other measures (IATA Annual report 2002)^: 
• Provision of "last resort" insurance following the withdrawal of cover 
by commercial insurance companies, including an allowance for some 
short term waiving of insurance premium charges. This scheme was 
initially approved for one month but was subsequently extended. 
• Compensation to airlines for the four days that US Airspace was 
closed, subject to complying with strict criteria as to how the 
compensation amount was to be calculated. 
• The airline cost issues had to be mainly paid by airlines with 
government offering minimal loans for the short term. 
In addition to the financial measures, the European Commission agreed to 
lobbied calls by major airlines to extend to one year the period that slots could be 
unused before being reallocated. This move was opposed by some low cost 
carriers looking for new slots^. 
^ Also triangulated with F015, F008, A002, C009, E023, B024 and E020 
^F015,F008,and E020 
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Although the above measures were agreed by the Commission, other forms of 
state aid were firmly opposed. The European Commission expressed their view 
that many of the airlines facing financial difficulties were already in trouble prior 
to September 11. Rather than rescuing failing airlines, consolidation in the sector 
was to be encouraged. However, airlines were against this, as an executive 
postulated: 
We needed to use everything to make the government give us what we 
lost. [E014] 
Figure 15 below describes the dynamic lobbying patterns during the exogenous 
policy context, based on the interviews conducted, documents from the European 
commission and annual reports. 
Figure 15: The lobbying capability development patterns 
Hearing about terrorist attacks 
Main issues: Compensation package, 
aviation cost and insurance issues 
* 
I 
(4-1 
O 
Collective lobbying 
SAS/KLM/ 
Luthansa 
TAP/Alitalia 
i n d i v i d u a l l o l i b y i n g 
SAS/KLM/ 
Lu thansa / 
TAP/Al i t a l i a 
2001 
Dual Strategy using individual and collective 
lobbying action before pemsing mainly a 
collective lobbying action 
Time period 2005 
Source: Interviews, European Commission reports and Annual reports 
From Figure 15, we see that some European flag carrier airlines were using an 
individual lobbying path in the early days after September 11, then realising that 
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they all needed to unify to save time after a few weeks. Let us look at one of the 
main issues that five case airlines were advocating using their specific lobbying 
processes. 
6 . 2 . 1 COMPENSATION PACKAGE ISSUE 
Post September 11, the unstable position of most airline companies was due to 
the overwhelming knock of 9/11 on consumer demand for travelling. Moreover, 
the European flag carriers were told post September 11 that they would not 
receive any money. As a result the airlines decided that they all had to 
persistently lobby their national governments and use AEA to lobby the 
European Union on securing the compensation packaged 
As a result, the European Commission accepted that some types of aid, including 
aid relating to the costs resulting from the closure of airspace to compensate for 
the damage caused by natural calamities or other extraordinary events (to quote 
the European Treaties) could be granted to the aviation sector by way of 
exception (AEA Annual report 2002). This was done in order to promote greater 
certainty in the short term. The Commission indicated to Member States that it 
would use its role in the field of state aid under the EU Treaty to approve each 
government's intervention as long as a proper notification was made and the 
guidelines were respected (European Union Website 2006). Therefore, post 
September 11, the airlines knew they would get something and focus was on the 
amount of compensation. 
However, the end result was that the Commission laid down a number of 
conditions for authorising emergency state aid schemes (AEA Annual report 
2002). In particular, compensation could be granted only for the costs arising 
during the four days in question following the grounding of planes decided upon 
by the national authorities, particularly in the United States, and the flights 
cancelled or disrupted as a result^. 
" F015, F008, AOOl, A002, C009, CO 10, E023, B024, F036 and E020 
^ F008, A002, C009, E023, F036 and E020 
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6 .2 .2 AVIATION SECURITY COST ISSUE 
For years, the aviation industry was one of the most powerful symbols of the 
modem era, representing promises of unlimited mobility, international co-
operation and technological progress which have been the shining face of 
globalisation (Hanion 1999). However, since the September 11 attacks, the issue 
of aviation security dominated headlines across the world (Lakdawalla and 
Zanjani 2005; Jaffee and Russell 2006). The attacks put pressure on all airlines 
around the world, as it asked many fundamental questions about making air 
travel safer. However, governments in European and especially the US guided 
the agenda to introduce strict measures to reduce the terrorist risk of another 
9/11. These measures were to be introduced by the airlines, but who was going 
absorb the additional new security costs? As a result many European airlines 
started to lobby governments nationally and internationally to find support on 
this cost issue. 
Defence against terrorism was viewed by airlines as a national government 
responsibility. The airline industry started lobbying on this issue as they felt they 
should not be singled out to pay the bill. They believed that their states had to 
"finance the protection of their citizens" (lATA Annual report 2003, p. 13). As a 
result, in Europe, much progress was made towards implementing the primary 
security measures as defined in ICAC Doc 30 as well as additional security 
solutions (see Appendix 5 for further expansion on costs). These included the 
classification of weapons, technical training for crew, checking and monitoring 
of hold luggage (100% hold baggage screening), and protection of cockpit access 
and quality control of security measures applied by Member States. Yet clearly 
the need for security had to be balanced with cost, convenience and civil 
liberties. New measures requiring airlines to invest in specific areas generated 
enormous costs for the airlines. In general the airline expenditures for security 
reached an estimated US$5.6 billion in 2003 (lATA Annual report 2003). The 
boundaries of what was considered acceptable intrusion are still being tested. 
Nevertheless, more emphasis was being put into technology, especially biometric 
identification to prevent boarding of those on police wanted-lists and those with 
previously identified erratic behaviour. Increasingly tests were being conducted 
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using both biometric hand and iris recognition in an effort to develop an effective 
balance between heightened security and efficient passenger processing. 
6.2.3 PROGRESS ON INSURANCE 
Insurance is very important to airlines as it can reduce risk. Insurance is a 
contract in which an individual or entity receives financial protection or 
reimbursement against losses irom an insurance company (Vaughan and 
Vaughan 2003). The company pools clients' risks to make payments more 
affordable for the insured coverage by a contract binding a party to indemnify 
another against specified loss in return for premiums paid. 
Full service airlines always had some insurance coverage. The events of 
September 2001 changed this with the market basically withdrawing from 
providing this type of cover. Many questioned the speed and consistency with 
which insurance underwriters almost simultaneously withdrew third party war 
and terrorism cover following the attacks on September 11, 2001 (Lakdawalla 
and Zanjani 2005). The difficulty with terrorism insurance has always been that 
there is a problem of uncertainty and not risk. Hence normal actuarial principles 
do not apply. The tendency is, therefore, for private insurers to be over cautions 
and levy high premiums. Governments can intervene but there is always a danger 
in state interventions distorting markets (or a lack of appropriate state actions that 
can damage markets). 
Nevertheless during this exogenous context, the European aviation industry 
realised that insurers were not willing, at any price, to cover third party terrorism 
risks adequately. Therefore, from 2001 to 2002, this harsh reality galvanised the 
European airline industry into action in terms of developing their lobbying 
capabilities. They started to develop their lobbying using specific resources that 
culminated from their decision making processes. The lobbying undertaken by 
the airlines laid down two important dates that paved the way for a long-term, 
viable solution to the insurance crisis. In early October 2002, the EU's Council 
of Transport Ministers met to decide whether to endorse 'Eurotime', a proposed 
mutual fund to provide the level of third party war and terrorism risk cover 
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without which airlines, airports and others in the industry could not operate^. 
Thereafter, ICAO announced 'Globaltime', its own proposed mutual insurance 
plan, which could have been secured with the requisite support of Member States 
(i.e. those contributing over 51% of ICAO's fiinding)^. Both proposals required 
initial financial guarantees fi"om governments, without which such schemes could 
not fly. Some respite was offered by the EU governments in the form of 
guarantees but there were measures aimed at ending this (European Communities 
2002). 
Indeed, coming across this exogenous policy context, the airlines realised that 
they needed to lobby their respected governments and the European Union 
quickly to sustain their competitive position or risk extinction. In this section, we 
explore the coping mechanisms that the European airlines used to adjust to the 
current policy climate, examine the impacts of these changes on lobbying 
capability development, and assess the issues at micro levels, focusing 
particularly on lobbying for the costs involved in introducing new security 
measures, compensation packages and insurance coverage. 
6 . 3 GENERAL STAKEHOLDER TARGETS IN THE LOBBYING PROCESS 
Before discussing lobbying capability development, it is worth listing the most 
important stakeholders who have been active in the policy process. We will aim 
to map out the different lobbying micro targets and stakeholders contacted by our 
chosen case government affairs offices. Figure 16 is created without claiming to 
be completely comprehensive but rather as accurate from the interviews, archival 
data and documents: 
^ F015, F008, AOOl, F036 and E020 
' A002, B029, B024, C009, CO 10, E023, B024 
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Figure 16: Initial organisation of key lobbying micro targets for all airlines 
during the exogenous policy context 
National level Firm level International level 
Ministries 
• Transport; 
• Finance; 
• Foreign Affairs; 
• Parliament CEO 
Government advisory bodies 
and industries, such as the: 
• Social and Economic 
Council 
• Provisional Council for 
Transport 
• Airport officials 
Government Affairs 
Office 
Marketing 
HR & Operations Depts 
Insurance bodies: 
Industries and organisations 
such as: 
• Association of 
European Airlines; 
• lATA 
• European Civil Aviation 
conference 
• European Regional and 
Charter Airlines 
Government advisory bodies, 
such as: 
• The Economic and 
social Committee 
• The Joint Committee 
The European government 
itself, in the form of: 
• The Economic and 
Social Committee 
• The Joint Committee 
• The European 
Commission, 
• European Parliament, 
• The Committee for 
Transport and 
Tourism; 
• The Council 
Lobbying for the three issues involved a fairly complicated and lengthy decision-
making process in which the stakeholders appeared in changing roles as 
protagonists in the different phases of the process. The complexity of some 
issues was to some extent dependent on the information provided by each 
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protagonist and influenced by the mutual positions they took up. For instance, it 
is important to airlines that they should be able to play their own direct roles vis-
a-vis interaction with a number of stakeholders in their individual internal-
decision making processes. However, in this context many of the stakeholders 
had strong overlapping interests, in which there were only slight differences in 
the individual goals for which they were striving. Because of the great number of 
stakeholders it is obvious that the decision-forming process, and consequently 
the process of influencing those decisions, is fairly complicated. The next part 
will aim to explore the individual cases in more detail. 
6.4 CASE STUDY ONE: KLM 
6.4 .1 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION 
The government affairs offices functioned slightly differently to the way they did 
in the deregulation context. Both pre and post 9/11 had very distinct effects on 
resource utilisation, decision-making associated to resources usage and lobbying 
capability development. In the pre 9/11 period, the main functional objective for 
the government affairs office within KLM was preservation and acquisition of 
traffic rights. As one respondent explains: 
Well, I think we were doing just routine work. I was doing what we 
always did. I was getting as many traffic rights as possible. That was 
obviously lobbying on regulation or policy initiated by the Dutch 
government or in Brussels or whatever. So that was normally, I would say 
our day to day work that we would do as a department outside or within 
the company. [E014] 
Similarly another senior respondent said; 
We also have a corporate centre which is basically, the, we call ourselves 
consultants to the board of the managing directors here at KLM. Now 
within government and industry affairs office, there are two main issues 
that we deal with. One is the bilateral air service agreements, the 
bilateral negotiations, so trying to acquire as many traffic rights as 
possible in the world. And the other part of what we do in government 
and industry is public affairs, which covers industry affairs and 
government affairs in a broad sense so we see ourselves as the counter 
parts of all sorts of government officials at all kinds of levels and 
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politicians. Both in the Netherlands, as well as outside, especially in 
Brussels and also due to our special relationship with the United States, 
with our joint venture with North West Airlines. We also deal very closely 
with Washington. Now to give you a brief description of the organisation. 
We have two full time KLM employees based in Washington, to man our 
Washington government and legal industry affairs office. And we have a 
joint office with our Air France partners in Brussels. And we are also 
there physically, so it is not a virtual office. We have people there sitting 
and living there everyday. Besides that here in head office in Amsterdam, 
we have a number of people dealing with bilateral affairs and the public 
affairs locally on government and I would say civil service input in the 
Netherlands. [E023] 
Therefore, pre 9/11, organisational components of planning, mainly for building 
new routes and traffic rights, consisted of the following:^ 
! A clear organisational structure; 
• Monitoring the relevant political fields; 
••• Developing and maintaining the network of stakeholders; 
• Systematic communication with different stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks after 9/11 shifted the strategic landscape for 
many airlines. The harsh impact of post 9/11 was hard for the airline industry to 
absorb. The government affairs office had to drastically re-focus its function, 
resources and capabilities to meet the new policy environmental needs brought 
forward by the exogenous shock. KLM introduced a corporate political strategy, 
to defend their commercial position; KLM's government affairs office followed a 
strategy by lobbying specific targets to regain a loss in revenue. It implemented 
this by attempting to exert influence by means of both generic and idiosyncratic 
exchanges of ideas with prominent figures in politics and the governments, and 
with representatives from various other sections in Netherlands, in the days after 
9/11. As one respondent said: 
Few hours after the planes went into the twin towers, we had to call our 
emergency director meeting and then a departmental meeting. From this 
meeting, we knew that we had to meet with some senior national level 
authorities to give them our position. These meetings with national 
authorities actually happened the following day. [El 4] 
'From E018,E022,E023 
-214-
'Lobbying Capability" 
KLM's lobbying activities for the three issues depicted above, insurance 
coverage, aviation security costs and compensation package, began very quickly. 
These lobbying activities cannot be described in terms of separate 'influencing 
campaigns', as they started individually but then shifted towards a coalition 
activity. The days after 9/11 included periodic meetings with members of the 
KLM board, exchanges of correspondence on suggestions and positions taken up, 
organisation of industrial visits, presentations, and so on. As a senior respondent 
explains: 
Well it was chaos that we saw all over the world after those events. There 
were a couple of things that were important for us. We had to get our air 
craft with passengers back into the transatlantic domain, you htow that 
the US sealed of their Air Space completely. So we had a lot of planes 
that had to fly to Canada, Greenland, Denmark, Mexico etc etc. So we 
had a lot of issues with the Dutch Government but also in Brussels and 
Washington. To get clearance to have the international transatlantic 
traffic flowing again. That was something that this department was 
dealing with a lot, together with flight operations who are responsible for 
the flight safety and stuff etc. So there was a lot of contact within KLM 
between various responsible departments, various parts of the flight, we 
had very very close contact with the Dutch government, because they 
were inquiring what our problems were. What they could do for us on a 
regulatory level, what they could do for us in Brussels. What they could 
do with their relationship with the United States, what the embassy in 
United states could do etc etc. And those contacts with national 
governments was all fed through this department. Besides that it was very 
important in that the European Commission, and the finance ministers, 
council of ministers, the treasury agreed upon a loan, a virtual loan, if 
the insurers back out of insuring the airlines because this was becoming a 
serious war threat or terrorist threat. We had a very hard discussion with 
a lot of insuring companies who insured KLM. Because they said that we 
have to pay a lot of premiums now because the risk is so much greater 
that we cannot cover it anymore in the market. That actually meant that a 
lot of airlines after a certain date would not start to fly because they 
would not be able to fly because they could not be able to pay their 
insurance premiums anymore. Now the Dutch government, and there 
were a large number of governments, gave us a national guarantee that 
they would step in if we would come into certain positions with our 
insurance company. So you understand? [E031] 
The next part will look at the different types of lobbying routines used by KLM 
to leverage and deploy the political resources to defend themselves from 
exogenous policy issues. 
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6.4.2 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY KLM 
There were lots of different lobbying routines found to be used by KLM's 
government affairs office during the exogenous policy context under 
investigation.^ These lobbying routines were used to influence both national and 
international political targets in the hours and days after September l l ' ° . We 
have managed to categorise the different lobbying routines according to generic 
and idiosyncratic lobbying routines. Table 20 shows the different illustrative 
quotes that are indicative of themes based on lists of common concepts and ideas 
emerging from the interview transcripts. As one KLM senior management 
respondent captured the essence of what was happening in this context: 
We have all sort of templates that we follow with the addition of our own 
templates. Our manuals have most answers to all possible scenarios. To 
be honest we have a very extensive emergency response manual here at 
KLM. That is not so much during 9/11. But I must admit that it has been 
sharpened up to say that after 9/11 but we have always had one. Actually 
I would say for decades, KLM has an emergency department which deals 
with further sophisticated guidelines. These include the principal 
contacts, what to do, how to act, who to get involved, the choice of 
jurisdiction. It goes from low down in the company to the CEO level. We 
also have a response manual that is part of this emergency manual, if we 
have a major accident or a hijacking outside the Netherlands, we have 
teams ready to travel to that country or position and deal with things at 
hand locally. So that is quite an extensive programme that we have here 
at KLM. And in an event like 9/11 although it was not directly aimed at 
KLM flights, we were affected ... the impact was so major that we all 
realised here in the company that this was going to mean a lot of stuck 
passengers in airports. A lot of KLM flights were going to be delayed. 
That is also something that is managed up onto the top level of the 
company. And this emergency response manual provides for all those 
things. The nice thing about emergency response manuals, you can unfold 
up to the level you feel deemed necessary at the moment. But this was 
definitely something that went up to the top of the company. [E020] 
Routines and processes are viewed here synonymously. 9 
E14 and European Commission Minutes, 12"' September 2001 (COM), 7476 
_____ 
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Table 20: Direct KLM quotes to show lobbying processes types 11 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"Formal visit" "Presenting at aviation conferences" 
"One to one contact with politicians" "AEA was very important for us" 
"Personal phone call" and "emails" "lATA" 
Another respondent said: 
Yes, we here at KLM tend to use the personal contact as the primary 
route to follow, perhaps on a general level but then we have to customise 
it according to the different stimuli. We tend to wait a little on writing 
letters, because letters make it always very formal and leaves hardly any 
time to negotiate. We use letters very much as a last resort. And we use 
letters only- nearly always only from the top level of the company. Before 
we reach that level because there is no progress or whatever way we see 
that there is no progress in our contacts with stakeholders we tend to use 
the letter as a last resort. What we do in KLM is that we are easy going in 
giving presentations. We are inclined to do that quite easily generally 
because we think that we have a message to send and tell. We are very 
willing to tell that message during conferences and lectures etc. And that 
is very much in the informal circuit, but still I mean I myself quite 
frequently give presentations at conferences. It might be an informal way 
of lobbying but it is a strong way to get your message across but there is 
always press around, there are always regulators around, there are 
always consultants and lawyers around, colleagues from other airlines 
and airports etc. So you do have the right setting of audience to be able to 
get your message across. We tend to do that regularly and most of the 
other lobbying is done through personal contact. That is not only done 
through only phoning someone and making an appointment, it also done 
through participating in boards and local communities and local 
municipalities. It is also in joint meetings with certain government 
officials or civil servants. If there is an issue coming up and we think that 
we have to do something about it, let's phone a politician. At KLM we try 
to get into the process as early as possible. 
The lobbying routines used during this policy context were used in a combination 
of ways. According to people interviewed, from the archival data obtained and 
EU commission reports, KLM used mainly individual idiosyncratic lobbying 
routines in the days after 9/11. However they shifted their lobbying efforts to 
move through AEA and the Dutch Authorities after a few weeks (see Appendix 9 
for letter from AEA). It was found that the actual decisions taken in using a more 
E020, E012, E018,E023 
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idiosyncratic lobbying routine combination first, followed by using a larger 
concentration of a generic routine, were based on the cognitive blueprints. The 
senior management people interviewed at KLM believed that this was the best 
way to influence based on their previous experience and the belief that they had a 
good political resource portfolio. In addition they realised that everyone was in 
the same boat with the same interests, so they shifted their lobbying routines to a 
more generic platform. The next part will look at the actual content of the 
political resources more carefully. 
6 .4 .3 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
The respondents acknowledged the fact that their political resources were very 
important in developing their lobbying capability process in this policy context. 
Moreover, senior management believed that their lobbying capability 
development process would start from their political resources. The senior 
management, using their cognitive blueprints, would weigh the options of 
introducing new political resources or using current ones, to make new lobbying 
processes that would leverage and deploy the political resources (a symbiotic 
relationship between resource and capability). 
Similar to the endogenous policy context, senior management explained that 
their thinking templates led them to believe that political resources were still 
comprised of human resources, organisational structure and network resources. 
They believed that these sub-level political resources needed to be reconfigured 
to create non-market change to impact the potential onset of new polices. We 
categorised all the themes found into three key variables that make up a political 
resource; human, organisational and network resources. 
The KLM senior management team believed that their previous experiences, 
foresight, current learning, ownership and time played important roles in 
configuring their political resources to develop their lobbying capability in order 
to effectively leverage and deploy their political resources once more'^. Table 21 
E020,E012, E018,E023 
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below shows the three main categories of the emergent concepts that are 
important in the political resource composition that contributed to the 
development of the KLM lobbying capability. 
Table 21: KLM political resources 
Political capital resource Illustrative quotes 
Human "Knowledge" and "experience", "We did 
not hire new people but we used our people 
Network "AEA was very important for us in the 
weeks and months after 9/11" and "We 
looked towards our friends and national 
relationships to get compensation". 
Organisational "Our department did not restructure at the 
start but we did a few years after 9/11 to 
reduce costs" 15 
One of the respondents believed that it was important to leverage on these 
resources and to get involved in the lobbying process early. Thereafter talking to 
high status people was viewed initially as the right way in this context. As this 
respondent says; 
/ believe that we followed the emergency manual from the first minutes 
and hours after 9/11. With the addition of our own thinking ofcourse. We 
were speaking to specific targets in our national governments as 
explained in the manual; however who to contact with regards to names 
was discussed in our emergency meetings. At the same time, we were 
using AEA, but afterwards we realised that we had to shift our efforts 
more at the EU level. At this stage we felt that AEA was the best way to 
influence in order to get the best outcome. Individual efforts were not 
needed as much after a few weeks and we thought it was a waste of time. 
Everyone was in the same boat, and we had the same interests so AEA 
played a paramount role for us in this context. But we did lobby within 
our AEA meetings too. [E0I8J 
The next part will aim to understand why and how KLM devised its lobbying 
capability and political resources within this office. In addition, as shown in 
Table 20 in the illustrative quotes, there were few variables that were key to 
KLM's development of lobbying capability in the exogenous policy context. 
E020 and E018 
' ' 'E012 and E023 
E020 and E23 
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However, we also came to learn that the government affairs office also used 
some form of templates or what we term a "cognitive blueprints" to modify their 
political resources in order to develop a lobbying capability. The next part will 
explore the core elements of the lobbying capability development process in 
more detail. 
6 .4 .4 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The decisions taken by senior management at KLM's government affairs office 
played a vital role in developing what they believed to be a strong lobbying 
capability for this period. The decision-making templates or the "cognitive 
blueprint" that the senior executives used in this period were created over time. 
Moreover, post 9/11 was a new experience and its effects put airlines under a lot 
of sustained pressure. Therefore, the executives started using core notions fi-om 
their previous blueprints with attention given to specific routines. Thereafter they 
shifted their focus to AEA using an "accumulative blueprint". Where did the 
cognitive blueprints and accumulative blueprints come fi-om? As one respondent 
put it: 
As with most jobs, the thinking processes come from previous 
experiences. This can be from learning from others or learning by doing 
and there is also some guess work. But we realised that we had to change 
the lobbying strategy by using AEA more; as a group people listen to you 
more. [E012] 
As the illustrative quote shows, the cognifive blueprint came mainly from their 
previous experiences, their current learning and consideration of fixture potential 
policy impacts. However, there were also AEA's blueprints that were used to 
help them lobby. The decision-making allowed the senior management to realise 
that AEA was the best way out'^. 
We also found that the KLM's decision-making blueprints were fairly flexible 
and it had a lot of support from its owners. Moreover, after hearing that there 
'E020, E0I2, E018andE023. 
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would be some potential political impacts, KLM identified the potential issues 
that required government help in order for KLM not to loose more money. The 
KLM government affairs management started to develop their lobbying 
capability by firstly looking at their own cognitive blueprints, then at the 
organisational blueprints and where they lacked knowledge they looked outside 
the organisation within their networks. As one senior informant put it: 
We looked within our departments, the emergency manual, attended 
conferences, had meetings with people and had lots of individual 
conversations daily. We also would meet with AEA, where we would find 
out what they were doing... AEA was crucial in this time to pull all our 
resources together and influence together. [E023] 
We can see here that the senior management within the government affairs office 
would learn by doing instead of getting formal training to develop their lobbying 
capability'^. It was this management attention on political resources and talking 
to people fi'om the inception of the event that helped in developing the cognitive 
blueprint in the early part of the exogenous policy context. However, KLM 
senior management in the government affairs office realised that they had to re-
focus to integrate their blueprint with the AEA office in order to influence using 
a larger pool of resources, as time was running out. 
With regards to the flow of knowledge, the lobbying cognitive blueprint 
processes were affected by board level cognitive blueprints. The direction and 
the command in the hierarchy played a role in further developing the cognitive 
blueprint. We found that within this period the actual decision-making went from 
the CEO level to government affairs office. As one informant put it: 
/ would say honestly that the knowledge flowed first from the CEO to 
department like ours. It went mainly downwards as it was a big political 
but also commercial issue so the CEO played a large role in 
disseminating information. But then it shifted to us more when it came to 
compensation, security and insurance issues, because I think that the 
experience and knowledge of the people in departments like ours, is very 
much focused on international regulatory setting, it is very much focused 
on what are the developments in the United States, in Europe, in the Far 
'E018 and E023. 
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East and we tend to be a bit closer to the fire as we would say in Holland, 
than the board of directors. However, we had a very close link to them. 
Obviously they had ideas and visions of how the future of aviation should 
look like. What the role of KLM should be etc etc. That has been like that 
for decades, that is not unique for the board which is in place now. Our 
department created the real incentive and push forward, the activeness of 
getting to a certain goal because we believe in a certain development and 
want to play a serious role in that area. In this time frame it very much 
originated from departments like governments and industry, strategy, 
maybe even legal here and there etc. [E022] 
We also found that the cognitive blueprint was influenced to a certain degree by 
the stakeholders like the Association of European Airlines (AEA); I AT A; ICAO, 
European Commission, European Parliament and members that attended the 
European Civil Aviation conference. As a one respondent said, 
I think that our thinking was affected mainly by the association of 
European Airlines and European Commission. But lATA, ICAO, and 
aviation conference we attended had some affect on our thinking 
processes. [E018] 
What are the cognitive blueprints used for? We found that senior executives from 
the government affairs office and their decision blueprints decided the targets 
and the sequence to lobby at, both national and international level. The cognitive 
blueprint also decided the routine combination, and finally, the choice of delivery 
mode. That is, whether political strategies should have been implemented 
directly by firm managers or outsourced to professional suppliers of these 
services. As one senior KLM representative said: 
I think that there are few critical elements that helped develop our 
lobbying at KLM during this time. In my opinion I think the choices 
concerning political lobbying building relate to these elements. The 
primary strategic choices of the level and type of argument to persuade 
the relevant constituencies. The choice of venue to be addressed. The 
choice of targets that will be engaged and the delivery mode. Here I mean 
outsource versus us directly implementing the strategy. [E023] 
As the illustrative quote shows, who in their networks to target was important in 
this context type. However, the choice of lobbying routines and argument content 
was also important. Nevertheless, in order to create this lobbying capability, the 
department had to slightly re-shuffle. The human, organisational, and network 
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resources, as well as competence investments, played an important role in 
developing an effective lobbying capability for this time. However, stakeholders 
also influenced the cognitive aspects of the top management team within the 
government affairs office. 
6 . 4 . 4 . 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
One of the ways through which the KLM lobbying capability was developed was 
by adapting the lobbying capability of the firm. Developing KLM's lobbying 
capability was associated with adapting the department's organisational, 
structural resources. However, in this context, the departmental structure was 
modified slowly over the two years after 9/11. The larger part of the restructuring 
happened later rather than straight away because this department had restructured 
during the deregulation. They felt that the pressure was intense and restructuring 
straight away was urmecessary. As one respondent said: 
We restructured slowly but most taking place between 2003 and 2004. 
Our observations suggested that organisational structure was used to reconfigure 
the lobbying capabihty at later stages in this policy context. This slow process 
was mainly because they were still very busy lobbying at their national level. As 
one respondent said: 
We have not really restructured the departments that much in the months 
after 9/11 to lobby and influence better. It was a fairly large department 
before 9/11. What we have done is we have kind of restructured in such a 
way that we were getting smaller in number slowly after 9/11. My 
department is now just four while there were five other people in same 
areas in 2001. There were something like 16 to 17people around 2000 in 
this department. And there is another department that deals with all the 
matters in Skipo airport now, as we have a discussion here in Holland as 
you most probably have heard from Holland, here about the whole 
infrastructure capacity. And especially the whole environment capacity 
here in the airport. We have now created a new department that deals 
with just that aspect. So the amount of people has slightly changed. We 
still have the government, industry and public, skipol, environmental etc 
affairs unit. But instead of having just one broad environment, one boss 
over our heads, we now have small number of departments under that 
same boss. This all happened from 2004 onwards. [E031] 
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The structure of the government affairs office was considered "hierarchical" 
throughout the exogenous policy context, that is below the director of 
government and industry affairs there were other directors (Environment, Public 
and Airport), managers and analysts'^. During more recent follow-up interview, 
the senior management believed that this choice of structure was particularly 
important and cost effective. It was also believed that shedding people and 
creating more sub departments would make their lobbying more effective and 
allow them to develop their lobbying quickly. 
On the other hand, there was a high level of transference of responsibility for 
strategic decision-making after a few months to interest group representation, 
where there was more of an attempt to influence in a collective manner. As one 
respondent said: 
At the start, we were lobbying mainly alone but also using AEA on the 
side line. Then we moved to lobbying using mainly AEA, as they became 
our main lobbying arm... We did restructure slowly over 2years to reduce 
costs and become more efficient. We lost a few people from our 
department and we changed our shape here at KLM. [E022] 
But we also found that the lobbying network relationship resources had been 
used by KLM to develop their lobbying capability. The next part will aim to 
better explore the relationship between network resources and the lobbying 
capability development process. 
6 . 4 . 4 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INTERACTIONS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Networks were viewed to be a central resource in creating a lobbying capability. 
From our analysis, we found that KLM's networks played a role in developing 
their lobbying capability in this context. However, it was found that KLM 
invested less time in building new networks when compared to the deregulation 
period, as they used their pre-existing relationships, particularly between their 
national governments, with whom they have traditionally been collaborating for 
long periods of time. Moreover, they focused fewer efforts in developing new 
network relationships mainly because of time, as the time frame meant that they 
' ' E 0 1 8 and E023. 
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had to react quickly to the potential exogenous policy issues. As one of our 
respondents said: 
Well post 9/11, we built it both ways. We like to form them naturally and 
by actually targeting specific people we know that might help us in 
achieving what we want. A lot of it forms naturally, I have had the 
privilege, whatever you want to call it, of being a civil servant before I 
joined the company. Out of these counterparts, in that job, I made friends. 
So that is veiy easy. I think that is something that develops naturally. On 
the other hand, as in a lot of western European countries, we do have a 
lot of political setting and a cabinet that change every four years, which 
means that you have to redevelop or re-invent your contacts at a right 
level every couple of years. So what we do is, of course some things go 
naturally because you go to the right receptions and cocktail parties or 
you have the right personal contacts because you have a issue that you 
must deal with. Therefore, in this time we had a financial issue, it was 
obvious that I would contact the ministry of financial affairs and the 
ministry of economic affairs and build my network from that. So that is 
issue driven. On the other hand, we think its necessary that when we have 
a new council in the city of Amsterdam which is a very important city for 
KLM and there are politicians there who we do not know from previous 
contacts when they get their seats in the Amsterdam city council. We 
actively go to them and invite them or stuff like that so it depends. It all 
boils down to communicating your views or which positions and in which 
organisations, you want to have in your network, and either actively or 
naturally, building up our network. [EOS 1] 
KLM were using their current people within the office that had specific networks 
that were built previously (either organically or actively) to create influence 
during this period. They were lobbying network targets that were pre-determined 
by the individuals but the sequence of who to target was detennined by access 
and time. As a respondent said: 
We were contacting all the people that we knew had power to get the 
insurance issue, aviation cost issue and compensation package issue 
resolved without affecting our revenue. We were communicating to them 
our position and how the EU needed to help us. I think that we used 
contacts that were in the emergency manual and our own contacts from 
the commission... Time and access was a very important factor to bear in 
mind... But then we started to use AEA more while at the same time 
working on reviving our commercial business. [E023] 
As interest and issues were similar for all flag carrier airlines, KLM started to use 
AEA's EU level networks to influence. KLM was using their indirect network 
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resources by using AEA, which was placed outside the KLM office but was a 
paid resource. However they used a combination of direct and indirect routines. 
As a respondent said: 
We had a lot of contact with people from the Ministry of Financial Affairs 
here in the Hague to get money. And there was this European financial 
incentive for the four days after the 9/11 attacks. If you could claim that 
your flights, that you were seriously impeded because your flights could 
not fly to the states or that our planes had to get diverted or wait all over 
the world missing our flight times etc. That amounts to a lot of extra costs 
for a lot of airlines. And the European commission allowed us to be 
compensated for that. And this department was very instrumental in 
gathering all the data within the company. Making sure that we had a 
sound legal claim and bringing this claim to the European Commission in 
Brussels. Therefore securing the fact that we could secure those funds. 
The next part will explore the logical interaction between network relationship 
resources and human capital investment. 
6 , 4 . 4 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING PROCESSES 
From our observations of KLM, we found there to be great importance attributed 
to the role of human capital resources in the process of developing their lobbying 
capability. According to the KLM respondents, they believed that in order to 
organise an effective lobbying capability, their current human capital resources 
had to be configured in specific way in order to communicate important 
information to their micro targets. However, in this time frame they believed that 
outsourcing of the lobbying or bringing in new people was not needed. As one 
informant said: 
Post 9/11 meant that we had to react quickly, as time meant less money 
and potential future problems. Having to react quickly meant that we had 
no time to recruit new people, and in actual fact it did not make sense 
hiring new people in this time for us. I think that we had the right people; 
we used our expertise and contacts to make the best possible 
communication to reflect our difficult position. Of course we had to let go 
of some people, as the pressure was on to become more efficient like 
other industries. The merger between Air France and us meant that we 
had to become better in lobbying. Taking some people out was needed as 
we had also Air France that had a government affairs office. [E018] 
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The human capital resources were used quickly post 9/11, but KLM realised that 
focusing more on individual lobbying made no sense, therefore there was a shift 
to coalition interest representation (AEA). At the same time, KLM realised firom 
this context that they had to shed the number of human resources, especially after 
the merger with Air France, as they had pressure from their current owners and 
new owners to become more efficient. 
Therefore, it made a lot of sense for the senior management to use AEA. AEA 
played a very important role in providing a platform where KLM could influence 
the EU. During this time AEA had around 20 people working within its office 
with 31 members (AEA Annual report 2002)'^. 
The next part will explore the overlap between lobbying competence and human 
capital investment. 
6 . 4 . 4 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Senior executives in the government affairs office at KLM explicitly related the 
development of the lobbying capabilities to a change in lobbying competencies, 
which were expected to allow them to influence new decision makers and 
increase internal efficiency. Instead of pursuing a policy of fetching new people 
with EU level knowledge or better networks, they used their in-house lobbying 
competencies at the early stage of the policy context, but then shifted their efforts 
by integrating their competence with AEA's lobbying competence. As one KLM 
respondent said: 
We were using our people post 9/11 and also using AEAs expertise and 
knowledge of lobbying. We realised that AEA was the best choice to 
lobby instead of focusing on lobbying alone. [E018] 
Underlying the shift to AEA was an effort to gain access to specialised expertise, 
embodied in individuals that had expertise in coalition lobbying^". Using AEA 
allowed KLM to gain different lobbying competencies, contacts and supporting 
F032 
20 E018 and E023 
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them throughout appeared to be the underlying model for the evolving KLM 
lobbying capability. An interesting question, with regard to bringing in lobbying 
competencies fi^ om AEA, is when should firms select external lobbying 
competencies to develop their own lobbying capabilities? 
We can see that lobbying capability development played an important role in the 
exogenous policy context where KLM had little time to manoeuvre to make their 
interest heard. From the micro level analysis of KLM'S government affairs 
office, we found that there were few variables that played a vital role in the 
lobbying capability construction. It was evident that political resources were 
comprised of human, organisational, and network, which was complemented by 
competence. These resources and competencies were used to reconfigure their 
lobbying capability development process. Cognition played a role in building this 
symbiotic relationship between political resources and lobbying capability 
development. The KLM lobbying capability had a larger focus at the start on 
idiosyncratic lobbying routines but then it shifted its focus to using generic 
lobbying routines to leverage and deploy the political resources to maximise 
influence (see Appendix 21 for KLM's overall storyline map cluster in the 
exogenous policy context). 
6.5 CASE STUDY TWO: LUFTHANSA 
6 .5 .1 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION 
The government affairs function within Lufthansa during the exogenous policy 
context was set up as if "they were strategic advisors",^' as well as people who 
are in charge with implementing strategy of Lufthansa, or, at least, creating or 
influencing the creation of the political and regulatory parameters to allow 
Lufthansa to implement its strategy. This department's function (in this context) 
brought in non-market information and analysis into the company and then they 
moderated their decision-making processes to react to potential policies, while 
defending their positions^^. In other words, this department took its non-market 
decisions post 9/11 and then tried to the influence the policy environment in 
Words used by one Lufthansa senior manager-A002. 
AOOl and A003. 
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order to facilitate the implementation of their own corporate strategy?^ They 
worked on the local level, with the hub communities, European commission and 
other European governments. 
On the other hand, pre 9/11 this office focused their efforts on many different 
issues. According to the interviews and annual reports, we found that this 
department focused large amounts of time on slot regulation, labour laws, and 
improving the image of Lufthansa with regards to the environment^"^. In addition, 
they were working in different jurisdictions to gain traffic rights e.g. from Japan 
to the U.S. At an abstract and peripheral level they focused mainly on monitoring 
and defending their organisation's position by scanning the non-market 
environment. As one respondent said: 
The main issues were mainly very dull. Of course the infrastructure 
scarcity was already an issue. So issues like slot regulation and 
environment. Single European Sl<y was already on the list. Galileo was 
another issue that was talked about. Then all kinds of labour law issues 
or operational regulations. lATA sounding for example safety issues. And 
then of course we spent a lot of time on forging alliances and getting the 
respecting clearances for that. Then noise issues. The hushkit debate. 
Subsidies questions. Alitalia two packages I guess. Many airlines were 
earning quite good money in the industry so the whole thing was not as 
critical and as adventurous as it was post 9/11. [A002] 
6 . 5 . 2 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY LUFTHANSA 
There were lots of different lobbying routines found to be used by the 
Lufthansa's government affairs office during this exogenous policy context. As 
one senior respondent describes the lobbying routines used in this context: 
We were using a combination of lobbying routines. These routines were 
the same as the ones used in other issues but in greater frequency and 
different combinations. The routines were used to influence our 
governments and EU level political actors. This was an extraordinary 
event so we used a mix of routines that we believed would create positive 
influence. These combinations are not a strict recipe but more dependent 
on our owners in mind. [A026] 
23 Lufthansa requested 180 million euros in state aid to compensate them for revenues lost as a 
result of 11 September (European Commission Web-site). 
F036, A026, AOOl, A002 and A003. 
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While another senior respondent said: 
To be more precise, let us look at things step by step. We were first 
evaluating what had occurred. Thereafter we used the phone calls to see 
who could help. So I had to look to see who could help us. Undeniably 
friends and alliances within the system are very important to this process. 
We used routines revolved around personal letters to the commission, 
phone calls to people in the commission but these routines are givens. 
However, what is important are the people that are most close to you 
within the system. These people can influence to some degree. But I 
would say that the combinations are important. Indirect routes cannot 
happen without direct routes. [A030] 
Table 22: Direct Lufthansa quotes to s low lobbying processes types^^ 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"We had direct many meetings with 
national authorities and our board 
members" 
"Participating in conferences" 
"Personal letters and lots of phone calls" "Using AEA" 
"One to one contact with politicians" 
"Talking to our government" 
As seen from the illustrative quotes from table 22, Lufthansa was using some 
lobbying routines to influence policy makers after 9/11. They started using a 
combination array of idiosyncratic lobbying routines and generic lobbying 
routines that involved complicated targeting and sequences by using an a 
combination of high frequency telephone routines, visiting friends, letters and 
one to one sessions with political contacts. The generic lobbying routines 
included AEA and holding talks at conferences. The generic lobbying routines 
were viewed to be the best way to influence political actors in their opinions after 
a few weeks; therefore they focused most of their efforts on coalition 
representation, instead of using mainly individual efforts. 
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office had freedom to lobby without having 
meetings with its CEO or other directors, as most of its senior representatives in 
this office were empowered to make important decisions with regards to 
' AOOl, A002, A003, A005. 
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lobbying. However, after 9/11, the direction and lobbying efforts had to change 
for the government affairs office because Lufthansa had to defend its declining 
position. Moreover, Lufthansa did not drastically change its approach to running 
its government affairs department nor did it restructure the department. It just 
shifted its focus to its coalition lobbying arm after lobbying individually. As one 
Senior Lufthansa figure highlights: 
Lobbying had to change at Lufthansa in the sense of whom to contact, 
which manner to contact and of course content. Also the flow of decision 
shifted from bottom up to top down. The individual routines were at the 
start similar to other contexts but used more frequently but then we used 
AEA more. [A002] 
The actual lobbying routines that were used by Lufthansa to leverage and deploy 
political resources in this context were important for Lufthansa. The next part 
will look at the actual content of the political resources more carefully. 
6 .5 .3 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
In this policy context, political resources were very important in developing 
Lufthansa's lobbying capability. Senior management believed that their lobbying 
capability development process would start from their political resource base. 
Consequently, they would use their thinking blueprints to weigh the options of 
whether introducing new political resources or use current ones, to make new 
lobbying processes or use current ones, in order to leverage and deploy the 
political resources to create favourable policy changes. 
Lufthansa's respondents disclosed that their thinking templates led them to 
believe that political resources were comprised of human, organisational, 
structural resources and network resources^^. They believed that some sub-level 
political resources needed to be reconfigured to create non-market change to 
impact on the potential onset of new polices. 
' AOOl, A002, A003 and A005. 
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The senior management team believed that their previous experiences, foresight, 
current learning, ownership and time played important roles in configuring their 
political resources to develop their lobbying capability in order to effectively 
leverage and deploy their political resources again. Table 23 below shows the 
three main categories of the emergent concepts that are important in political 
resource composition, in order to develop the Lufthansa lobbying capability. 
Table 23: Lufthansa political resources 27 
Political capital resource Illustrative quotes 
Human "Experience", "we had the right people 
wi th lots o f knowledge" 
Network " A E A was very important for us in the 
weeks and months after 9/11" and "our 
contact base". 
Organisational "Restructuring happened many months 
after 9/11" 
One of the respondents believed that it was important to get involved in the 
lobbying process early rather than late and that talking to high status people was 
initially the right way in this context. As this respondent says: 
/ think, like all airlines we were conveying our position to our authorities 
in the hours after 9/11. We did this for weeks using individual and AEA 
paths. We contacted people at both national and EU level. We tried to 
work with the European Commission. But it is always a very delicate 
game to balance your lobbying at Brussels and on a national front. You 
need support from your own member state and the council usually if you 
want anything done at Brussels. You don't just lobby just at Brussels, but 
you have to lobby at Berlin and Bohn. You have to balance between the 
all things in my view. [A030] 
As shown from Table 23, Lufthansa had few variables that were important to the 
development of their lobbying capability in the exogenous policy context. 
However, we also came to learn that the government affairs unit also used some 
form of templates to modify their political resources in order to develop their 
lobbying capability. The next part will aim to understand why and how 
Lufthansa devised its lobbying capability and political resources within this 
' A030, A026, AOOl 
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office. We will explore the core elements of the lobbying capability process in 
more detail. 
6 . 5 . 4 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The thinking processes used by senior management at Lufthansa's government 
affairs office were more autonomous in this policy context. These decision-
making processes played a vital role in developing what they believed to be a 
strong lobbying capability for this time. The lobbying decision-making templates 
or "cognitive blueprint" that the senior executives used in this period were 
modified fi"om pre 9/11 to meet the new policy pressures of post 9/11. 
Post 9/11 was a new context where airlines did not have time to invest in new 
lobbying processes but they had to instead change the combination of their 
routines in order to lobby. Therefore, the executives started using their existing 
blueprints to organise their political resources, so that they could lobby 
effectively. They shifted their focus to AEA using an "accumulative blueprint". 
Where did the cognitive blueprints and accumulative blueprints come from? As 
one respondent put it: 
My lobbying formation maps come from past experience and lots of 
reading. But I think the AEA maps and thinking processes also come from 
their own lobbying practices. However, in this context our maps were 
pre-existing ones that were from our emergency manuals. These manuals 
told us what to do and who to contact. But the sequence of whom to 
contact was slightly structured, to a certain level but then the rest 
depended on our own initiatives. [AOOl] 
The cognitive blueprints came mainly from their previous experiences and their 
current learning. But there were also AEA's blueprints that were used to help 
them lobby. The rational process for lobbying allowed the senior management to 
realise how they needed to form their lobbying capability. Moreover, this g 
Flexible, rational approach allowed them to be fairly ambidextrous, going 
between their generic and idiosyncratic lobbying routines. It was also found that 
their ownership structure affected their lobbying development process. As one 
respondent said in a follow up interview: 
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Our owners and stakeholders were very important for us in this context. 
While another respondent said: 
Especially in a densely regulated industry like aviation, if you are 
government-owned then your influence is quite different in this field, 
there is a more natural stakeholder ship by civil servants and by your 
own government. We still have some sort of natural stakeholder ship in 
terms of national pride or personal empathy. And affection for Lufthansa 
or British airways even though they are private companies but in the end 
it is not the same as it is in France, Italy, Portugal or Greece. State 
ownership makes a big difference in whether you need to lobby and how 
hard you have to lobby. It is very evident and the fact that not everybody 
is privatised makes the market very distorted. [A002] 
With regards to the flow of knowledge, the lobbying cognitive blueprint 
processes were affected by board level cognitive blueprints. Indeed the direction 
and the command in the hierarchy played a role in further developing the 
cognitive blueprint and the lobbying capability. As one informant put it: 
/ don't think in our department worked top down or bottom up after 9/11. 
I would say it was a mixture this time. We had meetings then ideas got 
consolidated into valid information and then decision making processes 
were started. But you know that those decisions can be basically bottom 
up, however, ultimately the top decided here. In that context, you start 
dealing with the problem on the 11 September in the ensuing days you 
receive dozens and maybe hundred of emails, faxes, phone calls, and 
everything. There you had to sort these things using your own initiative 
and experience. And then your superior knows and the decisions were 
taken. And sometime you had to get a decision. You brow in general that 
you work in the interest of the company and therefore if you get a formal 
decision then you start to work on it straight away. You start to get the 
problem out. You start to share the information with the regulators and 
politicians. Again it is not like a machine. It is like an organism that has 
many sensors out. It is like a reaction of a human body. Everyone's body 
reacts similarly to external viruses and bacteria in a certain ways but 
others react differently. That's how our firm worlis. There is always a 
general decision making process but the specific details changes with 
each issue and task. And certainly in a crisis situation like that it is not a 
plan. You react using all your competencies. [A026] 
Senior executives from the government affairs office and their decision 
blueprints decided who to target (this process including the status power 
weighing of each target) and the sequence to lobby at both national and 
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international level. The cognitive blueprint also decided the routine combination 
and finally the choice of delivery mode^^. That is, whether it should be 
implemented directly by firm managers or outsourced to professional suppliers of 
these services. As one senior Lufthansa representative said: 
Our thinking is revolved around the communication content argument. 
The choice of people to meet and the delivery mode. [A030] 
As the illustrative quote shows, who to target was important in this context type. 
However, the choice of lobbying routines (idiosyncratic lobbying routine at the 
start then shifting to a generic lobbying routine) and argument of content were 
important for Lufthansa. Nevertheless, in order to develop their lobbying 
capability, the department had to slightly reconfigure processes. The cognitive 
blueprint organised the human, organisational, and networks resources, as well as 
competence, which allowed the development of a perceived effective lobbying 
capability. The exogenous policy context type did seem to affect the choice of 
blueprint to use. In addition, the stakeholders also influenced the cognitive 
aspects of the top management team within this particular government affairs 
office. 
6 . 5 . 4 . 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
Lufthansa's lobbying capability was developed by adapting to meet its new 
environment. However, in this context, the departmental structure was not re-
structured in anyway. They felt that the pressure was intense and restructuring 
straight away was unnecessary. As one respondent said: 
Things change very slowly at major German corporations because of the 
problematic, well it is not just problematic, it's a decision that you can 
not really hire and fire at your will. So you are basically stuck with the 
same people so you just give them new jobs. So this is what happened. We 
just had couple of people turn exclusively to dealing with issues like 
keeping our slots after the 80/20 rule. There had to be an exception made 
to the 80/20 rule meaning that if you don't utilize 20% of your slots then 
you would loose the slots. And of course with the disruption in 
international air transport, that would have affected our networks. And 
28 AOOl, A026, and A030 
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therefore we had to get a change for that. We have the compensation 
issue where the security issue. We did have insurance problems with the 
potential of fleet being grounded because of withdrawn insurance 
coverage's for terrorist attacks and third party damages. That was a 
major issue that had to be reworked on and then of course all kinds of 
operational questions, short-term security measures with disruptive 
effects on our operations or with our passengers and all we sustained 
damages of about 50 or 60 million Euros of which 43 million Euros were 
compensated. I guess we were the ones that received the biggest package 
from the government. [A030J 
Our observations suggested that organisational restructuring was not necessary to 
develop their lobbying capability. This decision was mainly taken because they 
believed that they had the right lobbying capability structure for this context. 
Furthermore, they were still very busy lobbying at their national level and 
international level, so there was no need to change. As one respondent said: 
No, we did not change our structure. We remained structurally in tact 
with no modifications. Like I said earlier. This department is very 
specialised and each person plays a very important role which we can 
weaken Lufthansa, if they are taken out of the big picture. Yes other 
departments did lose people like marketing but our function is viewed a 
very important function. [A003] 
On the other hand, Lufthansa also used its interest group representation, where 
there was also an attempt to influence in a collective manner. As one respondent 
said: 
I think we relied heavily on our own lobbying tactics but AEA played a 
big role on time. Maybe it was a 60%: 40%. The latter being interest 
representation. [A002] 
However, we also found that the lobbying network relationship resources had 
been used by Lufthansa to develop their lobbying capability. The next part will 
aim to better explore the relationship between network resources and the 
lobbying capability development process. 
6 . 5 . 4 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INTERACTIONS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Networks were viewed to be a central political resource in creating a lobbying 
capability. From our analysis, we found that Lufthansa's network resources 
played a role in developing their lobbying capability in this time window. 
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However, it was found that Lufthansa invested less time in building new 
networks compared to the deregulation period, as they used their pre-existing 
relationships, particularly between their national governments, with whom they 
have traditionally been collaborating for decades. Moreover, they focused less of 
their efforts on developing new network relationships because of the tight time 
frame. The pressures of a short time line meant that they had to react quickly to 
the potential impacts of exogenous policy issues that could have affected their 
competitive position. As one of our respondents said: 
I think you could say that in this context building new networks were not 
important because we already had the networks and time was knocking 
on our door. In general, I would say the first most important thing we 
used would be the current network from our people. The second thing is 
that our organisation has a strong reputation, so this helps to build up 
such a network and keep your network healthy. Of course the contact 
maker has to be well connected and articulate in relaying the 
information. [AOOl] 
Lufthansa were using their current people within the office that had specific 
networks that were built previously (either organically or actively) to create 
influence during this period. However, they believed that their acquiring and 
maintaining strong networks was inevitable because of Lufthansa's strong 
reputation and history. The government affairs office was lobbying network 
targets early in the policy formation process, mainly individually, and these 
specific targets were pre-detennined by the individuals. However, the sequence 
of whom to target was determined by access, reputation of the individual and 
time. As a respondent said: 
I don't think the lobbying sequence was mechanistic in its manifestation. 
However, the targets were chosen actively, but this depended on access 
which always plays a big part in the influencing game. However the 
status of the target also has a big weight of our choice. We usually try to 
work bottom up where we leave the Idng and queen targets till later but 
on this occasion we had to speak to people with high positions. [A()03] 
Lufthansa realised that their interests and issues were similar across all flag 
carrier airlines. Therefore, Lufthansa also started to use AEA's EU level 
networks to influence at the same time. The government affairs office started 
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using their indirect network resources by using AEA, which was its other 
lobbying arm. As a result, the government affairs office used a combination of 
idiosyncratic and generic routines. As a respondent said: 
Well, there is a general recipe to lobby but it depends very much on the 
directors and CEOs. It's not a mechanism that works in the same way all 
the time. Each policy is unique which requires its own specification of 
combination of routines. I would say that there are some outside 
associations that all airlines can use which have their own routines that 
all firms have access to like the AEA and I ATA, but when it comes from 
influencing individually then we must use specific ways that other firms 
might not have. But the tasks and the stakeholders play a large role in 
this complex web and they also can act as forms of resistance to our 
lobbying efforts. So answering your question there are many ways to 
create influence but in this context, the importance and urgency of the 
policy formations were going to happen, so we looked at our resources, 
competencies, alliances and of course friends. [AO 30] 
The next part will explore the logical overlap between network relationship 
resources and human capital investment, 
6.5.4.3 HUMAN CAPITAL INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING PROCESSES 
The human resources in Lufthansa's government affairs office were found to be 
very important in the process of developing their lobbying capability. According 
to the respondents from the government affairs office, they believed that in order 
to organise an effective lobbying capability, their current human capital 
resources had to be configured in specific way in order to communicate 
important information to their micro targets^^. However, in this time frame they 
believed that outsourcing the lobbying, bringing in new people or even 
downsizing was not needed to develop their lobbying arm. As one informant 
said: 
We did not outsource or hire people to lobby for us. We had 22 people. 
They looked at everything from competition law to environmental issues. 
A team of international traffic right experts and there is an environmental 
team. Those are really the two expert teams. And then there are two 
political teams, one in Brussels and one in Berlin who deal with political 
affairs. They all lobby but our political affairs office does more lobbying. 
In this time, we had the right people in place and we had the knowledge. 
29 AOOl, A002, A003, A005 and A026. 
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While another respondent said; 
One thing about your point about how to acquire the best talent - really 
talent is two fold in government affairs. One thing is to have a real 
understanding of substance therefore of different topics, economic topics, 
dynamics of globalization, dynamics of the industry. And there is a 
second part is the networks, having a network, understanding how these 
political network processes works. So it is important for us to acquire at 
least in both these fields. And very often, in the second field, it usually 
happens by hiring people that are in the other side of the political 
process. As that is usually something that cannot be studied. Yes we can 
have the understanding of the broader issues, the broader dynamics in 
world politics, world economics, rather from a strong academic 
background. However the contacts cannot be born over night, it's more 
complex in our lobbying. For example in our department after September 
11 we had few people from different fields of knowledge. We had thinkers 
which are important and then contactors. At least that is how we worked 
then and still work. [AOOl] 
The human capital resources were organised to lobby quickly post 9/11, but 
Lufthansa realised that focusing on both individual lobbying and coalition 
interest representation (AEA) lobbying was the right strategy^°. Therefore, it 
made a lot of sense for the senior management to use AEA. Bearing in mind that 
everyone was in the same boat, AEA played a very important role in providing a 
platform where Lufthansa could influence the EU. AEA had around 20 people 
working within their Brussels office with 31 airline members adding lots of 
support. The next part will explore the overlap between lobbying competence 
and human capital resources. 
6 . 5 . 4 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Senior executives in the government affairs office at Lufthansa explicitly related 
the development of their lobbying capabilities to a change in their lobbying 
competencies, which was expected to enable them to influence the correct target 
decision-makers. However, instead of pursuing a policy of fetching new people 
with EU level knowledge or better networks, they used their in-house 
competencies and the competencies from AEA to lobby national and 
international political actors. As one Lufthansa respondent said: 
AOOl and A002 
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We were only using our in-house people post 9/11 and also using AEAs 
expertise and knowledge in lobbying political actors. I think the pool of 
resources at AEA was good for this time, as of course we could use these 
resources to influence. [A005] 
AEA had access to specialised expertise in-house and from its 31 airline 
members. Lufthansa using AEA allowed them to gain different lobbying 
competencies in contacting special high status targets. Supporting them through 
appeared to be the underlying model for the evolving Lufthansa lobbying 
capability. 
In summary, we can see that the lobbying capability development played an 
important role in the exogenous policy context where Lufthansa had little time to 
manoeuvre to make their interest heard. From the micro level analysis of 
Lufthansa's government affairs office, we found that there were few variables 
that played a vital role in the lobbying capability construction. It was evident that 
political resources were comprised of human, organisational, and network, which 
were supported with competences. These resources and competencies were used 
to reconfigure their lobbying capability development process. More importantly, 
cognition played a role in building this symbiotic relationship between political 
resources and lobbying capability development. The Lufthansa lobby capability 
had an equal focus between the idiosyncratic lobbying routines and the generic 
lobbying routines to leverage and deploy the political resources to maximise 
influence (see Appendix 22 for Lufthansa's overall storyline map cluster in the 
exogenous policy context). 
6 . 6 CASE STUDY THREE: ALITALIA 
6 . 6 . 1 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION 
The government affairs function within Alitalia was organised to deal with 
institutional organisations; it dealt with the legal frameworks, however it had 
developed a more business-oriented approach since the deregulation period. 
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Within this office, there were mainly senior people that were responsible for 
dealing with the key stakeholders. That covered all relations with institutions at 
national and EU level. At the national level, it was primarily dealing with the 
Italian parliament and the Italian government and it's Ministry of Transport^'. It 
also dealt with the treasury, as the treasury held about 62% of the capital of 
Alitalia (the main share holder)^^. They also had relations with the Italian 
regions, as Italian regions had a lot of power and the Vatican. At the EU level, it 
would have dialogue with the Commission, parliament and Council. 
Pre 9/11 this office focused their efforts on many issues, but getting a decree 
from the Italian government to authorise privatisation was one of the most 
important. Nevertheless, others efforts included lobbying for traffic to South 
America, labour law, and improving the tarnished state-owned image. At an 
abstract and peripheral level they focused mainly on monitoring and defending 
their organisafion's position by scanning the non-market environment. As one 
respondent said: 
Alitalia was focusing on getting a decree from the Italian government to 
authorise the privatisation of the company, because at the time Alitalia 
was developing its links with Air France. The company had just joined 
sky team. It had concluded a joint venture agreement with Air France, 
which foresaw ultimately merger between the two companies and for that 
to go forward it was essential for the company to be privatised. So it was 
essential to have in place a decree setting out the conditions for 
privatisation of the company. And the company was very much focused on 
lobbying at a national level to get that privatisation. At EU level, before 
11 September, the company was focused on using AEA to lobby. But there 
was no specific issue of importance except that the company wanted and 
knew that it would have to be recapitalised somewhere in 2002. And of 
course this recapitalisation would be undertaken partly by the state, 
being the main shareholder. And it would have to get approval from the 
commission. So it was preparing that. [D021] 
However, post 9/11, Alitalia was focusing on lobbying for three issues. During 
the exogenous policy context (2001-2005), this department made decisions to 
influence the policy environment in order to facilitate the implementation of their 
own corporate strategy to defend its position. They worked on the local level. 
D017, D021, F015, D034 and D035. 
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with the hub communities, European Commission and other European 
governments. As respondent said: 
The triple issues that everyone was lobbying for: the compensation 
package, the insurance cover issue and the security cost issue. We were 
lobbying for those issues, but I would put the security cost as the last 
issue because the priority was on compensation for the four days of 
closure of US Air space just after 11 September and on insurance. 
Because without insurance we would not be able to simply operate and 
then of course the reimbursement of security cost of having the states 
accept taking on those costs. For Alitalia there was a specific issue, 
which overcame all those issues. It is the fact that we were lobbying to 
get our new restructuring plan and the recapitalisation of the company 
approved by Brussels and that is what we obtained in June 2002. You 
may want to look at that commission decision; it is published in the 
official journal of the European communities. And it's a decision from the 
19"^ or 20''' June 2002 on the recapitalisation of Alitalia. We notified to 
the commission, the restructuring plan and the intention of the state to 
recapitalise. I think it was in December 2001. So in period a lot of 
lobbying was done. I was almost in Brussels non-stop. [DOl 7] 
Post 9/11, Alitalia asked the Italian Government for L600-700 billion to cover 
payments for staff redundancies through the cancellation of the 10 per cent ticket 
tax^^. This was in addition to the airline's receipt of the third and final L750 
billion tranche of aid agreed by the European Commission in October 2001, on a 
"one-time, last-time" basis and subject to various conditions (European 
Commission Web-Site 2006). Alitalia believed that US governments put in place 
a $15 billion dollar package which needed to be equaled in Europe. Moroever, 
the US received around five billion in cash and ten billion in loans for US 
carriers and so it was clear that Alitalia had to react along similar lines. However, 
they knew that it was going to be very difficult from the start, where the 
European government and commission offices considered not meeting a 
comparable US financial size. The evaluafion of options led them to believe that 
investing time and people in following the process was not really worth it, so 
they shifted all efforts to AEA. The message in Brussels was, ''yes we understand 
but air transportation is in trouble, but if you cannot survive this then too bad as 
we don't have too much money".^'^.As a result, Alitalia realised their lobbying 
" DO 17 and D035. 
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capability development process had to measure the best efficiency path and time 
for this type of context. 
6 .6 .2 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY ALITALIA 
The choice and combination of lobbying routines can be very important in 
creating a type of 'defense' influence to protect balance sheets from being 
eroded. This was the case for most airlines post 9/11, where airlines were going 
to face the exogenous policies that would hinder their competitive positions. 
Alitalia's government affairs office were using different lobbying routine 
combinations in order to leverage and deploy political resources to influence 
policy makers for the three policy issues, those being insurance coverage, airline 
security cost issue and a compensation package. They started using a 
combination of idiosyncratic lobbying routines and generic lobbying routines 
that involved targeting and sequencing their lobbying routines. Their 
idiosyncratic routines involved using an array of high frequency telephone 
routines, visiting friends, writing letters and one to one sessions with political 
contacts. However, they believed that generic lobbying routines were the best 
option for them to influence political actors as idiosyncratic routines would not 
add value. Therefore they focused most of their efforts on coalition 
representation (using AEA) after a few weeks instead of using mainly individual 
efforts^^. A senior manager said: 
Alitalia was hit badly by the terrorist attacks. We evaluated the damage 
and the future damages that would be incurred. As a result, we started 
asking the Italian Government for help to cover payments for staff 
redundancies we made, because of the cancellation of the tickets etc. We 
used several routes to pass information to our authorities about our 
declining positions. We used direct contacts, had meetings and phone 
calls with the treasury, which was not that successful in my view. But yes, 
I believe that AEA was the most important way to get our message heard. 
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Table 24: Direct Alitalia quotes to show lobbying processes types 36 
Idiosyncratic Lobbying Routines Generic Lobbying Routines 
"We had direct many meetings with our 
owners" 
"Attending conferences" 
"Personal letters and lots of phone calls" "AEA was important to Alitalia" 
"One to one contact with politicians" "Hiring outside help" 
"Talking to our government" 
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office did not develop a sophisticated 
European lobbying arm as they did not have to go far to speak to their national 
government. However, after 9/11, the direction and lobbying efforts had to 
change for the government affairs office because Alitalia had to defend its 
declining position. They did change drastically their approach to running their 
government affairs department and restructured the department. As a result, it 
just shifted its focus to its coalition lobbying arm. As one Senior Alitalia figure 
highlights: 
We did what we could by writing letters, talking to our friends, our 
owners. But in the end, we had to use AEA. Time was a big factor and we 
had to react quickly in order to utilise the right processes but we had 
limited resources. [DOl 7] 
While another respondent said: 
I can tell you that we increased our activities, writing, making phone 
calls, emailing, and so on. But we have not have a clean template like 
maybe British airways that focus in creating a particular type of routine 
groups, if that is what you like to call it. I think we were messy, probably 
because of the fact that we are so much less number of people after 9/11, 
and therefore it was difficult for us to organise our work and we were 
busy with issues. [D034] 
The actual lobbying routines that were used by Alitalia to deploy political 
resources in this context were important for Alitalia. The next part will look at 
the actual content of the political resources more carefully. 
36 D027,D021,D037 
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6 .6 .3 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
In this exogenous policy context, political resources were very important in 
developing Alitalia's lobbying capability. Senior management believed that their 
lobbying capability development process would start from their political resource 
base. However, we found that the antecedent of deploying resources was the 
cognitive blueprints. The senior management's cognitive blueprints were used to 
weigh out the different options, whether introducing new political resources to 
meet the new policy environments or using the current ones to make new 
lobbying processes, or using current ones in order to leverage and deploy the 
political resources to create favourable policy changes. 
Alitalia's respondents clarified that their thinking processes were well defined 
but constrained by time and ownership. However, following a blueprint led them 
to believe that political resources, human, organisational, structural, and network 
resources, could be used to develop their lobbying capability. They believed that 
some sub-level political resources were needed to be organised in such a way as 
to create non-market defense to reduce the potential onset of new exogenous 
polices. Yet the emergent policies were considered difficult to control in Alitalia 
view. As one respondent said: 
We did what we could by writing letters, talking to our friends, our 
owners. But in the end, we had to use AEA for the three issues as time 
was running out. While we used individual lobbying for the 
recapitalisation as that was the most important thing in my view... We 
had the expertise at the national level but could not lobby at the EU level 
the same way, as we did not have the right resources for this time. 
The senior management in the government affairs office believed that their 
previous experiences, current learning, ownership and fime played important 
roles in configuring their political resources. This helped to develop their 
lobbying capability in order to effectively leverage and deploy their political 
resources again. Table 25 below shows the three main categories of the emergent 
concepts that are important in the political resource composition in order to 
develop Alitalia's lobbying capability. 
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Table 25: Alitalia political resources 
Political capital resource Illustrative quotes 
Human "I think we had the right people" 
Network "We had a good national level contact base 
but not so strong EU contact base". "AEA" 
Organisational "The recapitalisation led us to change our 
departmental structure" "we organise our 
structure after 9/11 to lobby for the 
recapitalisation" 
The next part will aim to understand why and how Alitalia devised its lobbying 
capability and political resources within this office. In addition, as shown 6om 
Table 25, Alitalia had few variables that were important to the development of 
their lobbying capability during the exogenous policy context. However, we also 
came to learn that the government affairs unit used some form of templates to 
modify their political resources in order to develop their lobbying capability. 
This decision-making came from blueprints but was constrained by time and 
ownership. The next part will explore the core elements of the lobbying 
capability process in more detail. 
6 .6 .4 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The thinking processes used by senior management at Alitalia's government 
affairs office were more autonomous in this policy context. Their decision-
making processes played a very important role in developing what they believed 
to be a strong lobbying capability for this period. The lobbying cognitive 
blueprints that the senior executives used in this period were modified from pre 
9/11 to meet the new policy pressures of post 9/11^^. 
Post 9/11 was a new context where the government affairs office did not have 
time to invest in new lobbying processes but they had to instead change the 
combinations of their current routines. Therefore, the executives started using 
some aspects of their existing blueprints to organise their political resources, so 
" D021, D034, D035, D021 and D039 
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that they could lobby effectively. However, they shifted the blueprint focus onto 
AEA. As one respondent put it: 
Well, I knew what to do. I had worked in the European Comtnission so I 
had a cognitive blue print per se. I Imew perfectly who would be the 
internal people to contact. [D021] 
The cognitive blueprints came mainly from their previous experiences and their 
current learning. But there were also AEA's blueprints that were used to help 
them lobby. The rational process in this context allowed the senior management 
to realise how they needed to form their lobbying capability. Moreover, this 
rational function allowed them to be less ambidextrous, as they switched to their 
generic from initially using idiosyncratic lobbying routines (very quickly)^^. 
However, this function and blueprint choice was affected by the ownership 
structure and time, which affected the choice in the lobbying development 
configuration. As one respondent said in a follow up interview: 
Working for a company that is mainly government-owned is irritating to 
say the least. Things are not that simple and feel restricted at times... 
When you feel the time pressure, you must adapt and evolve quickly to 
meet the demands " [DO3 4] 
With regards to the flow of knowledge, the choices of the lobbying cognitive 
blueprint compositions by the senior management team were found to have been 
affected by the board level. It was found that the direction and the command in 
the hierarchy played a role in further developing the cognitive blueprint which 
then helped develop the lobbying capability. As one informant put it; 
The CEO had a vital role in the rising issues in that context. He had a 
role in the compensation issues for the 4 days and the insurance. These 
were issues of course high on his agenda, just like the recapitalisation 
issue. He was less involved in the security cost issue because he had more 
important issues. He also knew that we were not going to get a penny 
with regards to the security cost issue, so he decided not to put all his 
efforts on that case. [D027] 
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In terms of deciding who to target, the senior executives from the government 
affairs office made the decisions (this including the status power weighing of 
each target) and detemined the sequence for lobbying at both national and 
international level. However, we also found that the cognitive blueprints decided 
the targets, routine combinations and sequences. This blueprint also decided the 
choice of delivery mode, as in, whether to implement directly by firm managers 
or outsource to professional suppliers of these services. As one senior Alitalia 
representative said: 
I think we were slightly limited in who we could talk to being 
government-owned. But this can be good, as you can well imagine, being 
owned by the government means you can organise meetings quickly with 
important people to inform them about your position. This means we can 
be heard in Europe quickly. As we all know there are good things and 
bad things to being owned by a state. [D034] 
As the illustrative quote shows, Alitalia would target specific people. Although 
they felt restricted in their resource base, they could have direct conversations 
with their own government to lobby on their behalf at the European Commission. 
Thus, the choice of lobbying routines (idiosyncratic lobbying routine at the start 
then shifting to a generic lobbying routine) and argument of content were 
important for Alitalia with regards to lobbying for the three issues (plus 
recapitalisation). Moreover, the cognitive blueprints chosen organised the 
human, organisational, and networks resources, as well as competence, which 
allowed the development of their lobbying capability. The exogenous policy 
context type did seem to affect the choice of blueprint to use. But their 
ownership structure also seems to have affected the cognitive blueprint's choice 
within the government affairs office. 
6 . 6 . 4 . 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
Alitalia's lobbying capability was developed by adapting it to meet its new 
emerging policy environment. However, in this context, the department did re-
structure itself, as they felt that the pressure was intense and restructuring had to 
be done to become more efficient. As one respondent said; 
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Oh yes, it become even more crucial to restructure after 9/11. Actually 
that is when they hired me. They changed a bit the profile of the director 
for that position in the sense that before the person that was in charge 
had a more national background. After September 11,1 was recruited 
because Alitalia wanted someone that had more of an EU background. 
Our observation suggested that departmental restructuring was needed to develop 
their lobbying capability. This decision was mainly taken because they believed 
that they did not have the right lobbying capability structure for this context. As 
one respondent said: 
Before September 11. We were monitoring the political activity at both 
national and international levels and using our lobbying activity. But 
before September 11, we had a big structure. In fact, we had also an 
office in charge with Vatican relationship for example. Of course in Italy 
the Vatican is very important, so we have many contacts with the Vatican. 
But this office has been cut of after 11 September, this activity. And also 
we had an office dedicated to the regional affairs. But also these offices 
to be reduced so now we are few people following many affairs in both 
the national and international side. It was because after the 11 September 
we had a business plan which established also level costs reductions of 
course together with social costs absorbers and so on. Our office has 
been reorganised in this sense but of course issues such as security and 
insurance are very well followed. For example, I am personally involved 
in a working group at the AEA level that is very busy with the question of 
the APPNR issue. [D034] 
Therefore while they restructured their office, they also started using their 
interest group, AEA, to influence the European Commission. They believed that 
to influence in a collective mamier made more sense for them. As one respondent 
said: 
/ think that we might have a combination of routines. But I do believe that 
it is important for example to have awareness of some issues in advance 
in order to lobby in the adequate manner. After 9/11, we tried to do this 
through mainly AEA. For example, AEA that is the Association of 
European Airlines, in which Alitalia is in so much involved. And so 
through them we are able to follow the issues that we consider important, 
they also follow the issue from the beginning, as many information from 
the commission, the institution and also from the industry. They are a 
very good base for us. [DOSS] 
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However, we also found that the lobbying network relationship resources had 
also been used by Lufthansa to develop their lobbying capability. The next part 
will aim to better explore the relationship between network resources and the 
lobbying capability development process. 
6 . 6 . 4 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Networks were considered to be a central resource in creating a lobbying 
capability. We found that Alitalia's network resources played a role in 
developing their lobbying capability in this context. Moreover, it was found that 
Alitalia invested more time in building new networks compared to the 
deregulation period, as they used their pre-existing relationships, particularly 
between their national governments with whom they have traditionally 
collaborated for decades. Moreover, they changed their network base because 
they needed to become more efficient with regards to the industry average. The 
government affairs office started changing their network base after lobbying 
individually for their issues. After shifting focus to AEA, Alitalia started 
restructuring their department, which meant that they had to let go of some old 
networks and bring in new networks. As one of our respondents said: 
This department went through some changes after 9/11, where we had to 
lay off some people that were not needed. We tried to bring in only 2 
people with new EU and national level contacts. This was done not with 
the intent to use for the immediate three issues. These issues were dealt 
with by AEA and us of course. The people brought in were brought in 
more for the long term strategy of our lobbying. [D035] 
Therefore, Alitalia used their current people within the office that had specific 
networks, but they also shed some people of during this context to make room 
for new improved lobbying networks. In the days after 9/11, the current group 
was lobbying specific national targets more and these targets were pre-
determined by the individuals. They used a sequence of whom to target which 
was determined by access and time. As a respondent said; 
I think that Alitalia's network was short. What 1 mean is that they tended 
to speak to their national governments first, but that was outdated for this 
new type of context. [F015] 
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Conversely, Alitalia realised that the interests and issues were similar across all 
flag carrier airlines. Therefore, they started to simultaneously use AEA's network 
and their own networks to influence. As a result, the government affairs office 
used a combination of idiosyncratic and generic routines. As a respondent said: 
I think it worked well for us in using AEA and our own efforts. I think 
what was important is coordination through the AEA. I mean in those 
circumstances, AEA proved to be very essential; I did not need guidance 
from AEA because in the sense, I knew the commission and had worked 
there. But I believe that in this type of event, AEA was useful to 
accumulate the type of knowledge needed to react to the rising issues. 
They provided guidance to its members in what to do and how to do it. 
/DOJJ/ 
The next part will explore the overlap between network relationship resources 
and human capital investment. 
6 . 6 . 4 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING PROCESSES 
The human capital resources in Alitalia's government affairs office were found 
to be very important in the process of developing their lobbying capability. 
According to the respondents from the government affairs office, they believed 
that in order to organise an effective lobbying capability, their current human 
capital resources had to be organised in specific way in order to communicate 
important information to their micro targets during the exogenous policy 
context'*'^. However, in this timeframe they believed that outsourcing the 
lobbying was indeed necessary, on top of bringing in new people and downsizing 
to develop their lobbying arm. As one informant said: 
Yes, we had lawyers. We hired outside only for this specific issue of the 
recapitulation of the company. We hired a law firm specialised in EU 
affairs. While for the other topics, we did it through the AEA and 
individually. But we did not hire anyone. [D021] 
Alitalia maintained a government affairs office, with the intention of 
restructuring in the short to medium term. However in the short term, the human 
capital resources were organised in a way to quickly lobby post 9/11. Alitalia 
DO 17, D021, F015, D034 and D035. 
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soon realised that focusing more lobbying effort on their coalition lobbying 
platform (AEA) was the right strategy. The next part will explore the overlap 
between lobbying competence and human capital investment. 
6 . 6 . 4 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The senior management team within the government affairs office within Alitalia 
explicitly related the development of their lobbying capabilities to a change in 
their lobbying competencies, which was expected to enable them to influence the 
target decision-makers. They pursued a tactic of getting a few good people with 
EU level knowledge and better networks in the medium term. However, in the 
short term they used their in-house competencies and the competencies from 
AEA to lobby national and international political actors. As one Alitalia 
respondent said: 
We had the average competence in our office but did not have all the 
resources. The terrorist attacks damaged our bottom line. So, no, I don't 
think we had enough resources, well it was largely enough. However, 
specific skills and knowledge that we needed were not there during that 
time. We needed more knowledge on times, so we had to go to AEA. 
While another senior person said: 
Post September 11 we were hiring new, talented individuals who had 
knowledge in lobbying at an EU level, as that was where lobbying was 
moving... We hired people that have extensive knowledge in EU law. 
AEA had specialised experts in-house and from its 31 airline members. Alitalia 
used AEA to gain different lobbying competencies in lobbying and influencing. 
Supporting them tliroughout appeared to be the underlying model for the 
evolving Alitalia lobbying capability. 
We can see that the lobbying capability development played an important role in 
the exogenous policy context where Alitalia had little time to manoeuvre to make 
their interest heard. From the micro level analysis of Alitalia's government 
affairs office, we found that there were few variables that played a vital role in 
the lobbying capability construction. It was evident that political resources were 
comprised of human, organisational, network and competence resources. These 
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resources and competencies were used to reconfigure their lobbying capability 
development process. Cognition played a role in building this symbiotic 
relationship between political resources and lobbying capability development. 
Cognition allowed for a more idiosyncratic lobbying routines concentration at the 
start and then it shifted to a generic lobbying routines platform to leverage and 
deploy the political resources to make influence (see Appendix 23 for Alitalia's 
overall storyline map cluster in the exogenous policy context). 
6 .7 CASE STUDY FOUR: SAS AIRLINES 
6.7 .1 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION 
The government affairs function within SAS was organised to deal with legal 
firameworks, bilateral agreements with states, monitoring of the political 
landscape and, more importantly, implementing corporate political strategies to 
create or defend their competitive position''^ The senior people within this office 
were responsible for dealings with the key stakeholders, which covered all 
relations with institutions at national and EU level. National level was primarily 
the Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish parliaments and governments. 
Pre 9/11 this office focused their efforts on many issues including acquisition of 
traffic rights and monitoring the political scene^^. In other words, at an abstract 
level they focused mainly on monitoring by scanning the non-market 
environment. Soon after 9/11 (exogenous policy context), this department took 
decisions to defend their position from the emerging policy environment in order 
to facilitate the implementation of their own corporate strategy. They worked on 
the local level, with the hub communities, and at an international level with the 
European Commission and other European governments to protect their 
position'^^ They made it clear that SAS was in a difficult position; stopping 
insurance, not providing compensation, and making them pay for security costs 
would be disastrous for the Scandinavian region. As one respondent said: 
B006, B007, B024 and B028. 
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Acquisition of traffic rights and mainly monitoring the political scene 
were the activities that our departments were focusing their efforts on. 
But on the actual day of the attack I was in Brussels actually. At that 
point I thought that the airline industry will never be the same after and 
of course that was true. September 11 had a tremendous impact on the 
entire airline industry. But looking at 9/11 as an impact in context of this 
department and its functions, it did not change anything drastically in our 
department. It was just that we had some new topics that we had to deal 
with like security, like insurance and those kinds of things. But what we 
did before 9/11 and after 9/11 on general routines bases was not very 
different. We are a department that can be assumed to play a very 
important role for SAS and therefore we need stability in our structure. 
So we were not re-structured as a result like other parts of SAS. Actually 
before 9/11, SAS was focused on a cost cutting programme. But obviously 
after 9/11 happened that programme was even more important and 
stringent. [B012] 
While another SAS infonnant said: 
We expressed our views on insurance and security costs. Those were big 
things, so we were lobbying the EU system mostly through AEA but we 
also obviously used our national EU representatives also. We addressed 
the Scandinavian governments and parliaments. That was vital - without 
that state insurance help, I don't think that any airline would have 
survived. And the Airlines paying all the security costs would have been 
problematic. 
SAS realised their lobbying capability development process had to measure the 
best efficiency path and time for this type of context. They started lobbying using 
different lobbying routines but maintained a similar structure to pre 9/11. 
However, their decision frames were based on following other people and using 
their own rules. 
Everyone has different network base but we all use a generic platform 
like AEA. But the network is differentiated by who you hiow. I think 
individual lobbying has its perks and some contexts need this more, while 
coalition lobbying using trade associations have their benefits too in 
some contexts. Maybe using both individual and group lobbying is the 
best way forward. I think overall that we managed to get what we wanted 
at EU level and collectively with the other airlines, with AEA. We got the 
commission approving and authorizing the states to compensate the 
airlines of the four day of closure of the US airspace. We got the 
commission accepting the states to guarantee the airline activities, to 
provide the insurance coverage. And we got the commission to be very 
receptive and very positive on the idea of member stales paying for 
security costs. But that was only one side of the problem. Of course you 
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needed all these issues to be approved at EU level but as far as 
implementation was concerned, it all depended on national level, so then 
you needed to go to your respective member states and make sure that 
they would take the implementing decisions because it was there 
economic value that was getting affected. [B029] 
6 .7 .2 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY SAS 
There were lots of different lobbying routines found to be used by the SAS's 
government affairs office during this policy context. As one senior respondent 
describes the choice of lobbying routines: 
Well we used phone calls, letters and personal visits to meet some people 
at our national authorities in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. But AEA 
was doing most of the work for us when it came to lobbying the European 
commission. They provided the coordination and information gathering, 
intelligence exchange and so forth. [B029] 
While another senior respondent said: 
The process was very much like what it has been traditionally using the 
various routines and tools within our box, including letters and 
information material, including meetings, one to one or with larger 
groups. But at this point we had a time element as well, so intensity of 
lobbying had to change. So it would be fair to say that we had less time 
with direct contact with politicians to influence them in the way we 
wanted. Less time talking to all the different political parties and 
governments of the three Scandinavian countries. They understood the 
problems quite fast. They had no problem there and they all talked to 
each other to be sure that they were handling the matter the same way. I 
would say that process was with the most important people in the 
governments. That was about it and letters. [B028] 
SAS was using some lobbying routines to influence policy makers after 9/11. 
They started using a combination of idiosyncratic lobbying routines and generic 
lobbying routines that involved complicated targeting and sequences by using a 
combination of high intensity telephone routines, visiting friends, letters and one 
to one sessions with political contacts''''. The generic lobbying routines included 
mainly AEA and attending conferences. In the interests of time, the generic 
lobbying routines were viewed to be the best way to influence political actors in 
B006, B007 and B028. 
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their opinions after a few weeks. Therefore they focused most of their efforts on 
coalition representation instead of using mainly individual efforts'*^. 
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office had fi-eedom to lobby without having 
meetings with its CEO or other directors; this was the case as most of its senior 
representatives in this office were empowered to make important decisions with 
regards to lobbying. However, after 9/11, the direction and lobbying efforts had 
to change for the government affairs office because SAS had to defend its 
declining position. Moreover, SAS did not change drastically its approach to 
running its government affairs department nor did it restructure the department''®. 
It just shifted its focus to its coalifion lobbying arm. 
6 .7 .3 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
Equally, in this policy context, political resources were very important in 
developing SAS's lobbying capability. Senior management believed that their 
lobbying capability development process would start fi"om their political resource 
base. However before using these resources they would use their thinking 
blueprints to weigh up whether to introduce new political resources or use 
current ones to make new lobbying processes, or use current ones in order to 
develop their lobbying capability. 
SAS respondents disclosed that their thinking templates led them to believe that 
their political resources, human, organisational, structural, and network 
resources, needed to be used to defend their posifion from the policy 
enviromnent. Moreover, the senior management team believed that their previous 
experiences, foresight, current learning, and autonomous factors of ownership 
and time played important roles in configuring their political resources to 
develop their lobbying capability, in order to effectively leverage and deploy 
their political resources again (resource->capability->resource). Table 26 below 
shows the three main categories of emergent concepts that are important in the 
political resource composition in order to develop the SAS lobbying capability. 
B006, B007, B024 and 3028, 
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Table 26: SAS political resources 
Political capital resource Illustrative quotes 
Human "We had expertise" and "experience" 
Network "We used AEA" and "our friends". 
Organisational "We remained the same, as we had a good 
structure" 
The respondents believed that it was important to get involved in lobbying 
process earlier rather than later'^^. In this context, they realised that time was an 
issue, therefore talking to high status authorities early and using AEA was the 
right way to lobby. As this respondent says: 
Yes, I agree with you completely. Nobody could in Europe wait. It was 
about getting together quickly. The national governments were the ones 
to provide the guarantees. In this time, European structures were 
superfluous where national relations were extremely important. Because 
when things happen so fast there was simply no time to do anything on a 
consorted level. There was a development very quickly. It was called 
EURO time at ICAO. [B006] 
The next part will aim to understand why and how SAS devised its lobbying 
capability and political resources within this office. In addition, SAS had few 
variables that were important to the development of their lobbying capability in 
this exogenous policy context. We will explore the core variables of the lobbying 
capability process in more detail. 
6 .7 .4 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The senior management at SAS's government affairs office used specific 
thinking blueprints that were more autonomous than induced in this policy 
context. These decision-making blueprints played a vital role in developing what 
they believed to be a strong lobbying capability for this time. The lobbying 
decision-making templates or the "cognitive blueprints" that the senior 
executives used in this period were modified from pre 9/11 to meet the new 
B006, B007, B024 and B028 
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policy pressures of post 9/11''®. However, how did they build these blueprints? A 
respondent describes the process: 
We learn by doing. I am always learning at home. In fact that is how we 
build our decision-making processes, maps, whatever you want to call it. 
We do this by doing things as we go along. I get home and start to think 
about the issues on the plate, and then I refer to my library... In this 
context, we used our decision on the choice of level and type of strategy. 
Then the choice of the content for our argument to influence, the targets 
to contact and the mode of direct or indirect. [B007] 
As seen from the above illustrative quote, the cognitive blueprints came mainly 
from their current learning, but they also came from past experiences and 
foresight. The rational process used for their lobbying allowed the senior 
management to realise how they needed to form their lobbying capability. 
Moreover, this flexible logic allowed them to be fairly ambidextrous, switching 
between generic and idiosyncratic lobbying routines. Furthermore, it was also 
found that their ownership structure affected their lobbying development process. 
As one respondent said in a follow-up interview: 
Our owners and stakeholders allow us to be better at lobbying than say 
other airlines. We have access to three governments, more resources in 
some ways. But this can also mean three times more work. [B024] 
Indeed, post 9/11 was a new context where SAS did not have time to invest in 
new lobbying processes, thus instead they had to change the combination and 
intensity of their lobbying routines. Their executives started using existing 
blueprints and modified them slightly to organise their political resources, so that 
they could lobby effectively to meet the new policy challenges. These blueprints 
led them to shift their focus to AEA during this context. 
With regards to the flow of knowledge, the lobbying cognitive blueprint 
processes were affected by board level cognitive blueprints. Indeed the direction 
and the command in the hierarchy played a role in developing the cognitive 
blueprint and the lobbying capability. As one informant put it: 
' B006, B007, B024, B028 and F015 
-258-
'Lobbying Capability" 
It emerged at the CEO level. In crisis situations like this it should always 
come from the top. But we worked closely together on political affairs 
where I kept the CEO informed on the legal aspects of things. [B028J 
Senior executives from the government affairs office and their decision 
blueprints decided who to target (this including the status power weighing of 
each target) and the right sequence to lobby, at both national and international 
level. The cognitive blueprint also decided the routine combination, and finally 
the choice of delivery mode. That is, whether it be implemented directly by firm 
managers or outsourced to professional suppliers. 
As seen previously, who to target was important in this context type. However, 
the choice of lobbying routines and argument of content were important for SAS. 
Nevertheless, in order to develop their lobbying capability, the department had to 
slightly reconfigure processes. The cognitive blueprint organised the human, 
organisational, and networks resources, as well as competence, which allowed 
the development of an effective lobbying capability. The exogenous policy 
context type did seem to affect the choice of blueprint to use. In addition, the 
stakeholders also influenced the cognitive aspects of the top management team 
within this particular government affairs office. 
6 . 7 . 4 . 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
SAS's lobbying capability was developed as it was adapted to meet the new 
policy environment. However, in this context, the departmental structure did not 
vary in anyway at the micro level. Moreover, they felt that the pressure was 
intense and re-structuring straight away was unnecessary. As one respondent 
said: 
At this time we needed to be effective, efficient and more serious about 
lobbying. Influence on the political decisions making process cannot be 
made from a distance. You have to be there, physically present in the 
Brussels environment. That is a structure we introduced before 9/11 in 
2000. But we did not change our shape, as our shape was fairly robust 
compared to some other airlines. [B006] 
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Our observations suggested that departmental re-alignment was not necessary in 
the traditional sense to develop their lobbying capability in the short to medium 
term^°. This decision was mainly taken because they believed that they had the 
right lobbying capability structure for this context. However, they did introduce 
AEA into their lobbying game, and it acted as an extension of their department's 
structure. As one respondent said: 
AEA was important to our department weeks after 9/11. We worked 
closely with them through the whole period for the three issues. [B029] 
However, within this context, they only downsized their Norwegian office in the 
medium to long term. They did this to be more efficient in their lobbying. As a 
respondent said: 
We actually downsized our Norwegian office, less then other parts but we 
did downsize. However, this happened latter then sooner. In our office 
few people left because in the situation in which the industry was going 
into [at] that time. Overhead costs were the worst; it was a matter of 
cutting costs for any price. So the downsizing was substantial, we 
reshuffled. I would say that before September we had 9 people and at the 
end of the process we had 3 by 2005. The reason to go from 9 to 3 is 
because we have been reorganising the whole group. [B028] 
We also found that the lobbying network relationship resources had been used by 
SAS to develop their lobbying capability. The next part will aim to better explore 
the relationship between network resources and the lobbying capability 
development process. 
6 . 7 . 4 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Networks were viewed to be a central political resource in creating a lobbying 
capability. Moreover, SAS's network resources played a role in developing their 
lobbying capability in this context. Nevertheless, it was found that SAS invested 
less time in building new networks, as they used their pre-existing relationships, 
particularly between their national governments with whom they traditionally 
collaborated for decades. Moreover, they focused less of their efforts on 
developing new network relationship because of the tight timeframe. The 
pressures of a short time line meant that they had to react quickly to the potential 
B006, B007, B024 and B028. 
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impacts of exogenous policy issues, which could have affected their competitive 
position. As one of our respondents said: 
We have a very sophisticated IT system, where we have over 1000 names, 
emails, and telephone numbers of contacts, friends, politicians from all 
over the world. Plenty of people to contact but in this time, the main 
people we contacted were the people with authority. To make sure people 
hear you, you must contact your top trumps quickly then start contacting 
other friends at other airlines and AEA. [AOOl] 
SAS were using their current people within the office that had specific networks 
that were built previously (either organically or actively) to create influence 
during this period^'. The government affairs office were lobbying network 
targets early in the policy foraiation process, mainly individually. These targets 
were pre-determined by individuals but the sequence of whom to target was 
determined by access, reputation and time. As a respondent said: 
/ guess that having the contacts is half the stoiy, as also getting the 
meeting with them is the other half. But having the SAS brand can get the 
meeting quickly. [B024] 
SAS realised that interests and issues were similar across all flag carrier airlines. 
Therefore, SAS also started to use AEAs (EU level) networks to influence at the 
same time. The government affairs office started using their indirect network 
resources by using AEA, which was its other lobbying arm. As a result, the 
government affairs office used a combination of idiosyncratic and generic 
routines. The next part will explore the logical overlap between network 
relationship resources and human capital investment. 
6 . 7 . 4 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING PROCESSES 
The human resources in SAS's government affairs office were found to be very 
important in the process of developing their lobbying capability. Moreover, 
according to the respondents from the government affairs office, they believed 
that in order to organise an effective lobbying capability, their current human 
B024 and B028. 
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capital resources had to be organised in a specific way in order to communicate 
important information to their micro targets^^. However, in this timeframe they 
believed that outsourcing the lobbying or bringing in new people was not 
necessary to developing their lobbying arm. As one informant said: 
We kept everything in-house, as that is the best way to keep control on 
outcomes. Yes, everything was done in-house, so that we could save 
money. Hiring consultants is far too expensive and we need to keep the 
influence knowledge in house. [B004] 
While another respondent said; 
I think in this time the combination of direct and indirect ways was 
important. But there are no secret instructions when it comes to 
successful lobbying routines. You have the right financial and human 
resources that have the knowledge and contacts. It's a layered approach 
that make things happen. Each case we encounter is different so we need 
to use different ways, but using the general base of lobbying is a given of 
course. [B024] 
The human capital resources were organised to lobby quickly post 9/11, but SAS 
realised that focusing on both individual lobbying and coalition interest 
representation (AEA) lobbying was the right strategy. Therefore, it made a lot of 
sense for the senior management to use AEA. AEA played a very important role 
in providing a platform where SAS could influence the EU during this exogenous 
policy context. The next part will explore the overlap between lobbying 
competence and human capital investment. 
6 . 7 . 4 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The senior management team within the government affairs office related the 
development of their lobbying capability to a change in their lobbying 
competencies, which was expected to enable them to influence the correct policy 
decision-makers and improve internal efficiency^^. Moreover, they used their in-
house competencies and the AEA competencies to lobby national and 
international political actors. As one SAS respondent said: 
We had the competence in-house to deal with potential problems and 
where we lacked knowledge, we just had meetings or read things to fill 
" B 0 0 7 , B024, B028,F015 
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the gap. It was combination of old and new in perspective. Because we 
were also in an intermediary phase where the EU was partially taking 
over. The micro politics was still managed at the national level. That has 
changed since then. After September 11, we had already the right people 
so we slightly changed structures later for cost issues but less for 
competence issues. So it has been a gradual process in regards to that I 
would say. [B004] 
Other then just using their own lobbying competencies, SAS used AEA to gain 
different lobbying competencies in devising a strong lobbying content to create 
some influence. Supporting them through appeared to be the underlying model 
for the changing SAS lobbying capability. Indeed, we can see that lobbying 
capability development played an important role in this exogenous policy context 
where SAS had little time to manoeuvre to make their interests heard. 
Subsequently, we found that there were few variables that played a vital role in 
the lobbying capability construction. It was evident that political resources were 
comprised of human, organisational, and network which was complemented by 
competence. These resources were used to reconfigure their lobbying capability 
development process. While cognition played a role in building this symbiotic 
relationship between political resources and lobbying capability development. 
Indeed, the SAS lobbying capability had an idiosyncratic lobbying routines focus 
at the start and then it shifted to a generic lobbying routines platform to leverage 
and deploy the political resources to maximise influence (see Appendix 24 for 
SAS's overall storyline map cluster in the exogenous policy context). 
6 . 8 CASE STUDY FIVE: TAP AIR 
6 . 8 . 1 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FUNCTION 
The government affairs function within TAP air was organised to deal with the 
political environment and the legal frameworks. This office contained people that 
were responsible for communication with the key stakeholders. These forms of 
communications constituted formal and informal information exchanges at 
national and international levels with political actors; sustaining and building 
relations with institutions, airlines and political actors at both national and 
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international level; and monitoring the political landscape^"^. At the national level 
it primarily had contact with the Portuguese parliament and the Portuguese 
government. Contact with the national government was mainly with the Ministry 
of Transport and with the treasury^^. At the EU level they had contact with the 
commission, parliament and council. As one respondent said: 
I deal with government affairs and our department deals with government 
affairs, multi-lateral representation, and aeropolitical ajfairs and also 
alliances. So it is external affairs and alliances where we have to keep 
our networks fresh and alive. By alliances it does not mean on the 
alliance in which we are integrated in but also all the commercial 
arrangements that we have with other non-alliance partners. [C009] 
Pre 9/11 this office focused its efforts on issues such as route development to 
places like Brazil and Venezuela (Annual Report 2000). At an abstract and 
peripheral level they focused mainly on monitoring and creating new 
opportunities by scanning the non-market environment. As one respondent said: 
/ made it clear that it was all about the search of commercial 
opportunities. It was very much about our office lobbying our civil 
aviation authority in order to make sure they would allow us to grow here 
or there and so forth. This has been very much the main stream of effort 
before 9/11. Again I cannot remember well but there have been some 
regulations which were of course prepared by the commission during the 
consultation period of those regulations. The revenue enhancement side 
then on the cost reduction side, so that was probably the big difference, if 
you compare the period before and the period after. [CO 10] 
However, during this exogenous policy context (2001-2005), this department 
took decisions to influence the policy environment in order to facilitate the 
implementation of their own corporate strategy. Their strategic behaviour started 
more at a local level, with them touching base with contacts at the European 
Commission^^, With further evaluation of the different options, they decided not 
to invest too much time and resources on their individual lobbying processes. As 
a result, they shifted all efforts to AEA to do the lobbying. As a respondent said: 
COOP, CO 10, CO 11, CO 13 and C033 
" C009, C013 and C033. 
C009, CO 10, coil and CO 13 
- 2 6 4 -
"Lobbying Capability" 
On the security measures issues, we mimicked or processed on what other 
airlines did, so when one member state does something, other member 
states do the same. So one starts the chain reaction. For instance cock-pit 
doors, and that sort of things, there was coverage for that type of cost. 
But for the main cost incurred, there was no consensus. Again it is an 
issue of how many member states are willing to step into resolving a 
certain issue. More and more member states look at each other. They do 
not do anything without looking at each other, for instance Portugal will 
look at France or UK etc. So it very much depends on how strong you 
lobby with the national government. Wltat is the relative weight of that 
country in relation to all the others? So it is not so much that our efforts 
are less effective or more effective, the decision making in the end 
depends on many exogenous factors which we are not there to control. Of 
course, we also used an association called AEA. 1 believe, in this 
particular time, we used them a lot. With AEA, we always exchanged 
views, and tried to have all our peers as active as everyone else, as it is 
the only way. [CO 11] 
TAP realised their lobbying capability development process had to measure the 
best efficiency path for this type of context. The choice was determined by the 
facts that there was a short timeframe and most other airlines had similar 
interests. 
6 .8 .2 TYPES OF LOBBYING ROUTINES USED BY TAP 
The choice and combination of lobbying routines can be very important in 
creating a type of influence, which can protect competitive positions. TAP Air's 
government affairs office was using different lobbying routines in order to 
leverage and deploy political resources to influence policy makers for the three 
policy issues: insurance coverage, airline security cost issue and compensation 
package. They started using a combination of idiosyncratic lobbying routines and 
generic lobbying routines that involved targeting people and sequencing their 
lobbying routines. Their idiosyncratic routines involved using a combination of 
high frequency telephone routines, visiting friends, writing letters and one to one 
sessions with political contacts. However, they believed that generic lobbying 
routines were the best option for them to influence political actors as 
idiosyncratic routines would not add value. Therefore they focused most of their 
efforts on coalition representation (using AEA) after a few weeks instead of 
using mainly individual efforts. A senior manager said; 
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We used mainly personal contacts at the start. This choice was based on 
the fact that our previous experience showed personal routes are 
important at the start. The email is very impersonal and people read it or 
don't read it. If you send a letter that is one page, people get bored and 
they do not have time, they probably put it somewhere on their desk and 
let it sit there for two months. I do! It was very much our principal that as 
much as possible, we needed face to face meetings after 9/11, where we 
explained what we needed. Being a state-owned airline, people listen to 
at home. As much as we can that is how we worked. In other words, 
direct methods... But then AEA was also used to make our position more 
transparent... we did after 2003 restructure and lay off some people. 
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office did not develop a sophisticated 
European lobbying arm as they did not have to go far to speak to their national 
government. However, after 9/11, the direction and lobbying efforts had to 
change for the government affairs office at TAP, because they had to defend their 
declining position^^. Moreover, they drastically changed their strategic behaviour 
in running their government affairs department and hence restructured the 
department. As a result, it shifted its focus to its coalition lobbying ann. As one 
Senior TAP figure highlights: 
Well, we do not wait for the stimuli to eat our position. We are not sitting 
here and waiting for our civil aviation authority or external relations 
department of Ministry of Transportation. In most of the instances what 
we do is when we know that something needs a big effort, you need to be 
alert all the time and know about things that are coming, the earlier the 
better. Earlier you can intervene in the decision making process of the 
policy introduction the better. So that is where AEA and lATA play a very 
important role because they have a structure that is much better then 
ours, as it can read signs and alert us for certain processes or certain 
papers, communications, with some draft regulations which are about to 
come. So for me in order for the lobbying to be as effective as possible, 
you need to start your intervention very early in the process, as soon as it 
happens, we immediately create an internal questionnaire and discussion 
to create the broad lines of TAP's position on this or that issue. We 
discuss it with our CEO or the member of the board then we start 
shooting, we usually do it to the Ministry of Transportation, to the civil 
aviation authority, to the permanent representative of Portugal in 
Brussels. Sometimes directly with the transport committee of the 
European Parliament or even the Commission. And then of course we 
give our knowledge to AEA and I ATA, so that they know what we are 
doing. So this is very much the process. [C025] 
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The actual lobbying routines that were used by TAP to leverage and deploy 
political resources in this context were viewed as the best path for TAP. The next 
part will look at the content of the political resources more carefully. 
6 .8 .3 POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS 
In this exogenous policy context, political resources were very important in 
developing TAP air's lobbying capability. Senior management believed that their 
lobbying capability development process would start from their political resource 
base. The senior management's cognitive blueprints were used to weigh out the 
different options, whether introducing new political resources to meet the new 
policy environments or using the current ones, and making new lobbying 
processes or using current ones, in order to leverage and deploy the political 
resources to create favourable policy changes^^. 
During the interviews, TAP's senior management explained that thinking 
processes were well-defined, but constrained by time^^. However, following a 
blueprint led them to believe that political resources, human, organisational 
structural and network resources could be used to develop their lobbying 
capability. They believed that some sub-level political resources were needed for 
their lobbying to reduce the potential onset of negative polices for airlines. As 
one respondent said: 
We had the people with some good Jmowledge in place to deal with the 
rising issues from 9/11. But you need more time to influence at the EU 
level. Maybe our structure and competence was more national oriented 
then EU level, which we tried to fix around 2004. But using AEA was 
another avenue to follow after 9/11, as they had the resources and 
competencies. [C025] 
The next part will aim to understand why and how TAP devised its lobbying 
capability and political resources within this office. However, we also came to 
learn that the government affairs unit used blueprints to modify their political 
resources in order to develop their lobbying capability. This decision-making 
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came from blueprints but was constrained by time and ownership. The next part 
will explore the core elements of the lobbying capability process in more detail. 
6 . 8 . 3 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND TOP MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS 
The thinking processes used by senior management at TAP's government affairs 
office were more autonomous in this policy context. Their decision-making 
processes played a vital role in developing what they believed to be a strong 
lobbying capability for this period. Nevertheless, the cognitive blueprints that the 
senior executives used in this period were modified from pre 9/11 to meet the 
new policy pressures of post 9/11. 
These cognitive blueprints came mainly from their previous experiences, their 
current learning and their predictions for the future. However, there were also 
AEA's blueprints, which were used to help them lobby. The rational frinction of 
their lobbying process allowed the senior management to realise how they 
needed to form their lobbying capability. Moreover, this flexible, rational 
function allowed them to be fairly ambidextrous, switching between generic and 
idiosyncratic lobbying routines. However, the rational process and blueprint 
choice were affected by the ownership structure and time, which impacted on the 
choice in the lobbying development configuration. 
Indeed, post 9/11 was a new context in which the government affairs office did 
not have time to invest in new lobbying processes but instead had to change the 
combinations of their lobbying routines. Therefore, the executives started using 
existing resources to organise their political resources, so that they could lobby 
effectively. They shifted their focus onto AEA, after exhausting their individual 
routes. As one respondent put it: 
Being the head of this department, I think that we Imew that we needed to 
get the government on our side, as that was what everyone was doing. I 
think we had no problem doing this but the European Commission was 
hard on us all at the start. So we recognised that collective action was the 
best option on the table, as everyone did. [C009] 
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The choice made in the adoption of a lobbying blueprint was affected by 
hierarchy and structure. It was found that strategic behaviour in the department 
was affected by command in the hierarchy, which played a role in further 
developing their cognitive blueprint, which in turn helped to develop the 
lobbying capability. As one informant put it; 
The CEO had some important say in our lobbying in this time. Very 
different to other events. I think that commercial issues crossed his path, 
so he needed to get involved in the lobbying. We were all in serious 
problems, so the CEO had to navigate the ship by actually holding the 
steering wheel on many of the issues we talked about. [C025J 
In terms of deciding who to target, the senior executives from the government 
affairs office made the key decisions (including the status power weighing of 
each target) and determined the sequence to lobby, at both national and 
international level. However, we found that the cognitive blueprints decided the 
targets, routine combinations and sequences^®. This blueprint also decided the 
choice of delivery mode. That is, whether to implement directly by firm 
managers or outsource to professional suppliers of the services. As one senior 
TAP respondent said: 
We used a mixed soup of routines after 9/11... Being a state airline 
means obviously that we can talk to the national government. The 
ownership plays a big role in deciding how to lobby. In our case because 
we are a government-owned company, we don't have to lobby the same 
ways as British Airways or KLM. We have to speak directly to the 
government. It's very effective to have government sitting in your 
company. But, this also means that our lobbying was a little lazy on the 
European side over time. We had contacts in the Commission but I don't 
think it's anything like British Airways or Lufthansa. [C009] 
Consequently, post 9/11 TAP targeted specific people, and felt they had strong 
resources and some weaker resources. Thus, the choice of lobbying routines 
(idiosyncratic lobbying routine at the start then shifting to a generic lobbying 
routine) and argument of content were important for TAP with regards to 
lobbying for the three issues. Moreover, the cognitive blueprints chosen 
organised the human, organisational, and network resources and competence, 
which allowed the development of their lobbying capability to happen. The 
^ C009, COlO, COl 1, C013, C033 and F0I6 
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exogenous policy context did seem to affect the choice of blueprint, but their 
ownership seemed to have affected the cognitive blueprints choice within the 
government affairs office. 
6 . 8 . 4 . 1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE MODIFICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
TAP Air's lobbying capability was developed by adapting and reacting to meet 
its emerging policy environment. However, in this context, the government 
affairs department re-shuffled in the short term, as they felt that the pressure was 
intense, and they needed to work more efficiently. After transferring the major 
lobbying component to AEA, it decided on a departmental overhaul in the 
medium term in order to defend itself from future risk impacts. As one 
respondent said: 
Well, I would say we slightly re-shaped in early 2002 and did the main 
restructuring around 2003. But we definitely re-enforced our lobbying 
activities because with all the consequences it took place fi'om the 
attacks. We saw that we needed, first of all to reinforce the message of 
how aviation was of extreme importance to the economies and wellbeing 
of populations. So that was a message about us, the industry because the 
industry had been attacked. Then of course we had to lobby in relation to 
all the impacts that were being caused at the insurance level, at the 
security measure level, at the loss of revenue level. So we had to reinforce 
our lobbying activities and to tell you the truth we definitely put aside any 
priority in term of bilateral air services agreement because that was not 
the priority. The priority was much more to do with more with how we 
could minimise the negative impacts. [C009] 
Our observations suggested that departmental restructuring was needed to 
develop their lobbying capability. This decision was mainly taken because they 
believed that they did not have the right lobbying capability structure for this 
context. As one respondent said: 
We had to organise our people to focus on the important issues and at the 
same time lose some calories on the cost front. But we did not change the 
shape of the department by merging it etc. [CO 11] 
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Therefore while they reshuffled some people, they also started using their interest 
group, AEA, to influence at the European level. They believed that to influence 
in a collective manner made more sense for them. As one respondent said: 
We were using AEA like all other airlines. We were watching our friends 
in other airlines. We used similar behaviours to other state airlines. 
However, we also found that the network relationship resources had been used 
by TAP to develop their lobbying capability. The next part will aim to better 
explore the relationship between network resources and the lobbying capability 
development process. 
6 . 8 . 4 . 2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING PROCESSES 
Networks were viewed to be a central resource in creating a lobbying capability. 
We found that TAP's network resources played a role in developing their 
lobbying capability in this context. Moreover, it was found that TAP invested 
less time in building new networks after 9/11 to affect the emerging policies, as 
they used their pre-existing relationships, particularly between their national 
governments with whom they have traditionally collaborated for decades. In 
other words, the government affairs office did not change their network base 
after lobbying individually for their issues. However, after shifting their focus to 
AEA, they decided to let some human resources go and bring in two new people. 
As one of our respondents said: 
The department had some ups and downs. The department saw some 
people leaving after 2003. The department at that time was 12 people, we 
went down to 8 people. Then we had to recruit 2 more people. In the last 
10 years it went through certain changes for sure. Within the department 
which is structured in two separate areas, we try and make everyone feel 
comfortable with any kind of issue. So there is no specialisation to 
appoint someone that is not got a capability in that type of activity. Now 
in terms of the organisation of the airline itself, there has been radical 
change. Not only at a group level but also at an airline level. How much 
of that is due to 9/11 and how much of that is due to the internal 
restructuring that we had before that where we streamlined is difficult to 
tell. I think that one followed the other, but again it is because we started 
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that exercise before 9/11, we did not feel the impact the other airlines did. 
Therefore, TAP was using their current people within the office that had specific 
networks, but they also shed some people of during this context to make room 
for new improved lobbying networks^'. In the days after 9/11, the cuiTent group 
was lobbying specific national targets more and these targets were pre-
determined by the individuals. They used a sequence of who to target, 
determined by status. As a respondent said: 
We had some people in mind that we contacted but there is no sequence 
in my head. Just who has status or who is higher in the food chain. 
Maybe that is a sequence. [CO 13] 
Subsequently, TAP realised that interests and issues were similar across all flag 
carrier airlines. Therefore, they started to use AEA's network and their own 
networks to influence simultaneously, and then shifted entirely to AEA. As a 
result, the government affairs office used a combination of idiosyncratic and 
generic routines. The next part will explore the overlap between network 
relationship resources and human capital investment. 
6 . 8 . 4 . 3 HUMAN CAPITAL INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING PROCESSES 
The human capital resources in TAP's government affairs office were found to 
be very important in the process of developing their lobbying capability. 
According to the respondents from the government affairs office, they believed 
that their strategic behaviour and intent was to organise an effective lobbying 
capability for the rising policy issues from 9/11. This meant that their current 
human capital resources had to be organised quickly in a specific way in order to 
communicate important information to their micro targets during this context. 
However, in this timeframe they believed that keeping a fairly similar human 
resource structure was only necessary in the short term, as everything was 
shifting. As a result, in the medium term TAP decided to bring in new people and 
downsize to develop a better lobbying arm. As one informant said: 
C009, CO 10, CO 11, CO 13 and C033 
"Lobbying Capability" 
It was all still done in-house and our people were used immediately after 
9/11 to work on the three issues discussed. However, the actual main 
restructuring was related to the fact that we had to cut costs and make 
our lobbying better. We had to cut all the fat that we had in order to 
streamline the organisations. So this is a process that started, I think that 
we were less effective then other airlines because this process had 
already started mainly after 2001 so it took the last four years or five 
years. It was very much inward looking on how we could improve 
organisation methods, working processes and stuff like that. So we went 
through all this internal restructuring and internal exercise with the help 
of external management consultants. [CO 10] 
TAP maintained a government affairs office, with the intent to restructure in the 
medium term. However in the short term, the human capital resources were 
organised in such a way as to quickly lobby post 9/11. TAP then realised that 
focusing more lobbying effort on their coalition platform (AEA) was the right 
strategy^^. The next part will explore the overlap between lobbying competence 
and human capital investment. 
6 . 8 . 4 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The senior management team within the government affairs office explicitly 
related the development of their lobbying capabilities to a change in their 
lobbying competencies, which was expected to enable them to influence the 
correct targets and communicate the right types of information. They pursued a 
tactic of getting a few good people with EU level knowledge and better networks 
in the medium term. However, in the short terni they used their in-house 
competencies and the competencies from AEA to lobby national and 
international political actors. As one TAP respondent said: 
We had all the expertise we needed for the short term, as we could just 
have meetings with friends or partner airlines to discuss problems etc. 
We just needed better EU level competencies. But this lack of competence 
was substituted by AEA. [CO 11] 
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TAP used AEA to gain different lobbying competencies in lobbying and 
influencing. Supporting them throughout appeared to be the underlying model 
for developing TAP Air's lobbying capability. 
We can see that the lobbying capability development played an important role in 
the exogenous policy context, where TAP had little time to manoeuvre to make 
their interests heard. From the micro level analysis of TAP's government affairs 
office, we found that there were few variables that played a vital role in the 
lobbying capability construction. It was evident that political resources were 
comprised of human, organisational, and network, combined with competence 
resources. These resources and competencies were used to reconfigure their 
lobbying capability development process. More importantly, cognition played a 
role in building this symbiotic relationship between political resources and 
lobbying capability development. TAP's lobby capability had an idiosyncratic 
lobbying routines focus at the start and then it shifted to a generic lobbying 
routines platform to leverage and deploy the political resources to maximise 
influence (see Appendix 25 for TAP Air's overall storyline map cluster in the 
exogenous policy context). 
6 .9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As seen from the empirical findings above, after September 11, the precarious 
position of the airlines was brutally exposed to uncertainty. What followed was a 
massive and painful restructuring of the industry (Harrington et al. 2005). In the 
months after September 11, dozens of airlines in Europe and around the world 
slashed their routes, shed jobs, filed for bankruptcy, where their share prices 
plummeted, and in some cases, ceased to exist altogether. 
Indeed, we have seen that lobbying capability development played an important 
role in this exogenous policy context where the airlines had little time to 
manoeuvre to make their interests heard. Subsequently, we found that there were 
few variables that played a vital role in the lobbying capability construction. It 
was evident that political resources were comprised of human, organisational, 
and network, which were complemented by competence. These resources were 
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used to reconfigure lobbying capability development process. Cognition played a 
role in building this symbiotic relationship between political resources and 
lobbying capability development. The airlines' lobbying capabilities generally 
had an idiosyncratic lobbying routines focus at the start and then shifted to a 
generic lobbying routines platform, in order to leverage and deploy the political 
resources to maximise influence. 
To summarise, there were clear differences and similarities between the cases 
from the European flag carrier airlines. The cases from the state airlines showed: 
1. Great emphasis on generic lobbying routines. 
2. Greater emphasis on changing networks and human capital assets. 
In contrast, the cases from the privately owned airlines showed: 
1. More emphasis on both generic and idiosyncratic lobbying routines. 
2. Greater emphasis on using current networks and human capital assets. 
These differences suggest that ownership structure and policy environment type 
exert a strong influence on the way that capabilities are developed. The next 
chapter discusses why lobbying capabilities are developed differently, including 
cross-case and cross-policy environment analysis. 
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THEORETICAL DISCUSSION: MICRO 
FOUNDATIONS IN LOBBYING 
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
The previous chapter considered the empirical findings from the five case studies 
of European airlines for their lobbying capability development efforts. This 
chapter will now consider how these empirical findings link to the three 
aforementioned research questions: 
> "What" lobbying capabilities does the firm develop to selectively 
leverage and deploy its resources in an exogenous and endogenous policy 
context? 
> "How" and "Why" does a firm develop lobbying capabilities to 
selectively leverage and deploy its resources in an exogenous and 
endogenous policy context? 
This chapter will be chronological. We will theoretically discuss these research 
questions, and the two broad themes of analysis: the policy environment and 
lobbying capability development sources. This chapter will also relate to the 
literature examined previously in Chapters 2 and 3. As evidenced in the previous 
empirical chapters, the use of cognitive blueprints emerged as a significant 
finding in developing a lobbying capability, with the addition of the political 
resources (network, organisational structure, human capital and competence). 
As such, this chapter will provide some propositions and theorise the impact of 
the cognitive blueprints on strategic decision-making processes across the 
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government affairs offices, as well as how they use these blueprints to 
reconfigure political resources to develop their lobbying capability in the 
contrasting policy contexts. From here we will try to explain why this original 
intention has been realised. Finally we will then reconceptualise these findings 
into a broader theoretical framework of archetypes of lobbying capability 
development, and discuss how this overall analysis contributes to a theory of 
building dynamic capability in an organisation. 
7.1 THE APPLICABILITY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The aim of this research was to generate a detailed understanding of how the 
context interacts with lobbying capability development processes while also 
looking at micro level variables.' This thesis focuses on a particular type of 
dynamic capability, lobbying capability, essential for strategic renewal given the 
pace of policy formation, and crucial in terms of the ability to generate and 
sustain an advantage. An organisation's ability to generate and sustain value-
creating lobbying strategies as scientific knowledge evolves is a dynamic 
capability, since it depends on generating and modifying routines for influencing 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002; Bonardi et al. 2007). This research used the 
implementation of lobbying strategies in the contrasting policy contexts as an 
indirect means to understand the micro foundations of the lobbying capability 
development process. These development initiatives are the aspects of the overall 
capability design solution that can be attributed to the government affairs office 
intent to minimise the policy uncertainty in two types of policy contexts. This 
discussion focuses on the key issues in the development of lobbying in different 
policy contexts. This research sought to identify the micro foundations of the 
multiple issues within each policy context. 
The case studies undertaken as part of this research were viewed from two 
contexts. Therefore, the research findings relate only to a sample of two extreme 
' In other words, to understand organisation-level outcomes in lobbying, we need a detailed 
picture of how and why individuals in different organisations interact, and what factors determine 
whether and how their employing organisation creates value from lobbying. 
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contexts. As a result, the findings are not necessarily representative of all airline 
behaviours and further quantitative research is required to confirm the validity of 
the findings. Consequently, the recommendations made in this discussion should 
only be implemented after additional research has been undertaken. However, it 
must be noted that the knowledge gained on lobbying capability development in 
the course of this research suggests that the research findings apply to the vast 
majority of lobbying activities in the non-market environment. It must also be 
noted at this stage of the discussion that the chosen contexts are not typical 
contexts. The reasons for this are discussed later in this section. 
7.2 LOBBYING CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
Dynamic capabilities are rooted in the ability of a business unit to explore and 
exploit to create a competitive advantage (March 1991). We operationalised 
lobbying in two contrasting policy contexts in terms of lobbying development to 
create influence; lobbying that both incrementally builds on the previous 
lobbying, as well as extends through new lobbying process. These developments 
of lobbying processes involve architectural change e.g. lobbying may be targeted 
to different political actors at either national or international level. These 
lobbying streams or paths present substantial organisational challenges since the 
structural, network, and human resources, and competencies required to further 
exploit existing resources, are actively affected by its policy context, owners and 
time. This research explored how a set of business units dealt with the 
contradictory requirements of an endogenous and exogenous policy environment, 
as shown below in Figure 17. 
Figure 17: Business and policy environment interplay 
Policy Environment: 
-Endogenous 
-Exogenous 
Business units: 
Government affairs office 
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This section will analyse how the findings relate to the theory of lobbying 
capability in Chapter 2, Barney's (1991) RBV approach, Teece et al. 's (2000) 
dynamic capability view, and Holbum's (2001) political capability perspective. It 
will initially provide an overall comparison and conclusion about the 
organisation of lobbying capability development within the five cases in 
contrasting policy contexts, and then conceptualise the emergent findings 
through an inductive model of "contextually bounded lobbying capability 
development process". 
Let us recap the three explored theories in lobbying capability development. 
Firstly, fi-om both the RBV and dynamic capabilities view, Sirmon ef al. (2007) 
explain that resource management is the extensive process of structuring the 
firm's resource portfolio, bundling the resources to build capabilities, and 
leveraging and integrating those capabilities with the purpose of creating and 
sustaining value for customers and owners. Structuring the resource portfolio 
involves using processes (i.e. acquiring, accumulating, and divesting) to obtain 
the resources that the firm will use for bundling and leveraging purposes 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Bundling refers to the processes (i.e. stabilising, 
enriching, and pioneering) used to integrate resources to form capabilities. 
Leveraging involves the set of processes (i.e. mobilising, coordinating, and 
deploying) used to exploit capabilities (in our case the lobbying capability) to 
take advantage of specific market and non-market opportunities. Alternatively, 
leveraging can involve defending your position from potential risks that arise 
from both the market and non-market (Kobrin 1978). Thus, through an external 
orientation, the purpose of leveraging is to use capabilities to create solutions for 
current and new customers (Kazanjian et al. 2002) or political actors (Vining et 
a/. 2005). 
From the corporate political activity perspective, studies show that the lobbying 
processes involved in managing resources are affected by the non-market 
environmental context (Bonardi et al. 2007), in our case the policy environment, 
in which the firm operates. Because of exogenous (high) and endogenous (low) 
political environmental types being either uncertain or certain (meaning the 
varying degree of enviroimiental magnanimity) firms develop a series of 
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temporary competitive advantages. Creating a series of temporary advantages 
allows the firm to create new value from all value accumulation (Sirmon et al. 
2007). Thus, effectively and efficiently managing political resources and 
lobbying capabilities within a political environmental context ultimately 
determines the amount of value the firm generates and maintains over time 
(Ireland and Webb 2006). 
This section will examine how the empirical findings from the five case studies 
relate to these three particular theories of lobbying capability. However, firstly 
some consideration needs to be given to the operationalisation of these theories, 
or, more simply, how to identify these theories in action. As identified by the 
RBV theorists (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000), it not sufficient to purely focus on 
decision-making or resource or capabilities as an indicator of capability 
development, as this ignores conflicts, context and micro sources that never enter 
the picture of the strategy process. Hence, on the basis of the core doctrine of 
each specific theory that was considered, lobbying capability development was 
viewed longitudinally and identified through: 
• RBV (Barney 1991): evidence of value creation from resource 
acquisition or development. 
• Dynamic Capability (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Ethiraj et al. 
2005): evidence of routines and process to leverage and deploy 
resources to align with the changing environment, 
• Corporate Political Activity (Holbum 2001; De Figueirdo et al. 
2002): evidence of activities to influence regulators and legislators to 
maintain or defend the competitive position. 
The next part will aim to understand the lobbying capability development 
process in contrasting policy contexts. 
7 .3 LOBBYING AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
If paths are crucial for lobbying capabilifies, how do firms pace lobbying 
development and where is the locus of energy for these contradictory processes 
in different policy contexts? The corporate political activity and dynamic 
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capability literatures are unresolved on these organisational issues. We found 
airlines to be developing their lobbying capability paths to be either exploiting or 
exploring different paths in the two contrasting policy contexts, but not 
simultaneously in the organisational architectures. These lobbying structures are 
composed of highly differentiated networks and humans that are weakly or 
strongly structurally-integrated according to the different policy contexts. The 
energy to drive these lobbying processes forward and the force for strategic 
linkage in these complex architectures stems from the senior team and their 
cognitive blueprints. It is the senior management that try to interpret the different 
policy environment contexts to decide how to develop their lobbying. 
The significance of the environment for managing resources suggests that 
contingency theory logic should be included into our understanding of the RBV. 
Although research of this type has been completed, it has been focused, to date, 
on understanding when a resource is valuable (Priem and Butler 2001). Miller 
and Shamsie (1996), for example, found that property-based resources are more 
valuable in stable environments, whereas knowledge-based resources are more 
valuable in uncertain environments. Brush and Artz (1999) discovered that the 
value of capabilities differs based on the services offered by the firm and the 
level of information asymmetries in the environment. Aragon-Correa and Sharma 
(2003) explain that a firm's competitive context affects the value of its resources 
in developing proactive, natural environment strategies. While these results are 
informative, following dynamic theory's focus on the "fit" between 
environmental contingencies and internal configurations may lead to greater 
understanding of how resources can be managed to optimise value creation, 
because firms do not operate in a vacuum (Keats and Hitt 1988). 
The environmental dynamism concerns the amount of uncertainty emanating 
from the external environment (Baum and Wally 2003). This is also applicable to 
the policy environment in which different levels of certainty and uncertainty co-
exist. Uncertainty in the policy field is created by instability in the political 
environment that produces deficits in the political information needed to identify 
and understand cause and effect relationships (Vining et al. 2005). An 
information deficit affects the way firms must manage resources to create value. 
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For example, policy uncertainty in industry actions affects the type and amount 
of political resources needed in the resource portfolio, the capabilities necessary 
to outperform rivals, and the leveraging strategies required to gain and maintain a 
competitive advantage (Bonardi et al. 2007). Dynamism is reflected by the 
regularity and amount of change occurring in the policy environment. Thus, 
changes in the policy structure and the probability of non-market shocks are 
important elements producing uncertainty in the environment. The next part will 
try to understand the exogenous and endogenous policy environments in 
conjunction with the lobbying capability development process. 
7.3 .1 EXOGENOUS VS ENDOGENOUS POLICY CONTEXT 
Overall this study suggests that political resources, governance features and 
policy environment uncertainty levels can be a strong constraint or facilitator in 
the transferability of micro sources in the development of lobbying capabilities. 
Past research on dynamic capabilities (more broadly RBV) has emphasised the 
constraining effect of organisational history, organisational learning, 
technological trajectories, evolutionary paths created by organisational routines, 
resources or cognition of top managers which tend towards inertia (Teece et al. 
1997; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; Dyerson and Pilkington 2005; Ethiraj et al. 
2005). Our research identified a range of organisational variables that the airlines 
were expectedly seeking to change or not change in the endogenous policy 
(proactive lobbying) context,^ and unexpectedly seeking to change or not change 
in the exogenous policy (reactive lobbying) context,^ as shown in Figure 18. 
Making these changes in both contexts was mainly viewed not as overcoming 
inertia or commitment to an existing path of lobbying capability development, 
but rather as a need for a different realignment of policy management in order to 
reach what several informants termed "the following stage" of the policy making 
process. In other words, not all airlines were purposely seeking to create an 
^ Endogenous policy context as per Brink (2004) is a context where the firm has an expected 
understanding of stakeholders, decisions or actions within a political system. As a result the firm 
lobbies proactively to advance its interests. 
^ An exogenous policy context (post September 11 2001) is the context where the firm is 
unexpectedly confronted by policy decisions, stakeholders or actions within a political system. 
As a result, the firm must react to this policy context. 
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effective 'lobbying capability' from the time when they came across either the 
exogenous and endogenous policy contexts, but rather it was about lobbying to 
reach the next stage of obtaining the "positive decisions from within the political 
system""^. Nevertheless, the decisions were taken by the senior managers in order 
to defend against or create potential policy impacts. 
Figure 18: Cognition and policy environment interplay 
K E Y 
E-POLICY ENVIRONMENT- OLD AND NEW 
e-EMERGENT (SUB-LEVEL) ENVIRONMENT 
Choosing the 
cognitive 
blueprint in 
strategy making 
Context change 
(emerging endogenous or 
exogenous policy 
context) 
Induced lobbying 
strategy 
Choice to use 
internal or/and 
external political 
resources and • 
routines B 
Autonomous 
(emergent) effects 
on the lobbying 
strategy 
As seen in Figure 18, we conceptualised the interplay between the senior 
management's cognition and the policy environment as a type of cycle. The 
systematic order from 1-6 depicts the underlining logic from the cognitive 
blueprint choice to reacting to the emerging policy enviromnent (e), where the 
organisation has to shift from previous policy environment (E) to the new policy 
enviromnent (E). At stage 1, the senior management teams are dealing with the 
day to day activity of a specific policy environment at international and national 
level with a given cognitive blueprint type. At this stage they choose a new 
cognitive blueprint or use an existing one to meet the new emerging policy 
context (stage 1 and 2 are closely linked). At stage 2, the management come 
across an emerging policy context, whether an endogenous or exogenous policy 
Most, senior management were not conscientiously acting to develop their lobbying 
capabilities; however they did develop their lobbying capabilities following their cognitive 
blueprints. 
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type. At stage 3, the senior management introduces a strategy for lobbying, 
where they decide how to deploy, leverage or reconfigure their specific political 
resources to either defend or create political advantage. However, stage 3 ties in 
with stage 4, where the senior management comes across "autonomous" 
(emergent) effects on the lobbying strategy, either due to "time-frame" or 
"ownership" structure, which act as a constraint mechanisms to lobbying 
capability development, causing the path to be pre-determined in some way and 
offering little fiexibility i.e. as found in state-owned airlines. At stage 5, the 
senior management have to decide how to configure their political resource base, 
in order to use generic or idiosyncratic lobbying routines to influence. At stage 
6, they must react to the new dominant policy context (E). 
The findings on lobbying capability development from the five case studies in 
the endogenous and exogenous policy contexts are shown in Tables 27 and 28^. 
The tables below provide an overview of each of the five case studies regarding 
their function and strategic intent to develop their lobbying in the contrasting 
contexts. When we compared the state-owned airlines to privately owned airlines 
in both contexts, we found diverging styles to developing a lobbying capability. 
Moreover, we found that there was a general pattern in place, where state-owned 
airlines were investing less effort into their lobbying capability development in 
both contexts. Similar to Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001), we found that 
organisations reacted similarly and differently to their given environmental 
context. However, we found that state-owned airlines illustrated that they could 
not behave in the same way as privately owned airlines. One answer to this 
difference is that state-owned airlines felt more constraints on resources, which 
affected their lobbying capability development process. Perhaps this difference 
was attributed to the fact that there was no separation of control and ownership, 
which did not align the principle and agent (Williamson 1975; Eisenhardt 
1989b). The interests and incentives were different, which perhaps caused some 
inefficiency on the investment of effort (Rosen 1986; Prenergast 1999). 
' To see the full lobbying capability development process, please look at appendices 16-25. 
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Table 27: Summary of the different characteristics of airUnes in the endogenous 
poHcy context 
K L M Lufthansa Al i tal ia SAS TAP A i r 
Stakeholder Private/State® Private/State' State^ Private/State^ State'" 
t y p e * 
Purpose of the To influence and To influence and To influence and To influence and To influence 
government exchange exchange exchange exchange and exchange 
office in this information with information with information with information with information 
context policy makers policy makers policy makers policy makers with policy 
makers 
Bui ld ing Directive-Bottom- Directive- Non-directive Directive- Non-directive 
approach to up-Proactive Bottom up- Bottom up- Bottom up- Bottom up-
lobbying Proactive Proactive Proactive Proactive 
capability 
development 
Cognitive Mainly Mainly Mainly focusing Mainly Mainly 
blueprints and idiosyncratic idiosyncratic on generic idiosyncratic focusing on 
routine composition then composition then routine composition then generic 
combinations shifting focus to shifting focus to development shifting focus to routine 
generic routine generic routine generic routine development 
development development development 
Organisational Modified early Modified early Modified late Modified early Modifiedlate 
structure (pre-deregulation) (pre- (After second (pre- (After second 
investment deregulation) package) deregulation) package) 
Network Modified early Modified early Modified late Modified early Modified 
investment (pre-deregulation) (pre- (After second (pre- early 
deregulation) package) deregulation) (After first 
-Sequence order package) 
from national to -Sequence order 
-Sequence order -Sequence order 
international from national to from national to from national to -Sequence 
political targets international international international order from 
political targets political targets political targets national to 
international 
political 
targets 
Human capital Modified early Modified early Modified late Modified early Modified 
investment (pre-deregulation) (pre- (After second (pre- early 
deregulation) package) deregulation) (After first 
package) 
Competencies Modified early Modified early Modified late Modified early Modified 
investment (pre-deregulation) (pre- (After second (pre- early 
deregulation) package) deregulation) (After first 
package) 
* "Private" in this thesis refers to the airline having a majority private investor shareholding compared to its 
minor state shareholding. "State" owned airlines here refer to the government having a majority 
shareholding in the company compared to the private shareholding. 
® Less government shareholding, which we refer to it as a privately owned airline 
' Less government shareholding, which we refer to it as a privately owned airline 
^ Majority government shareholders that we refer to as a state-owned airline 
' Less government shareholding, which we refer to it as a privately owned airline 
Majority government shareholders that we refer to as a state-owned airline 
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Table 28: Summary of the different characteristics of airlines in the exogenous 
policy context 
Stakeholder 
type* 
Purpose of the 
government 
office in this 
context 
Bui ld ing 
approach to 
lobbying 
capability 
development 
Cognitive 
blueprints and 
routine 
combinations 
K L M 
State/Private" 
To influence and 
exchange 
information with 
policy makers 
Directive- Top-
down 
Reactive 
Use both generic 
and idiosyncratic 
lobbying routines 
Lufthansa 
State/Private 12 
To influence and 
exchange 
information with 
policy makers 
Directive- Top-
down 
Reactive 
Use both generic 
and idiosyncratic 
lobbying routines 
(Ambidextrous) (Ambidextrous) 
Organisational Modified later 
structure 
investment 
Network 
investment 
Modified later: 
-Sequence order 
from national to 
international 
political targets 
Not 
modified 
Not modified: 
-Sequence order 
fi-om national to 
international 
political targets 
Ali tal ia 
State'^ 
To influence 
and exchange 
information 
with policy 
makers 
Directive- Top-
down 
Reactive 
Use more of 
generic 
lobbying 
routines then 
idiosyncratic 
lobbying 
routines 
Modified early 
SAS 
State/Private'"* 
To influence and 
exchange 
information with 
policy makers 
Directive- Top-
down 
Reactive 
Use more of 
generic lobbying 
routines then 
idiosyncratic 
lobbying routines 
Not 
modified 
Modified early: Not modified: 
-Sequence order 
from national to 
international 
political targets 
-Sequence order 
from national to 
mtemational 
political targets 
TAP A i r 
State'^ 
To influence 
and exchange 
information 
with policy 
makers 
Non-directive 
Bottom up-
Proactive 
Use more of 
generic 
lobbying 
routines then 
idiosyncratic 
lobbying 
routines 
Modified 
early 
Modified 
early: 
-Sequence 
order from 
national to 
intemadonal 
political targets 
Human capital 
investment 
Competencies 
investment 
Modified later 
In-house 
competence not 
modified. 
However, 
modified 
competence by 
shifting focus to 
AEA 
Not modified 
In-house 
competence not 
modified. 
However, 
modified 
competence by 
shifting focus to 
AEA 
Modified early Modified early Modified early 
Modified early-
In-house 
competence 
modified and 
AEA 
competence 
introduced 
In-house 
competence not 
modified. 
However, 
modified 
competence by 
shifting focus to 
AEA 
Modified 
early-
In-house 
competence 
modified and 
AEA 
competence 
introduced 
* "Private" in this thesis refers to the airline having a majority private investor shareholding compared to its 
minor state shareholding. "State" owned airlines here refer to the government having a majority 
shareholding in the company compared to the private shareholding. 
" Less government shareholding, which we refer to it as a privately owned airline 
Less government shareholding, which we refer to it as a privately owned airline 
Majority government shareholders that we refer to as a state-owned airline 
Less government shareholding, which we refer to it as a privately owned airline 
Majority government shareholders that we refer to as a state-owned airline 
- 2 8 6 -
"Lobbying Capability" 
From the cross-case analysis shown in the tables above, we found the five case 
airlines to be lobbying differently in both exogenous and endogenous contexts.'® 
In the exogenous policy context, we found both state-owned airlines and 
privately owned airlines to have been mainly lobbying their national 
governments 6om the onset of the context then shifting their attention to EU 
level. However private airlines were using simultaneously individual influence at 
the European Commission and European Parliament level (for a longer time) 
unlike state owned airlines that opted for AEA (association lobbying). 
Nonetheless, all the airlines shifted their efforts to interest group representation 
to lobby for three main policy issues in the months after 9/11.'^ As shown in 
Figure 19, in general senior management teams in government affairs offices 
developed their lobbying capability by shifting the focus from the national level 
to the international EU level, as time played a vital role in their decision making. 
There was a crossover between lobbying between the national targets and 
international targets, as airlines started to talk to their own governments first, but 
then realised that AEA was the fastest route to influencing EU actors. 
In this context all five airlines were not found to be lobbying the United States at any time for 
any of the three policy issues, as it was viewed to be the less effective route according to 
organisational "sense-making process". 
The first policy stimulus, the insurance coverage issue, was related to the insurance industry 
not wanting to insure airlines due to a high potential risk exposure. Secondly, the security cost 
policy stimuli that asked airlines to make flights safer for its passengers by adding air marshals, 
introducing reinforced cockpit doors, screening of catering staff and employee check-ups. And 
finally, the compensation package stimuli, where airlines wanted European governments or the 
European Commission to compensate them for their loss in revenues caused by the grounding of 
their fleets in the US immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
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Figure 19: Discrete sub-emergent policy fields around the exogenous policy 
context 
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Our cross-case analysis of the five airlines in the endogenous policy context 
showed divergent results in the lobbying capability development process 
between state and privately owned airlines, as shown below in Figure 20. 
State/government airlines and privately owned airline were mainly lobbying their 
national governments at the start of this context. However private airlines soon 
started using individual influence at the European Commission, European 
Parliament, and European Council levels. Moreover, the private owned airlines 
when compared to state airlines, started earlier in developing their lobbying 
capabilities. 
Figure 20: Discrete sub-emergent policy fields around the endogenous policy 
context 
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The senior management teams from the state owned airlines developed their 
lobbying capabilities by shifting the focus from the national level targets to the 
international EU level targets. However, they opted for using coalition lobbying 
(e.g. AEA) more then individual lobbying. This happened because senior 
management at these airlines were limited in their political resources and so felt 
consfrained to lobby like private owned airlines. 
7.4 TYPES OF LOBBYING CAPABILITIES, POLITICAL RESOURCES AND POLICY 
RESPONSIVENESS 
Earlier we defined a lobbying capability as a collection of organisational routines 
and processes that enable senior representatives or representatives acting on 
behalf of the firm to influence policy-making in a political environment. These 
routines are always used by senior management in different sequences and 
combinations (Dahan 2005). In their study, Hochberg et al. (2007) looked at 
lobbying routines but more from the investors; and executives' behaviour side to 
explore how they finally affected the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
mainly using a letter writing routine. Their study does well in using probit 
regressions to understand outcome, using the opinions of the letter writers, 
however their study still fails to capture all the lobbying routines. Similarly, King 
and O'Keefe (1986) examine the relationship between corporate lobbying and the 
trading activities of corporate insiders surrounding proposed accounting 
standards that require to expense oil expenditures with dry holes, but they too fail 
to capture all the lobbying routines. Therefore, from the two contrasting event 
windows (exogenous versus endogenous) which we employed to understand the 
development of a lobbying processes, our research findings indicate that 
lobbying capabilities could be further categorised as being idiosyncratic and 
generic in nature (see Figure 21) by assessing the routines that were used for 
policy issues in an exogenous and endogenous policy context. These heuristics 
emerged from the data after examining the specific actions of government affairs 
executives and their departments in conjunction with what occurred before, 
during, and after both policy contexts. 
-289-
"Lobbying Capability" 
Figure 21: Lobbying routines used in exogenous and endogenous policy 
contexts 
Idiosyncratic Routines 
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The idiosyncratic routines and generic routines were used to leverage and deploy 
three political resource types, which are shown in Table 22. We conceptualised 
the routines as "idiosyncratic" and "generic". The "idiosyncratic" level 
represents the routines that are bundled in a way that is particular to the firm 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). The "generic" level represents the bundle of 
routines that can be easily accessed by other firms' thus reducing or creating 
value (Winter 2003). Research shows that firms must strive to create 
idiosyncratic resources to create more value and high rents (Wemerfelt 1984; 
Barney 1991). However current research (both didactic RBV and CPA works) 
fail to look at idiosyncratic and generic lobbying routine combination types in 
different policy contexts. They also fail to capture what executives believe to be 
important combination and sequences. Finally, these scholars don't conceptualise 
political resources or explain how these resources can be used as inputs to 
develop lobbying capabilities. 
On the other hand, Barney's (1991) conceptualisation for resources was divided 
into physical, human and organisational. This was helpful in our analysis to 
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define the boundaries of political resources but our analysis indicated more 
specifically that political resources used in both the exogenous context and the 
endogenous policy context were comprised of mainly human resources, 
organisational resources and network resources. However, as depicted in the 
literature review, physical resources were apparently not a component of the 
political resource. We found 'network' resources to be an important core 
component, which was the often repeated word amongst the informers. The 
network resource was crucial to developing a lobbying capability in the 
contrasting contexts. Therefore, from the interviews, we conceptualised political 
resources as being comprised of mainly three sub-divisions, human and 
organisational (Barney 1991), and the additional network resources (Granovetter 
1973). Indeed, the deployment, leveraging or integration of the political 
resources was viewed by senior management to be important in creating value in 
the non-market environment by changing it, i.e. during the deregulation period, 
or to defend their position from non-market environment change i.e. post 9/11 
policy issues. 
Table 22: Political resources leveraged 
Political capital resource Observations 
Human Knowledge, training, intelligence, insight 
and experience obtained in areas such as 
law, economics, politics and management 
Network These networks include formal (e.g. being a 
member of an association or committee) 
and informal (e.g. friends and 
acquaintances within the political system) 
networks, as well as relations among groups 
within a firm and those in the non-market 
environment. 
Organisational structure The formal organisational structure of the 
department, its planning and coordinating 
systems. 
From the case studies, the respondents explained how the human, organisational 
structure (departmental re-structuring) and network resources were used to 
We have attempted to conceptualise the key sources that help in developing a lobbying 
capability. Similar to Dahan (2005), we contend that the existing typologies are too simplistic and 
incomplete but in Chapter 8 we will offer some thoughts on the limitations. 
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develop their lobbying capabilities in the two contrasting contexts. The three sub-
level political resources were used to create both idiosyncratic and generic 
routines. Moreover, we found a combination of idiosyncratic and generic 
routines that were used by different airlines to leverage and deploy political 
resources in the contrasting policy contexts. 
In the endogenous policy context, according to the respondents, the combination 
of routines and its concentration level was inclined towards idiosyncratic routines 
for deploying and leveraging their resources with regards to creating influence, 
as shown in Figure 22 (a general pattern). We came to learn that the privately 
owned airlines used AEA minimally to lobby in this period because they had lots 
more time to manoeuvre and influence. Subsequently, it was believed that the 
private airlines wanted to leverage their individual relationships more to enhance 
their competitive positions. On the other hand, the state-owned airlines were less 
inclined to lobby using idiosyncratic and generic routines due to their complacent 
positions. These differences might be attributed to poor management and lack of 
political resources. 
Figure 22: Lobbying concentration levels in an endogenous context 
Generic 
Routines 
Idiosyncratic 
Routines 
From the case studies in the exogenous policy context, we found an interesting 
combination of idiosyncratic and generic routines that were utilised by different 
airlines to deploy and leverage their political resources. Moreover, there was a 
slightly different utilisation pattern found between state and privately owned 
airlines in this context. Nevertheless, the two general patterns found were 
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combinations of routines with the concentration level inclined towards the 
generic routines for leveraging and deploying their resources in order to create 
some influence, as shown in Figure 23. This was more the case in state-owned 
airlines then privately owned airlines post 9/11, from the start. Yet according to 
the respondents, the pattern was fairly similar after a few months for both state 
and private airlines (apart from Lufthansa, who believed they used a more 
balanced routine combination). Nevertheless, the shift to the generic lobbying 
routines occurred because airlines believed that they had less time to manoeuvre 
and everyone had common interests on the three issues. The decision to leverage 
AEA's relationships was more to defend their competitive positions (see 
Appendix 9 for an example of lobbying letters sent by AEA). 
Figure 23: Lobbying concentration levels in an exogenous context 
Generic 
Routines Idiosyncratic 
Routines 
We found political resources to be leveraged and deployed using generic routines 
(e.g. AEA and conferences) and idiosyncratic direct lobbying pro cesses/routines 
(e.g. sending emails, formal letters, talking to friends and face to face meetings). 
To be more specific, at a micro level, idiosyncratic or generic lobbying 
capabilities were used by senior management to create influence, as shown in 
Figure 24. Our "lobbying capability development framework", illustrates the 
micro foundations in the lobbying capability development process. This chapter 
will look at each micro source more carefiilly. 
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Figure 24: Framework for Lobbying Capability Development and Leveraging 
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Respectively, Figure 24 shows how the different levels of efforts (+/-) are needed 
on the different lobbying components to create influence. Moreover, 
organisations were either making positive investment or no/little investments at 
all (+/-) in developing lobbying. The effort here is about "management 
attention" given to specific lobbying routines and political resources to meet the 
strategic intent of the organisation (Bouquet 2005). Indeed, this management 
attention, as shown in the findings, came from the cumulative learning processes, 
particularly localised leaming-by-doing to make sense of the policy environment 
to reconfigure departmental structure, non-market competency, human capital 
and network relationships. This played a prominent role in developing lobbying 
process as a strategic capability (this will be further explored in this section). The 
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following propositions summarise the nature of actions generated in developing 
lobbying capabilities to leverage and deploy political resources: 
Proposition la. Firms rely more on developing idiosyncratic lobbying 
capabilities then developing generic lobbying capabilities in an endogenous 
policy context. 
Proposition lb. Firms rely more on developing generic lobbying capabilities 
then developing idiosyncratic lobbying capabilities in an exogenous policy 
context. 
7 .5 COGNITIVE BLUEPRINT AND MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN DEVELOPING 
THE LOBBYING PROCESSES IN CONTRASTING POLICY CONTEXTS 
A central contribution to dynamic capability literature lies in articulating the 
casual mechanisms by which firms leam to develop capabilities, in our case the 
lobbying capability. At the core foundations of the lobbying capability 
development process was the cognitive blueprint (Child 1972; Weick 1979). It 
played an important part in developing the content of the lobbying processes. 
Drawing on framing theory in the social movements literature (Benford and 
Snow 2000), we suggest that shifts in lobbying opportunities or lobbying defense 
routines are generated by the emergence of the policy environments. Individuals 
(in-house lobbying experts) or coalition groups (AEA) propose changes in micro-
level investment patterns based on a specific interpretation of the policy 
environment in order to develop the lobbying capabilities. These 'efforts' or 
'management attentions' can be seen as 'cognitive blueprints' in the given 
context in order for the organisation to defend its competitive position or create 
advantage (Levy et al. 2007). 
Looking at capability development in this way opens up the possibility for 
examining cognition as "blueprints", where cognition is individually created or 
collective, in that it is the product of interactions among people (Lave 1988; Lave 
and Wenger 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992; Orlikowski and Gash 1994). 
Moreover, our research suggests that learning by "doing" is one part of the 
process in order to make sense of the context and create "blueprints" (Thomas et 
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al. 1993; Chang, 1995; Anand and Khanna, 2000). Prior literature shows that 
leaders and managers often possess attributes that make them better at making 
decisions as they "go along" rather than beforehand through planning (Thomas et 
al. 1993; Chang 1995; Allinson et al. 2000). Likewise, the fast pace and 
situations that need actors to be reactive or proactive makes many lobbying 
routines and processes less valuable when one has to plan far in advance. Some 
research contends that executives are better served to leam processes through 
systematic observation of outcomes instead of through pre-planned materials that 
may be outdated or obsolete for the current situation (Bird 1988). In this way, our 
data suggests that in both endogenous and exogenous policy contexts, the 
composition of lobbying capabilities begins to form before there is any "doing" 
at all, where senior managers have to create their first blueprint or use their 
existing blueprint. As one executive informant put it: 
We learn by doing, in order to make our thinking clear. I am always 
learning at home in new events. In fact post 9/11, we built our decision 
making map first before doing things. I would start to think about the 
issues on the plate, and then I refer to my library. [AOOIJ 
Rather than jumping in and figuring out the path, directors of government affairs 
intentionally created new "cognitive blueprints" or just "used existing blueprints" 
to charmel and guide learning during early experience to develop their lobbying. 
Yet intriguingly, while prior research suggests that cognitive blueprints are 
usually vague mental models of the world, derived from prior experience 
(Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; Helfat and Lieberman 2002) and beneficial to 
learning when they are correct (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Gavetti and Levinthal 
2000), data from this study reveals a different pattern. Cognitive blueprints are 
clear and not frizzy. They take the form of specific heuristics for choosing 
opportunities or threats, evaluating them, making sense of them and a few 
heuristics for executing them. Data also shows that cognitive blueprints originate 
not only from past experience but from executive mental planning for the future. 
They can also be collectively generated by using interest groups or other types of 
coalitions. In addition, our data reveals that blueprints need not be correct, as 
they are a construction by an individual who learned from their previous 
experience and foresight. 
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As the European flag carrier airlines, and more specifically managers in their 
government affairs departments, entered the two contrasting policy contexts, they 
often found their views challenged, prompting them to seek and test alternative 
approaches to organising and developing their lobbying capability within these 
emerging contexts. At the process level, the actions taken by these airlines were 
reflective of lobbying capability development via leaming-by-doing instead of 
trial-and-error learning. Trial-and-error learning refers to changes to firm 
behaviour because of insights obtained from exposure to situations that refine 
existing knowledge bases or reduce variation in activity (Argote 1999). However, 
in this case it was viewed to be very risky to use trial-and-error learning to 
develop their lobbying capability, as they did not get too many chances. 
The way in which top management decision-making was shaped played a very 
important role in developing the architecture for lobbying processes. Figure 25 
shows the main ways in which the cognitive blueprints interacted with the sub-
level political resources in order to develop the lobbying capability. 
Figure 25: Architectural cognitive blueprint and lobbying development 
framework 
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We can see from Figure 25 that the cognitive blueprints took the form of a few 
boundary rules to integrate, leverage and reconfigure political resources to first 
develop lobbying and then use the capability to leverage and deploy political 
resources to maximise influence. These "blueprints" took the form of: 
• A few 'boundaries rules', defined as heuristics, about which threats and 
opportunities to monitor. 
••• A few 'how to organise rules', defined as heuristics, for capturing target 
opportunities. 
o How to organise rules included: 
• How to contact and in what sequence within the network. 
• How to structure the department. 
• How to hire or use current people. 
Indeed the senior management used these cognitive "boundary rules" and "how 
to organise rules" to use the micro-level sources, organisational structure, 
networks, human capital resources and competence investments to develop their 
lobbying capabilities, with the addition of "time" and "ownership". A Director 
that we interviewed suggested that: 
The ownership plays a big role in deciding how to lobby. In our case 
because we are a government-owned company, we don't have to lobby 
the same ways as British Airways or SAS. We have to speak directly to 
the government. It's very effective to have government sitting in your 
company. [C009] 
While another respondent explained the rationale in more detail: 
Having being owned by different shareholders puts a lot of pressure on 
different aspects of your management. After September II, things had to 
change. The budget for lobbying had to slightly change and we had to 
change our formation and thinking slightly. In fact our lobbying became 
more efficient as a result. I think September II made most airline 
departments more efficient including our institutional relations 
department. We had to focus more on developing our strengths in order 
to meet the investing stakeholders. We had to hire new people that had 
the right networks and expertise. {DO17] 
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The RBV literature has neglected to look at the effects of ownership on 
capability development and cognition. In both policy contexts, we found that the 
capability development process was either supported or constrained by its 
ownership structure. In the endogenous policy context, we found that the 
privately owned airlines had a more sophisticated lobbying development process, 
and relied less on lobbying only their own government. According to the 
respondents this was the case, as the government empowered the airline to make 
the most efficient decisions. Therefore, the private airline government affairs 
offices were lobbying using more combinations of generic and idiosyncratic 
routines. On the other hand, the state airlines felt that they were constrained by 
their ownership composition, as they did not have to go far to lobby. As a result, 
the lobbying cognition at the state airlines was not as inertial (as previously 
shown by Gilbert 2005), as there were some core rigidities (Leonard-Barton 
1992). Similarly, we find the same pattern in the exogenous policy context, 
where senior management (fi-om government affairs offices) within state-owned 
airlines felt again constrained by being owned by their government, as they had 
less dexterity in the lobbying capability development process. 
With ownership in mind, the respondents in the state-owned airlines felt that 
their access and networks to political actors was limited to their own country, 
while respondents fi-om the privately owned airlines explained that they were 
better prepared due to ownership structure allowing them to have a good 
accumulation of political resources, which then allowed them to form better 
networks and access. 
At the centre, the cognitive blueprint decides the target and sequence of networks 
to lobby at both national and international level; the level of investment in 
structural reconfiguration and the hiring of specific people with competence. Yet 
how is this cognitive blueprint created? We found, the cognitive blueprint is not 
incrementally created but in a "fiux",'^ based on mental blueprints fi-om previous 
experience, current learning and foresight. So in what direction did this 
knowledge flow to develop the blueprint and lobbying process? To answer this 
' As used by one of the interviewees (AOOl). 
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question we will have look at both the contexts in more detail. Therefore in the 
exogenous policy context, 2001-2005, the lobbying was conducted more at an 
international level then at a national level, as shown in Figure 26. Moreover, with 
the temporal context being short, the decisions started at mainly the CEO level in 
most airlines, where the information on strategy was disseminated to the 
government affairs office ("top down flow"). 
Figure 26: General decision-making process in the exogenous policy context 
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Conversely, we found that during the endogenous policy context (1988-1997), 
the lobbying was conducted more at a national level then at an international 
level, as shown in Figure 27. One reason for this could be attributed to the fact 
that the power had not shifted from national governments to the European Union. 
Nevertheless, the cognitive blueprint from private airlines still encapsulated the 
EU level lobbying targets. Furthermore with the temporal context being longer 
due to the packages format, the decisions started mainly in the government 
affairs office then shifted upwards (bottom-up flow), where the information on 
strategy was disseminated to the government affairs office. 
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Figure 27: General decision making process in the endogenous policy context 
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In general, from both contexts, we found that rather than jumping in and using a 
laissez-faire path in creating strategy, directors of government affairs used their 
cognitive blueprints from previous experience and learning to channel and fuel 
their decisions on the lobbying process. The way in which executives and top 
management think plays a very important role in developing the architecture for 
lobbying processes. Therefore we can see that cognitive blueprints played a vital 
role in defining competence, networks, structure, and human resources but we 
also found the ownership acted as a "core rigidity" (Leonard-Barton 1992; 
Gilbert 2005). Further, there seems to be an ownership effect in the development 
process which has not previously been explained in the RBV literature. 
According to Piaget, in individual cognition assimilation, or absorption, not 
shifts the knowledge absorbed, but can in the process of assimilation shift the 
mental schemas employed in assimilation. This entails seeing e.g. new policy 
issues or seeing and interpreting policy uncertainty degrees. Figure 28 shows the 
yields and the source of invention in the cognitive blueprint with the marked 
balls being examples of combinations of "thought patterns" of an individual 
senior manager's cognitive blueprint. According to Piaget (1970, 1974; see also 
Flavell 1967; George and Zheng 2004) the process of assimilation contributes to 
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the change of mental structure (called 'blueprint') in the following steps, witli 
increasing deviation from previous knowledge structures. As seen in Figure 28 
(which illustrates our findings), in phase one and two, heuristics (following 
boundary and organising rules) schema's are confirmed and stabilised in repeated 
application. Nooteboom (2000) proposed that this may yield a general "logic of 
discovery", applicable also to organisational learning, as a source of variation 
that is guided by selection. Depending on how competence-destroying a policy 
environment is, the director of government affairs has to escape from the grip of 
the existing selection policy environment by configuring his political resources to 
develop his lobbying capability to meet the lobbying environment needs. It is 
only when the existing dominant "blueprints" are subjected to new challenges, 
threatening survival that one is willing to make the sacrifices of modifying or 
replacing proven and efficient blueprints (Kaplan 2005). 
Figure 28: Breaking the lobbying of a senior manager's cognitive blueprint* 
Ownership Time 
Cognitive Blueprints 
Heuristics-boundary and organising rules-
past experience, current learning and foresight 
Policy Uncertainty degree 
(Phase 1) o o © 
o o o 
Q O O 
(Phase 2) 
Network 
capital 
actions 
o o o 
O 0 O 
O 0 o 
Structural 
capital 
actions 
o o o 
o ® o 
o @ o 
Lobbying 
competence 
actions 
o o @ 
o @ o 
o @ o 
Human 
capital action 
® o o 
# @ o 
o o # 
* The patterns depict an example of a blueprint composition in lobbying 
development. 
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The following propositions summarise the nature of actions generated through 
senior management cognitive processes to leverage specific resources in 
developing a lobbying capability: 
Proposition 2a. In both endogenous and exogenous policy contexts, lobbying 
capability development is started by the senior management cognitive blueprint, 
causing them to reconfigure organizational structure, networks, human 
resources and lobbying competencies to develop lobbying. 
Proposition 2b. In both endogenous and exogenous policy contexts, ownership 
played a role in the senior management's choice of cognitive blueprint, which 
manifested itself in the decision of which stakeholders to engage with in order to 
influence the policy process. 
Proposition 2c. In both endogenous and exogenous policy contexts, time played a 
role in the senior management's choice of cognitive blueprint, which manifested 
itself in the decision of which stakeholders and resources to engage with in order 
to influence the policy process. 
7.5.1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE MODIFICATIONS IN THE LOBBYING 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN CONTRASTING POLICY CONTEXTS 
A number of RBV writers have pointed out the importance of an organisation's 
structure with regard to capabilities and the relationship between them and its 
environment (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Winter 
2003)/° Bearing in mind the relationship between organisational structure and 
environment, scholars like Bums and Stalker (1961) have concluded that if an 
organisation is to achieve enhanced performance then its structure must fit with 
or match the rate of change in its environment. Pascale et al. (2000, p. 197) 
explain that "design is the invisible hand that brings organisations to life and life 
to organisations". Moreover, organisational structure and design choice are 
closely entwined (Mabey, Salaman and Storey 2001) with many aspects of 
human resource management. Thus departmental structure has a key role in the 
Mullins (1993) and Mabey, Salaman and Storey (2001) describe the structure of an 
organisation as the pattern of relationships between roles in an organisation and its different parts. 
They see the purpose of this structure as serving to allocate work and responsibilities in order to 
direct activities and achieve the organisation's goals. Structure enables managers to plan, direct, 
organise and control the activities of the organisation (Mullins, 1993, Mabey, Salaman and 
Storey 2001). Here is a traditional view of organisational design that uses principles derived from 
classical and scientific management. 
-303-
'Lobbying Capability" 
all important human dimensions (networking to competence) of an organisation, 
and more importantly in lobbying. However, we found that most RBV and 
corporate political activity researchers have some short comings as they are 
disregarding the policy environment and its affect on lobbying and structure. We 
found from our data some interesting interactions in the lobbying capability 
development process and the contrasting policy contexts. 
In both policy contexts, one of the ways through which the lobbying capability 
was developed, found in all the five organisations, was by "adapting the lobbying 
capability of the firm". We use the term "adapting" because it was used by 
several of our informants and adequately reflects the notion. Informants 
expressed that they were working towards bringing lobbying process to "the 
following stage" in both policy contexts. The "following stage" refers to a good 
outcome that either defends their organisation's position or creates an advantage. 
In both the exogenous policy context (i.e. lobbying for insurance coverage issues, 
security cost issues and compensations package issues) and endogenous policy 
context (i.e. lobbying for route licenses, state aid and prices), different 
organisations focused on different aspects of management and structural 
organising in order to develop their lobbying processes to influence political 
actors. The general pattern of adaptation, more specifically the department's re-
structuring, varied between the two contexts. Consequently, we found that this 
variation in adaptation was a result of the different cognition blueprints that were 
affected by the different flag carrier's ownership compositions (private versus 
state) and the context type. As a result, the senior management steered the pace 
of restructuring in which political resources were leveraged and deployed to 
develop their lobbying capability. 
In the endogenous poUcy context (1985-1997), we found that in privately owned 
airlines, the senior government affairs managers were developing their lobbying 
capability with care, planning and precision. In these types of environments firms 
have more time to be more proactive and effective (Sharma and Vredenburg 
1998). Pre-deregulation (1985-1988), the government affairs offices were 
learning to deal with the potential impact of deregulation, therefore they 
structured themselves to influence more effectively and bring in new talent. Their 
lobbying development was associated with greater levels of interaction with the 
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top management teams from other functions in the organisation. They changed 
their department's structure before and during deregulation in order to facilitate 
European level political access with additional focus on their national 
governments. Conversely, the state-owned airlines, pre-deregulation (1985-
1988), had a very different approach to developing their capability. They tended 
to be very small government affairs offices, so they interacted less with other 
departments. With the nature of lobbying changing after 1997, the government 
affairs offices realised that they had to change by bringing in new talent with EU 
level knowledge and networks. Both types of airlines were structured similarly 
with regards to using their association group (AEA). However, both airlines were 
seen to be using less of AEA to influence target actors, preferring individual 
lobbying strategies. 
In the exogenous policy context (2001-2005), we found that developing a 
lobbying capability was associated with greater level of transference of 
responsibility for strategic decision-making to interest group representation 
where there was more of an attempt for "joint problem solving". Post 9/11 (in the 
short term, or first few weeks), private airlines focused on developing both their 
generic and idiosyncratic lobbying routines in order to be more ambidextrous. 
For the privately owned airlines, the department's structure did not change much, 
as they believed that they had the right structure. However, post 9/11 was 
different for government-owned airlines when it came to developing a lobbying 
arm. Their lobbying activities in this challenging policy context changed, often 
leading to structural reorganisation and formal redefinitions of the 
responsibilities in the office as well as substructures with the government affairs 
office. Moreover, government-owned airlines were less ambidextrous with 
lobbying development, shifting their efforts to their generic platforms, instead of 
using their idiosyncratic lobbying routines. This was the case, as the senior 
management felt constrained by their structure and lack of political resources. 
Nevertheless, both airlines were seen to be using more of the AEA to influence 
high status political target actors, as compared to individual lobbying strategies. 
From looking at the contrasting policy contexts, we can see that findings confirm 
an extant view of lobbying capabilities as constrained by the structural 
organisation of firms (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). At the same time it 
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disconfirms existing views that organisational structures tend to be static and to 
impede the development of a firm's dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997). Our 
investigation suggested that organisational structure was used to reconfigure the 
lobbing capabilities, political resources and lobbying competencies that a firm 
used to exert influence in the non-market place, especially in the endogenous 
policy context (as compared to the exogenous context), as shown in Figure 29. In 
this figure we see how both airline types (private and government), and their 
senior management team (using cognitive blueprints) were either making 
positive investment in structure (which included human resources structure) or 
no/little investments at all these structures (+/-). 
Figure 29: Micro Foundations of lobbying capability development 
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As shown in the diagram above, there were some interaction effects between 
organisational structure and human resources/networks. The extant literature has 
postulated some important determinants for a firm's dynamic capabilities, with 
emphasis on its external environment and organisational structure, which are 
emphasised by the resource-based theorising (Spanos and Prastacos 2004). 
However, these studies have failed to understand the micro-level dynamics and 
the development of specific capabilities in conjunction with specific 
environments, in our case the lobbying capability and the policy environment. As 
such, we found that structure mainly changed through "either people being taken 
out or brought in" or "using AEA to lobby", in order to develop a lobbying 
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capability to increase efficiency for potentially emerging policy issues. Indeed, 
each policy had a degree of uncertainty associated with it. Therefore we found in 
each policy context, that there was a sort of push or pull effect on development 
process for each of the different European airlines. The following propositions 
summarise the nature of structural modification actions generated through senior 
management teams to develop a lobbying capability in the contrasting policy 
contexts and airline types: 
Proposition 3a. In an endogenous policy context, private airlines radically 
modified their government affairs department structure to develop idiosyncratic 
lobbying routines at the start, with minimal shifting to the generic lobbying 
routines. (Non-Ambidextrous) 
Proposition 3b. In an endogenous policy context, state airlines incrementally 
modified their government affairs department structure to develop more 
idiosyncratic lobbying routines at the start, but then shifting to the generic 
lobbying routines. (Non-Ambidextrous) 
Proposition 3c. In an exogenous policy context, private airlines modified no 
government affairs department structure to develop a more ambidextrous 
platform by using both idiosyncratic routines and generic routines. 
(Ambidextrous) 
Proposition 3d. In an exogenous policy context, state airlines radically modified 
their government affairs department structure to focus less effort on their 
idiosyncratic routines and shift more effort to their generic routines. (Non-
Ambidextrous) 
7.5.2 NETWORK RELATIONSHIP RESOURCE INVESTMENTS IN LOBBYING 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES IN CONTRASTING POLICY CONTEXTS 
As previously explained in Chapter 2, the network perspective has been used in 
the field of organisational studies for decades, and in recent years it has become 
increasingly popular as a way of analysing the internal and external workings of 
the firm (Nohria and Eccles 1992). It has recently been seen through the focal 
lens of the RBV to understand the dynamics of competitive advantage 
(Birkinshaw and Hagstrom 2001). As an extension of the resource-based view, 
the relational view maintains that competitive advantage derives not solely from 
firm-level resources but also from difficult-to-imitate capabilities embedded in 
dyadic and network relationships (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Dyer and Singh 
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1998)?' In our research, we found networks to be an important variable to aid the 
lobbying capability development process, as lobbying involves influencing 
specific targets in a given network. 
We found the development of networks entailed the development of new 
lobbying competencies which also helped the re-configuring of the lobbying 
capability in our contrasting policy contexts. Cast in diverse styles of argument 
(Granovetter 1973; Coleman 1990; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Finkelstein et al. 
2006), network capital has become a ubiquitous metaphor in the study of 
organisations. The compelling metaphor embodied in the notion of networks is 
implicitly or explicitly present in various research streams that focus on how 
relationship ties enhance actors' ability to attain their goals. This research 
identifies two main ways in which networks with political actors can help 
organisational performance. First, networks between the airlines and specific 
political actors can facilitate access to information, resources, and opportunities 
(Campbell et al. 1986 and Podolny 1997 and 2001). Thus, actors with networks 
rich in network capital (sometimes used interchangeably with social capital) have 
privileged access to resources and information, and this should make them better 
at leading, organising, and mobilising other actors towards goals. 
Research in networks has focused on the value of relationships as conductors of 
information and channels to access resources or social support (Lin, Ensel and 
Vaughn 1981). Consistent with the emphasis on relationships, this research has 
found the strength of the ties between political actors and the top management 
team within the government affairs office to be very important in facilitating 
access to the appropriate information and resources. We found two main ways in 
which the structure of the network surrounding a given top management team 
can confer advantage on the firm: by facilitating access to information-resources, 
and opportunities, and by helping overcome dilemmas of collective action (Burt 
1997). 
Previously explained in this thesis, much to the exasperation of anyone trying to research it, there are 
many possible approaches to defining network relationships. In this thesis we contest and define networks as 
having an emphasis on the role of relationships (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Networks arc available to all 
members of an organisation indiscriminately depending on how much effort you give to building them 
(Woolcock 2001). 
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In both the exogenous policy context (i.e. lobbying for insurance coverage, 
security costs and compensations package issues) and endogenous policy context 
(i.e. lobbying for route licenses, state aid and prices), different organisations 
focused on different aspects of network management and organisation in order to 
develop their lobbying processes to influence political actors. The general pattern 
of network adaptation, more specifically the government affairs departments' 
network adaption strategy varied between the two contexts. Consequently, we 
found that this variation in adaptation was a result of the different cognitive 
blueprints that were affected by the different flag carriers' ownership 
compositions (private versus state) and the context type. As a result, the senior 
management navigated their choice of network configuration in which political 
resources were leveraged and deployed to develop their lobbying capability. 
Looking closely at the endogenous policy context, and more importantly at 
privately owned airlines, we found that the senior managers and executives in the 
government affairs departments were developing their lobbying capability very 
differently to state-owned airlines. According to our research, pre-deregulation 
(1985-1988), the government affairs offices were learning to deal with the 
potential impact of deregulation, where they had ample time to react in a manner 
that would benefit them, using different lobbying routines and resources to lobby 
people. Therefore they started widening their network base with intention and 
sometimes organically. Moreover, the senior executives explained that they 
wanted to develop their network base with the idea of developing their lobbying 
portfolio of contacts. The privately-owned airlines changed their contact base 
before and during deregulation in order to facilitate information exchange with 
political actors and regulators. During the deregulation context, they started to 
focus on leveraging their investments into network development for packages 
two and three (1988-1997). After the deregulation period the network base 
remained static with the government affairs offices just focusing on their own 
personal agendas i.e. route development etc. 
On the other hand, state-owned airlines developed their lobbying differently to 
privately owned airlines. More importantly we found that their senior 
management in the government affairs units developing their lobbying 
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capabilities put little effort or intent in developing the process. As such, pre-
deregulation (1985-1988), the directors/senior management had a very different 
approach to developing their capability when compared to the privately owned 
airlines. The state-owned airlines tended to have very small government affairs 
offices and their focus in lobbying was limited to their national governments. 
According to our research, in the pre-deregulation period, the government affairs 
offices were aware that they had ample time to react and lobby individually to 
advocate their interests (for the first package). However, they were reluctant to 
see any type of manifesto related to deregulation. This was because the state-
owned airlines were comfortable in their monopoly positions. From here we 
found that the directors were reluctant to change their lobbying routines and 
political resources, and they felt lobbying their national political actor was 
sufficient to be heard. They went on to explain that they did not want to widen 
their network base as they believed lobbying through their ownership structure 
was enough. However, they did use AEA to advocate their interests, as they felt 
this had to be happening. However, during the deregulation context, they started 
to invest in EU network development for the third package (1992-1997). They 
did this because they realised that they ''had to be heard because the power was 
moving to Brussels"?^ After the deregulation period the network base remained 
static with the government affairs offices just focusing on their own personal 
agendas i.e. route development etc. With the nature of lobbying changing after 
1997, both state- and privately owned airlines (more specifically the directors of 
government affairs) realised that they had to change by bringing in new talent 
with EU level networks. However, both airlines were seen to be using less of 
AEA to influence target actors, focussing instead on individual lobbying 
strategies. 
In the exogenous policy context, we found that developing a lobbying capability 
was associated with using existing individual and AEA networks. Both state- and 
privately owned airlines had fairly similar strategies; using their current networks 
instead of developing new ones. Let's first take privately owned airlines. We 
found from our cross-case analysis that post 9/11 (in the short term, or first few 
coil 
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weeks) these types of airlines focused on developing both their generic and 
idiosyncratic lobbying routines, in order to be more ambidextrous. In other 
words, privately owned airlines were found to be using both AEA (external 
network resource) and their own network resources (internal network resource). 
What is more, the government affairs departments' contact base (network) did 
not change much as they believed that they had the right contact base to use for 
lobbying purposes prior to the manifestation of the policy environment. 
However, post 9/11 it was a different story for government-owned airlines in 
conjunction with developing a lobbying arm for the rising policy issues. The 
lobbying activities undertaken by the senior management teams in this policy 
context shifted from influencing specific network targets at their national 
governments to AEA, who lobbied the EU commission on their behalf (see 
Appendix 9 for letters used to lobby). Moreover, government-owned airlines 
were less ambidextrous in terms of lobbying capability development process, 
shifting their efforts to generic platforms (i.e. more AEA and conferences), 
instead of using their idiosyncratic lobbying routines. This was the case, as the 
senior management felt constrained by their department which had a lack of 
political resources, which AEA had from its own people and through the use of 
other airlines networks. Nevertheless, both airlines were seen to be using more of 
AEA at different times to influence high-status political target actors, rather than 
individual lobbying strategies. Using these external resources (AEA) allowed 
them to develop their lobbying capability with a perceived value added for this 
type of policy context. 
From looking at the contrasting policy contexts, we can see that findings provide 
a unique view of lobbying capabilities helped by the network resources of firms. 
Our investigation suggested that the departmental network base was used to 
reconfigure the lobbing capabilities, political resources and lobbying 
competencies that a firm used to exert influence in the non-market place, 
especially in the endogenous policy context (as compared to the exogenous 
context). The airlines wanted to influence quickly during this period so they 
decided to use AEA which had extensive networks and resources. The airlines 
also used a combination of network resources to develop a lobbying capability, 
as illustrated in Figure 30. However, there is some evidence to suggest that 
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ownership structure constrained the government-owned airlines from being more 
ambidextrous, as compared to privately owned airlines. Nonetheless, from the 
illustration in Figure 30, we can see that the micro-level activity in the 
development process involved both external (i.e. associations and conferences) 
and internal (i.e. lobbying individually) network resources. Both airline types 
(state and private), and more importantly their senior management within the 
government affairs departments, had to decide the level of investment using their 
cognitive blueprints, either to make positive investments or no/little investments 
(+/-) in network modification. 
Figure 30: Interaction effects between networks and human resources 
+ / -
+ / -
+/. 
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> Human 
resource 
Internal network 
resource 
External network 
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Network 
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While strategy scholars primarily focused on firm capabilities and network 
scholars examine network base and structure (Zaheer and Bell 2005), we found 
that airlines with investments in network bases to develop their lobbying 
capabilities tended to be the privately owned airlines rather than the government-
owned airlines (more so in the endogenous policy context than the exogenous 
policy context). This was done either to defend their fmn ' s performance or create 
an advantage, as shown in previous studies using other organisational capabilities 
(Zaheer and Bell 2005). We found that the government affairs directors 
perceived through their sense-making cognitive processes that their networks 
needed to be modified to lobby either using internal networks or by the means of 
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using external resources (McEvily and Zaheer 1999).^^ The following 
propositions summarise the nature of network modification actions generated 
through senior management to develop a lobbying capability in the contrasting 
policy contexts and airline types: 
Proposition 4a. In an endogenous policy context, private airlines radically 
modify their government affairs departmental networks, but tend to focus more 
effort on their internal network base with a slight shift of focus to an external 
network base. (Non-ambidextrous) 
Proposition 4b. In an endogenous policy context, state airlines incrementally 
modify their government affairs departmental network, but tend to focus less 
effort on their internal network base and less effort to an external network base. 
(Non-ambidextrous) 
Proposition 4c. In an exogenous policy context, private airlines incrementally 
modify their government affairs departmental network, becoming more 
ambidextrous through using both their internal and external network base. 
(Ambidextrous) 
Proposition 4d. In an exogenous policy context, state airlines incrementally 
modify their government affairs departmental network, but tend to focus less 
effort on their internal network base and shift their focus to an external network 
base. (Non-ambidextrous) 
7.5 .3 HUMAN RESOURCE INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPING LOBBYING 
PROCESSES IN CONTRASTING POLICY CONTEXTS 
Felin and Foss (2005, p.451) unreservedly acknowledge the significance of 
human resource management for dynamic capabilities in their suggestion that 
"standard operating procedures and rules of interaction are first created and 
specified by organisational founders or managers, and then individuals interact 
given these collective structures or constraints". RBV scholars have begun to 
deal more explicitly with the contribution of HRM to dynamic capabilities 
(Bhattacharya and Gibson 2005; Bhattacharya and Wright 2005; Evans and 
Davis, 2005). Colbert (2004) suggests that dynamic capability might incorporate 
a continual, deliberate reinterpretation of HR principles in the light of 
organisational change. The process of drafting and reinterpreting HR principles 
Network relationships are generally perceived to be a private and public good because, through 
its creation as a by-product of social relations, it benefits both the creator and bystander (Putnam 
2000). 
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in a manner that combines the intentions, actions and choices of agents within 
and outside the organisation would be a means of generating resource-based 
advantage. Bhattacharya and Gibson (2005) argue that flexibility of employee 
skills, employee behaviours, and HR practices represent critical sub dimensions 
of HR flexibility and are related to superior firm performance. Bhattacharya and 
Wright (2005) use a real options approach, arguing that HR practices generate 
capabilities or "options" for managing uncertainties, thereby creating value for 
the firm. Wright and Snell (1998) argued that some HR practices are aimed at 
building flexibility to respond to future uncertain events; Bhattacharya and 
Wright suggest that this flexibility can be seen as a human capital capability. 
Our research has found that lobbying capabilities originate fi-om individual 
actions and interactions. Moreover, this important variable confirms ideas fi-om 
extant research on dynamic capabilities, which links them to changes in specific 
fiinctional capabilities (Bhattacharya and Wright 2005) and knowledge flows 
(Helfat and Rabitscheck 2000). Our findings add to this pool of knowledge, by 
highlighting the greater importance of the role of human capital in the process of 
developing lobbying capabilities. In particular, it appears that identifying and 
gaining access to what is considered top talent in the area of government affairs 
is an important factor in developing lobbying capabilities. As one informant said: 
Before the deregulation period, we were hiring new talented individuals 
that had knowledge in lobbying at an EU level, as that was where 
lobbying was moving. [A002] 
Furthermore, our research highlighted the role of organisational processes not 
only in developing human capital but also in discovering what new lobbying 
competencies should be developed. Together these insights suggest that the 
development of firms lobbying capabilities can be understood as change 
processes unfolding at two levels (in human capital modification): a lower level 
associated with the upgrading of the organisation's management in terms of 
staffing key positions with more experienced, better networks and skilled 
managers and redefining responsibilities at different levels of the departments 
hierarchy, and a higher level associated with developing new lobbying 
competencies in order to respond to changing policy environments. As shown in 
Figure 31, these two levels are driven by changing perceptions of top managers 
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about what it takes to succeed in their non-market contexts and what managerial 
and lobbying competencies are required to respond to the changes or make 
changes. 
Figure 31: Lower level and higher level human resource modifications 
Human resource 
modification 
Higher level: Competence 
Lower level: Management 
Respond to 
policy changes 
or makes policy 
changes 
In both the exogenous policy context and endogenous policy context, different 
organisations focused on different aspects of human resource management and 
organisation in order to develop their lobbying processes to influence political 
actors. The general pattern of human capital adaptation in the government affairs 
departments (in the European airlines) varied between the two contexts types. 
Consequently, we found that this variation in adaptation was a result of the 
different cognitive blueprints that were affected by the different flag carriers' 
ownerships compositions (private versus state) and the context type. As a result, 
the senior management decided how to configure their political resources to 
develop their lobbying capability. 
In the endogenous policy context, from analysing the data across all five firms 
(privately and government-owned) suggested that the momentum for human 
resource development in lobbying capabilities came from the top executive 
teams' cognitive belief about "moving to the following stage" in the policy-
making process in order to develop some type of value for its services. Pre-
deregulation (1985-1988), this belief was a broadly defined aspiration for 
changing the level of influence for organisations in the political arena, while 
other executives from the government-owned airlines indicated the level of 
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influence they wanted opposed to the general consensus. However, state-owned 
airlines brought in some people after the second package to make an influence at 
the European level, while keeping a strong tie with their national government. 
In the exogenous policy context, ft-om our data, we found that the privately 
owned airlines and government-owned airlines organised their human resources 
very differently to develop their lobbying capability. We found that privately 
owned airlines tended to have all the people they wanted. According to the senior 
management from the government affairs office units, they believed that in order 
to organise an effective lobbying capability, their current human capital 
resources were configured in specific way in order to communicate important 
information to their micro political targets. However, in this timeframe they 
believed that outsourcing the lobbying or bringing in new people or even 
downsizing was not needed to develop their lobbying arm. Conversely, the state-
owned airlines found configuring human resource to be an important process in 
developing their lobbying capability. However, in this timefi"ame they believed 
that outsourcing the lobbying was needed, with the addition of bringing in new 
people and downsizing to develop their lobbying arm. 
By looking at the two contrasting policy contexts, privately owned airlines had 
the sufficient type of human capital but the state-owned airlines could not deal 
with the impact as well. The government affairs units from state-owned airlines 
intended to restructure in the short to medium term to align their structure to 
meet the rising issues. As a result they shed some people from their offices. 
Therefore in the short term, the human capital resources were organised to 
facilitate quickly lobbying post 9/11, but state-owned airlines realised that 
focusing more lobbying efforts on their coalition platform (AEA) was the right 
strategy. Privately owned airlines reacted in a similar way, but they did not shed 
people from their office and were more ambidextrous in their lobbying, using 
both people from AEA and their own people. 
As shown in the Figure 32, the human resources also had competencies which 
they used in developing their lobbying capabilities. This interaction effect helped 
the lobbying development process. Both airline types (government and private), 
and more importantly their senior management within the government affairs 
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departments, had to decide the level of investment in human resource 
modifications to make, either positive investments or no/little investments (+/-). 
Figure 32: Interaction effects in lobbying capability development 
Competence + J 
; 
+ • 
Human 
Resource 
The level of lobbying development depended on the amount of competencies that 
the organisation managed to accumulate, which depended on who was hired and 
worked at the organisation. Therefore, interaction effects and overlaps were 
found between human resources and competence that played a role in developing 
a lobbying capability. 
7 . 5 . 4 LOBBYING COMPETENCIES IN THE LOBBYING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Competence or skill is at heart of any successful a c t i v i t y , a s we found in our 
(dynamic) lobbying capability development investigation. Respectively, the 
variation in the degree of success of business organisations by reference to 
different degrees and qualities of competence has been a major focus of recent 
theorising in both strategic management and organisational theory (Hamel and 
Prahalad 1990; Bogaert et al. 1994). From pioneering efforts, such as Selznick's 
(1957) "distinctive competence", to the more recent and refined notions of core 
competencies (Hamel and Prahalad 1990) and architectural knowledge 
(Henderson and Clark 1990) there are decades of investment in sorting out the 
traits and the boundaries of the phenomena. However, the research on 
competencies has so far been largely market-oriented and driven by theory 
building, and theory refutation. Theory has developed more in reaction to the 
The heart of competencies is the ability to integrate specific elements of know-how (i.e. it 
results from the 'learning by doing'), rooted in skills and technical systems-specific assets into 
wider value-creating competencies, through management systems and processes (Campbell and 
Luchs 1997). Competitively valuable competencies are entrenched in integration between skills 
to create value for customers in ways that are not imitable by competitors. 
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economics-driven industry and the market environment analysis evolution of the 
business strategy field, instead of focusing on the managerial aspects and the 
non-environment. It is important to understand the antecedents in the dynamic 
capability development process, but this work lacks both a solid empirical base 
and a micro theoretical foundation. This part will explore the interaction between 
lobbying competence and lobbying capability development in the non-market 
environment. We use the term "lobbying competencies" to refer here to technical 
subject matter and know-how in influencing and communicating (hard for 
competitors to duplicate), that enable firms to influence policy makers. 
As the non-market strategy field progresses in the definition of the politics 
phenomenon, though, it becomes correspondingly apparent that we are still 
missing a solid account of how organisational capabilities, in our case the 
lobbying capability, come into existence and of how they evolve over time in 
different policy contexts. What accounts for the fact that one organisation 
exhibits "lobbying competence" in some sense, while another does not? And how 
do we explain the growth and decay of that particular lobbying competence, 
other than the simple repetition, or lack thereof, of behaviour? Also, the 
definition essentially "kicks" the learning problem one level up, from single-loop 
to double-loop learning in Argyris and Schon's (1978) terms, and leaves us with 
the same problem: how are dynamic lobbying capabilities developed? How do 
they evolve in different policy context? 
As such, we found that at the micro foundations lobbying competence 
management helped in developing the lobbying capability in contrasting policy 
contexts, but there were some variations between state- and privately owned 
airlines. In both policy contexts and all five cases, senior executives in the 
government affairs departments, directly or indirectly related the development of 
the lobbying capabilities of their firm to a change in lobbying competencies, 
which were expected to enable them to influence new policy makers or current 
policy makers. Either of these strategies, or a combination of them, was viewed 
as the means for reaching "the following stage". Each of the five cases could be 
seen as pursuing different means for developing new lobbying competencies. 
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In the endogenous policy context, for instance, pre-deregulation (1985-1988) the 
privately owned airlines were ^'"bringing in new human resources and getting rid 
of old" competencies, which was expected to give them access to new knowledge 
and better networks that they believed they could not have accessed otherwise. 
One privately-owned airline made a major investment in bringing clear 
communication and substantial media competence into its government affairs 
office, enabling it to reach out to more politicians and provide a new means to 
influence policy-making. Another privately owned airline sought to outsource its 
lobbying to an external consultant, in order to gamer resources from the external 
experts. There were some important commonalities in the actual processes to 
which all of these separate moves led. Underlying the diversity was an effort to 
gain access to specialised expertise, embodied in individuals that were viewed as 
being among the top in their fields of expertise. This was a strategy described by 
one informant as "hiring a few good men". These airlines developed 
sophisticated lobbying competence discovery blueprints that allowed them to 
target people they believed had the right competence. As such, hiring top experts 
in areas targeted for developing new lobbying competencies and supporting them 
through appeared to be the underlying common model for evolving lobbying 
capabilities in all firms we examined. 
However, state-owned airlines behaved very differently in the endogenous policy 
context. We came to learn that pre-deregulation (1985-1988) they were not 
changing the portfolio of their competencies. Some informants from state-owned 
airlines felt that they did not have the right management competence for lobbying 
pre-deregulation, which resulted in them joining the game latter. However, they 
did start to modify their competencies portfolio only after the second package 
(1990-1993), as they were starting to realise the importance of introducing new 
competence to develop their lobbying. This tactic was viewed as the means of 
moving forward and aligning themselves with the endogenous policy context. 
After the second package, the state-owned airlines pursued a strategy of fetching 
new people that had EU level competence which was expected to give them 
access to new knowledge and better networks that they believed could not have 
accessed otherwise. However, from the micro-level analysis of state-owned 
government affairs department, we found that the ownership structure was 
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viewed by some of the senior management to have affected their cognitive 
blueprint and their decisions in developing a new competence capacity. In 
addition, the state-owned airlines were very comfortable and resting on their 
laurels and monopolistic positions on specific routes instead of adapting earlier 
like the privately owned airlines. 
On the other hand, in the exogenous policy context (post 9/11), we found from 
our cross-case analysis that the privately owned airlines were not bringing new 
competencies into their organisations but were instead using their existing ones 
with the addition of competencies from their external resources (mainly AEA). 
They were interacting extensively with different cross functions to attain 
competence. Their competence discovery process was very much based on the 
individual's cognitive blueprint. This cognitive blueprint would decide which 
format to follow; whether to use idiosyncratic or generic lobbying competencies. 
In this context, this senior management decided to develop both idiosyncratic 
lobbying competencies and generic lobbying competencies, as they perceived 
this to be the best path to develop and influence the correct target decision-
makers. However, instead of pursuing a policy of fetching new people with EU 
level knowledge or better networks, they used their in-house lobbying 
competencies and the lobbying competencies from AEA to lobby national and 
international political actors. The senior management believed that AEA had 
access to specialised expertise in-house and from its 31 airline members (AEA 
Annual report 2002). Therefore they started using AEA as this gave them 
lobbying competencies in contacting special high status targets. Supporting this 
ambidextrous mode appeared to be the underlying model for the evolving 
privately owned lobbying capabilities. 
The various types of state-owned airlines also related the development of their 
lobbying capabilities to a change in their lobbying competencies in the 
exogenous policy context (post 9/11). In stark contrast to privately owned 
airlines, we found by looking at the state-owned airlines that they were not 
bringing new competencies into their organisations, but they were instead 
focusing on de-layering their government office and shifting their focus to using 
competencies from their external resources (mainly AEA). This decision to use 
mainly generic lobbying competencies instead of idiosyncratic lobbying 
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competencies was taken by the senior management. They perceived this to be the 
best path to develop their lobbying, as they believed that time, paucity of 
political resources and a damaged balance sheet put a lot of pressure on them to 
focus on becoming efficient. Indeed, they did use their in-house competencies, 
but competencies from AEA to lobby national and international political actors 
were important to them. The senior management believed that AEA had access 
to specialised expertise in-house and from its 31 airline members. Therefore they 
started using AEA as this gave them lobbying competencies in contacting special 
high-status targets. Supporting this mode appeared to be the underlying model 
for the evolving state-owned lobbying capabilities. 
Selznick (1957) argued that it is the various commitments entered into by 
organisational stakeholders that defines an organisation's character and bestows 
upon it a distinctive competence in the conduct of its affairs. For Selznick, 
commitment is an enforced component of social action; as such it refers to the 
binding of an individual to particular behavioural acts in the pursuit of 
organisational objectives. One of the strengths of Selznick's perspective is its 
emphasis on group and organisational levels of analysis. Support for Selznick's 
position comes from several quarters. Knudsen (1994) offers direct support and 
recommends Selznick's (1957) institutional theory as a suitable process-based 
perspective to augment the outcome-centric view of organisational competence 
prevalent in the literature on the RBV. Of import here is Knudsen's contention 
that the deficiencies in resource-based perspectives are countered by the fact that 
Selznick's institutional theory captures the dynamics of the continuous exchange 
and interrelationships between an organisation's latent competencies and its 
structure and processes. Knudsen argues that these are an expression of a firm's 
accumulated knowledge and are a consequence of human design and 
"intentionality" as expressed by the commitments entered into by the 
organisation's stakeholders. Selznick's work therefore provides appropriate 
behavioural foundations for the dynamic resource-based view of the firm, which 
has hitherto operated from the perspective of bounded rationality, in terms of the 
design and development of computer-based information. In terms of the design 
and development of lobbying capability, Bonardi et al. (2007) highlight the role 
of competence commitment in shaping the design of such lobbying process. 
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However, the interaction between competence and capability development has 
not been previously highlighted from the political environment view. 
We have seen that lobbying competencies involve discovering new network 
links, creating the need to develop new know-how that is essential to either 
defend or exploit, for the long term success of the firm. We have shown and 
argued that cognitive blueprints played a role in allowing managerial attention to 
be paid to long term and short term situations, and providing the ability to 
acknowledge and manage tensions created by a series of paradoxes that were key 
to the renewal of competencies to develop their lobbying capabilities. An 
interesting question with regard to developing new lobbying competencies is not 
only what processes enable firms to configure them effectively, but also how 
firms select lobbying competencies to further develop lobbying capabilities. 
Several informants describe the process through which new lobbying 
competencies were targeted, tagging them as "important" during regular 
managerial meetings, and integrating them into strategic planning efforts. The 
nature of the accounts regarding lobbying competence acquisitions to develop 
lobbying leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 5a. In an endogenous policy context, privately owned airlines 
engage their government affairs departments in high level lobbying competence 
acquisition to develop their lobbying capability. 
Proposition 5b. In an endogenous policy context, state-owned airlines engage 
their government affairs departments in low level lobbying competence 
acquisition to develop their lobbying capability. 
Proposition 5c. In an exogenous policy context, privately owned airlines engage 
their government affairs departments in no lobbying competence acquisition to 
develop their lobbying capability but use their current lobbying competence and 
an association's lobbying competence. 
Proposition 5d. In an exogenous policy context, state-owned airlines engage 
their government affairs departments in no lobbying competence acquisition to 
develop their lobbying capability but rely more on using their association's 
competence and than their own lobbying competence. 
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7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THEORETICAL RECONCEPTUALISATION 
We have seen how lobbying capability is developed in contrasting policy 
contexts. Managers choose strategic actions to achieve competitive advantage in 
the short or long term. The plethora of management literature on dynamic 
capability suggests that a greater understanding of these practices is needed and 
desirable. Yet, with a few exceptions, organisational scholars know very little 
about how managers actually construct a dynamic "lobbying" capability. This 
thesis reports on a case study exploration of corporate lobbying strategy-making 
to uncover the practices that government affairs managers engage in order to 
develop lobbying. Results show that senior government affairs managers in their 
daily practice must engage in path-creation efforts, including problematisation of 
the current situation, decision and action. To do this, they create specific types of 
"cognitive blueprints" into the future both in terms of diagnosis (possible 
trajectories) and prognosis (potential resolutions). But these projections are 
critically shaped by the past: actors draw on heuristics of accumulated 
knowledge (the past) which focus their attention and shape their interpretations 
of the situation. Thus, lobbying development is not simply about making 
decisions in the present but about how managers draw on the past (in a more or 
less routinised way) and project into the future (in a more or less creative way). 
The evidence sheds light on how "cognition" can explain forces for stasis and 
change. Lobbying capabilities can be quite routinised if they are continuously 
reproduced; yet, our articulation of a policy environment types perspective 
(endogenous versus exogenous) suggests that there are few ways that managers 
may act to lobby in order to influence political actors, e.g. focusing on 
idiosyncratic versus generic, using political resources. Therefore, we can see 
"why" lobbying can be dynamic in its own right. 
Research on dynamic capabilities, as an explanation for heterogeneous firm 
response to radical technical change, has brought the role of the manager back to 
the forefi-ont of theory. Dynamic managerial capabilities are posited to have an 
effect above, beyond, and (potentially) different from the effects of 
organisational capabilities, though this has rarely been explored empirically. 
Similarly, research in dynamic capabilities has moved beyond the stage of simply 
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proving their existence, and towards trying to understand which types of 
capabilities matter in which contexts. In this study, we measure different types of 
capabilities at both the organisational and managerial levels of analysis. In 
particular, we use a novel measure of managerial cognitive frames to capture one 
aspect of managerial dynamic capabilities. We present the findings of an 
investigation of the driving forces behind the heterogeneity in adoption patterns 
of lobbying routines and processes by European flag carrier airlines in 
contrasting policy contexts. Preliminary results suggest that a general scientific 
orientation actually restricts adaptation, while specific scientific capabilities and 
a strong industry orientation are both conducive to change. We also show that 
managerial capabilities have an effect above and beyond that of the 
organisational capabilities, and that the interrelationships between the 
organisational and managerial levels appear to be fruitful areas for additional 
research. 
We can see that lobbying capability development played an important role in 
both the exogenous policy and endogenous policy contexts. We found that in the 
exogenous policy context, airlines (privately vs state-owned) had little time to 
manoeuvre to make their interests heard. The privately owned airlines were 
found to be using an ambidextrous platform of idiosyncratic and generic routines, 
while state-owned airline focused their efforts mainly on generic lobbying 
routines to deploy political resources to influence specific targets. 
We found that in the endogenous policy context, airlines (privately vs state-
owned) had time to manoeuvre to make their interests heard. The privately 
owned airlines were found to be using more of an idiosyncratic lobbying routine 
than a generic lobbying routine, while state-owned airline focused their efforts 
mainly on generic lobbying routines to deploy political resources to influence 
specific targets. 
As shown in Figure 33, from the micro-level analysis of all government affairs 
offices, we found that there were few variables that played a vital role in 
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developing a lobbying capability. We found that political resources had a 
"symbiotic relationship" with lobbying capabilities, which aided the 
development process. It was evident that political resources were comprised of 
human, organisational structure and network, which was supported by the 
lobbying competences. These resources and competencies were used to 
reconfigure their lobbying capability development process. Cognition played a 
prominent role in building this symbiotic relationship between political resources 
and lobbying capability development. The lobbying capability was further 
divided into idiosyncratic lobbying routines and generic lobbying routines 
designed to increase influence. Figure 33 summarises the theoretical insights 
discussed in this section in an inductively constructed model of the processes 
through which a firm's lobbying capabilities develop. We can see that the 
development of lobbying capability depends very much on the interaction 
between three micro ingredients that interplay to aid the lobby capability 
building process. The emphasis on the two lobbying capability routines (either 
generic or/and idiosyncratic) is very important for lobbying in different policy 
(exogenous or endogenous) uncertainty contexts. The cognitive blueprint is also 
important for influencing the path chosen (whether emergent or induced). This 
blueprint aids the management and organisation of political resources in 
developing the lobbying capability. However, the cognition can be heavily 
affected by "time pressures" and "ownership", which constrain the development 
process. 
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Figure 33: Inductive integrative model for developing a lobbying capability 
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7.7 EXTENSION OF THE DYNAMIC RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND CORPORATE 
LOBBYING ACTIVITY 
Following Hillman et al. (2004), this thesis argues for the importance of theory 
in the research process because it acts to impose order on disordered experiences 
to increase human understanding and prediction in the real world. In the 
positivist perspective of things, theory posits relationships between independent 
and dependent variables and/or outcomes, while also determining what data is to 
be collected (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). From an interpretivist scheme (used in 
this thesis), theory acts to help formulate a prior understanding or to enrich extant 
understandings of phenomena, in our case the corporate lobbying development 
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phenomena (Getz 1997). The integrative dynamic resource-based theory 
presented in this thesis accords well with interpretive perspective. 
Having introduced the conceptual components of this study, which are the 
government affairs office, cognition, lobbying capabilities and political 
resources, in some detail, this thesis's theoretical model is now presented in 
Figure 34. Unlike previous conceptualisations, this model is process-based, in 
that the 'microanalytic attributes' of organisational and managerial processes are 
further elaborated by the application of Benford and Snow's (2000) theory of 
"framing" (what we call "cognitive blueprints"), thereby capturing the multi-
faceted nature of the phenomenon. The role of the explicit and tacit knowledge as 
the tangible and intangible resources which underpin capability development is 
also recognised (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Andreu and Ciborra 1996). 
Furthermore, the model's scope and constituent concepts map well onto Hillman 
et al.'s (2004) view of the phenomena studied by corporate lobbying activity 
scholars and its articulation in their conceptualisation of the lobbying artefact and 
its immediate nomological net. 
The extended dynamic resource-based view (dynamic capability) theory as 
articulated in the integrative theoretical model is as follows in Figure 34: 
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Figure 34: Understanding the lobbying capability development process 
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Elaborating on Teece et al. (1997); Getz (1997); Eisenhardt and Martin (2000); 
Holbum (2001); Sirmon et al. 2007 and Bonardi et al.'s (2007) ideas, we 
previously described in Chapter 2 a lobbying capability as the corporate political 
processes, specifically the combination or sequence routines in which managers 
work together to leverage and deploy resources, which use resources to match or 
even create non-market change. Moreover, lobbying capabilities are the 
organisational and strategic routines by which senior representatives or acting 
representatives achieve influence to match or even create non-market change in 
the corporate political environment. At a fundamental level, core, enabling and 
supplemental competencies are applied in lobbying-related activities, e.g. in 
lobbying for the insurance coverage issue or for tariff. 
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As lobbying activities are increasingly used to deliver superior value propositions 
and services to internal stakeholders they have acquired the status of firm-
specific (i.e. valuable, rare, appropriate, imperfectly imitable, non-substitutable, 
and imperfectly mobile) resources. Accordingly, the lobbying capabilities that 
are used to leverage, deploy and manage political resources in pursuit of business 
objectives have become core objective for business enterprises. It is important to 
note therefore that important synergies and relationships exist behveen business, 
lobbying capabilities and resources. However, we found that state-owned airlines 
were not actively investing in these types of activities as privately owned airlines 
were, which could explain their performances in reality (this could be another 
study in the future, but is not a focus of this study). 
Based on insights from the literature cited previously, and this study's data, 
which is shown in the previous parts, we find our propositions describe at a high 
level of analysis the central tenets of this thesis's elaboration of the RBV and the 
role of commitment in shaping the development and application of lobbying 
capabilities. The propositions are the product of logical deductions informed by 
critical analysis of the different dynamic capability schools of thought that 
surround the RBV. As such they address many of the theoretical limitations of 
the RBV (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Priem and Butier, 2002, Ethiraj et al. 
2005), while also extending and elaborating the theory of dynamic capabilities, 
and simultaneously building in a behavioural dimension by applying a theory of 
cognition that operates on several levels of analysis. In addition, each proposition 
was deduced fi-om extensive research, which assesses the business and lobbying 
capability profiles of five organisations: two state-owned airlines (TAP Air 
Portugal and Alitalia) and three privately owned airlines (SAS, Lufthansa and 
KLM). The theoretical model therefore prepares the way for future process-based 
research of an interpretive nature on lobbying capability development and 
political resources, while also helping to inform the conduct of variance, based 
on different contexts and ownership structures. 
With regards to extending corporate political activity theory, we make several 
contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide a general model of 
firms' lobbying capability development process that integrates different aspects 
-329-
'Lobbying Capability" 
examined in previous studies, including the ideas of policy environment types 
and micro-level sources from cognition to political resources. The literature so 
far has remained scattered, with little focus on the antecedents of non-market 
performance and with disparate theoretical perspectives that lack an inside 
organisation approach. De Figueiredo (2002) for instance, presents the results of 
U.S. companies and their lobbying activities - electoral campaign contributions, 
informational lobbying, advocacy advertising, constituency building - but does 
not provide any insights about the factors that shape their performance. We 
believe that the concept of lobbying capability development has the potential to 
provide such an integrative framework. As argued in this thesis, elements from 
corporate politics, from the dynamic resource-based view of the frrm and from 
cognitive theory view can be integrated into the framework to provide a 
comprehensive view of lobbying development process, as well as a basis for 
fixture research. 
Another contribution of our development model is that we provide a better 
understanding of lobbying development in the airline industry. Firms in a wide 
variety of industries are subject to industry-specific agency rule-making, 
including agriculture, pharmaceuticals and utilities. Therefore, we can provide 
some insight into some generic patterns that could be applicable to their 
industries. Furthermore, many other firms are subject to fiinctional regulations 
that cross industry borders, such as workplace safety, labour standards and 
environmental impact. 
An additional contribution relates to networks and interactions. Existing research 
finds that the prior experience of firms' board members in political institutions is 
associated with better over-all firm performance (Hillman et al, 1999). In 
extending the corporate political activity literature we argue that privately owned 
airlines have more network interactions with both national and international 
policy-makers, which is likely to be an important mechanism for developing their 
lobbying capabilities, since they provide an opportunity for firms to learn from 
experience, make the organisations more flexible and resource-rich; and, 
critically, enable firms to establish a reputation for credibility with government 
actors. The latter is essenfial for overcoming the high transaction costs of 
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exchange in non-markets. This is consistent with Oliver's (1991) proposition that 
regulated firms can obtain a degree of legitimacy by conforming to institutional 
processes. 
The inductive model we have presented here has multiple implications for 
government affairs managers. In particular, managers need to be able to acquire, 
accumulate (develop current resources), and divest (in external resources; interest 
groups like AEA) political resources to have the most effective resource portfolio 
at any given time. Managers should also have the competence necessary to 
bundle resources to create effective lobbying capabilities. Firms especially need 
to be able to develop new lobbying capabilities, as policy environmental changes 
can greatly reduce the value of their current capabilities. Managers must also 
effectively manage the feedback and learning processes necessary to 
continuously update their cognitive blueprints and adjust the political resource 
portfolio and/or the leveraging strategies used. 
While other types of capabilities have been extensively studied elsewhere 
(Henderson and Cockbum 1994; Ethiraj et al, 2005; Makadok 2001), as far as we 
know, this is one of the first empirical studies to directly attempt to understand a 
lobbying capability development process and its micro sources. Our study also 
raises an interesting question: if firms create cognitive blueprints fi-om their own 
experiences, foresight and current learning in particular policy contexts, can they 
re-deploy these lobbying capabilities to other policy setting? We believe this is a 
promising avenue for the future. 
7.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This section has drawn on old and new dynamic RBV strand in strategic 
management, psychology and politics in order to posit a theory of lobbying 
capability development, resources and decision-making that spans all three 
pillars or approaches - regulative, normative and cognitive - to understand micro 
level organisational processes and structures. In extending and elaborating upon 
extant treatments of the resource-based view (see, for example, McWilliams et 
al. 2002; Bonardi et al 2007), we developed the micro perspective practices of 
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strategy making in European national flag carrier airlines. We examined the ways 
actors attempted to transform their own cognitive frames of the situation into 
predominant blueprints in the organisation. Where blueprints were about choices 
that were not congruent, government affairs actors engaged in highly political 
blueprint strategies aiined at making their lobbying capability resonate and at 
mobilising action in their favor. 
Indeed the thesis presents a theoretical model of corporate lobbying (political) 
activity with a comprehensive perspective on the development and application of 
lobbying capabilities and political resources in organisations. For example, the 
model's behavioural RBV theory component views lobbying professionals and 
organisational actors as intentional, purposeful entities who commit themselves 
to particular courses of action using their cognitive blueprints. Furthermore, the 
theoretical model and its associated research framework illustrate that an 
understanding of the policy environment and organisational mechanisms which 
shape knowledge in political contexts, and of the commitments which shape and 
influence the development and application of such knowledge, is vital if the 
lobbying capabilities (of government affairs professionals), both enabling and 
supplemental, which are used to build and leverage political resources to deliver 
valuable services, are to be fully comprehended and explained. 
The outcome of this thesis's integration and elaboration of RBV theory, cross-
fertilised with corporate political theory, has, we believe, resulted in a logically 
consistent theory, model and framework that helps explain the processes by 
which lobbying capabilities and resources are developed and applied in privately 
and state-owned airline organisations. Secondly it portrays blueprints in strategy-
making as both highly contested and tightly intertwined with the political pursuit 
of interests. It therefore provides a foundation for future academic research on 
this important topic and the testing of our findings and fi-amework in other 
industries/market areas. 
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis has explored a number of European flag carrier airlines and how 
they develop their lobbying processes as a strategic capability in contrasting 
policy contexts. Although initially conceived as a novel approach to managing 
lobbying capability development in different policy environments, it has an 
emphasis on the airline industry. This attempt to comprehend the lobbying 
process has been theoretically conceptualised in the previous chapter from two 
contrasting policy contexts. The characteristics of a lobbying capability 
development have been shown to exist in an embodiment of a multidimensional 
configuration in our inductive framework. This presents a novel 
o / r / m e rg^garcA m ^^rmfggfc maMOgg/Mgnf m^grMan'ona/ 
^zt^rngf^ cofWfWgr /Mor/rgf / b r c g ^ ro fAe (/gvg/opmgM^ q / a (fyna/Mzc 
capability, such views neglect the non-market forces and micro sources in the 
development process. The following sections will reflect on the empirical and 
theoretical contributions of this thesis, and consider the future direction of this 
rg^ygorcA. 
8.1 SYNOPSIS 
The concept o f 'development' can be abstracted from biological 'evolut ion' , in 
'Universal Darwin ism' , w i th only the bare notions o f variety generation, 
selection and replication, and without specification o f how those micro processes 
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really work (Nelson and Winter 1982). However, on the whole this idea can be 
made to fit the evolution of a capability to a large extent, but with an external 
view, whereas we need an internal micro view. In this thesis we have attempted 
to amplify this micro level view and maintain an evolutionary perspective in 
order to provide a coherent picture of the different combinations of internal and 
external causes of change in lobbying, and structure, avoiding both an overly 
rational view of managerial design and a view of environmental determinism 
without actors. With this thesis, we intend to make a contribution, building on 
strategic management literature, and focusing on the issues that have been most 
neglected or incompletely developed in previous literature. 
We have seen that this thesis sets out to develop an inductive model of what 
determines the firm's capability development process in two contrasting policy 
contexts. Building on dynamic resource-based view and corporate political 
(lobbying) activity view, we argue that non-market performance is influenced 
both by the characteristics of the firm's policy environment and by the lobbying 
capabilities the firm develops over time. More precisely, we create propositions -
and find empirical support in the context of European Flag carrier Airlines -
stating that the rivalry created by competing demanders of public policies (such 
as consumers and governments), the ownership, time boundaries, and the 
political resources of the airlines involved have an impact on the firm's ability to 
develop their lobbying capability. 
Using case study methodology, we uncovered the everyday practices of senior 
government affairs managers developing a lobbying capability when pre-
established lobbying routines are challenged by rapid or slow change in the 
policy environment. This study examines cognition of lobbying strategy-making 
by following several lobbying initiatives for specific policy issues over a period 
of years in two contrasting policy contexts to understand not just the decisions 
themselves, but how they are produced in the course of situated action (Suchman 
1987). Looking at capability development in this way opens up the possibility of 
examining cognition as "blueprints", where cognition is created individually or 
collectively in that it is the product of interactions among people (Lave 1988; 
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Lave and Wenger 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992; Orlikowski and Gash 1994). 
Nevertheless, we specified three issues concerning lobbying development: 
^ The nature of the lobbying routines (idiosyncratic vs generic) carried 
out by senior government affairs managers, interpreted as being 
important in developing lobbying; the sources of cognition, political 
resources and stability of micro level sources as interactors (i.e. 
competence, networks, organisational structure, ownership and 
temporal effects); and the causes and extent of their differences 
between airline types (state vs private). 
> The extent to which organisation can exploit or defend themselves 
against the policy envirormient (endogenous vs exogenous) type. 
> How lobbying development is and the extent to which it may be 
guided by the cognition of senior management who design the 
process. 
In an attempt to deal with these issues, we offered an analysis on the basis of 
mainly a "dynamic RBV theory and corporate political activity theory, but also 
with some cognitive theory of organization", which is in turn based on an 
'embodied lobbying' branch of management literature that yields, among other 
things, the notion of 'cognitive blueprint' between senior management, carried to 
the extent that they have developed their cognition frames along different policy 
environment contexts. 
Concerning the nature of lobbying routines (bullet point one), this yields the 
notion of an organisation as an 'absorption device', which limits the cognitive 
blueprints for the sake of allowing an efficient achievement of corporate 
lobbying capability (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). It consists of an individual and 
collectively generated bundle of blueprints (perceptions, interpretations, 
meanings and value judgements concerning goals, priorities, jobs and roles, 
norms and values of conduct and conflict resolution) to develop lobbying 
capability in the form of generic or idiosyncratic lobbying routine combinations. 
These yield requisite stability of senior managers as interactors, intra-industry 
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differences mostly on the governance side, inter-industry differences on both the 
competence and the governance side, and limited possibilities for integral and 
instantaneous revision of routines. The analysis also allows us to create stable 
boundaries of activities as part of the definition of organisations. 
Regarding the second issue, with detailed analysis we concluded that while 
policy environment context types and in that sense evolutionary selection can be 
inefficient, significant internal selection pressures generally remain (organisation 
of lobbying can to a greater or lesser extent be moulded by senior managers, 
singly (i.e. using individuals from in-house government departments) or 
collectively (i.e. using AEA). Subsequently, the difference between the two 
contrasting policy contexts was that one had a pull effect (exogenous-defend-
reactive) and the other had a push effect (endogenous-exploit-proactive). Indeed, 
some private airlines created ambidextrous lobbying routines in these pull and 
push policy environments, while state airlines did not. This brings forward the 
question of ownership structures and how these seem to hinder or help the 
lobbying development process. 
Concerning the third issue, we gave an analysis of lobbying capabilities (routines 
and processes) on the basis of communication of information to influence 
political actors. We argued for the intelligent lobbying development design, 
lobbying individually or by collaboration, and on a path of cumulative insight 
and experience, were guided by 'cognitive blueprints'. However, while lobbying 
their interests, some airlines found much resistance in lobbying information 
exchange, expansion and transfonnation of knowledge. This resistance was 
found to happen at the selection processes using cognitive blueprints, where 
some airlines (mainly state owned flag airlines) felt they could not develop their 
lobbying capabilities (as opposed to private owned flag airlines).' Overall, the 
cognitive blueprints were dependent on 'uncertainty degree, time, political 
resources, competence and ownership composition' in order to develop lobbying. 
' In other words, the state owned organisations seemed to have more problems lobbying 
effectively than private owned airlines. 
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In general, the analysis yields a sophisticated view of capability development for 
the non-market. We see the ability to achieve novel combinations of existing 
internal political resources by collaboration with external political resources (i.e. 
AEA), selecting development paths at optimal levels using cognition and the 
ability to control policy environment uncertainty. The ability to control emerging 
policy contexts where sources of novel insight and motives for change is a path 
of differentiation and hybridisation of knowledge and competence. For the 
purpose of hybridisation, this includes the ability to optimally select networks, 
manage departmental structure and human resources, sub level resources of the 
political resource. 
We also see that each component of the political resource management process is 
individually important, but, to optimise value creation, they must be 
synchronised. Thus, while managing each component of the lobbying process is 
important, the integration and balancing of political resource components to 
ensure accord in the process is necessary to create value for the organisation. 
Therefore, government affairs managers should view their department as a 
system/constellation of resources developing and leveraging strategies that match 
their lobbying capabilities to the policy environmental context. Moreover, 
creating synchronisation between generic and idiosyncratic processes requires 
government affairs managers to be simultaneously involved in all stages of the 
political resource management process and consistently scanning the policy 
environment. 
Likewise, government affairs managers should consistently scan and monitor 
their policy environment, focusing especially on potential changes that could 
affect their firm's ability to create value for customers. A firm will likely need to 
respond both to competitors and to the level of uncertainty in the environment. 
When competitors introduce changes in their lobbying offerings, which could 
eliminate the firm's current competitive advantage, swift and significant 
responses are needed. Significant responses could be initiated in any of the 
political resource management components (e.g. acquiring new network 
resources or human capital resources or using external network resources in 
order to develop a new lobbying capability). Thus, managers need to balance the 
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need for efficient investments in political resources with the need to maintain the 
political resources necessary to react flexibly to exogenous or endogenous policy 
changes, and focusing on investing in existing resources or getting new ones 
(internal vs external resources). 
In conclusion, we extend dynamic capability and corporate political activity 
literature by looking at the antecedents of a lobbying capability. Moreover, we 
portray the ability of managers to develop lobbying processes by using specific 
political resources (networks, human, organisational, structural) in emerging 
policy contexts that yield opportunities to maintain exploitation or processes for 
defence. This includes the ability of government affairs managers to choose in 
emerging policy contexts the different micro sources and directions of change 
that are sufficiently similar to allow for some continuation, at least initially, of 
familiar competencies. It also includes the ability to tap from memory concerning 
earlier experience to engage in defence or opportunity by using corporate 
political strategies (Baysinger 1984). It also includes the ability to select partners 
from networks in specific sequences and status orders, for types of policy 
contexts. 
8 .2 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
As seen in this thesis, recent contributions aimed at clarifying distinctions among 
the various dynamic RBV (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) and CPA (Hillman et al. 
2004) constructs offer some hope that the problem of proliferating and 
overlapping terminologies is being alleviated and real progress is being made. As 
the field of corporate political activity (lobbying activity) and dynamic resource-
based view advances, we realise that the micro foundations of the lobbying 
capability development phenomenon are apparently still missing a solid account 
of how lobbying capabilities come into existence and of how they evolve over 
time in different contexts. As a result, this thesis tries to address those questions 
by providing a theoretical account of the genesis and development of "dynamic" 
lobbying capabilities within European flag carrier airlines. More importantly, it 
tries to meet the shortfalls in knowledge by providing "in depth" and "rich" 
descriptions to fill some gaps. 
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Indubitably, the thesis attempts to make contributions to the existing corporate 
political activity and dynamic capability literatures, as previously highlighted. 
Firstly, it does so by presenting a model of cyclical development of lobbying 
capability, and then focusing on selected cognitive-based mechanisms that might 
be responsible for at least part of its function. It does this by providing an 
inductive framework in that there may be identifiable patterns of interaction that 
give rise to situated cognition in organisations. Our analysis of these patterns 
suggests that there may be specific combinations of context and blueprints that 
would provide relatively common yet fruitful testing grounds for our perspective 
of cognition and lobbying capability development in organisations as transitory 
and contextually situated. Further investigation of these patterns may reveal new 
insights that advance our ability to understand and manage lobbying capability 
development in organisations. For example, one pattern we identified suggests 
that perceptions of option attractiveness arise through the interaction of context 
blueprints. This finding suggests that choice in organisations is influenced not 
simply by the blueprint an individual senior manager holds about a specific 
decision or event, such as the development of a new lobbying capability, but also 
the perspectives or pressures that exist from their owners and policy 
environment. 
Secondly, it presents another simple model describing the interactions among the 
capability-building mechanisms that underlie the development of lobbying 
routines. It proposes how the lobbying capability-building process can be 
affected by variation in the fundamental characteristics of the policy issues in 
hand, from which we derive a set of propositions about the relative effectiveness 
of the identified mechanisms within different policy contexts and airline types. 
The propositions integrate two contrasting policy contexts that highlight 
diverging developments of lobbying capabilities between state and private 
airlines.^ 
^ The literature so far has remained scattered, with little focus on lobbying development and with 
disparate theoretical perspectives that lack a unifying approach. 
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Finally, we have also seen many corporate political activity studies that are U.S. 
focused. These studies look at companies and their impacts on various non-
market activities - electoral campaign contributions, informational lobbying, 
advocacy advertising, constituency building - but do not provide any insights 
into the lobbying development process and neglect to look at Europe. Therefore 
our study feeds into a new spectrum of European strategy research that is still 
embryonic. To summarise the full contributions please see the bullet points 
below: 
^ EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION: The ways in which this research contributed 
empirically are as follows: 
o Evidence of how different European flag carrier airlines and their 
senior managers developed specific types of lobbying capabilities 
in specific endogenous (expected) and exogenous (unexpected) 
policy contexts. 
o Evidence of why different European flag carrier airlines and their 
senior managers developed specific types of lobbying capabilities 
in specific endogenous (expected) and exogenous (unexpected) 
policy contexts. 
o Evidence of how the micro sources in the lobbying capability 
development process either encourage or discourage the 
implementation of specific lobbying strategy. Highlighting the 
interaction effects at the micro level between political resources 
and cognitive blueprints in developing lobbying. 
4- THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION: The ways in which this research 
contributed to the literature are as follows: 
o To the literature on RBV theory and more specifically the 
dynamic capability literature. We created awareness and a linkage 
of the RBV, more specifically dynamic capability, to the non-
market. We provided models and propositions to explain how 
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these lobbying capabilities are developed in the different policy 
contexts and for distinct airline types.^ 
o To the literature on corporate political activity. We provide scope 
to build on the current literature and ideas of corporate lobbying 
activity where dynamic capability explains the antecedents of why 
some top managers choose certain routines and resources over 
others. 
d To both corporate political activity and RBV theory. We develop 
potential solutions to the problematic issues identified in the 
procurement and development of a lobbying capability and clarify 
a future research agenda. 
4- METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION: The research operationalises lobbying 
capabilities using a case study approach, instead of a quantitative 
approach. This ensures an explication of the contextual and social 
richness that characterises the strategic management process. 
The research findings will also be of interest to a wide range of individuals, from 
people concerned with airline services to those working in lobbying institutions. 
However, the findings will have specific value in the provision of government 
affairs in airlines, for both state owned and privately owned airlines. They will 
appeal to individuals at various managerial levels from government affairs 
managers to CEOs and government officials. It brings back the idea that "how 
you use thinking blueprints in conjunction with uncertainty and political 
resource accumulation matters immensely in lobbying development process in 
different policy environments''. As lobbying is rapidly gaining popularity around 
Europe, the findings will also be of value in countries that are currently 
experimenting with the lobbying method i.e. India. 
^ In other words, strengthen the theoretical understanding of the antecedents of the development 
of lobbying processes as a strategic capability by analysing the processes using dynamic 
resource-based theory. 
In other words, it will support corporate political activity literature in conceptualising the 
relationship between the internal government affairs department, the policy environment and the 
development of lobbying capabilities. 
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8 .3 PROPOSITIONS 
We have seen that the purpose of this thesis was to understand the lobbying 
capability development process and to formulate propositions to the question of 
what are lobbying capabilities, how are lobbying capabilities developed in 
contrasting policy contexts and why specifically are they developed in that way. 
Indeed, the propositions in chapter 7 were constructed in order to capture the 
dynamics and relationships between specific variables in the lobbying capability 
development process. More precisely, in that chapter, we theorized and explored 
the development and design aspects of capabilities to understand the evolution of 
lobbying in different policy environments. Subsequently, in the face of these 
challenges of policies and different airline types, the chapter draws on a recent 
history of paradigmatic capability design problems, and investigates whether or 
not airlines were in transition from an enviromnent dominated or not dominated 
by policy uncertainty (exo vs endo), and where the senior management did or did 
not embrace design as a primary organizing feature. To this end, it offered 
several propositions and, hence, RBV and CPA-centered theory for developing 
lobbying capabilities. 
Concerning the design of lobbying capabilities, the thesis allowed us to create a 
framework of the degree on policy uncertainty and suggested instead 
management cognition needed to address improvements of design of capability 
practices, especially by different airline types. It culminated in a sketch of an 
exogenous design vs endogenous design by state and private airlines. These 
propositions allow for future research to use a large scale quantitative study, in 
which the different propositions from chapter 7 can be tested in order to really 
capture and explicate the notion of competitive advantage. 
8 .4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
As was highlighted in the introduction to this work, this was a qualitative study 
in the area of lobbying capability development. Indeed, very little previous work 
has been done in this area and hence there was a general lack of authoritative 
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literature arising from past studies. In this particular study, there was difficulty in 
gaining access when needed to senior respondents in government affairs 
departments, as they tended to be very busy people with crowded schedules. 
However, through persistence and using our own lobbying techniques, we 
managed to gain good in-depth interviews with senior management at five 
airlines. We tried to triangulate where possible but the fact is it is not possible to 
gain internal documents and memos from within all the firms for the endogenous 
policy context (1985-1997) and exogenous policy contexts (2001-2005). 
Therefore, we used European Commission, AEA, lATA and government web-
sites to provide some additional documents. 
Given that the aim of this study was primarily theory-elaboration, the theory 
linkages and propositions should be regarded as being tentative at this stage. For 
any qualitative study, the limitation of narrow sampling and scope is apparent, 
and this longitudinal field study of two policy contexts is no exception. The 
sample was composed of 5 European flag carrier airlines. An improper or 
inadequate sampling population may provide spurious conclusions, but we did 
not see evidence of routines or processes as being confounded because of the 
nature of the sample. The senior government affairs managers we interviewed 
were familiar with lobbying development and the standards, strategies, resources 
and routines adopted by their departments. We tried to reduce the process of 
potential misinterpretation and other halo-effect biases. Although we have tried 
to limit this bias by checking accounts with the top managers themselves and 
triangulating with other sources of information, it cannot be completely removed 
and there is also the danger of placing too much reliance on the perceptions of 
those involved. We believe our results are encouraging but the propositions have 
to still be tested in other industries, raising questions about the general 
applicability of our findings to other settings. We might expect to find that the 
roles of firm lobbying capabilities, for instance, is less significant in industries 
that are less heavily regulated than the airlines sector where firm-regulator 
interactions are relatively frequent. For instance, other industries like utilities 
also have a unique ability to initiate policy change through the rate review 
process (Bonardi et al. 2007); without such rights, firms in other industries may 
find it more difficult to gain access to policy-makers and to establish polifical 
-343-
"Lobbying Capability" 
markets, making political strategies less effective. Also, while a larger sample is 
potentially advantageous to any study, we reached theoretical saturation with the 
patterns that these interviews revealed. 
On another note, given more time, more cases may have been examined. Ideally, 
given more time, a large-scale, statistically-based study could also have been 
conducted to test the propositions provided. A large-scale quantitative study was 
eschewed due to theoretical difficulties in describing lobbying capability 
development and practical difficulties in measuring some components, such as 
cognitive changes. Having completed this study a more precise definition and 
operationalisation of lobbying capabilities is now possible but the density of the 
theory can still be improved. 
From a theoretical perspective, we show the different ownership structures 
impact on the cognitive blueprints choice to design the lobbying capability 
development. Moreover, we explain the differences in our proposition between 
the different types of ownership structures and differences in developing 
lobbying in various environments, but we fail to look too much into the 
governance structures of the airlines and the country culture effects. This was not 
done because we wanted to concentrate the focus within the firm, on its 
behaviour in the two contrasting 'policy' contexts. 
On the subject of theory, another limitation is that we don't delve into the 
lobbying process of the external resources (AEA). The research design does well 
to find firm-level lobbying capability development and firm-level strategies 
which seek to understand the cognitive blueprint. However, we do not explore 
collective action blueprints (AEA) and we fail to really show the blueprint 
configurations from the interest group representation perspective. This was again 
due to the time factor and access issue with the AEA. 
Nonetheless, future empirical studies now have the benefit of a framework for 
lobbying capability development in exogenous and endogenous policy contexts. 
While we could not have generated as much detail without a qualitative 
methodology, we encourage future studies using both inductive and deductive 
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approaches to further elaborate on the issues uncovered by our study in other 
industries. 
8 .5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is scope for future work to consider a more fine-grained measure of 
lobbying capability development and to consider the demand and supply-side 
conditions in which it will be more or less effective. Firstly, a potential route for 
developing the lobbying capability model is to examine the interactions between 
and within demand and supply-side factors; does lobbying competition, for 
example, have a more powerful effect on profits when the policy environment is 
more uncertain (exogenous policy environment) or less uncertain (endogenous 
policy environment)? We believe that addressing this question would provide 
important additional theoretical insights into the attractiveness of the non-market 
policy environment. 
Secondly, future research requires that particular attention be paid to the country 
culture on the lobbying development process. For example, how do cultures of 
different countries affect lobbying development processes and more importantly 
how do they affect cognitive lobbying blueprints? How do Italian and 
Scandinavian cultural differences affect lobbying development? Are lobbying 
capability development paths different in China compared to Europe? 
Thirdly, the flows of different types of lobbying knowledge within various 
industry environments could be mapped, as we did in this thesis. In addition, 
instead of studying the same firms and industry, the general applicability of the 
theory and propositions could also be tested with other cases in other industries. 
In other words, this study examined the effects of endogeneity and exogeneity 
policy change in the airlines, but the oil and pharmaceutical industries would also 
provide important information into the lobbying development process. 
Moreover, understanding the cognitive lobbying blueprints in each of those 
industries would also be another rich avenue to follow to understand the micro 
level interactions of the capability development phenomenon. 
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Finally a future research path could look at conducting a large scale study using 
quantitative methods. The main problem that could to be resolved would be 
operationalising the variables. This study identified some of the key components 
and dimensions of lobbying capabilities but more robust, standardised scales 
would need to be developed before statistical tests could be used with 
confidence. The highly dynamic nature of the airline industry would need to be 
taken into account in any study. A suitable technique to model the changes 
quantitatively may be a catastrophe model (Oliva et al. 1980)/ This technique is 
particularly appropriate for modelling discontinuous changes and has been used 
in the past to model competitive dynamics in industries (Oliva et al. 1988; 
Kauffinan and Oliva 1994). A recent study includes this modelling technique in 
the construction of conflict behaviour to understand the micro level interactions 
(Yiu and Cheung 2006). Judging by the variables in our thesis, the dependent 
variable would be impact on lobbying capabilities, the independent variable 
would be lobbying change and the splitting variable would be policy 
environmental stability. Suitable quantitative measures would need to be 
developed for each of the key variables and data on a large enough sample of 
firms over a long enough period would be required. 
8 .6 FUTURE ISSUES CONFRONTING THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
As previously seen in Chapter 3, the airline industry will go through many 
changes over the next few decades. Moreover, many people within the industry 
are anticipating a series of new challenges that will loom ahead on the airline 
industry's horizon. We anticipate that the lobby capability will become a very 
important integrative process for airlines to make a difference on the non-market 
environment in the years to come. This part will look at the future contours in 
more detail. 
^ Catastrophe theory is a mathematical development in topology and an extension of calculus 
(Thorn 1975). It concerns the shape of all possible smooth equilibrium surfaces, which (as proved 
by the French mathematician Rene Thom) for four or less underlying factors are reducible to 
seven elementary catastrophes. It was popularised by Zeeman (1976), where he explained each 
catastrophe defines an archetypal equilibrium surface in terms of one or two state variables and 
one to four control factors. One of these seven surfaces, called the butterfly, is especially suitable 
to the conflict helix. 
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Firstly, there is the issue of airport and air traffic capacity, which in some places 
has already been reached. The construction of new runways, airports and 
supporting infrastructure is causing growing headaches for planners and local 
governments, and is being strongly opposed by citizens groups and 
environmentalists concerned about the impact of increased noise levels, traffic 
congestion and habitat loss. It has been estimated, for example, that satisfying the 
forecast demand for air travel growth in Europe would require a new runway to 
be built every 4-5 years somewhere in every country (lATA 2005 Annual 
report). Therefore we believe that lobbying capability will become ever more 
important on the above issues of infrastructure building, noise levels, habitat loss, 
and so forth. 
Secondly, there is the issue of aviation's growing contribution to greenhouse gas 
emissions, and hence climate change. Airline emissions are the fastest-growing 
contributor to greenhouse gases. In 1992, 3.5% of global warming was attributed 
to flying, yet by 2050 the UN thinks this will rise to 7% (New Scientist report 
2007). Momentum has been growing to impose an international aviation fuel tax 
to account for the environmental costs created by these emissions. Shortly after 
September II'^, the European Union called on the rest of the world to tax 
aviation fuel as a way of curbing the environmental impact of air travel. While 
the timing of the announcement was terrible for the airlines, it signalled the 
commitment of European countries, led by Gennany and Sweden, to embark 
upon the unsustainable rise in aviation fuel consumption and implement the 
"polluter pays principle". A paper for the European Commission calculated that 
to pay for the environmental damage caused by flights passengers would face a 
charge of about €45 per 1,000 km travelled (BBC News online 2002). This again 
highlights the importance of lobbying for airlines in the years to come with 
regards to tax and climate change.^ 
^ Switzerland and Sweden have already introduced a system linking landing charges on exhaust 
emissions. Now the British government has introduced drastic increases in airline levies. 
Environmental taxes have been announced by Chancellor Gordon Brown on airlines to 
compensate for their damage to the environment. A joint consultation paper by the Treasury and 
Department for Transport put the "national cost" of global warming caused by air travel at £1.4bn 
a year, rising to £4.8bn by 2030. At present, carriers contribute just over £800m a year to the UK 
Treasury in air passenger duty (BBC News 2006). 
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Finally, unfortunately for the industry, such arguments are not likely to hold the 
Commission or member governments or airlines at bay for much longer. New 
technologies are not offsetting current growth in emissions, and if predicted 
flight increases occur the effects on climate change are likely to be huge. Indeed, 
by imposing a tax upon landing, the EU could effectively penalise any polluting 
airline using an EU airport, minimising the discriminatory impacts on European 
carriers. However, what does this mean for airlines and the introduction of such 
future policies? We foresee a growing momentum among airlines in lobbying 
activities over the next few years. 
8 .7 CLOSING REMARKS 
This thesis offers new insights into the micro level sources that affect the ability 
of firms to engage and develop their lobbying capabilities in conjunction with 
their strategies in different policy enviromnents. In particular, we conceptualise 
in our inductive model, using both policy environments (endogenous vs 
exogenous) and airline types (state vs privately owned), the way in which finns 
develop lobbying using their cognitive blueprints. The key political resource 
variables (comprised of network, organisational structure, human and 
competence) were leveraged, integrated and deployed by airlines to develop their 
lobbying capabilities. We also found how ownership structure and two types of 
policy contexts played a large role in developing the lobbying capability path. 
Indeed, using data from European flag carrier airlines, we find good theory 
support for this thesis even though much work sfill remains to be done/ 
At this point we end, but Mark Van Doren's (Pulitzer Prize-winning poet) long 
comment on the incompleteness of our knowledge serves two purposes in acting 
as the last words in this thesis. Firstly, we have discussed only a part of the 
numerous discussions which goes on within organisations. Secondly, while we 
^ This results in a simpler and clearer causal structure, avoids the existing ambiguities in the 
RBV, and should pave the way for more rigorous theoretical contributions and applicable 
empirical research. 
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have tried to say something novel in terms of how we have tried to understand 
lobbying capability development, that novelty is part of the on-going discussion 
both about dynamic capability and about the nature of lobbying. We therefore 
have not proved anything and instead have tried to describe and illuminate a 
lobbying development process within organisations. This process however has 
some bearing on how we can come to appreciate the centrality of micro 
components in the influencing game. So having entered the parlour of lobbying 
in airlines, we leave with the words of Mark Van Doren: 
"Any piece of knowledge I acquire today has a value at this moment 
exactly proportioned to my skill to deal with it. Tomorrow, when I know 
more, I recall that piece of knowledge and use it better. " 
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APPENDIX 3 
The European liberahsation process began in 1988 with a package of measures 
giving some flexibility to increase capacity or adjust fares on European Union 
(EU) cross-border routes, without the need for a process of negotiation between 
the two countries concerned (AEA Annual report 1997). 
Two successive relaxations of the rules were followed in January 1993 by the 
Third Package of Liberalisation Measures which effectively deregulated EU 
cross-border services from that date, with domestic routes to follow in April 
1997. 
LIBERALISATION WITHIN THE EU IN SUMMARY 
Valid from 01.04.97 for international & Domestic, FULL MARKET ACCESS 
Sched. & Charter, Passenger & Cargo Air Transport. • Full access makes it possible for a Community 
airline to operate any route within tlie Community, 
FREE PRICING including routes betv/een iVlember States other 
• However, provisions for States or Commission than its home country and routes wholly within 
to intervene in cases of excessively high or another Member State (irrespective whether the 
low fares. route is part of one from/to its home country), 
• Access can be limited under public service 
BLOCK EXEMPTIONS ALLOWING COOPERATION obligations and on certain new regional routes. 
• Schedule coordination. 
• Tariff consultations. FULL FREEDOM TO START AN AIRLINE 
• Slot allocation at airports. • If Community ownership. 
• Common computer reservation systems. • If financially sound operations. 
• Joint operations on new or less busy routes. • if safety requirements are met. 
Source: AEA Yearbook (1997) 
The scope of the Third Package has been extended to the European Economic 
Area, bringing Norway and Iceland within its geographical coverage. Several 
other European countries have signalled their readiness to participate in this 
Single Market. 
Therefore, from April of this year, any airline majority-owned by EU nationals, 
with the necessary licenses and approvals for safety and financial fitness, can fly 
at whatever fare it chooses to charge between any of the 446 airports within the 
EU, Norway and Iceland - and, eventually, any future participants in the single 
air transport market. 
The change from the old regime, based on bilateral regulation internationally and 
absolute sovereignty over domestic routes, is remarkable, the more so for having 
been achieved in less than ten years. (In contrast, US deregulafion involved no 
surrender of sovereignty, and the US internal market remains closed to all 
foreign carriers). 
Nevertheless, it should not be anticipated that the final elements of liberalisation 
which fell into place on 1 April 1997 will lead to major changes in the structure 
of air transport in Europe. By definition, any fifth-freedom or cabotage market is 
IV 
a "foreign" one, both in geographical terms and in the sense that it is detached 
from their hub-based network (AEA Year book 1997). 
Subsequent chapters review developments since 1993. Attention is currently 
focussed on the final phase of the Third Package, and what it might mean for 
domestic markets. Its greatest impact, however, is likely to be on the cross-
border routes, which are already in their fifth year of liberalisation and have 
already seen major developments. 
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Figure 36: Interest coalition actors for European Airline deregulation 
NONMARKET POLITICAL FORCES-EUROPEAN UNION 
There are complex institutional arrangements within the European Union (EU). 
For the airline industiy, the most important ones are those regarding non-air 
transport institutions, such as general competition laws that influence the 
structure of the air transport supply (Kyrou 2000). These arrangements are 
products of a variety of factors, not least prevailing political, social and economic 
theories and the experiences of previous policies. Nonetheless, within the EU, 
there are several institutional arrangements that airlines target to influence 
government decision-makers. These are mainly European Commission, 
European Parliament, European Council and National Governments. 
The European Union (EU) is an intergovernmental and supranational union of 25 
democratic member states (Bloomberg and Stubb 2003). The European Union is 
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the world's largest confederation of independent states, established under that 
name in 1992 by the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). 
However, many aspects of the Union existed before that date through a series of 
predecessor relationships, dating back to 1951. 
The Union currently has a common single market consisting of a customs union, 
a single currency managed by the European Central Bank (so far adopted by 12 
of the 25 member states), a Common Agricultural Policy, a common trade 
policy, and a Common Fisheries Policy (Mercado et al. 2001). A Common 
Foreign and Security Policy was also established as the second of the three 
pillars of the European Union (Bloomberg and Stubb 2003). The Schengen 
Agreement abolished passport control, and customs checks were also abolished 
at many of the EU's internal borders, creating a single space of mobility for EU 
citizens to live, travel, work and invest. 
The most important EU institutions include the Council of the European Union, 
the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European 
Parliament, the European Council, and the European Central Bank (Mercado et 
al. 2001). The European Parliament's origins go back to the 1950s and the 
founding treaties, and since 1979 its members have been elected by the people 
they represent. Every five years elections are held in which registered EU 
citizens may vote (Gabel 1998). 
The EU's activities cover most areas of public policy, from economic policy to 
foreign affairs, defense, agriculture and trade (El-Agraa 2004). However, the 
extent of its powers differs greatly among areas. In some, the EU may resemble a 
federation (e.g. on monetary affairs, agricultural, trade and environmental policy, 
economic and social policy), in others a confederation (e.g. on home affairs), and 
in yet others an international organisation (e.g. in foreign affairs) (Nugent & 
O'Donnell 1994). 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
The Commission is considered the most supranational institution in the EU 
decision-making process. The European Commission (formally the Commission 
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of the European Communities) is the executive body of the European Union. It is 
geared towards promoting common European interests, as well as promoting its 
own position (Rometsch and Wessels 1997, p.214). The Commission is geared 
towards "promotional brokerage", trying to push the Member States to accept 
policies that go beyond a purely intergovernmental consensus based on the 
lowest common denominator. To play its role as promotional broker in the EU 
legislative process, the Commission needs information about the EEL The 
Commission has a substantial interest in this because it can help to identify 
common European interests.' 
The Commission consists of 25 Commissioners, one from each member state of 
the EU, supported by an administrative body of several thousand European civil 
servants divided into departments called Directorate-General. The term "the 
Commission" is generally used to refer both to the administrative body in its 
entirety, and to the team of Commissioners who lead it. Its primary roles are to 
propose and implement legislation, and to act as 'guardian of the treaties' which 
provide the legal basis for the EU (Nugent 2004). The role of the European 
Commission has many parallels with the executive body of a national 
government, but it also differences (see below for details). 
The Commission plays a central role in the EU legislative process. As the 
analysis in this thesis is confined to legislative lobbying in the first pillar of the 
"pillar" structure introduced by the TEU,^ the fundamentals of the Commission's 
position in the legislative process can be found in Article 149 of the EEC Treaty 
9. The Commission's sole right of legislative initiative is based on Article 149(1) 
' A l o n g s i d e t h e E u r o p e a n Pa r l i amen t and the Counc i l o f the E u r o p e a n Un ion , it is o n e of the th ree m a i n 
ins t i tu t ions g o v e r n i n g t h e Un ion . T h e C o m m i s s i o n or ig ina ted in the High Au thor i ty of the E u r o p e a n Coa l 
and Steel C o m m u n i t y , w h i c h w a s es tab l i shed in 1951 u n d e r the t e rms of the Trea ty Es tab l i sh ing t h e 
E u r o p e a n Coa l and Steel C o m m u n i t y ( N u g e n t 2004) . In 1958 t w o fu r t he r bod i e s w e r e es tab l i shed u n d e r the 
t e r m s o f t h e Trea t i e s o f R o m e ( K y r o u 2000) . T h e s e w e r e the C o m m i s s i o n of the E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c 
C o m m u n i t y and t h e C o m m i s s i o n o f the E u r o p e a n A t o m i c E n e r g y C o m m u n i t y . F ina l ly , in 1967, these th ree 
b o d i e s m e r g e d to f o r m the C o m m i s s i o n of the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t i e s , e s tab l i shed u n d e r the t e rms o f the 
M e r g e r Trea ty . Th i s is t h e b o d y that con t inues to exist to this day (Gabel 1998) . 
^ In the s e c o n d and third pi l lar , the C o m m i s s i o n h a s to sha re t h e r ight o f ini t ia t ive with the M e m b e r States . 
H o w e v e r , the Counc i l o f the European Un ion and the European Pa r l i amen t are both ab l e to fo rma l ly r eques t 
that the C o m m i s s i o n legis la te on a par t i cu la r topic. In the areas that fall wi th in the " s e c o n d p i l l a r " ( fo re ign 
po l i cy and d e f e n c e ) and " th i rd p i l l a r " (cr iminal law) , t h e C o m m i s s i o n shares the p o w e r o f in i t ia t ing 
legis la t ion wi th t h e E u r o p e a n Counc i l (S tacey 2003a) . 
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(Stacey 2003a). As agenda-setter, the Commission has the formal right to initiate 
legislation and is thus responsible for the drafting of legislative proposals. The 
drafting of proposals takes place in the first phase of the policy-making process 
and requires a substantial amount of expertise. Expert Knowledge is therefore the 
critical resource for the Commission's legislative work, and as a result they must 
work closely with industry. Because of understaffing and severe budget 
constraints in the Commission, the "institution is dependent on external resources 
to obtain the necessary expertise" (Spence 1997, p.71). 
The Commission^ also takes the role of guardian of the treaties, which includes 
taking responsibility for initiating infiingement proceedings at the European 
Court of Justice against member states and others who it considers to have 
breached the EU treaties and other community laws (Stacey 2003b). It is 
responsible for adopting technical measures to implement legislation adopted by 
the Council and, in most cases, the Parliament. This legislation is subject to the 
approval of committees made up of representatives of member states (Gabel 
1998). The Commission also regulates competition in the Union, vetting all 
mergers with Community-wide effects and initiating proceedings against 
companies which violate EU competition laws. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
In stark contrast to the Commission, the Council is the most intergovernmental 
institution in the EU legislative procedure. As the Union's supreme decision 
maker, it is the forum for reconciling the distinctive purposes and powers of the 
Member States. The Council of the European Union forms, along with the 
European Parliament, the legislative arm of the European Union (EU). The 
Council of the European Union contains ministers of the governments of each of 
the European Union member states. It is sometimes referred to in official 
^ T h e C o m m i s s i o n negot ia tes in ternat ional t rade ag reemen t s (in the W o r l d T r a d e Organ i za t i on ) and o the r 
in terna t ional a g r e e m e n t s on beha l f of the EU. It c lose ly co -ope ra t e s in this with the Counc i l of t h e E u r o p e a n 
Un ion . 
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European Union documents simply as the Council or the Council of Ministers 
(Stacey 2003a, 2003b). 
The Council has a President and a Secretary-General. The President of the 
Council is a Minister of the state currently holding the Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union; while the Secretary-General is the head of the Council 
Secretariat, chosen by the member states by unanimity (Stacey 2003a). The 
Secretary-General also serves as the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Council is assisted by the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which consists of the ambassadors 
or their deputies from the diplomatic representations of the Member States to the 
European Communities (Rometsch and Wessels 1997). COREPER generally 
prepares the Council agenda, and negotiates minor and non-controversial 
matters, leaving controversial issues for discussion, and other issues for formal 
agreement, by the Council (Stacey 2003b). Below COREPER, civil servants 
from the member states negotiate in Council working groups, often reaching de 
facto agreement which is formalised through COREPER and the Council of 
Ministers. The Council and its preparatory bodies are supported by European 
civil servants (approximately three thousand as of July 2005) providing general 
advice, qualified legal advice, translation services and impartial negotiation 
assistance (Stacey 2003a). The Council's Secretariat and its Presidency "embody 
a sense of collective purpose and collective commitment" and thereby give this 
intergovernmental institution a supranational flavour (Wurzel 1996, p.273; 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). 
The Council shares its legislative powers increasingly with the European 
Parliament. It is the Council's task to amend and decide on legislation by 
reaching a decision that is acceptable to all or, at least, to a majority (Westlake 
1995). According to Westlake (1995), there are four main legislative procedures 
that can be identified: 1) the consultation procedure, 2) the assent procedure, 3) 
the cooperation procedure, and 4) the co-decision procedure. The Council can 
influence the final shape of the legislative proposal to varying degrees, 
depending on the procedure being used. When it comes to decision-making in the 
Council, the proposal has already been technically elaborated and the demand for 
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Expert Knowledge from private interests is therefore substantially reduced. To 
comment on or amend a proposal, a different kind of information is required than 
that required for the actual drafting by the Commission. At this stage of the 
decision-making process, the Council is more interested in information that can 
facilitate the bargaining process among the Member States. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The European Parliament (formerly European Parliamentary Assembly) is the 
parliamentary body of the European Union (EU), directly elected by EU citizens 
once every five years. As a forum for discussions of political importance during 
the legislative process, the European Parliament has both supranational and 
intergovernmental characteristics. Although supranational political groups have 
been established in the Parliament over time, nationality remains a relevant 
cleavage within the assembly (Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). Together with the 
Council of Ministers, it comprises the legislative branch of the institutions of the 
Union (Corbett et al. 1995; Westlake 1994). 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established a 'Common 
Assembly' in September 1952, its 78 members drawn from the six national 
Parliaments of the ECSC's constituent nations. This was expanded in March 
1958 to also cover the European Economic Community and Euratom, and the 
name 'European Parliamentary Assembly' was adopted. The body was renamed 
the 'European Parliament' in 1962. In 1979 the Parliament's membership was 
expanded again and its members began to be directly elected for the first time. 
Thereafter the membership of the European Parliament has simply expanded 
whenever new nations have joined; the membership was adjusted upwards in 
1994 after German reunification. 
The European Parliament represents around 450 million citizens of the European 
Union. Its members are known as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). 
Since 13 June 2004, there have been 732 MEPs. (It was agreed that the 
maximum number of MEPs should be fixed at 750, with a minimum threshold of 
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six per member state and no member state being allocated more than 96 seats). 
Elections occur once in every five years, on the basis of universal adult suffrage. 
There is no uniform voting system for the election of MEPs; rather, each member 
state is free to choose its own system subject to three restrictions: 
• The system must be a form of proportional representation, under either 
the party list or Single Transferable Vote system. 
• The electoral area may be subdivided if this will not generally affect the 
proportional nature of the voting system. 
• Any election threshold on the national level must not exceed five percent. 
In order to understand the Parliament's role in the legislative process, the 
constituency orientation of the MEPs has also to be taken into account. All MEPs 
are in fact elected at the national level and therefore retain important links with 
their electorate back home. In order to increase their chances for re-election, 
MEPs need information about their national electorate (Hansen 1991). This is 
why MEPs need information about the DEI, which would provides them with 
information about the needs and preferences of their voters. 
On an industry note, in view of the Parliament's legislative role, its demand for 
expert knowledge is rather limited. The European Parliament cannot initiate 
legislation, but it can amend or veto it in many policy areas. Although some basic 
expert knowledge is indispensable, the amount of technical market expertise 
needed to amend and take decisions is much lower in the European Parliament. 
The Parliament particularly needs information from industry that allows it to 
assess the legislative proposals made by the European Commission. As a directly 
elected supranational assembly, it is the Parliament's task to evaluate "the 
legislative proposals from a European perspective" (Kohler-Koch 1997, p. 12). 
The specific information the Parliament requires for this assessment is 
information about the EEL This good access constitutes the institution's critical 
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resource because it provides encompassing private-sector information about the 
needs and interests in the EU internal market/ 
In some respects, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers resemble 
the upper and lower houses of a bicameral legislature (Hansen 1991). Neither the 
European Parliament nor the Council of Ministers may initiate EU legislation, 
this power being reserved by the Commission, and the fact that the European 
Parliament cannot itself propose laws makes it different from most national 
legislative assemblies. 
However, once a proposal for an EU law or directive has been introduced by the 
Commission, it must usually receive the approval of both Parliament and Council 
in order to come into force. Parliament may amend and block legislation in those 
policy areas that fall under the co-decision procedure, which currently make up 
about three-quarters of EU legislative acts. Remaining policy areas fall under 
either the assent procedure or (in a very few cases) the consultation procedure; 
under the former. Parliament has power to veto but not formally amend 
proposals, while under the latter it has only a formal right to be consulted.^ 
4 
In cer ta in o the r po l i cy areas , it h a s the r ight on ly to b e consu l ted . Pa r l i amen t a l so supe rv i ses t h e E u r o p e a n 
C o m m i s s i o n ; it m u s t a p p r o v e all a p p o i n t m e n t s to it, and can d i smis s it wi th a v o t e o f censure . It a l so has the 
r igh t t o con t ro l t h e E U b u d g e t . O t h e r o rgan i sa t ions o f E u r o p e a n count r ies , such as t h e O S C E , the Counc i l o f 
E u r o p e , a n d t h e W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n U n i o n , h a v e pa r l i amen ta ry a s sembl i e s as wel l , bu t the m e m b e r s of t he se 
a s s e m b l i e s a r e a p p o i n t e d by na t iona l par l iaments . T h e E u r o p e a n Pa r l i amen t is d i rect ly elected b y the p e o p l e 
o f t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n and has s o m e res t r ic ted legis la t ive p o w e r ( K o h l e r - K o c h 1997), 
^ T h e E u r o p e a n Pa r l i amen t a l so cont ro l s the E U budge t , wh ich m u s t b e app roved by the Counc i l in o rder to 
b e c o m e law. 
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APPENDIX 5 
F U N D I N G O F A N T I - T E R R O R I S T S E C U R I T Y M E A S U R E S 
E U R O P E A N A I R T R A N S P O R T I N D U S T R Y P O L I C Y P A P E R 
1 December 2003 
Attachment: Examples of additional costs for anti-terrorist security 
measures borne by air carriers and airports 
Sta f f screening (personnel and equ ipment ) : 
• Aeroports de Paris (ADP) paid € 19.2 m in 2002 and € 26.4 m in 2003 for 
screening of staff entering restricted areas. ADP forecasts a cost of € 30 m 
for 2004; 
• Schiphol Airport paid € 21.8 m in 2002 and € 22.8 m in 2003. The airport 
operator's forecast for 2004 amounts to € 10.6 m; 
• Frankfurt airport forecasts the cost of staff screening for 2004 at € 5.5 m, 
excluding necessary construction costs for modifying the layout of buildings. 
A n t i - t e r r o r t r a i n i n g o f a i r crews as we l l as secur i ty a n d awareness t r a i n i n g 
f o r a l l s ta f f w o r k i n g at a i rpor ts : 
• for such training British airways spends € 1.2 m annually alone for its 
operational bases LHR and LGW; 
• KLM spent some € 4 m in the two years preceding 1 April 2003; 
• Lufthansa spent additional € 2.5 m since 09/11 for crew training 
• the total cost for security awareness training at Frankfurt Airport was € 
664,000 for 2003. The forecast for 2004 amounts to € 352,000; 
• Aeroports de Paris (ADP) paid € 500,000 in 2003 for security awareness 
training; 
• at smaller airports, such as Malta International Airport, the total cost for 
security awareness was € 103,500 in 2003 and the forecast for this outlay in 
2004 amounts to € 110,400. 
Rein fo rced cockp i t doors 
• British Airways has already spent € 14.7 m for reinforced cockpit doors 
(parts and labour, not including dedicated aircraft downtime); 
• KLM spent around € 16 m for the strengthening of cockpit doors since 09/11; 
• Lufthansa spent € 16.5 m for hardened cockpit doors (phase & and 2) since 
09/11. 
O n b o a r d means of survei l lance and new opera t iona l onboa rd procedures 
• British airways has already spent € 9.9 m (parts and labour, not including 
dedicated aircraft downtime) for these security measures; 
• Lufthansa has calculated to spend € 8.2 m for the installation of onboard 
video systems since 09/11 through 2004. 
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In tens i f ied gua rd ing of a i r c ra f t and pat ro ls a r o u n d the a i r p o r t pe r ime te r 
fence 
• in 2002 and 2003, Schiphol Airport paid € 3 m each year for patrols around 
the exterior of the airport perimeter fence; 
• During 2003, Zurich Airport paid € 2.13 m for patrols around the airport 
perimeter fence; 
• In addition to increased costs for airport authorities in the UK for patrols, 
airlines are required to guard/control access to aircraft at airports. British 
Airways' cost for this at LHR and LGW are € 12.9 m per year; 
• For additional surveillance activities, KLM spent around € 14 m in the two 
years preceding 1 April 2003; 
• By the end of 2003, Lufthansa estimates to have spent an additional € 3 m for 
extra aircraft guarding services at Frankfurt and Munich alone. 
Regu la r b a c k g r o u n d checks on s taf f and cer t i f i ca t ion o f secur i ty s ta f f 
• For newly implemented criminal and background checks in the UK, British 
Airways' total costs in 2003 will be € 2.8 m, but are expected to reduce to 
about 700 000 € per year; 
• KLM incurred € 350 000 in additional costs for staff background checks in 
the year preceding 1 April 2003; 
• Since 09/11, Lufthansa incurred € 1.45 m in additional costs for internal 
background checks; 
• Frankfurt Airport paid € 1.2 m in 2002 and in 2003 for background checks on 
staff. € 1.2 m was also paid during 2003 for certification of security staff; 
• at a smaller airport, such as Zurich Airport, costs of € 100,000 for 2002 and 
2003 were incurred for background checks of staff. In addition, Zurich 
Airport paid approximately € 50,000 on certifying security staff in 2003. 
I nd i r ec t costs f o r ca ter ing and c leaning services 
• British Airways' annual costs for these services are € 1.06 m higher, 
compared to pre 09/11 levels; 
• During the two years preceding 1 April 2003, KLM incurred € 7 m in 
additional costs imputable to security. 
A P I S and P N R access p rov is ion 
• With each country adding their own national requirements, this is a very 
worrying subject; PNR access for the USA and the additional costs for 
implementing, running and maintaining the US/TSA watch lists alone cost 
British Airways € 580 000 per year; 
• KLM calculated additional € 3 m in costs for sharing PNR data with 
security/border police in the year preceding 1 April 2003; 
• Since 09/11 through 2004, Lufthansa will have spent an additional € 2.2 m 
on this. 
Moreover, the additional costs for additional security measures given are just 
demonstrative of some individual air carriers and airports operators. Actually, all 
sectors and operators of the air transport industry have been and will continue to 
be affected. The costs illustrated are massive but these may be proportionally 
higher than smaller carriers and airports that cannot enjoy the economies of scale 
of the larger airports or airlines. 
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Table 29: KLM income Statement 
I n c o m e S t a t e m e n t 
Year 
Mar 2 0 0 5 
Mar 2 0 0 4 
Mar 2 0 0 3 
Mar 2 0 0 2 
Mar 2 0 0 1 
Mar 2 0 0 0 
Mar 1 9 9 9 
Mar 1 9 9 8 
Mar 1 9 9 7 
R e v e n u e Net I n c o m e 
{$ mil . ) {$ mil . ) 
8 , 3 1 7 . 3 
7 . 1 5 4 . 1 
7 , 0 6 6 . 0 
5 , 6 8 8 . 0 
6,100.0 
6 ,018.0 
5 , 7 1 7 . 8 
5 . 6 6 6 . 2 
5 , 5 1 5 , 6 
1 1 7 . 5 
29 2 
( 4 5 4 . 0 ) 
( 1 3 6 . 0 ) 
6 7 . 0 
32Z0 
2 2 3 . 2 
1 , 0 5 8 . 8 
1 2 5 , 7 
' Mar 1 9 9 6 5 , 7 6 9 , 3 3 3 0 , 4 
Source: Annual reports 1995-2005 
Net E m p l o y e e s 
Profit 
Margin 
1 . 4 % 
0 ^ % 
1.1% 
5 . 4 % 
3.9%b 
18.7%, 
2 . 3 % 
5 . 7 % 
2 7 , 9 8 3 
3 1 , 1 8 2 
3 3 , 0 3 8 
33,265 
3 3 , 7 6 3 
3 0 , 1 5 9 
2 8 , 3 7 4 
26,811 
2 6 , 3 8 5 
2 5 , 0 0 3 
POLAND 
F R A N C E UST UNCARY R O M A N I A 
SPAIN 
Picture shot of economy (1995): 
GDP ($ bn): 394.2 
GDP per head ($) 25,435 
Consumer price inflation: 2% 
Current account balance: 16.3% 
Exports of goods ($) 172,9 
imports of goods ($) -153,8 
Picture shot of economy (2001): 
GDP ($ bn): 384,4 
GDP per head ($) 24,051 
Consumer price inflation: 4.1 % 
Current account balance (,$): 8,1 
Exports of goods ($) 204,52 
Imports of goods ($) -183,64 
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Table 30: Lufthansa Income Statement 
Year 
D e c 2 0 0 4 
Dec 2 0 0 3 
D e c 2 0 0 2 
Dec 2 0 0 1 
Dec 2 0 0 0 
Dec 1 9 9 9 
D e c 1 9 9 8 
D e c 1 9 9 7 
D e c 1 9 9 6 
Dec 1 9 9 5 
R e v e n u e Net I n c o m e 
( £ mil .) ( £ mil . ) 
1 2 , 0 0 9 . 8 
1 1 , 2 6 2 . 4 
1 1 , 0 8 7 , 1 
1 0 , 1 8 4 . 7 
9 , 5 8 3 . 8 
7 , 9 6 5 . 5 
8 . 1 4 4 . 3 
7.826.4 
7 , 9 0 1 . 7 
8 , 9 2 0 . 4 
286.0 
( 6 9 4 . 5 ) 
4 6 8 . 3 
(386.4) 
4 3 4 . 4 
3 9 2 . 4 
5 1 4 . 4 
282.2 
2 0 9 . 8 
6 5 7 . 1 
Net Profit 
Margin 
2 . 4 % 
4 . 2 % 
4 , 5 % 
4 . 9 % 
6 , 3 % 
3 , 6 % 
2 , 7 % 
7 . 4 % 
E m p l o y e e s 
9 0 , 6 7 3 
9 3 , 2 4 6 
9 4 , 1 3 5 
8 7 , 9 7 5 
6 9 , 5 2 3 
6 6 , 2 0 7 
5 4 , 8 6 7 
5 8 , 2 5 0 
5 7 , 9 9 9 
5 7 , 5 8 6 
Source: Annual reports 1995-2005 
F I N L A N D 
LAI VI 
I T H U A N 
U K R A I N E 
F R A N C E 
kgy siRiuABtilCiUi 
St y S P A I N 
Picture shot of economy (1995); 
GDP ($ bn): 2,415 
GDP per head ($) 29,600 
Consumer price inflation: 1.8% 
Current account balance ($): -23.9 
Exports of goods ($) 380.0 
Imports of goods ($) -340.0 
Picture shot of economy (2001): 
GDP($ bn): 1,855.0 
GDP per head ($) 22,605 
Consumer price inflation: 2.0% 
Current account balance ($): 2.4 
Exports of goods ($): 570,0 
Imports of goods ($) -481,4 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), CountryData. 
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Table 31: Alitalia Income statement 
I n c o m e S t a t e m e n t 
Year R e v e n u e 
(£ mil .) 
D e c 2 0 0 4 2 ,882.0 
D e c 2 0 0 3 3 ,039 .1 
Dec 2 0 0 2 3 ,095 .5 
D e c 2 0 0 1 3 , 3 5 8 . 4 
D e c 2 0 0 0 3 ,569.0 
D e c 1 9 9 9 3 , 1 5 5 . 1 
D e c 1 9 9 8 3 , 3 2 2 . 0 
D e c 1 9 9 7 2 , 9 9 8 . 8 
D e c 1 9 9 6 3 , 1 2 3 . 0 
D e c 1 9 9 5 3 , 1 8 1 . 5 
Net I n c o m e 
(£ mil . ) 
( 5 7 4 . 8 ) 
(366.8) 
60.8 
( 5 5 3 . 5 ) 
(161.2) 
3.8 
1 4 8 . 9 
1 5 2 . 7 
( 4 6 9 . 1 ) 
(36.9) 
Net Profit 
Margin 
2,0% 
0.1% 
4 . 5 % 
5 . 1 % 
E m p l o y e e s 
2 0 , 5 7 5 
22,200 
2 2 , 5 3 6 
2 2 , 9 4 8 
2 3 , 4 7 8 
2 0 , 4 9 7 
1 9 , 6 0 0 
1 5 , 7 4 0 
1 6 , 5 0 7 
17,982 
Source: Annual reports 1995-2005 
^ 5 5 
F I N L A N D 
P O L A N O 
USTRlAJlIU 
R O M A N I A 
:*»y'5SEBaiA\lMJL 
St- T SPAIN 
Picture shot of economy (1995): 
GDP ($ bn): 1,086 
GDP per head ($) 18,900 
Consumer price inflation: 5,9 
Current account balance: 14,6 
Exports of goods ($): 198,8 
Imports of goods ($) -154,3 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), CountryData. 
Picture shot of economy (2001): 
GDP ($ bn): 1,092.8 
GDP per head ($) 18,860 
Consumer price inflation: 2.8 
Current account balance ($): 0.0 
Exports of goods ($): 242,4 
Imports of goods ($) -226,6 
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Table 32: SAS Income statement 
I n c o m e S t a t e m e n t 
Year 
Dec 2 0 0 4 
Dec 2 0 0 3 
Dec 2 0 0 2 
Dec 2 0 0 1 
Dec 2 0 0 0 
Dec 1 9 9 9 
Dec 1 9 9 8 
Dec 1 9 9 7 
Dec 1 9 9 6 
Revenue 
(£ mil.) 
4 . 5 5 7 . 2 
4 , 4 8 1 . 6 
4 . 6 2 5 . 8 
3 . 3 5 1 . 9 
3 , 3 8 0 . 6 
3 , 0 0 9 . 9 
3 . 0 4 5 . 3 
2,980.2 
3 , 0 3 8 . 9 
D e c 1 9 9 5 3 , 4 2 7 . 2 
Source: Annual reports 1995-2005 
Net I n c o m e 
(£ mil.) 
( 1 4 6 . 9 ) 
( 1 0 9 . 8 ) 
(9.4) 
(69.3) 
1 5 1 . 8 
1 2 2 . 3 
2 1 0 . 4 
1 7 0 . 8 
1 5 3 . 4 
2 2 8 . 9 
Net Profit 
Margin 
4 . 5 % 
4 . 1 % 
6 . 9 % 
5 ^ % 
5 . 0 % 
6 ^ % 
Employees 
3 2 , 4 8 1 
3 4 , 5 4 4 
3 5 , 5 0 6 
3 0 , 9 7 2 
3 0 , 9 3 9 
2&,863 
2 7 , 0 7 1 
2 5 , 0 5 7 
2 3 , 6 0 7 
2 2 , 7 3 1 
Picture shot of economy (1995): 
GDP ($ bn): 93,222 
Consumer price inflation: 1.3% 
Exports of goods (Euros bn); 414 
Imports of goods (Euros bn) -326 
Picture shot of economy (1995): 
GDP ($bn): 250.2 
GDP per head (US$) 28,310 
Consumer price inflation %: 0.5 
Current account balance ($): 4.8 
Exports of goods ($): 79.1 
Imports of goods ($) 64.3 
Picture shot of economy (2001): 
GDP ($ bn): 106,486 
Consumer price inflation: 3.0% 
Exports of goods (Euros bn): 650 
Imports of goods (Euros bn) -429 
Picture shot of economy (2001): 
GDP ($ bn): 159.0 
GDP perhead(US$):29,718 
Consumer price inflation: 2.3 
Current account balance (US$bn):4.1 
Exports of goods (US$bn): 50.9 
Imports of goods (US$bn): 44.0 
N L A N D 
Btmrtus 
O L A N O 
U K R A I N E 
Picture shot of economy (1995) 
GDP ($ bn): 172,2 
GDP per head (US$) 33,130 
Consumer price inflation: 2,1 
Current account balance: 1,9 
Exports of goods ($): 48,7 
Imports of goods ($) 41,3 
Picture shot of economy (2001): 
GDP (US$bn): 237 
GDP per head (US$) 26,600 
Consumer price inflation: 2,7% 
Current account balance (US$bn): 6,7 
Exports of goods (USSbn): 76,2 
Imports of goods (USSbn): 62,4 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), CountryData. 
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Table 33: TAP Income statement 
I n c o m e S t a t e m e n t 
Year 
Dec 2 0 0 4 
Dec 2 0 0 3 
Dec 2 0 0 2 
Revenue 
C$ mil.) 
1 , 1 5 9 . 1 
1 , 2 4 6 . 0 
7 , 5 4 . 2 
D e c 2 0 0 1 1 , 5 4 5 . 4 
Source: Annual reports 2001-2005 
Net I n c o m e 
($ mil.) 
0 
0 
(6) 
(44) 
Net Profit 
Margin 
Employees 
5 , 6 8 3 
5 , 7 0 1 
8,357 
8 , 2 0 3 
M N L A N D 
U K R A I N E 
TUXCM-DOUR 
F R A N C E USTRIA;HUNGAJRY ROMANIA 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), CountryData. 
Picture shot of economy (1995): 
GDP (Esc bn): 14,401 
GDP per head (Esc) 1,664 
Consumer price inflation: 5.7 
Current account balance (Esc): -229 
Exports of goods (ESc): 4,217 
Imports of goods ($) -5,789 
Picture shot of economy (2001): 
GDP (Euro): 110,1 
GDP per head (Euro) 7,500 
Consumer price inflation: 4.4 
Current account balance (US $): -10.0 
Exports of goods ($): 25.8 
Imports of goods ($) 38.8 
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Interview Summary 
Code Date Position Firm Approx Time 
Pilot interview 
ZZ 18"" January 2005 Director of Environment Z 1 hr 
ZZl 20"" January 2005 Director of Government Affairs Z 50 mins 
ZZ2 24^ January 2005 Director of Government Affairs Y 1 hr 
Actual Interviews 
AOOl 27* January 2005 Director Government affairs A 1 hr 
A002 9"" February 2005 Director Aeropolitical A 1 hr 
A003 28*^  February 2005 Director of External Relations A 50 mins 
B004 12* August 2005 Director of Government Affairs B 1 hr 
A005 2""^  September 2005 Director of Government Affairs A 1 hr 
B006 21^'September 2005 Director of Communication B 45 mins 
B007 4* October 2005 Director of Government Affairs B 40 mins 
F008 4* October 2005 Air Transport Policy Mang/Directorate General F 50 mins 
C009 19"= October 2005 Director of Government Affairs C 1 hr 
COlO 24*^  October 2005 CEO C 1 hr 
coil 1®' November 2005 Manager of Government Affairs C 1 hr 
E012 24"* November 2005 Director of Social Affairs E 45 mins 
C013 29"^  November 2005 Manager of Government Affairs C 1 hr 
E014 8* February 2006 Director of Government Affairs E 40 mins 
F015 20* February 2006 AEA government affairs manager F 1 hr 
F016 24* January 2006 lATA Director of Government Affairs F 2hr 
D017 14* March 2006 Director of Institutional Affairs D 1 hr 
E018 20* March 2006 Government Affairs Manager E 1 hr 
F019 10* April 2006 Ex lATA director of Gov Affairs F 50 mins 
E020 20* April 2006 Manager of Government Affairs E 1 hr 
1)021 31* May 2006 Vice president of Business Development D 1 hr 
E022 26* June 2006 Director of EU Affairs E 1.40 hr 
13023 28* June 2006 Director of Infi-astructure E 40 mins 
Actual interviews and Follow up (*) 
13024* 12* July 2006 Director of Government Affairs B 20 mins 
C025* 15* July 2006 Director of Government Affairs C 20 mins 
A026* 4* August 2006 Director of Government Affairs A 20 mins 
13027* 15* August 2006 Director of Institutional Affairs D 40 mins 
13028* 3'^ '' October 2006 Director of Government Affairs B 20 mins 
13029* 7* October 2006 Director of Government Affairs B 20 mins 
A030* 13* October 2006 Director of Government Affairs A 20 mins 
E031* 16* October 2006 Director of Government Affairs E 20 mins 
F032 17* October 2006 AEA Secretary General F 1 hr 
C033* 20* October 2006 Manager of Government Affairs C 20 mins 
1)034 22"'' Jan 2007 Manager of Public Affairs D 20mins 
1)035* 22"'' Jan 2007 Vice president of Business Development D 10 mins 
F036* 1^ ' February 2007 AEA government affairs manager F 50 mins 
F037 4* February 2007 AEA government affairs manager F 40 Mins 
F038 26* February 2007 Citigroup Vice President (Aviation) F 30 Mins 
1)039 28* February 2007 Director of Marketing D 1 hr 
A -Lufthansa 
B-SAS 
C - Tap air 
D-Alitalia 
E - K L M 
F-External Expert 
*-Follow up interview 
XXI 
A P P E N D I X 8 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Contact summary Form: with coded themes 
Interview type: 
Type of contact: Director Coder 
With whom Place Date Data Coded_ 
Page Salient Points 
Themes/Aspects 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
XXII 
DEVELOPING A LOBBYING PROCESS AS A STRATEGIC CAPABILITY: A 
STUDY OF EUROPEAN FLAG AIRLINES IN CONTRASTING POLICY 
CONTEXTS 
Interview Schedule 
Introduction 
A. The case covers two pohcy contexts, which are the introduction of the third 
air transport hberaUzation package in 1993 (we refer to this as a proactive 
policy context) and Post September 11^ Terrorist attacks in 2001 with 
focus mainly on the lobbying efforts of (NAME OF THE FIRM) for a 
compensation package and lobbying efforts for not to pay for the anti-
terrorist security costs (we refer to this as a reactive policy context). 
B. I want to write a more detailed account of how firms developed their 
lobbying processes, lobbying routines and lobbying skills to deploy and 
leverage certain political resources in two contrasting policy contexts. 
C. Data will be confidential and I shall provide a summary or give you a copy 
of the report to check before releasing it. 
D. There are some questions that will be repeated indirectly as a means to 
enhance validity. 
E. Time of the interview is approximately 45 mins. 
Background 
o What is your role? What is the function of this department? 
o How long have you had this position? Number of years? What job did you 
have prior to joining (NAME OF FIRM)? 
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o How long has (NAME OF FIRM) been lobbying individually on a national 
and trans-national level (i.e. EU level)? Do you remember when you joined 
AEA? What other associations/groups do you belong to other then AEA, 
lATA? 
DEREGULATION CONTEXT 
> During the deregulation period of the European airline industry, did 
(NAME OF FIRM) play a role in the formulation of the third package 
before it came to function or did another institution play a part on your 
behalf, i.e. civil aviation authority? AEA? 
> During the deregulation period (1988-1997) did (NAME OF THE 
FIRM) have a corporate government affairs or external affairs or 
political/regulatory affairs office, or did you just have a few structured 
positions shared within your organisation? Please elaborate on the 
positions and responsibilities. 
> Can you recall before the introduction of the first package (1988-1997) 
what did (NAME OF THE FIRM) mainly lobby for? What was your 
decision-making process? Talk about your thinking? 
> With regards to lobbying on a national and EU level, what lobbying 
routines did (NAME OF FIRM) start to develop in the run up to the 
introduction of the 3^ '^  package in 1993, e.g. trying to get traffic rights? 
Step by Step? For example, direct methods (routines around personal 
visits, personal letter, phone calls, association/group)? Indirect methods 
(Friends inside the system, consultants, affiliated interest groups, 
debates, firm organised cocktails, dinner parties, breakfast meetings)? 
Combinations? 
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^ Did (NAME OF THE FIRM) hire lobbyists, consultants or lawyers 
outside its firm before the introduction of the third package? If so, were 
they in Brussels or your home country during the deregulation time and 
why did (NAME OF THE FIRM) not just develop it in-house? 
^ What new routines did you start to develop after the third package was 
introduced, if any? Did you carry on the same lobbying routines after 
deregulation was introduced or did you start to introduce new routines 
due to other rising important issues? For example, direct methods 
(routines revolved around personal visits, personal letter, phone, public 
action group)? Indirect methods (friends inside the political system, 
consultants, affiliated interest groups, dinners, cocktails, debates)? 
> In your view and opinion what lobbying routine/activities or 
combination of routines/activities was most successful in creating 
influence for your firm? Indirect way or direct way? Combination? Did 
you lobby the Commission, the European parliament and the Council of 
Ministers? Is it different for each group? Does the lobbying style 
change depend on who was in power? 
> Where did the decisions originate to deal with the introduction of the 
third package? Top down/CEO or bottom up/Department level? 
> What expertise and experience did you have in place to deal with this 
policy context? People's previous background in law? Knowledge in 
law? Skills? Outsourced? Trained at your firm or do they have expertise 
from previous jobs? 
> How did these lobbying routines emerge with regards to the 
introduction of the third package? Did your company react to the 
external environment or was it based on your company's own 
initiative? 
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^ How did you build new thinking within your department during this 
period? Learning by training? Having meetings with other departments? 
^ How much effort and time did you spend on training people within your 
department to improve their abilities during this period? 
> How much time, effort and money did you spend on building formal 
relations with other political actors during the deregulation period? Did 
you try to provide EU and national level political decisions makers 
recreational services like seminars, company visits, dinner parties, 
cocktails etc? 
> How was your position when you came across this policy context? For 
example. Ambiguous? hi Control? 
> How did you protect your processes, routines and people (skills) from 
being copied? Did you use pay or do you have other mechanisms? 
> How would you describe your networks and relationships during the 
deregulation period? Extensive? Built over time? How do you build 
these relationships? 
> How would you describe the structure of your department? Large or 
small after the deregulation? How many people were working in the 
SAS Aeropolitical affairs office from 1993-1998? What were their 
positions? How centralised was your company, i.e. centralised or 
decentralised? Did it change much from before the third package was 
introduced to after? Why did you choose this structure? 
> Why did you use different forms and combinations of corporate 
political activities for this specific policy context? 
> In your view did (NAME OF THE FIRM) invest a lot of time, and 
effort into lobbying activities before the introduction of the third 
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liberlisation package? If so, why did (NAME OF THE FIRM) invest 
time and effort into lobbying before the introduction of the third 
liberlisation package? 
POST TERRORIST ATTACKS 9/11 CONTEXT 
> Do you recall when you first heard of the terrorist attacks on the twin 
towers on September 11*^? What was your department mainly focusing 
its effort on before this event took place? Acquisition of traffic rights, 
just monitoring or lobbying other issues? Would you say your 
department's routines (day to day activity) were stable before this 
event? 
> After September 11"^ did you still maintain a fully utilised corporate 
government or external/political affairs office? Did you have to change 
or create new positions or restructure this office after September 11"'? 
> After September 11*%, did (NAME OF FIRM) lobby the European 
Union and your national government for compensation package? Did 
(NAME OF FIRM) hire lobbyists, consultants or lawyers outside its 
firms. If so, then why in your opinion did you hire them? 
> What lobbying routines did you start to develop the day after September 
ll"^ to lobby for the compensation package? For example, direct 
methods (routines revolved around personal visits, personal letter, 
phone, public action group)? Indirect methods (firiends inside the 
system, consultants, affiliated interest groups, debates, firm cocktails, 
dinner parties, breakfast meetings)? Combinations? 
> Did you carry on the same routines after the EU introduced the 
compensation/rescue package or did you develop new routines for 
another new focus? For example, direct methods (routines revolved 
around personal visits, personal letter, phone, public action group)? 
Indirect methods (friends inside the system, consultants, affiliated 
interest groups)? 
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^ In your view what lobbying routine/activities or combination of 
routines was most successful in creating influence for your firm? 
Indirect or direct way? 
^ Where did the decisions originate to lobby for the compensation 
package after September 11/^? Top down or bottom up? 
^ What expertise did you have in place to deal with this policy context? 
People? Knowledge? Skills? Outsourced? Trained at your firm or did 
they have expertise from previous jobs? 
> What experience did your company have to deal with this uncertain 
policy context in which you had to react quickly? 
> How did these lobbying routines emerge? Did your company react to 
the external environment (environmental pull) or was it based on your 
companies own initiative (organisational push)? 
> How did you build new thinking within your department after 
September ll"^? Learning by training? Having meetings with other 
departments? 
> How much effort did you spend on training people within your 
department to improve their abilities during this period? 
> How much time, effort and money did you spend on building formal 
relations with other political actors after September 11/^? Did you try to 
provide EU and national level political decisions makers recreational 
services like seminars, company visits, dinner parties, cocktails etc? 
> How was your position when you came across this event? For example, 
ambiguous? 
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^ How did you protect your lobbying routines and people from being 
copied? For example, knowledge, routines and processes? Do you have 
some kind of mechanism like pay or other ways? 
^ How would you describe the structure of your department? Large or 
small after September l l " ' ? How many people were working in the 
SAS Aeropolitical affairs office from 2000-2004? What were their 
positions? How centralised was your company, i.e. centralised or 
decentralised? Did it change much from before the policy was 
introduced to after? 
> Why did you use different forms and combinations of corporate 
political activities when trying to get the compensation package? Did 
you lobby the Commission, the European parliament and the Council of 
Ministers? Is it different for each group? Does the lobbying style 
change depending on who was in power? 
> In your view did (NAME OF THE FIRM) invest a lot of time, effort 
and money into lobbying after September l l ' ^ for the compensation 
package? If so, why did you invest time into lobbying? Was money 
spent on training your in-house lobbyists, or more on external of the 
company (with lawyers, consultants, trade associations)? 
Conclusion 
> Do you have any archive documentation on lobbying activities or routines 
during those times? Thanks. 
> Other people I should talk to within your firm? Someone below you? 
(Vice president public affairs office) (European vice president of 
corporate sfrategy) 
> The contact details of the law firms, consultants, lobbyists. 
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Association of European Airlines 
Avenue Louise 3K) B -1050 Brussels 
Tel.+32 (0)2 639 89 89 Fax 639 89 99 
E-mail aea.secrelarlat@aea.be 
Direct Line 32 (0)2 639 89 79 
E-mail K-H.Neumeister@aea.be 
22 Febniaiy, 2002 
With our letter of 13 February we informed you of the problems the aviation 
industry in Europe encounters with insurance coverage of w a r and te r ror i sm 
risk over and beyond 31 March 2002. 
Witfi this letter we submit a more detailed proposd on how, with the help of 
Governments, our problems could be resolved over time. 
Special attention is now drawn to points 1 - 8 of the enclosed document. The 
idea is to establish a European fund to which airlines, airports and related service 
industries would contribute. The amount of this extra coverage would be 1.5 bn 
US dollars per event. For a limited time we need the help of Governments in 
order to close the gap between the aggregated volume paid by industry and the 
guaranteed amount. The fund would be under the supervision and organisation 
of the European Commission and open to European countries outside the EU. 
There would be compatibility with the emerging ICAO model. 
May we kindly ask COREPER Transport Attaches to infirm their colleagues in 
charge of ECO FIN. The same request is made to ECAC DGCAs and AEA 
Presidents with regard to their Ministers of Finance. 
Yours sincerely. 
K-H. Neumeister 
Sent to: COREPER Transport Attaches (2 copies), ECAC DGCAs 
Copy to: AEA Presidents 
Adria Airways, Aer Lingus, Air France, Air Malta, Alitalia, Austrian Airlines, British Airways,BMI British Midland, 
Cargolux, Croatia Airlines, CSA, Cyprus Airways, Finnair, Iberia, Icelandair, JAT, KLM, Lufthansa, 
Luxair, Malev, Olympic Airways, SAS, Spanair, Swissair, TAP Air Portugal, Tarom, Turkish Airlines. 
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E-mail aea.sscretarlal@aea.be 
POSITION PAPER OF THE AEA 
Meeting between the Commission, Vice President de Palacio, and the 
AEA Presidents Committee, 20 September 2001. 
THE US TRAGEDY AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Overall position of the AEA 
The AEA emphasises the 
position. It Jooks at the 
Council) to take the lead. 
need for a common European response and 
Community Institutions (Commission and the 
• This is the moment of truth for the Community to stand togctlier and to act 
collectively as the main partner of the US in dealing with the issues. 
• The AEA expects and indeed demands, that industry will be a full partner in 
the internal European discussions. Specific reference is made to the work of 
the ad-hoc multi-disciplinary group formed by the Council and the 
Commission, 
• The US is already taking decisive steps in response to the crisis. Europe 
therefore, needs on its |)art, respond quickly indeed. 
• We have to ensure that there is no discrimination or distortion of competition. 
Europe and the US need to act in a co-ordinated and balanced manner. 
AdrIa Airways, Aer Lingus, Air France, Air Malta, Alitalia, Austrian Airlines, British Alrways,BMI British Midland 
Midland, Cargoiux, Croatia Airlines, CSA, Cyprus Airways, Finnair, Iberia, Icelandair, JAT, KLM, Lufthansa, 
Luxair, Malev, Olympic Airways, Sabena, SAS, Spanair, Swissair, TAP Air Portugal, Tarom, Turkish Airlines. 
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Our Industry is in dire need 
We are facing an emergency situation that affects all. This situation is caused by 
external factors, beyond the control of the airlines. It is because of this that we 
address the Community. 
We are not seeking state aid. We are seeking support and expect just 
compensation for damages caused by political events now and in the future from 
our European Community, in order to survive this storm. 
This storm threatens the vital role that air transport plays in our economy. By 
affecting the airlines and the aerospace industry it also has a knock-on effect on 
the travel industr\', business, tourism, and the public. 
The European airline industry is an important contributor to the European 
economy and to European employment. Attached we present you some relevant 
data. It is a vital European industry. 
Our business was already facing a difficult situation, because of a combination of 
economic slowdown, weak passenger demand and increasing labour and external 
costs (fuel, infrastructure). The industry was addressing this situation. Airlines 
were readying themselves for recovery and actively working to achieve this. 
This meant curbing employment, deferring further investments and reducing 
capacity. 
An Exceptional Situation 
The shut down of Transatlantic operations and the loss of the US market for 
more than three days including the slow start-up of the system, the closure of 
markets in the Middle East, added to that the disruption in the schedule of 
European and Far-East markets are costing the AEA members a substantial 
amount of money. The US carriers have immediately lost between 2-3 billion 
USD, European damage will not be much below that. 
Heightened security will come at a price. Additional measures, stringent 
application of security and resulting delays in the operating schedule will affect 
the airlines cost structure negatively. Declining traffic and increased costs are 
resulting in declining and thus disappearing margins, with resulting loss of 
employment. This is all happening at great speed! 
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As a result from the immediate measures and the following crisis, the US carriers 
expect a decline of revenues ranging from 60% in September, going down in 
October 40%, the rest of 2001 about 25 % per month and up to June 2002 up to 
15% each month. This has already resulted in major financial problems, ranging 
from acute liquidity problems (Approximately 24 billion USD is needed 
additionally; from an expected positive cash balance in 2002 of 8.5 billion USD 
it is now expected to be over 15 billion USD negative) to more structural 
problems. 
In the US worst-case scenario approximately 33 billion USD will be needed in 
government assistance. 
The US government measures immediately after the tragedy have also severely 
affected the European carriers. If US carriers are able to obtain compensation for 
the damages resulting from these measures, then affected European carriers 
should have similar opportunities. 
As far as the resulting crisis is concerned, the position of European carriers will 
naturally be severely affected by this situation also. While the position in Europe 
undoubtedly differs from the US, we will - and already are - suffering the 
negative consequences. For this reason, the airline industry welcomes the 
proposal by the Commission to set-up a working group to assess the situation 
and quantify the effects for European air transport. 
What can the EU do? 
Security 
The AEA Members support the conclusions of the Special Trans]X)rt Council of 
last Friday, 14 September. The airlines would like to emphasise that: 
• The financial consequences of enhanced security measures should be 
carefully considered. Security is an obligation to the public. It should 
therefore also benefit from public funding. 
• Industry should be a full part of the Multi-disciplinary group that focuses on 
Security issues. 
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• We need to look at realistic actions in the short terra based on a common 
European approach. These measures should be implemented in a common 
manner in all European States. 
• There is a need to focus on the outcome of the ECAC meeting, and in 
particular those elements of Document 30 that can be implemented in a 
common, efficient and cost-effective manner. 
• Europe should closely liaise with the US in order to ensure compatibility, 
non-discrimination, and avoidance of conflicting measures. The US and 
Europe should at least ensure equivalent measures! 
Legislation and Policy 
• Current legislation should be applied in a flexible manner. To give the 
most critical issues: 
As regards the application of the Slots Regulation the "use it or lose it 
rule" would need to take into account the current difficult circumstances. 
The industry needs an immediate reprieve from this rule. The value of the 
current Article 10 which allows the Commission to take account of events 
hke this must be applied to the fullest extent possible. 
As regards the application of Competition rules; given the extraordinary 
circumstances and in light of possible intervention by the US Government 
in the aviation market, we may need an accelerated review of airline 
mergers, restructuring of capacity and, in exceptional circumstances, the 
ability to co-ordinate schedules and capacity. 
• Pending legislation 
Lately, we have seen a number of legislative proposals that increase the 
burden on the industry. We propose a reassessment of all pending 
legislation and current policies in view of the recent events and the 
financial consequences of the crisis. 
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In particular the proposals that increase the burden on airlines need to be 
reassessed. Slots and Denied Boarding Compensation are of special 
concern. Europe needs to focus on helping its industry survive! 
The White Paper also needs to be re-evaluated to take into account the 
economic effects (both in general and air transport terms) of this situation. 
Needless to say, the implementation of the Single Sky would actually 
enhance safety and security while, at the same time, improve the 
industry's position! 
• Insurance premiums 
Premiums are rising both on passenger liability (1.25 USD per passenger; 
with more than 850.000 passengers per day, this translates into 
approximately 500 million Euros per year for the AEA airlines) and war-
risks (15 fold increase!). Here, as in the Gulf crisis, Government 
intervention or at least involvement could reduce the burden for carriers 
and passengers. 
An approach could be contemplated that would aim to cover excessive 
risks beyond the normal commercial risks that would apply without a 
crisis situation. Moreover, political intervention could help prevent 
excessive third country pressure on the level of premiums and the 
limitations of coverage. Such intervention should preferably be 
implemented in a co-ordinated manner. Community-wide. 
• Taxation issues 
Possible tax relief measures should be contemplated to assist the industiy 
and be co-ordinated on a Community level to ensure fair implementation 
and non-discrimination. 
This should be co-ordinated with the US which is currently considering 
tax-holiday facilities for US airlines. European airlines would look for 
equivalent treatment in this respect. 
The proposed kerosene tax would further deteriorate the financial position 
of the airlines. Therefore, discussion on this topic should be halted for the 
time being. 
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• Structural Issues 
Incentives for the structural reduction of capacity should be considered. 
Similar schemes were implemented in other sectors of European industry. 
Such reduction could focus on older and less environmentally friendly 
types of aircraft. 
• Labour issues 
In view of the expected losses in employment, the Community could 
alleviate the consequences for employees by assisting in re-employment 
and temporary assistance programmes. 
• Financial issues 
Assistance should be made available to allow the European industry 
survive this crisis. Unlike in the US, we are not asking for state-aid. We 
are asking for damage compensation, damage control and assistance. We 
also need to balance the burdens and achieve some benefits. 
US carriers are sponsoring a damage assistance programme before 
Congress that will probably amount to an immediate cash infusion of up 
to 5 Billion USD, and measures amounting to 24-33 Billion USD in 
assistance. 
As the US is cunently doing, the Community would need to start a debate 
on the future of its airline industr)' in the light of the effccts of this crisis 
and its aftermath. The debate should include (1) the creation of a specific 
EU assistance fund to deal with this major crisis, and (2) clear common 
guidelines on the provision of assistance in a non-discriminatory and 
balanced manner. 
Finally 
The AEA considers that all measures should support or at least not contradict the 
inevitable consolidation of the European airline industry. 
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Avenue Louise 350 B -1050 Brussels 
Tel.+32 (0)2 639 89 89 Fax 639 89 99 
E-mail aea.secretarlat@aea.be 
26 November 2001 
THE IMPACT OF 11 SEPTEMBER ON THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 
Address by Karl-Heinz Neumeister, AEA Secretary General, to the European 
Parliament Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism 
I am speaking to you today on behalf of an industry which, in less than three 
months, has seen called into question almost everything it used to take for 
granted. 
In more than 50 years since the War, the European airline industry has only once 
posted an annual decrease in traffic. That was in 1991. when the Gulf War. and 
the recession which followed it. combined to produce a minus 6% in passenger 
volume. 
The subsequent crisis in our industry lasted for four years. The European 
Commission created the famous 'Comite des Sages' / "Wise Men Committee' 
which, for all its good work, could recommend little more than 'don't burden us 
with costly regulation". It saw a number of European national carriers brought 
to the brink of extinction, saved only by the 'one time, last lime' round of State 
Aids. The same period saw the adoption of the Third Package of liberalisation 
measures. 
So. where are we now? This time, the economic downturn came before the war, 
so by the end of August we were registering only a cumulative 0.6% traffic 
increase, although the intra-European market was still fairly buoyant. Bui true, 
this situation already caused us a problem. Experts tell us that 'the industry was 
already in trouble' before September 11"' and 'the airlines are trying to hide their 
internal problems behind the US tragedy' - the first part is true but the latter is 
totally wrong. 
Adria Airways, Aer Lingus, Air France, Air Malta, Alitalia, Austrian Airlines, British Airways,BMI British Midland 
Cargolux, Croatia Airlines, CSA, Cyprus Airways. Finnair, Iberia, Icelandalr. JAT, KLM, Lulthansa, 
Luxair, Malev, Olympic Airv/ays, Sabena, SAS, Spanair, Swissair, TAP Air Portugal, Tarom, Turkish Airlines. 
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For us, 'trouble' is zero growth. Between September 1 and November 4"^ , we 
saw North Atlantic traffic fall by 35%, a decreases of more than 10% in Europe, 
and more than 17% to the Far East. With figures like these, we lack the words 
to express our astonishment. They bear no relation to anything we have ever 
seen. This industry has its skills in managing growth, not the reverse. If you 
plan for an increase of, say, 6% and 'overnight' you find yourself looking at a 
decrease systemwide of, say, minus 19%, then you have a problem of one-
quarter magnitude - for your whole business. 
Wliat does this mean in money terms for the totality of AEA member airlines? 
Well, our revenue loss in October, if it were sustained over 12 months, would 
amount to 10 billion euros. I hope this gives you some idea of the scale of the 
problem. 
I admit, my ten-billion figure refers to revenues, and not to profit, but how are 
the airlines going to lake an equivalent sum out of their cost base? If they cut 
back on their flying, they still have to pay the ownership costs of the aircraft 
which are standing idle. Reducing staff numbers in this magnitude is a very 
painful - and very expensive - exercise. 
Our worst-ever annual loss - in 1992 - was 2.4 billion USD. This time it is 
going to be much more. 
As I mentioned, the airlines were in a difficult, but by no means insup|)ortable, 
position prior to September. Last year (2000), the AEA airlines, collectively, 
made a small profit, thanks to a very small number who were doing well; most 
were already making losses and in the early part of this year were trying very 
hard to put in place realistic business recovery plans. Who is to say those plans 
would not have worked? Now. for Sabena. and for Swissair, it's all too late. 
Our textbook economists tell us thai this is all for the best and that there are too 
many airlines in Europe anyway. The medicine prescribed is: RESTRUCTURING. 
Do people really know what they are talking about? For some restructuring is 
another word for going out of business or going bankrupt! For me restructuring 
is consolidation or mergers. But this is exactly what is not possible on a cross 
border basis. In the EU it is feasible but such a company would lose its traffic 
rights with third countries. Its scope would be limited to the Single Market 
only. 
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So rescue i rom outside for both Swissair and Sabena is very limited because, as 
of today, bilateral air agreements between States (worldwide) stipulate that 
"substantial ownership and effective control of the airline designated should be 
in the hands of nationals of the designating party". The politician's should 
change this. 
I don ' t know iji detail the plans of the airline that is in the process of replacing 
Sabena, but my understanding is that they are concentrating on the intra-
European market, which I believe is economically very wise. But the fact 
remains that with the disappearance of Sabena, some 20 cities outside Europe 
were, overnight, no longer linked directly to Brussels, and many more cities 
within this category were handed over to non-European competitors. Some 27 
European destinations so far monopoly routes of Sabena, may be rescued by 
other Belgian carriers. 
Let us ask the 'experts' again. The vacuum will be filled, they say. There will 
be three or four global airlines in Europe, and these, plus a number of so-called 
'no-frills ' carriers, will meet all of Europe's needs. 
Do you believe that? Do you believe that Air France, Lufthansa. British Airways 
or KLM, will be falling over each other in the rush to serve the Brussels long-
haul market, with direct flights? They will not - for the simple reason that they 
have no traffrc rights in Brussels to destinations outside the Single Market. Will 
the 'no fril ls ' carrier establish a network in Brussels to link, say, all capitals of 
the Single Market? Will the no frills' replace the 27 destinations in Europe 
Sabena used to fly alone? They will not, because, as with the charter carriers, 
'no frills ' concentrate on a limited number of point to point routes - they don' t 
offer networks. 
Travellers f rom Brussels have at least a choice of neighbouring hubs to help 
them on their way around the world. Some of these hubs are even rcachable by 
train. If Lisbon, or Dublin, or Athens were to suffer a similar loss of service, 1 
seriously question how the integrity of the Single Market could be maintained. 
The traditional government help line (Stale Aids) does not function any more. 
The willingness of the Swiss and Belgian business communities to help re-
establish hub airlines in their home countries should not be regarded as exercises 
in questionable nationalism. They are the clearest possible expressions of the 
importance to a national economy of a locally-based airline. 
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Here's another expression of the importance of a vigorous airline industry: just 
days after the September I I * outrage, the US Government set up the Air 
Transport Stabilisation Board - its own 'Wise Men Committee' - armed not 
merely with words, but with funds. To be precise, five billion dollars in cash 
and ten billion dollars in loan guarantees and three billion for reinforced aviation 
security. A total of eighteen billion. By the way, five billion cash is the 
equivalent of two weeks of revenues systemwide for the US carriers. Eighteen 
billion equals fifty days. In Europe we talk about a compensation of four days 
for North Atlantic only, which equals half a percent of AEA carriers' yearly total 
revenue. 
Make no mistake, I am not complaining about the US: 1 think the US 
government does it right and we, in Europe, do it wrojig. In the US there is an 
administration that appreciates the need to keep its citizens flying. The political 
will demonstrated by the US is in total contrast to the grudging attitude of the 
Europeans, who reluctantly seem to have accepted that there is damage but are 
unwilling to accept the bare minimum of compensation. 
Take the insurance question: governments, i.e. their respective security agencies, 
did not do their job well because they could not prevent civil aircraft from being 
used by terrorists as powerful rocket projectiles. 
After the event, governments declared war. and, in Europe, turned to tlieir civil 
airlines with the sarcastic advice to see to it that they get a war risk insurance at 
market conditions. A war risk insurance at market conditions - what a bad joke! 
There is no market and no market conditions for insuring war. (Military is not 
insured either.) The behaviour of European governments is highly unfair and 
unjust and with such an attitude they will continue to weaken European airlines. 
Again, this is in sharp contrast with the support given by President Bush. The 
US government has taken over the third party liability for terrorism and war risks 
for 180 days. The war risk is where it belongs, namely with the US government. 
Airhnes, aliports and insurance companies can concentrate on their real business 
.... and this is difficult enough nowadays. 
One word on security! Each tragedy of major significance triggers off new 
security measures. In other words, we always learn from these sad events. 
Passenger screening and hand baggage search was introduced more than 20 years 
ago following the Mogadishu incident. 
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100% hold baggage screening was triggered off some ten years ago as a 
consequence of the Lockerbie disaster. It will come on stream in Europe in one 
to two years time. 
The September 11"* tragedy of 2001 will also leave its security marks which will 
stay with us for ever. However, these measures have long lead times and hasty 
political actions are not of great help. 
What we need now is to fight complaisance and properly apply existing rules! 
As a next step we need harmonisation of security standards, along with 
enforcement - a good new task for the EU. 
On Security, we should not mix up responsibilities. The main defence for 
airline security is on the ground. I call the ground the first line of defence" 
because there is also a second line of defence, namely on board the aircraft. 
'First line defence' should make 'second line defence" obsolete. We simply 
must prevent criminals reaching our aircraft. The responsibility for this is 
clearly with the States. The airlines' interest in this dossier is facilitation, 
procedures acceptable to their passengers. Both airlines and airports are 
convinced that the responsibility and the cost of security on the ground should be 
borne by the States. 
The second line of defence (hopefully not to be used at all) is on board the 
aircraft. The responsibility lies with aircraft manufacturers, aircraft operators 
and their crews and we are taking care of it. 
In the long run security measures need to be harmonised with the US (and the 
world at large). I am sure you are aware, there are remarkable differences in 
what is best practice between Europe and the US. 
In conclusion, I am questioning the theory that textbook economics be applied to 
a crisis which results from, or is at least exacerbated by criminals, terror and war. 
After the Gulf War, we recovered with the industry intact. We shall recover 
from this setback too, but the industry will not be intact. There will be gaps. 
Cities will lose networks. Local economies will be placed at a disadvantage vis-
a-vis their competitors. 
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And, of course, thousands of people will be out of work. Some will be re-hired 
when the market picks up again. Others will be less fortunate because theii-
employer has ceased to exist all because of a single act of terror which took 
place 5,000 kilometres away. 
Thank you for listening. 
For further information, please contact: 
Karl-Heinz Neumeister, Secretary General (+32 2} 639 89 79 
David Henderson, Manager Information (+32 2) 639 89 72 
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GENERAL VIEW OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT& THEIR AIRLINE POLICY 
Apart from the issue of the granting of licenses, KLM's relationship with its 
government has always been important due to their majority holding which their 
governments have held in share capital. Furthermore, the Netherlands, being a 
small state dependent on international trade, has always been a proponent of free 
trade and travel for many decades. As a corollary, the Dutch government 
maintains liberal policies towards foreign direct investment. The only Dutch 
sectors exempted from the application of the OECD Code of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements are air transport, maritime transport and banking and 
financial services. Apart from these exceptions, foreign firms are able to invest in 
any sector of the economy and are entitled under the law to equal treatment with 
domestic firms.^ 
With respect to airlines, the Dutch government was in favour of a relaxation of 
the ownership rules during the early 1990s. Together with other member states of 
the EC, it has therefore asked the European Commission to develop initiatives to 
that effect and to raise these within ICAO.' In addition, the Netherlands 
promoted the realisation of a so called Transatlantic Common Aviation Area, an 
'open skies' agreement between the EC as a whole and the US. It is expected that 
under such an agreement the US would allow airlines of EC member states to be 
substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of the EC (Pedler and 
Van Schendelen 1994). This would give the Community ownership and control 
provision in the EC licensing regulation full effect. According to the Dutch 
Minister of Transport, it would be interesting for KLM and for European aviation 
^ http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/country/netherls.htm and Netherlands Investment Climate 
Statement, U.S. Embassy The Hague, Economic Section, August 1999, 
http://www.usemb.nl/usduinv.htm. 
^ Letter by the Minister of Transport to parliament, 7 November 2001, Kamerstuk 21501 -09, no. 
136, p. 9. 
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in general to come to a European ownership and control.^ Mergers between 
European airlines would enhance their competitive competition vis-a-vis the 
United States and would, according to the Minister, thus prevent the US from 
dictating the market.^ 
Already in 1991, in its explanatory memorandum attached to the proposals for 
the three Regulations finalising the internal European aviation market, the 
European Commission stated that: 'It is, however, clear that the ownership 
limitations may hinder a normal business development in the interests of 
Community air carriers. It is, therefore, desirable to introduce a possibility to 
conclude more liberal agreements with third countries on a mutually beneficial 
basis, without prejudice to international c o m m i t m e n t s H o w e v e r , despite 
continued requests by the European Commission during the last decade, at the 
time of writing there is still no agreement among the EC Council of Transport 
Ministers to give the Commission a mandate to negotiate the exchange of traffic 
rights on behalf of the EC with third countries. The Netherlands is among the 
member states in favour of such a mandate. 
^ Council Regulation 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on Fares and Rates for Air Services, Official 
Journal (1992) L240/15. 
^ Minutes of a meeting between the Minister of Transport and the Parliamentary Committees on 
Transport and European affairs, 11 OciQber2QQ\,Kamerstuk2\50\-Q9,vio., 137. 
Completion of the civil aviation policy in the European Communities. Towards single market 
conditions, 18 September 1991, C0M(91) 275 final, p. 9. 
'' Idem. Letter by the Minister of Transport to parliament, 7 November 2001, Kamerstuk 21501-
09, no. 136, p. 9. 
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A P P E N D I X 12 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT& THEIR AIRLINE POLICY 
Lufthansa's rise to market power took place in a highly regulated business 
environment. As a consequence of the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and the 
dismantling of the German air force, civilian aviation remained the only way to 
maintain a German air fleet. The Federal Ministry of Transportation actively 
sponsored commercial aviation and bore the responsibility for mergers and 
realignments in the German airline industry. After the bankruptcy of Germany's 
main aircraft manufacturer, Junkers, in 1925, the government decided to combine 
the two major players under a new corporate name, Lufthansa (Lufthansa website 
2006). 
Since the 1920s, meticulous research reveals considerable governmental 
involvement in the highly regulated and heavily subsidised German aviation 
market during the interwar period (Fischer's 2003). Since then the main objective 
of the German government was not to create a friendly environment for healthy 
competition, but to establish one powerful national airline with sufficient means 
to stimulate research and development in aviation. High federal subsidies at this 
time were meant to foster an industry that would otherwise have been strangled 
by the high costs of aviation. Although a few Lufthansa shares were distributed 
to private shareholders, the government dominated Lufthansa's supervisory 
board and appointed all its senior managers between 1920 to 1950. Because of its 
position as the main provider of funds, the government exerted tight control over 
Lufthansa's schedules and, above all, over its fleet. Lufthansa was politically 
obliged to follow the army's recommendations regarding its fleet policy. The 
new Lufthansa aircraft served as prototypes for future bomber planes. Fischer 
points out convincingly that the relations between the German armed forces and 
Lufthansa cannot be interpreted simply as either a principal-agent problem or as 
evidence of the primacy of the military, but rather as a convergence of mutual 
interests. 
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Fischer (2003) analyses the evolution of German aviation policy and the 
interplay between federal and state transportation agencies in considerable detail. 
Because of its overarching interest in establishing an economically strong and 
technologically innovative airline in a nascent and highly vulnerable market, the 
German government was strictly opposed to allowing any real competitors to 
gain entry to the aviation field. Both the administrative elite and the academic 
advisors on transportation considered the prospect of competition between 
carriers as economically ruinous and technologically counterproductive, claiming 
that a monopoly in aviation was determined by technological and economic 
factors. A heated conflict between the Federal Ministry of Transportation and the 
state {Lander) governments of Bavaria and Saxony ended with the states being 
forced to accede to the federal position, which meant accepting that Lufthansa's 
demands overrode the transportation needs of the states. 
But German aviation policy was not unique among the major nations and 
therefore did not necessarily indicate militarisation of transportation or a general 
trend toward state capitalism. Despite its monopolistic tendencies and the strong 
links between military and civilian aviation, the high levels of subsidies were not 
exceptional, nor were they without international precedents. In the United States, 
for example, airlines would not have survived without the indirect subsidies of 
the Postal Service, which covered most of their operating expenses. Both the 
Ministry of Transportation and the Transportation Committee of the German 
Parliament (Reichstag) became increasingly critical of the waste and lack of 
accountability that characterised Lufthansa at the onset of the Great Depression. 
Although the company continued to depend on subsidies in the 1950s, there was 
growing evidence that its management was moving toward a more commercial 
orientation in the 1960s. From 1970 to the present the German government has 
always made it very clear that Lufthansa would fiinction like a commercial 
entity, moreover, it would no longer rely on government money to drive it 
forward (Fischer 2003). 
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A P P E N D I X 13 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT & THEIR AIRLINE POLICY 
Alitalia's rise to market power took place in a highly regulated business 
environment. Following the Second World War the Partito Socialista Italiano 
(PSI) and the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) joined coalition governments led 
by Alcide De Gasperi of the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) to run Italy. However, in 
1947, as relations between the West and the Soviet Union became fraught, the 
US and the Church intensified their opposition to the presence of the PCI in 
government. Consequently, the DC dissociated itself from the left, resulting in its 
exclusion from government. De Gasperi was determined that as Europe divided, 
Italy would be firmly in the western, US-led camp, and in the 1948 election the 
DC obtained an absolute majority in parliament (Economic intelligence unit, 
Italian political report, 2006). Indeed, from the interviews we found, De Gasperi 
wanted a national airline to be created, so he invested in creating Alitalia in 1946 
to follow other European Airlines after the Chicago convention. As a result, 
Alitalia got off the ground in 1946 as Alitalia Aerolinee Italiane Intemazionali, 
where the airline was 40%-owned by BEA (British European Airways, later part 
of British Airways) and 60%-owned by the Italian government. 
Between the 1950s and 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s, the loss 
making national airline, Alitalia, which is 65% state-owned, was hampered in its 
efforts to return to profitability by strong trade union resistance to restructuring. 
This change was evident when one of Italy's most prominent and richest 
businessmen, Silvio Berlusconi, unexpectedly entered the political arena before 
the March 1994 general election. In just two months support shifted in favour of 
his centre-right coalition, the Polo delle Liberta, subsequently renamed the Polo 
per le Liberta and later the Casa delle Liberta. At the end of 1997 Alitalia entered 
into an alliance with a Dutch carrier, KLM, but this deal collapsed in early 2000, 
when KLM withdrew from the partnership, after delays in privatising the Italian 
company and problems with the new airport at Malpensa outside Milan, which 
KLM and Alitalia had planned to use as a hub. However, in December 2000 the 
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European Commission approved the use the Malpensa airport as an international 
national hub, but Alitalia's problems have continued, and the company, which 
lost almost € l b n in 2004, came close to collapse in September 2004 (Economic 
intelligence unit 2006). 
A government-backed rescue envisages the creation of two new firms, AZFly, 
regrouping the profitable core activities of Alitalia, and AZService, regrouping 
other activities to be sold or liquidated, but this has not yet been fully 
implemented, as trade union resistance continued until as recently as January 
2006. In October 2004, the European low fares airline association, which 
comprises 11 airlines including Ryanair, challenged the legality of the 
restructuring in a letter to the European Commission, on the grounds that it 
constituted illegal state aid. In June 2005 the Commission approved the plan, 
providing that the government behaves as a private investor and does not provide 
state aid. 
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A P P E N D I X 14 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE SCANDANAVIAN GOVERNMENT'S & THEIR AIRLINE 
POLICY 
The Scandinavian region, especially the governments of Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, agreed to create SAS to bring the region closer together. More 
importantly, they agreed to create and merge the national airlines of Sweden 
(ABA), Norway (DNL), and Denmark (DDL) in 1946 to create SAS airline. 
These three governments still have some relationships with their airlines. Let us 
now look at the chronological play between the different governments, parties 
and SAS. 
Looking at the first element of the Scandinavian composite and more importantly 
SAS, in this case the element is "Denmark"; it can be seen that this country was 
nearly always governed by the centre-left Social Democrats (SD) during the 
1950s (Economic intelligence unit, Denmark political report 2006). The party 
supported the idea of bringing Scandinavia together and improving the region's 
transport system. This pattern was broken in 1982 with the election of a centre-
right administration. However, in 1993 the Social Democrats returned to power 
following the resignation of center-right Prime Minister Poul Schlueter over an 
immigration scandal. The Social Democrats' hold on power was reaffirmed by 
general election victories in 1994 and 1998. This was cut short in 2001 when the 
center-right coalition led by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen won the 
legislative elections, repeating the victory in 2005. Marking a drastic shift fi-om 
the 20th century political structure, the Social Democrats were very much for 
making SAS an important independent entity that would function without the aid 
of any Scandinavian government (Economic intelligence unit, Denmark political 
report 2006). 
The second element of the SAS composite is Norway; its labour party dominated 
Norwegian politics for the most part between 1930s to the early 1970s 
(Economic intelligence unit, Norway political report 2006). They held power 
fi-om 1935 to 1965, forming a coalition in exile during the Nazi occupation of 
Norway in 1940-45. It lost office for just one month in 1963, when Norway was 
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briefly ruled by a centre-right coalition, which returned to power in 1965-71. 
This labour party believed that SAS was an important way to bring all the 
Scandinavian countries closer together in order to enhance their competitive 
positions. However, the coalition resigned over the question of membership of 
the European Economic Community (EEC, now EU), and a minority labour 
administration was formed. Following the collapse of the centre-right 
government, Mrs Brundtland was appointed as Prime Minister for the third time 
in 1990 to 1994. Thereafter her predecessor took the helm. 
The final element of the SAS composite is Sweden. The Swedish political system 
is based on consensus among the major organised groups in society. It was 
evident that during the 1940s Sweden wanted to help create wealth in the 
Scandinavian region, therefore creating strong links with other countries in the 
region was seen as a good way to do this. Therefore, it helped to merge ABA 
(their flag carrier) with the other two country airlines to create SAS. Nonetheless, 
after achieving remarkable levels of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the decline of the Swedish economy had called into question the continued 
viability of Sweden's considerable welfare state (Economic intelligence unit, 
Sweden political report 2006). While the Swedish public were largely supportive 
of maintaining Sweden's high level of welfare provisions, the government had 
begun to address the high costs by introducing some reforms. Government action 
in this area was considered one of the reasons that the Social Democrats were 
punished at the polls in the 1998 parliamentary elections. 
Indeed, in the parliamentary elections of 21 September, 1998, the Social 
Democrats lost substantial support, winning 36.4 percent of the vote and 131 
seats. The Moderates won 82 seats, the Left Party won 43 seats, the Christian 
Democrats won 42 seats, the Center Party won 18 seats, the Liberals won 17 
seats, and the Greens won 16 seats. The Social Democrats formed another 
minority government after the election with the support of the former 
communists in the Left Party and the Greens. 
Sweden was scheduled to hold its next parliamentary elections by September 
2002. With regard to foreign policy, the election campaign centred on the 
advantages and disadvantages - both economic and pohtical - of Swedish 
membership in the EMU. In terms of transport pohcy, the strategy focused on 
making the transport system better and greener. Reform of the expensive 
Swedish welfare system figured highly on the domestic policy in 2005. 
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A P P E N D I X 15 
GENERAL VIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT & THEIR AIRLINE POLICY 
Portugal's Air transport network has always been deficient relative to its main 
European partners, despite the significant improvements made in the mid-1990s 
with the help of EU structural and cohesion funds. However, TAP Air in its 
infant years has always been plagued with problems and has historically always 
been supported by its governments and their transport policies. They still have a 
strong relationship to this day. Let us now look at the chronological play between 
government, parties and TAP from the 1930s to the present. 
In 1932, Mr Salazar became prime minister and established the so-called estado 
novo, a corporate state based on vague but generally rightist ideals. Politically, he 
wanted to preserve Portugal as a rural and religious society, where 
industrialisation, democracy and other modernising influences would be 
excluded (Economic Intelligence unit 2006). However, going against most of 
Salazar views, in 1945 the director of the Department of the Secretary of Civil 
Aeronautics created Portuguese Air Transport (TAP) after discussing the ideas 
with Mr Salazar. Portugal stayed out of the Second World War, but in the post-
war era the economy continued to fall short of its potential, and in the 1960s 
there was a massive wave of emigration (Dienel and Lyth 1998). By 1974 around 
one in five Portuguese citizens had emigrated elsewhere in Europe or the 
Americas. Portugal had become the poor relation of Europe, in contrast to its 
comparative affluence in the 1930s. The economy was further debilitated by the 
burden of fighting colonial wars. Portugal was the last large-scale colonial power 
in Africa, controlling Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Sissau on the mainland, 
as well as Sao Tome and Principe, and the Cape Verde islands. The maintenance 
of this colonial role helped to create an identity for Portugal, but the financial 
burden rose inexorably, and by 1974 almost one in five men of military age were 
in the armed forces (or engaged in related activities). 
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In 1968, Mr Salazar suffered a paralysing stroke and was succeeded by another 
academic, Marcelo Caetano. However, he and his aids wanted air transport to 
flourish in Portugal; therefore they created Lisbon airport and new facilities for 
TAP in 1971. The dictatorship ended in 1974 when a coup, supported by most of 
the Portuguese people, was mounted by army officers tired of war in Africa. The 
new forces in power were deeply divided about the future of the country. From 
1974 until mid-1975 there was a shift in power to the left, notably towards the 
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). Major sectors of the economy were 
nationalised (including banking, insurance, shipbuilding, air and road transport, 
cement and beer production), and the African colonies were granted 
independence. The left 's hold on power was broken in August 1975, when the 
Socialists and the Popular Democrats (now the Social Democratic Party, PSD) 
formed a new, more moderate government. 
The country's first two democratic governments were led by the moderate 
Socialist leader, Mario Soares, who confirmed Portugal's European orientation 
by applying to join the European Community (EC, now the EU). The centre right 
Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition, headed by the charismatic leader of the 
PSD, Francisco Sa Cameiro, achieved a parliamentary majority in the 1979 
election and increased its margin in the 1980 election. However, Mr Sa Cameiro 
was killed in an air crash later that year and his successor, Francisco Balsemao, 
was unable to steer the government in any clear direction. The PS re-emerged as 
the largest party in the general election in April 1983 and, with the economy 
deteriorating rapidly, a national coalition between the PS and PSD was formed, 
with Mr Soares as prime minister. An IMF austerity programme was agreed and 
implemented for 18 months, while negotiations over EC entry entered the final 
phase. 
In 1989, Portugal's long honeymoon period, following entry into the EU in 1986, 
came to an end and the economy fell into recession. However, the TAP group 
still received lots of money to buy a fleet of new airbuses. A general election in 
late 1995 and a presidential election in early 1996 marked the beginning of a new 
political era. In 1995 the PS was returned to government after ten years of PSD 
rule, and although it fell four seats short of an absolute majority, it was able to 
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form a fairly strong minority government under the leadership of Mr Guterres. In 
1996, meanwhile, Mr Soares stood down as president after serving two 
successive five-year terms, and was replaced by Mr Sampaio, the former 
Socialist mayor of Lisbon, who thwarted the presidential ambitions of Mr 
Cavaco Silva in that year's elections (Economic Intelligence unit 2006). 
Nevertheless, there were three international airports in continental Portugal by 
1997: Lisbon, Oporto and Faro. Guterres pushed for a fourth airport to be opened 
in Ota. However, the decision to delay the construction of a new international 
airport for Lisbon, was introduced due to financing issues in 2000. 
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-Personal letters 
-Meetings 
-Personal phone calls 
-Cocktail parties 
-Holding speeches 
-Using interest groups 
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2003-2004 2004-2005 
First Phase Goals to design the 
emerging policy issues: 
Second Phase Goals: Third phase goals: Third phase goals: 
-Compensation package 
-Aviation security issue 
-Insurance coverage issue 
' -Insurance coverage issue 
: -Monitor the political 
; landscape 
r-Developing new routes 
-Monitor the political 
landscape 
-Lobbying for "one sky" 
between USA and Europe 
-Compensation package issue 
First Phase cognitive blueprint: 
-Use current people with EU networks 
Second Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
Fourth Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
, Third Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
2001-2002 20002-2003 
Lobbying 
Capability 
Development 
and competencies to lobby 
-Use the current organisation of the 
department to accommodate the 
emerging policy environment 
-Leverage current in-house people and 
AEA to lobby targeted people. 
-Maintenance of contacts at EU and 
national level 
•Leverage current people to ] 
lobby targeted people. 
-Monitoring 
-Working out parameters 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national leve l 
-Using effective channels to 
influence decision-makers 
-Leverage current people to 
lobby targeted people. 
-Monitoring 
-Working out parameters 
-Maintenance of contacts at EU 
level and national level. 
-Using effective charmels to 
influence decision-makers 
-Monitoring 
-Find new issue to lobby 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national level. 
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Lobbying 
Capability 
development 
Lobbying 
Capability 
development " 
Rout ines used: 
-Formal visit 
-Personal letters 
-Meetings 
-Personal phone calls 
-Cocktail parties 
-Holding speeches 
-Using interest groups 
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2003-2004 2004-2005 
First Phase Goals to design the 
emerging policy issues: 
Second Phase Goals: Third phase goals: Third phase goals: 
-Compensation package 
-Aviation security issue 
-Insurance coverage issue 
-Insurance coverage issue 
-Monitor the political 
landscape 
-Developing new routes 
-Monitor the political 
landscape -Compensation package issue 
2001-2002 20002-2003 
Lobbying 
Capability 
Development 
First Phase cognitive blueprint: 
-Use current people with EU networks 
and competencies to lobby 
-Change the organisation of the 
department to accommodate the 
emerging poUcy environment 
-Leverage current people to lobby 
targeted people. 
-Use AEA to lobby EU level political 
targets. 
Second Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
-Leverage current people to 
lobby targeted people. 
-Use AEA to lobby specific 
people. 
-Working out parameters 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national level. ' 
Third Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
Use AEA to lobby specific 
people. 
-Monitoring 
-Using effective channels to 
influence decision-makers 
Fourth Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
-Monitoring 
-Find new issue to lobby 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national level. 
Lobbying 
Capability 
development 
Lobbying 
Capability 
development " 
Routines used: 
-Formal visit 
-Personal letters 
-Meetings 
-Personal phone calls 
-Cocktail parties 
-Holding speeches 
-Using interest groups 
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2001-2002 2003-2004 2004-2005 
First Phase Goals to design the 
emerging policy issues: 
Second Phase Goals: Third phase goals: Tlilrd phase goals: 
-Compensation package 
-Aviation security issue 
-Insurance coverage issue 
-Insurance coverage issue 
-Monitor the political 
landscape 
-Developing new routes 
-Monitor the political 
landscape 
-Lobbying for "one sky" 
between USA and Europe 
-Compensation package issue 
20002-2003 
Lobbying 
Capability 
Development 
First Phase cognitive blueprint: 
-Use current people witli EU networks 
and competencies to lobby 
-Use the current organisation of the 
department to accommodate the 
emerging policy environment 
-Leverage current people to lobby 
targeted people. 
-Maintenance of contacts at EU and 
national level 
Second Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
-Leverage current people to 
• lobby targeted people. 
-Monitoring 
-Working out parameters 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national level. 
-Using effective channels to 
influence decision-makers 
Third Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
-Leverage current people to 
lobby targeted people, 
-Monitoring 
-Woridng out parameters 
-Maintenance of contacts at EU 
level and national level. 
-Using effective channels to 
influence decision-makers 
Fourth Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
-Monitoring 
-Find new issue to lobby 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national level. 
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Lobbying 
Capability 
development " 
Routines used: 
-Formal visit 
-Personal letters 
-Meetings 
-Personal phone calls 
-Cocktail parties 
-Holding speeches 
-Using interest groups 
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2004-2005 2003-2004 2001-2002 20002-2003 
Lobbying 
Capability 
Development 
First Phase Goals to design the 
emerging policy issues: 
-Compensation package issue 
First Phase cognitive blueprint: 
-Use current people with EU networks 
and competencies to lobby 
-Change the organisation of the 
department to accommodate the 
emerging policy environment. 
-Leverage current people to lobby 
targeted people. 
-Use AEA to lobby EU level political 
targets. 
Second Phase Goals: 
-Compensation package 
-Aviation security issue 
-Insurance coverage issue 
Second Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
-Leverage current people to 
lobby tai^eted people. 
-Use AEA to lobby specific 
people. 
-Working out parameters 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national level. 
Third phase goals: 
-Insurance coverage issue 
-Monitor the political 
landscape 
-Developing new routes 
Third Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
Use AEA to lobby specific 
people. 
-Monitoring 
-Using effective channels to 
influence decision-makers 
Third phase goals: 
-Monitor the political 
landscape 
Fourth Phase cognitive 
blueprint: 
-Monitoring 
-Find new issue to lobby 
-Maintenance of contacts at 
EU level and national level. 
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Lobbying 
Capability 
development 
Lobbying 
Capability 
development 
Routines used: 
-Formal visit 
-Personal letters 
-Meetings 
-Personal phone calls 
-Cocktail parties 
-Holding speeches 
-Using interest groups 
